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[Cites 14, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Sandeep Das Gupta vs Mukul Khampariya on 10 April, 2026

         NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032




                                                                1                             MCRC-33877-2023
                              IN        THE    HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                     AT JABALPUR
                                                           BEFORE
                                              HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. SHARMA
                                                    ON THE 10th OF APRIL, 2026
                                              MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 33877 of 2023
                                               SANDEEP DAS GUPTA AND OTHERS
                                                           Versus
                                                    MUKUL KHAMPARIYA
                           Appearance:
                              Shri K.S. Jha - Advocate for petitioner.
                              Shri Shreyas Dharmadhikari-Advocate with Shri Teerthesh Bhartiya- Advocate for
                           respondent.
                                                                    WITH
                                              MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 39466 of 2022
                                               SANDEEP DAS GUPTA AND OTHERS
                                                           Versus
                                                NITYA NIRANJAN KHAMPARIYA
                           Appearance:
                              Shri K.S. Jha -Advocate for petitioner.
                              Shri Arpan Pawar- Advocate with Shri Akshat Arjaria- Advocate for respondent.

                                                                    ORDER

The facts and question of law involved herein are similar however, in order to effectively address the issues involved in the said petitions, the facts relevant for adjudication are being culled out and taken from M.Cr.C No. 33877/23.

2. The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been instituted by the applicants invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashment of Complaint Case No. Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 2 MCRC-33877-2023 UNCR/2151/2020 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, instituted under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, along with challenge to the order dated 27.10.2022 whereby the learned Magistrate has allowed an application for amendment of the complaint permitting impleadment of the company, namely Eurasian Minerals & Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., as an accused, and further seeking quashment of summons and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, as is evident from the petition filed before this Court.

3. The factual matrix, reveals that the dispute between the parties is rooted in a long-standing commercial relationship which originated from a partnership arrangement constituted vide partnership deed dated 06.07.2010 executed between Eurasian Minerals & Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Nitya Niranjan Khampariya, whereby a partnership firm under the name and style "M/s Eurasian Gandhigram Sihora" was established for the purposes of mining, exploration, extraction and trading of minerals from the mining lease situated at Village Gandhigram, Tehsil Sihora, District Jabalpur . In furtherance of the said arrangement, an extraction agreement dated 07.07.2010 was also executed between Mukul Khampariya and the partnership firm regulating the extraction of minerals from the leased area, thereby forming the substratum of the commercial dealings between the parties. It further transpires that disputes arose between the parties in relation to financial transactions, including allegations of overdrawn capital, non- settlement of accounts, and liabilities arising out of the partnership business, which is evident from the demand notice dated 18.03.2019 wherein a sum Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 3 MCRC-33877-2023 exceeding Rs.1.41 crores was claimed as recoverable from the respondent's side towards overdrawn balance in the capital account. The dispute subsequently escalated into arbitration proceedings, as reflected from the notice of invocation dated 03.04.2020 and the order passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court appointing a Sole Arbitrator, thereby indicating that the dispute has substantial civil and contractual dimensions, further corroborated by the statement of claim filed before the learned Arbitrator.

4. M.Cr.C No. 39466/22 has been instituted under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, calls upon this Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction for quashment of Complaint Case No. 993/2021 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, arising out of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petition raises questions of considerable legal significance touching upon the mandatory nature of statutory notice, the indispensability of arraigning the company or firm as an accused in prosecutions involving vicarious liability, and the permissibility of curing foundational defects by way of amendment.

5. The facts of the case, discloses that the respondent/complainant initiated criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging dishonour of a cheque bearing No. 000713 dated 25.06.2020 for a sum of Rs. 36,97,711/-, which is stated to have been issued in the course of business transactions arising out of the partnership firm styled as "M/s Eurasian Gandhigram Sihora" . The complaint, as originally instituted, was directed against the present applicants, who are stated to be associated with the affairs of the said firm or company, either in the capacity Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 4 MCRC-33877-2023 of directors or persons in charge of and responsible for its business.

6. A careful perusal of the material placed on record reveals a crucial and determinative aspect, namely that the company/firm, which is the drawer of the cheque in question, was not arrayed as an accused at the time of institution of the complaint. It is further borne out that the statutory demand notice contemplated under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act was not issued to the company/firm but only to the individual applicants.

