Gujarat High Court
Anil @ Khodo Sajanbhai Keshvala vs State Of Gujarat on 24 November, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/SCR.A/15308/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/11/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 15308 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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ANIL @ KHODO SAJANBHAI KESHVALA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR KISHAN K NAYI(13080) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS JYOTI BHATT, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
Date : 24/11/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS)
1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Learned APP waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent-State.
2. The detenue herein namely Anil @ Khodo Sajanbhai Keshvala came to be preventively detained vide the detention detention order dated 06/11/2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Porbandar, as a 'dangerous person' as defined under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as 'the Act of 1985).
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3. By way of this petition through his mother, the detenue has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
4. This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.
5. Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued that there was no material available with the detention authority to indicate as to how the public health or public order or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner. Thus, in absence of any such material on record, the order of detention ought not have been passed. It is further submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned order is passed without application of mind and prima facie the order is passed mechanically.
5.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the impugned order was executed upon the petitioner and presently he is detained in the Surat Central Jail.
6. On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present petition contended that the detenue is habitual offender and his activities affected at the society at large. Hence, the Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of Porbandar and lastly prayed to dismiss the present petition.
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7. Having considered the facts as well as the submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law or not?
8. We have carefully gone through the order passed by the concerned authority. It appears that the order impugned was executed upon the petitioner and presently he is detained in Surat Central Jail. In the grounds of detention, reference of two criminal cases for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 221, 270, 296(B) and 351(3) of the BNS, 2023 and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act registered with Miyani Marine Police Station against the detenue from 10/12/2023 to 13/10/2025 is made out.
8.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of the detenue as a "dangerous person" affects adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order as explained under the provisions of the the Act of 1985. Undisputedly, in the aforesaid alleged offences, the detenue was granted bail by the concerned court.
9. Considering the impugned order, it appears that the provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1985 is referred by the concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to be reproduced. The same reads as under:
Page 3 of 6 Uploaded by PATEL ILA KANTIBHAI(HC00194) on Mon Nov 24 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Nov 24 21:44:01 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/15308/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/11/2025 undefined "(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of three successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter VIII or Chapter XVI (except section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376, 376A, 376B, 3376C, 376D, or 377) or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959;"
10. After consideration of the available material, we are of the considered view that on the basis of two cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be acting in a manner 'prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. In our considered opinion, the said offences do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. In this regard, we would like to refer the decision of the the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, wherein, the detention order was made on the basis of the registration of the two prohibition offences. The Apex Court after referring the case of Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10 held and observed that mere disturbance of law and order leading to detention order is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under preventive detention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer, which read thus:
"17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v.State of West Bengal, where the distinction between `law and order' and Page 4 of 6 Uploaded by PATEL ILA KANTIBHAI(HC00194) on Mon Nov 24 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Nov 24 21:44:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/15308/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/11/2025 undefined `public order' has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
10. "Does the expression `public order' take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act."
18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti- social activities of the petitioner adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger Page 5 of 6 Uploaded by PATEL ILA KANTIBHAI(HC00194) on Mon Nov 24 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Nov 24 21:44:01 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/15308/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/11/2025 undefined within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order We have carefully considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order. The order of detention cannot, therefore, be upheld."
11. For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered opinion that, the material on record are not sufficient for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either affected adversely or likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.
12. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order impugned dated 06/11/2025 passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(N.S.SANJAY GOWDA,J) (D. M. VYAS, J) ILA Page 6 of 6 Uploaded by PATEL ILA KANTIBHAI(HC00194) on Mon Nov 24 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Nov 24 21:44:01 IST 2025