Gujarat High Court
Pravinbhai Bababhai Chauhan vs State Of on 10 July, 2013
Author: Akil Kureshi
Bench: Akil Kureshi
PRAVINBHAI BABABHAI CHAUHAN....Appellant(s)V/SSTATE OF GUJARAT....Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) R/CR.A/966/2008 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 966 of 2008 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.P.DHOLARIA ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ================================================================ PRAVINBHAI BABABHAI CHAUHAN....Appellant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT....Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR PRATIK B BAROT, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MR HL JANI, APP for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.P.DHOLARIA Date : 10/07/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI) The appellant-original accused has challenged the judgement dated 1.9.2007 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anand, under which he was convicted for offences under sections 302 and 498-A of the IPC. For offence under section 302, he has been sentenced to imprisonment for life. For offence under section 498-A, he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years. For both the offences, fine has also been imposed. Substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently.
Briefly stated, the prosecution version was as follows :
Deceased Alkaben was wife of accused. Their marriage had taken place barely four months before the date of the incident. The husband was suspicious about the character of the wife. He had forbidden her even to go to the well for collecting water. On 11.5.2006, when they were at home, the accused once again doubting the character of the wife, abused her, got angry, poured kerosene and set her on fire with a matchstick. The wife received serious burn injuries. She died on 16.5.2006 at about 9 O clock at night.
Dr. Shaikuddin Alihussain Adenwala PW-1, exh.6, was the medical officer at Khambhat at the relevant time. He deposed that Alkaben aged about 20 years was brought to the hospital at 9:25 at night. She had received burn injuries. The history was given by her relatives in which it was stated that because of the bursting of stove, she received the injuries. He had examined the patient and found that she had received 90% burn injuries.
In the cross examination, it was suggested that the history was given by the deceased herself to which he did not agree. In the certificate, exh.7, he had merely recorded Alleged H/O Burns by explosion of stove.
Dr. Kishorebhai Pramodbhai Desai PW2, exh.11, was the one who had carried out the postmortem of the deceased. He produced the postmortem report at exh.12. He had opined that the death was due to septicemia due to burns. He had noted that the girl had received 75% to 80% burn injuries.
Danabhai Harkhabhai, father of the deceased, PW-3 was examined at exh.15. He however, turned hostile and did not support the prosecution version that the deceased had given a dying declaration to this witness at S.G. Hospital, Vadodara. Like-wise, PW-4, exh.16, mother of the deceased also turned hostile. Ramanbhai Chaganbhai Chauhan PW-5, exh.17 was a relative of the accused. He was residing in the same neighbourhood. He also turned hostile and did not support the prosecution.
We may record that in view of above-noted witnesses turning hostile, entire prosecution case depended on multiple dying declarations given by the deceased and other circumstantial evidence to which we would refer to hereafter.
Under a Yadi dated 12.5.2006(exh.21), the Executive Magistrate, Vadodara, had proceeded to the hospital for recording the dying declaration of the deceased. Chavda Bhavaansinh, the Executive Magistrate PW-6, exh.19, in his deposition described the steps taken by him for recording the dying declaration. He had upon receipt of the instructions proceeded to the hospital. After inquiring with the doctor and the nurse about the location of Alkaben and whether she was conscious or not, he went to the cabin where Alkaben was kept. He instructed the relatives to leave the place and, thereafter, proceeded to record the dying declaration. He recorded such dying declaration between 5:40 to 6:07 in the morning hours.
In the cross examination, he denied that there were overwriting in the dying declaration.
In the dying declaration, exh.20, after preliminary questions, when she was asked as to what happened, she stated that she was burnt by her husband on the previous day at 7 O clock in the evening by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. She stated that the incident happened in the kitchen. She further stated that her husband every now and then under some pretext or the other, used to quarrel and tell her not to show her face. On the previous evening after taking up a fight, he poured kerosene from a can lying in the house and, thereafter, set her on fire with a matchstick. She clarified that the husband was suspicious. He had in fact forbidden her from going out even for filling up water. If she did go out, he would falsely doubt her and pick up fights. To a question whether there was any other member of the family present at that time, she answered in the negative. As to who saved her, she stated that when she shouted the neighbours came, covered her with mattress and poured water on her.
