Madhya Pradesh High Court
Hareram Cotton Industries Pvt. Ltd. ... vs Bank Of Baroda on 28 February, 2024
Author: Sheel Nagu
Bench: Sheel Nagu
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VINAY SARAF
ON THE 28th OF FEBRUARY, 2024
M.P. No.917 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
1. HARERAM COTTON INDUSTRIES PVT.
LTD. THROUGH THE DIRECTOR SMT.
SHARDA RAMDAS HIRODE W/O LATE
RAMDAS HIRODE, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
R/O GANESH WARD NO.17, SHARDA
MARKET, PANDHURNA (M.P.).
2. RAMDAS HIRODE THROUGH HIS LEGAL
HEIRS, LUV KUMAR RAMDAS HIRODE S/O
LATE RAMDAS HIRODE, AGED ABOUT 30
YEARS, R/O GANESH WARD NO.17,
SHARDA MARKET, PANDHURNA (M.P.)
3. SMT. SHARDA RAMDAS HIRODE W/O LATE
RAMDAS HIRODE, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
R/O GANESH WARD NO.17, SHARDA
MARKET, PANDHURNA (M.P.)
.....PETITIONERS
(BY SHRI RAUNAK YADAV - ADVOCATE)
AND
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1. BANK OF BARODA CORPORATE OFFICE,
BARODA CORPORATE CENTER, PLOT
NO.C-26, G-BLOCK, BANDRA KURLA
COMPLEX, BANDRA (EAST), MUMBAI
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER.
2. AUTHORIZED OFFICER, BANK OF
BARODA, THAKURDWAR BRANCH, NANA
SHANKARASETH SMRUTI, JSS ROAD,
CHIRABAZAR BUS STOP, MUMBAI.
3. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, OFFICE OF THE
DISTRICT COLLECTOR AND
MAGISTRATE, CHHINDWARA,
DISTRICT- CHHINDWARA.
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY RESPONDENTS NO.1 & 2 - SHRI ALOK
TIWARI, BY RESPONDENT NO.3- SHRI AMIT
KUMAR SHARMA - GOVERNMENT
ADVOCATE)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This petition coming on for admission this day, Hon'ble Shri
Justice SHEEL NAGU passed the following:
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution primarily assails order dated 24.08.2023 contained in Annexure P/3 by which Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur dismissed S.A. No.669/2019 preferred by petitioners (borrowers) on the ground of having been filed u/S 17(1) of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity "SARFAESI Act") beyond the period of 45 days.
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2. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard on the question of admission.
3. Learned counsel for petitioners at the very outset relying upon recent decision of Coordinate Bench of this Court in Aniruddh Singh vs. Authorized Officer, ICICI Bank Ltd. dated 03.01.2024 passed in M.P. No.5324/2023, submits that the issue herein is no more res integra in view of finding rendered in the said case Aniruddh Singh (supra) which for ready reference and convenience is reproduced herein as under:
"8. Now applying the aforesaid principle of law to the fact situation attending the present case, it is obvious from plain reading of SARFAESI Act that while prescribing the period of 45 days for filing an application u/S.17(1) this special Act does not expressly bar the application of Section 5 of Limitation Act.
8.1 Consequent upon the above discussion, it is obvious that provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply with full force and are available for making a prayer for condonation of delay before the DRT in applications u/S.17(1) which are filed after expiry of 45 days.
9. This Court is bolstered in its aforesaid view by the decision of Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal vs. Bank of India and Others [(2016) 1 SCC 444], relevant extract of which is reproduced below:-
"14. We have already held that the power of condonation of delay was expressly applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act and to that extent, the provisions of the Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated under the special statutes in question, Section 29(2) stands impliedly excluded. To this extent, we differ with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as the Madras and Bombay High Courts. We are also in agreement with the principle that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be impliedly inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does
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not apply, as laid down by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. [(2008) 7 SCC 169] and M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE [(2015) 7 SCC 58].
15. As a result of the above discussion, the question is answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an appeal under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills (P) Ltd. Case [AIR 2011 MP 205] is overruled."
10. In conspectus of above discussion, it is held that benefit of the provisions from Section 4 to Section 24 (both inclusive) of Limitation Act is available to the causes raised u/S.17(1) before DRT.
11. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed to the following extent:
(i) Impugned order of DRT dated 02.09.2023 passed in S.A. No.806/2022 is set aside.