7. It is also not in dispute that during the pendency of the proceedings, the complainant moved an application before the trial court seeking amendment of the complaint so as to implead the company/firm as an accused. The said application, however, remains pending adjudication.

8. Parallel to the aforesaid proceedings, the respondent initiated criminal prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging dishonour of cheque issued in the course of such transactions. The complaint was filed against the present applicants, who are stated to be directors/authorized signatories of the company. It is an admitted position that at the time of filing of the complaint, the company, which is the drawer of the cheque, was not arrayed as an accused. It further emerges from the record that the statutory demand notice dated 08.09.2020 was issued to the directors/authorized persons, though reference to the company appears in the address portion, but not in the strict legal sense as a notice to the drawer entity itself.

9. Subsequently, during the pendency of proceedings, the complainant moved an application before the trial Court seeking amendment Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 5 MCRC-33877-2023 of the complaint for impleading the company as an accused, which application came to be allowed by the learned Magistrate vide order dated 27.10.2022, primarily on the reasoning that the presence of the company was necessary for proper adjudication of the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The legality and correctness of the said order, as well as the continuation of proceedings, form the subject matter of challenge in the present petition.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has advanced detailed and forceful submissions contending that the entire prosecution is vitiated at its inception and is liable to be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It is submitted that the cheque in question was issued on behalf of the company and not in the personal capacity of the applicants, which fact stands admitted from the complaint itself as well as from the pleadings in the present petition, and therefore the company is the principal offender and its arraignment at the initial stage is a sine qua non for maintainability of proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is further contended that in absence of the company being made an accused at the inception, the prosecution against the directors alone is legally unsustainable.

11. It is further argued that the statutory demand notice, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 138, was not issued to the company as the drawer of the cheque, but only to the directors, and therefore the essential pre-condition for initiation of prosecution has not been fulfilled. Learned counsel submits that such defect is not procedural but goes to the root of Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 6 MCRC-33877-2023 jurisdiction and renders the complaint non-maintainable ab initio. It is contended that the subsequent amendment permitted by the trial Court cannot cure this foundational defect, as criminal liability cannot be imposed by way of post facto amendment after expiry of statutory period.

12. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 5 SCC 661, Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P and Anr. (2022) SCC Online SC 1598, Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609 and P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd (2021) 6 SCC 258.

13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent, placing heavy reliance upon the reply filed before this Court, has opposed the petition by contending that the petitioners have approached this Court with a narrow and hyper-technical interpretation of the law, ignoring the substantive facts and circumstances of the case. It is submitted that the complaint, when read as a whole, clearly discloses that the cheque was issued on behalf of the company and that the applicants were acting as its authorized signatories, and therefore the role of the company is embedded in the complaint itself and was never absent in substance.

14. It is further submitted that the objection regarding non-issuance of notice to the company and its non-impleadment at the initial stage was specifically raised before the trial Court and was duly considered, and thereafter the learned Magistrate, upon appreciating the nature of the transaction and the necessity of proper adjudication, has allowed the Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 7 MCRC-33877-2023 amendment application permitting impleadment of the company. It is argued that the amendment does not introduce a new cause of action but merely corrects an omission and brings on record a necessary party whose involvement was always evident.

15. Learned counsel has also contended that the statutory notice cannot be construed in a hyper-technical manner, and that the notice issued to the directors at the address of the company sufficiently brought the demand to the knowledge of the company and its officers, thereby satisfying the object of Section 138. It is further submitted that the dispute arises out of admitted commercial transactions, including partnership arrangements, extraction agreements, and financial dealings, and the petitioners are attempting to avoid criminal liability by raising technical objections.

16. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the recent authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekaran & Anr., (2025) 10 SCC 96 , to contend that the scheme of Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act must be construed in a manner that advances the object of the statute while ensuring that technical defects do not defeat substantive justice. It is submitted that in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the concept of vicarious liability in cheque dishonour cases, particularly in the context of partnership firms and corporate entities, and has clarified that while the company or firm is to be treated as the principal offender, the role of persons in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business cannot be viewed in isolation or in Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 8 MCRC-33877-2023 a hyper-technical manner divorced from the factual matrix of the case. Learned counsel submits that the Supreme Court has emphasized that the provisions of Section 141 create a legal fiction whereby liability is extended to those who are in control of the affairs of the company, and that procedural lapses relating to description or impleadment of the company, particularly where the role of the company is otherwise evident from the complaint, ought not to be treated as fatal so as to defeat the prosecution at the threshold. It is thus urged that in the present case, where the complaint itself clearly discloses that the cheque was issued on behalf of the company and the applicants were acting as its authorized signatories, the subsequent impleadment of the company by way of amendment, as permitted by the learned trial Court, is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the ground of initial non-impleadment or alleged technical deficiency in notice, particularly when such issues are capable of being adjudicated during the course of trial.

17. The objections raised by the applicants are matters of defence and does not warrant exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage. It is thus urged that the defect, if any, does not render the complaint non est and the same is a matter for adjudication during trial, and that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be invoked to stifle a legitimate prosecution at the threshold.

18. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

19. There are certain points for consideration before this Court for Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 9 MCRC-33877-2023 adjudication of the dispute between the parties. Firstly, whether the Company can be impleaded by amendment in case under Section 138 of NI Act? Secondly, whether legal notice sent to the Director can be treated as legal notice to the Company? Thirdly, whether the Company can be impleaded by amendment in case under Section 138 of NI Act prior to taking cognizance despite the fact that legal notice has not been issued to the Company but, issued to the Director?

20. The aforesaid aspect is no more res integra and has been finally decided by a three-Judge of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) and the said decision was subsequently followed in the case of Charanjit Pal Jindal vs L.N. Metalics reported in (2015) 15 SCC 768 . And, recently Hon'ble Supreme Court has again considered the similar issue in the case of Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy 2006 SCC OnLine Kar 880 held as under :

4. The appellant submitted that the cheque was issued by a Director of Lakshmi Cement and Ceramics Industries Ltd., a public limited company. In other words, the cheque was not issued by the signatory in his personal capacity. Hence, it was urged that the complaint ought to have been instituted against the company and its Directors and not against the appellant.
5. The High Court by its order dated 24-1-2006 [Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy, 2006 SCC OnLine Kar 880] dismissed the petition.

The High Court rejected the submissions urged on behalf of the appellant on the ground that the complainant had pleaded ignorance about the existence of the company. Moreover, in the view of the High Court, it would not be difficult for the complainant to take steps to proceed against the company as well as against other persons who are responsible for the affairs of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 10 MCRC-33877-2023 company.

6. The judgment of the High Court has been questioned on two grounds. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that firstly, the appellant could not be prosecuted without the company being named as an accused.

The cheque was issued by the company and was signed by the appellant as its Director. Secondly, it was urged that the observation of the High Court that the company can now be proceeded against in the complaint is misconceived. The learned counsel submitted that the offence under Section 138 is complete only upon the issuance of a notice of demand and the failure of payment within the prescribed period. In absence of compliance with the requirements of Section 138, it is asserted, the direction of the High Court that the company could be impleaded/arraigned at this stage is erroneous.

7. The first submission on behalf of the appellant is no longer res integra. A decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. (2012) 5 SCC 661 governs the area of dispute. The issue which fell for consideration was whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without the company being arraigned as an accused. The three-Judge Bench held thus : (SCC p. 688, para 58) "58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the company" appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 11 MCRC-33877-2023 proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted."

In similar terms, the Court further held : (SCC p. 688, para 59)

59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag- net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself."

8. The judgment of the three-Judge Bench has since been followed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics. There is merit in the second submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant as well. The proviso to Section 138 contains the preconditions which must be fulfilled before an offence under the provision is made out. These conditions are : (i) presentation of the cheque to the bank within six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (ii) a demand being made in writing by the payee or holder in due course by the issuance of a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank of the return of the cheques; and (iii) the failure of the drawer to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.

9. In MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, this Court held thus :

"12. The proviso to Section 138, however, is all important and stipulates three distinct conditions precedent, which must be satisfied before the dishonour of a cheque can constitute an offence and become Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 12 MCRC-33877-2023 punishable. The first condition is that the cheque ought to have been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The second condition is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, ought to make a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition is that the 15 drawer of such a cheque should have failed to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. It is only upon the satisfaction of all the three conditions mentioned above and enumerated under the proviso to Section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof that an offence under Section 138 can be said to have been committed by the person issuing the cheque."