The FIR, exh.46, also contained the statement of deceased to the police in which in consonance with her dying declaration with the Executive Magistrate, she had stated that for about a month and half after the marriage she was treated well by the husband. Thereafter, since past a month and half or so, he had started doubting her and started picking up frequent quarrels. She was also prevented from fetching water from the well or going to the village pond for washing the clothes. Since the suspicion of the husband was totally baseless, she would suffer the ill-treatment silently. On 11.5.2006 at about 7 O clock in the evening, when her mother-in-law had gone out for some errand and she was cooking in the kitchen, the husband came and picked up a fight for having defied the instruction of not going to the well for fetching water and had started abusing her. When she told him not to use bad words, he got angry and excited. He picked up a plastic container filled with kerosene, poured it on her and set her on fire with a matchstick. Her clothes caught fire. She thereafter, ran out of the house and started screaming upon which her husband ran away. The people from the neighbourhood came and doused the fire. She was brought to the hospital at Khambhat by her husband s elder brother from where she was taken for further treatment at Karamsad Krishna hospital and, thereafter, at Vadodara.
Kholabhai Ichhabhai Chauhan PW-7, exh.22, was the panch witness to the panchnama of the scene of the incident. He stated that at the scene of the incident where the girl had got burnt, there was a stove lying in broken down condition. Kerosene and water had spilled. The panchnama exh.23 recorded that the room (the kitchen) had an earthen fire place for cooking (usually with the aid of wood or dried cow-dung). There was firewood and dried cow-dung stored in the corner. The panchas found kerosene mixed water and few articles like, burnt piece of cloth, burnt pieces of human skin which were recovered, sealed and sent for analysis. A matchbox was also recovered. It was smelling of kerosene. The panchnama recorded one stove in not working condition. It did not have wick.
Significantly, neither on the walls or on the place for keeping water-pot, there were any signs of any burning or smell of kerosene. The room was of the dimension of 10ft x 5ft.
Inquest panchnama, exh.26, showed the body of the deceased in a highly burnt condition all over the body.
Can of the kerosene allegedly used for commission of offence was discovered at the instance of the accused. The panch witness Dhirubha Jeetsinh Chavda PW-10, exh.30, produced such panchnama at exh.31 in which it was recorded that the accused had voluntarily led the police and the panch party to the discovery of the container which was taken out by him from an open space dividing the two buildings in which cow-dung cakes and firewood was stored. He took out the can and produced it. He also identified the can which was shown to him before the Court.
Atmaram Eknath Patil, PW-14, exh.42, had carried out part of the investigation. During the course of such investigation, he had recorded the statement of Alkaben on 12.5.2006, exh.43. In such statement also Alkaben had stated that on 11.5.2006 when her mother-in-law was away and she was alone with her husband Pravin, at about 7 O clock in the evening, the husband had picked up a quarrel suspecting her character, had got angry, poured kerosene and set her on fire.
The later investigation was carried out by Chauhan Bhupendrasinh Ranjitsinh PW-15, exh.45. He outlined the steps taken during the course of investigation. He stated that he had obtained endorsement of the doctor on the Yadi, exh.47, to the effect that the patient was conscious.
From the above evidence, it could be seen that the prosecution relied heavily on three dying declarations of the deceased namely, (1) recorded by the Executive Magistrate at exh.20, (2) the FIR (exh.46) recorded by the police as stated by the deceased and (3) the statement of the deceased (exh.43) recorded by the Investigating Officer. We would discuss the reliability of these dying declarations keeping in mind the attendant circumstances. Since PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 had turned hostile and not supported the prosecution about the dying declarations given to them by the deceased, we would not attach any importance to such factors.