(ii) DRT is now expected to proceed to consider and decide the application for condonation of delay filed by petitioner along with S.A. No.806/2022.
(iii) Interim order passed by this Court on 14.09.2023 shall continue till the Tribunal decides the application for condonation of delay whereafter decision of the Tribunal shall prevail.
12. This Court hastens to add that no comment herein is made as regards the tenability of claim for condonation of delay in preferring S.A. No.806/2022, which is left for the Tribunal to go into."
3.1 No doubt, Coordinate Bench of this Court took the aforesaid view, but in another case, the said decision in Aniruddh Singh (supra) was doubted which is evident from order dated 19.02.2024 passed in W.P. No.23638/2023 [Atindra Contrainter Pvt. Ltd. (Erstwhile) Atindra Foodstuff Ltd. (Present Co.) Vs. Punjab National Bank
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(Erstwhile Oriental Bank of Commerce) and others] which is reproduced below for ready reference:
"Instant case was heard and reserved on 25.01.2024 for passing final order.
2. The gamut of arguments extended and heard centered around the question as to whether benefit u/S 5 of the Limitation Act can be availed before Debt Recovery Tribunal for condonation of delay in preferring an application u/S 17 of SARFAESI Act.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 03.01.2024 rendered in MP No.5324/2023 (Aniruddh Singh vs. Authorised Officer, ICICI Bank Ltd.) in which one of us (Sheel Nagu, J.) was a Member, whereby it was held that on the anvil of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, the benefit flowing out of Section 5 of Limitation Act is available to be availed in an application u/S 17 of the SARFAESI Act filed after expiry of 45 days.
4. After considering arguments of learned counsel for rival parties and having gone through various decisions cited, this Court is of the considered view that the authoritative decisions of Apex Court in the case of 2008 (7) SCC 169 (Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others) and 2015 (7) SCC 58 (M.P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise), on the point of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to an application u/S 17 of SARFAESI Act, missed the attention of Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Aniruddh Singh (supra).
4.1 Moreover, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 1361 (Akshat Commercial Pvt. Ltd. And another vs. Kalpana Chakraborty and others), has also taken a view contrary to Aniruddh Singh (supra).
5. Consequently, for rendering justice, it would be appropriate to hear this matter again.
6. Accordingly, matter stands released for rehearing to be listed as early as possible."
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4. The cause for doubting the precedential value of decision in Aniruddh Singh (supra) was that the Coordinate Bench of this Court while deciding the case of Aniruddh Singh (supra) failed to consider the earlier contrary view taken by Apex Court and Division Benches of High Court i.e. 2008 (7) SCC 169 (Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others) and 2015 (7) SCC 58 (M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise) and also Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 1361 (Akshat Commercial Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. Kalpana Chakraborty and others).
4.1 As such, the precedential value of Aniruddh Singh (supra) is under cloud since the same was rendered prima facie per incurium the earlier decision of Apex court in the case of 2008 (7) SCC 169 (Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others) and 2015 (7) SCC 58 (M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise).
5. The challenge herein is to the final order passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur dismissing S.A. No.669/2019 as time barred. Such an order is appealable u/S 18 of SARFAESI Act before Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad (DRAT for brevity) which remedy has not been availed by petitioners.
5.1 The contention of learned counsel for petitioners is that the question raised herein is purely legal with no involvement of disputed questions of fact and therefore can be gone into while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
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5.2 The aforesaid contention of learned counsel for petitioner does not impress this Court since a more efficacious, alternative statutory remedy of preferring an appeal to appellate forum is available but the same has not been availed. In an appeal u/S 18 of SARFAESI Act, legal as well as factual disputes can very well be raised and considered.
5.3 SARFAESI Act is a special enactment promulgated to ensure speedy recovery of bad debts which are categorised as Non Performance Assets (NPA). This special Statute relates to the field of economics and was enacted to reduce the burden of NPAs over various banks which had assumed monstrous proportions in the past. The SARFAESI Act not only provides for a procedure for expeditious recovery of bad debts but also lays down the forums which are manned by experts in the field to adjudicate the grievances of various stakeholders. As such when the special Statute relating to the field of economics is a complete Code in itself, entertainment of a petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution ought to be eschewed. The Apex Court has repeatedly come down heavily on the High Courts for interfering by exercise of power of judicial review in matters relating to SARFAESI Act, which is evident from various judicial pronouncements by Apex Court, relevant extracts are reproduced below:
United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110
43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of
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banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.
State Bank of Travancore Vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases
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falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603, as follows: (SCC p. 611, para 15) "15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case [AIR 1964 SC 1419], Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation"
8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sarfaesi Act states that the banking and financial sector in the country was felt not to have a level playing field in comparison to other participants in the financial markets in the world. The financial institutions in India did not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. The existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimhan Committee I and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without court intervention which would enable them to realise long-term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the DRT Act") with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular courts affecting expeditious
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adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order.
9. Even prior to the Sarfaesi Act, considering the alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan [Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569] that: (SCC p. 570, para 6) "6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act."
15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the taxpayer's expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260], has also not been
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kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: (SCC pp. 123-24, para 46) "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556], Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order."
Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. Vs. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345
18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution -- ARC -- the appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under the Sarfaesi Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as
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performing a public function which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the Sarfaesi Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the Sarfaesi Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585] and Ramesh Ahluwalia [Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 :
(2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 45 : 4 SCEC 715] relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance to the borrowers.
21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the court. The writ petitions have been filed against the proposed action to be taken under Section 13(4). As observed hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 13-8-2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of appeal under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. Even the impugned orders passed by the High Court directing to maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the secured properties on payment of Rs 1 crore only (in all Rs 3 crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are to the extent of approximately Rs 117 crores. The ad interim relief has been continued since 2015 and the secured creditor is deprived of proceeding further with the action under the Sarfaesi Act. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex parte ad interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of the secured creditor/assignor. Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings before the High Court deserve to be dismissed."
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Varimadugu Obi Reddy Vs. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC 168 "36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act, 2002, but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal, the respondent borrowers approached the High Court by filing the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. We deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ application by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy available under the law. This circuitous route appears to have been adopted to avoid the condition of pre-deposit contemplated under 2nd proviso to Section 18 of the 2002 Act."
South Indian Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Naveen Mathew Philip and Another (2023) SCC Online SC 435
18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal."
G.Vikram Kumar Vs. State Bank of Hyderabad and Others (2023) SCC Online SC 549 "21. ......It is required to be noted that against any steps taken by the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act the aggrieved party has a remedy under the SARFAESI Act by way of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to approach the DRT. Therefore, in view of the availability of the alternative statutory remedy available by way of proceedings/ appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in which the e-auction notice was under challenge. Therefore, the High Court has committed a very serious error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India......"
6. From the aforesaid facts, circumstances and the law laid down by Apex Court, it is luminous that this Court ought not to interfere in the
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impugned order passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur dated 24.08.2023 dismissing S.A. No.669/2019 as time barred.
6.1 Another reason for this Court to refrain from interfering on merits and pronounce a judgment as to the applicability of Limitation Act including Section 5 to an application u/S 17(1) of SARFAESI Act, is the pendency of the case of K.J. George and Another Vs. The Authorized Officer, Indian Bank and Others pending before Apex Court in shape of SLA (C) No.4754/2021 where while dealing with similar question, Apex Court had passed following interlocutory order on 26.03.2021:-
"Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the principle underlying the decision in C.A. No.5924 of 2015 titled as "Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal Vs. Bank of India & Ors." reported in (2016) 1 SCC 444 dealing with Section 18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), must also apply to the dispensation provisioned in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act being similarly worded.
Issue notice, returnable within four weeks.
Dasti, in addition, is permitted."
The website of Apex Court indicates that the said case of K.J. George (supra) is tentatively listed on 22.03.2024.
6.2 In this view of the matter, when Apex Court is ceased of the same question of applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act to an application u/S 17 of SARFAESI Act, it would be appropriate for this Court to await the verdict of Apex Court and leave it to Appellate Court (DRAT) to deal with the matter in accordance with the prevailing legal position.
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7. It is needless to emphasize that petitioners are always free to avail the remedy of appeal in accordance with Section 18 of SARFAESI Act before the DRAT which if availed within a period of 30 days from today alongwith copy of this order, the same shall be entertained and decided without being dismissed on limitation alone provided other provisions of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act law are complied with.
8. Petition stands dismissed with the aforesaid liberty.
(SHEEL NAGU) (VINAY SARAF)
JUDGE JUDGE
YS
Digitally signed by YOGESH KUMAR SHRIVASTAVA
Date: 2024.03.06 15:29:47 +05'30'