The attendant circumstances referred to above would be the discovery of the can, allegedly used for commission of offence by the husband, at his instance, as also the panchnama of the scene of offence. Salient features of the place of incident being that it was a small room of the size of 10ft x 5ft and there was no evidence of any other articles or the walls or other furniture in the room catching fire or even getting blackened with the flames. This would be significant when we examine the defence theory of the lady having caught fire accidentally on bursting of the stove. This panchnama also in the same respect would be significant when though it records the presence of an old stove, it is referred to as out of use condition and not having any wick.
If we peruse the three dying declarations minutely they are totally consistent and absolutely reliable and dependable. The deceased had given specific account of the events of the evening. She was clear about the absence of mother-in-law when the incident took place. She had stated that the husband was suspicious about her character and was in the habit of picking up quarrels. She had been forbidden from going to the village well or the pond for filling up the water or washing clothes. On the date of the incident in the evening, he once again picked up a quarrel on this count, started abusing her, got angry, picked a can containing kerosene lying nearby, poured it on her and set her on fire. In all the three dying declarations, there are no material contradictions. On the genesis of the incident, on her husband s suspicious nature, on the point of his doubting her character and picking up frequent quarrels, on the date of the incident once again picking up quarrel on the same ground and on pouring kerosene and setting her on fire after abusing her, she was totally consistent.
We have absolutely no reason to discard such series of declarations made by the deceased before she died. In particular, the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, she has given full details howsoever in brief about the incident in question. Such dying declarations are corroborated by the discovery of kerosene can at the instance of the accused. He led the police party and the panch witness to the house and unearthed the can from an empty open space between two house used for storing firewood and cow-dung. The scene of the incident also found a puddle of kerosene mixed water, a matchbox, burnt piece of cloth and burnt human skin, all pointing to the unfortunate incident.
It is true that the Executive Magistrate did not obtain endorsement of the doctor that the deceased was conscious and coherent during the course of recording the dying declaration. This safeguard is neither mandated by law nor insisted upon the Courts as an invariable rule. If on the basis of evidence on record, it could be gathered that the deceased was conscious, was in the frame of mind to give coherent answers to the questions put to him or her, there would be no objection in relying upon such a dying declaration merely because the endorsement of the doctor was not obtained. In a recent decision in case of Ashabai and anr. v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2013 Supreme Court 341, it was observed as under :
It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of a declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. It is not in dispute that her statement relates to the cause of her death. In that event, it qualifies the criteria mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor it is required to be recorded only by a Magistrate. As a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of the imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assess independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variation in the other.
The defence counsel urged that this was a case of accidental death because of bursting of stove. Some questions were put to the prosecution witnesses by the defence. However, there is absolutely no evidence to accept such a suggestion. The panchnama as noted recorded presence of a stove in the kitchen. Neither the panch witness nor the panchnama referred to the stove as damaged by bursting. The panchnama recorded that the stove was not in a working condition and in fact did not have a wick at all. If that was so the theory of the stove having burst causing injury to the deceased is clearly falsified. The panchnama also did not record any evidence of burning of the objects or blackening of the walls or any other furniture in the kitchen catching fire. We may recall that kitchen was as small as 10ft x 5ft in dimension. If the stove had burst as suggested, besides the deceased catching fire, there had to be some evidence of this accident. Additionally, we also notice that the panchnama recorded presence of earthen cooking place and presence of firewood and cow-dung for such cooking. In fact, the deceased had also stated that when she was cooking on such earthen cooking place, the husband came and picked up a quarrel. To conclude this issue evidence on record unerringly points to the involvement of the deceased. The dying declarations were clear, consistent and reliable. The deceased specifically stated that her mother-in-law was not present at home confining the role of the husband alone.
Counsel for the appellant however, argued at length that this was a case of sudden and grave provocation and the offence would be one punishable under section 304 and not section 302 of the IPC. Section 299 of the IPC as is well known defines Culpable homicide as whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. Section 300 defines the term murder and provides inter-alia that except in the cases hereinafter accepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-......
Exception 1 of section 300 pertains to sudden and grave provocation and reads as under :
Exception
1.-When culpable homicide is not murder.-Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:-
First.-That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly.-That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.-That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation.-Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Exception-1 to section 300 codifies the principle that if homicide is committed in face of grave and sudden provocation emanating from the victim, the charge of murder by person for such grave and sudden provocation from the victim reduces the charge of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Few things immediately emerge. The requirements of exception-1 to section 300 are (1) provocation (2) that such provocation must be sudden and grave and (3) that same should emanate from the victim except when death of some other person than intended is caused by mistake or accident.
In case of Budhi Singh v. State of H.P. reported in 2013 Cri.L.J.962, the Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any principle of universal application. It was observed as under :
13.
The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any principle of universal application. This will always have to depend on the facts of a given case. While applying this principle, the primary obligation of the Court is to examine from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence if there was such grave and sudden provocation so as to reasonably conclude that it was possible to commit the offence of culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was not a culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence resulting from grave and sudden provocation would normally mean that a person placed in such circumstances could lose self-control but only temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of provocation. The provocation could be an act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of injury.
14. Another test that is applied more often than not is that the behaviour of the assailant was that of a reasonable person. A fine distinction has to be kept in mind between sudden and grave provocation resulting in sudden and temporary loss of self-control and the one which inspires an actual intention to kill. Such act should have been done during the continuation of the state of mind and the time for such person to kill and reasons to regain the dominion over the mind. Once there is pre-meditated act with the intention to kill, it will obviously fall beyond the scope of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
In case of Samual v. State of Karnataka reported in 1996 Cri. L.J. 1165, Division Bench of Karnataka High Court rejected the plea of sudden and grave provocation pursuant to a quarrel between husband and wife on the ground that repeated blows were given even after there was knocking on the door by the PW-3.
In case of Pasadi Veerabbayi v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1984 Cri. L.J. 440 Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh observed that the initial burden rests on the accused to prove the existence of circumstances to bring the case within the exceptions. The Court shall start with the initial presumption of the absence of such circumstances. It was observed that the standard of proof on the part of the accused is not so onerous as it would undoubtedly rest on the prosecution, namely, the general burden of proving the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused may discharge this burden by establishing a mere balance of probabilities in his favour with regard to the said circumstances. The onus is, therefore, on the accused to lift the initial burden placed by the Legislature under the latter part of Section 105 of the Evidence Act.
In case of Suresh Chand v. the State reported in 1972 Cri. L.J. 1416, Division Bench of Delhi High Court was examining the defence of sudden and grave provocation when due to sour relations the wife refused to go back to the husband upon which she was stabbed. In this context it was observed as under :
10. The learned counsel for the appellant next seeks to invoke Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC in favour of the appellant. In order to bring the appellant s case under Exception 4, it must be shown that the appellant acted without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Every one of the circumstances mentioned in Exception 4 must be proved and it is not sufficient if only some of these circumstances are proved.
The most famous case pertaining to sudden and grave provocation because of allegation of infidelity by wife was that of K.M.Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 605. It was observed as under :
85.
The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of "grave and sudden"
provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
86. Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will assume that he had momentarily lost his self-control. But if his version is true-for the purpose of this argument we shall accept that what he has said is true-it shows that he was only thinking of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation from Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self-control, but on the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of Ahuja and then to his flat, went straight to the bed-room of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1-30 P.M., when he left his house, and 4-20 P.M., when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed, and therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control, even if he had not regained it earlier. On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and calculated one. Even if any conversation took place between the accused and the deceased in the manner described by the accused-though we do not believe that-it does not affect the question, for the accused entered the bed-room of the deceased to shoot him. The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore, hold that the facts of the case do not attract the provisions of Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.
In the present case, what we have on the record is the version of the wife. She had stated to the effect that shortly after the marriage the husband had shown deep suspicion about her character and had restricted her movements. She was even prevented from leaving the house to fill the water or for washing the clothes. Husband would frequently pick up quarrels about her character. Once again when she was cooking on the evening in their house, the husband came, picked up a fight, got enraged, abused her, threw kerosene from a can lying handy and set her on fire. There is absolutely no evidence, no foundation, no basis for any provocation emanating from the wife. All the while she had accused the husband of wrongly doubting her character. There is nothing on record to suggest that there was any element of truth in such accusations. There is nothing to suggest that the wife had extramarital relations or was found with another man so as to even hurt the feelings of the husband. Mere one sided suspicion without any basis certainly would not give any cause to the husband to pick up a quarrel. For right reason or wrong, he did pick up the quarrel and set the young woman on fire. The fact that he poured kerosene on her and then set her on fire is firmly established. This act of the husband resulted into causing severe burn injuries to the lady to which she succumbed a few days later. The doctor opined that she had received nearly 80% to 90% burn injuries. The act of the husband was committed with a clear intention of causing death is an inescapable conclusion. In absence of any evidence to suggest provocation by wife leave even sudden or grave, there is absolutely no ground for us to accept such a contention. We reiterate, to fall within exception-1 of section 300, initial burden is on the accused to either lead evidence or to establish from the evidence on record that he falls within the exception. Such burden would not be as strict as cast on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt.
When the evidence on record only suggests that the husband suspected the character of the wife and put several restrictions on her movement, shortly after her marriage and on the date of incident after picking up quarrel set her on fire, in our opinion, there is no basis to believe that there was any provocation much-less sudden or grave provocation emanating from the deceased.
We may at this stage refer to and deal with the decisions cited by the counsel for the appellant.
Decision in case of Maniben v. State of Gujarat reported in (2009) 8 Supreme Court Cases 796, does not pertain to exception of sudden and grave provocation at all, but the case was taken under clause(4) of section 300 where the Court had recorded that it cannot be stated that appellant had an intention that his action would cause the death or such bodily injuries which was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death.
In case of Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat reported in (2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 312, in facts of the case, the Court believed that the accused had no premeditation to kill the deceased or cause any bodily harm or injury to the deceased and everything happened on the spur of the moment. The appellant must have lost self-control on some provocative utterances of the deceased. In the present case, there is no evidence of any provocative utterances by the deceased.
In case of Pundalik v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2010) 15 Supreme Court Cases 122, the Supreme Court converted the conviction from that under section 302 to section 304 Part I when it was found that even according to the prosecution there used to be frequent quarrels between the accused and his deceased wife. On the date of incident finding his wife in an inebriated condition, he got infuriated and in the heat of passion assaulted her. Once again such facts are missing in the present case.
In case of Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 491, what had come on record is that the accused and the deceased had quarreled late at night. They once again quarreled next morning pursuant to which accused inflicted two blows by wooden log on head of the deceased. It was in this background that conviction was converted from that under section 302 to section 304 Part I. Significantly this was not a case of sudden and grave provocation at all. But the case was taken under exception 4 of section 300.
In case of Ghapoo Yadav and others v. State of M.P. reported in (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 528, is pertinent for the difference between first and fourth exception to section 300. It was in this background observed as under :
10.
The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter.
Chinnathaman v. State represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2007) 14 Supreme Court Cases 690, was a case where finding that there was no premeditation or pre-plan to cause death by the accused and in the background of the accused nurturing a feeling that the deceased and his sister s son had facilitated elopement of his niece and thereby defamed the family and that the deceased though younger to the accused had advised him to behave properly, it was held that the same would amount to grave and sudden provocation. On the additional facts that the medical opinion did not suggest that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary nature to cause death and despite having sufficient opportunity to give further blows, accused had not done so and thus not acted in a cruel manner, the conviction was converted from that of section 302 to section 304 Part I of the IPC.
All the judgements cited above are clearly inapplicable in facts of the present case, particularly, when we find that there was no iota of evidence of any provocation much-less sudden or grave provocation by the deceased wife to the husband.
Before closing, we cannot help but observe that perhaps the time has come to recognise that the suspicion about infidelity of wife by the husband cannot be seen as a provocation to commit an act of violence on the wife. A suspicion or even some information about the character of the wife cannot be a license to violate her bodily or to endanger her life or safety.
In the result for the reasons recorded above, conviction and sentence of the appellant-original accused is confirmed. Appeal is dismissed.
R & P be transmitted back to the concerned trial Court.
(AKIL KURESHI, J.) (R.P.DHOLARIA,J.) raghu Page 24 of 24