10. The importance of fulfilling these conditions has been adverted to in a recent judgment of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas. Adverting to the ingredients of Section 138, the Court observed as follows:

"26. ... Obviously such complaints must contain the factual allegations constituting each of the ingredients of the offence under Section 138. Those ingredients are : (1) that a person drew a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker; (2) that such a cheque when presented to the bank is returned by the bank unpaid; (3) that such a cheque was presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (4) that the payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the cheque the payment of the amount of money due under the cheque to payee; and (5) such a notice of payment is made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid."

11. In the present case, the record before the Court indicates that Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 13 MCRC-33877-2023 the cheque was drawn by the appellant for Lakshmi Cement and Ceramics Industries Ltd., as its Director. A notice of demand was served only on the appellant. The complaint was lodged only against the appellant without arraigning the company as an accused.

12. The provisions of Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished.

13. In the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused."

21. From a perusal thereof, it is apparently clear that if the cheque has been issued on behalf of a company by its Director then the Company is required to be made a party to the proceedings, failing which the complaint itself will not be maintainable.

22. It is not in dispute and the admitted fact that the cheque in question has been issued by the petitioners in the capacity of a Director of the Company which can very well be seen from the pleadings of the parties and cause-title of the complainant. The petitioners has been shown as an accused as Director/Signatory of the Company. The law on the subject is settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) which was Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 14 MCRC-33877-2023 recently followed in Himanshu (supra) that a Company subsequently cannot be arraigned as an accused in proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act, since there was no demand notice against the Company and pre-conditions under Section 138 of NI Act were not met. Consequently, in the absence of Company being arraigned as an accused, prosecution of others is not maintainable. Relying on the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pawan Kumar Goel(supra) concreted the position that no amendment for impleadment is permissible, if the limitation period under Section 142 of the NI Act has expired.

23. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court has also, in its recent judgements in Harikisan Vithaldasji Chandak v. Syed Mazaruddin Syed Shabuddin, through his Lrs (2023 SCC OnLine Bom 955) and Srushti Developers, through Partner Shri Girish v. Ramesh and ors. (2023 SCC OnLine Bom 958), categorically rejected the applications for amendment seeking to implead the company as an accused u/S 138 of the NIA complaint. The Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold that, considering the mandatory provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and its scheme, a defect of this kind cannot be rectified subsequently by amending the complaint by adding the company or firm as an accused, and that the grant of such an amendment would be completely against the law. Furthermore, it held that such a legal flaw in the complaint is not a curable infirmity or defect, and the same cannot be allowed to be cured or rectified by granting the amendment.

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court have consistently held that prosecuting the Company under Section 138 of NI Act requires statutory Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 15 MCRC-33877-2023 demand notice to be served specifically on the Company as the drawer of the cheque. Without such notice, the complaint against the Director is not maintainable. The post filing amendment to add the Company in the Complaint under Section 138 of NI Act cannot cure this defect even prior to taking cognizance because, in order to name the Company as an accused, a legal notice must be served within the stipulated time frame.

25. In Pawan Kumar Goel (supra), it has been held that failure to serve notice on the Company renders the proceedings against it invalid, rejecting amendments that attempt to rectify non-compliance with proviso to Section 138. Similarly, in Aneeta Hada (supra), the Apex Court emphasised that the Company must be arrayed as an accused only after fulfilling notice requirements. Therefore, from the aforesaid analysis, it is clear that the Company cannot be added by amendment in the complaint under Section 138 of NI Act.

26. While notice to a Director may impute knowledge to the Company in certain contexts under Section 141 NI Act. It is statutory provisions under Section 138 of NI Act mandates that demand notice to be issued directly to the drawer i.e. the Company, not merely to its Director or officers. Notice to the Director alone does not substitute for notice to the Company. This principle was reaffirmed in Krishna Texport & Capital Markets Ltd vs. Ila A. Agarwal (2015) 8 SCC 28, wherein it is held that notice only to the Director is insufficient for the Company.

27. Even before cognizance, amendments to include the Company are impermissible, if no demand notice was issued to it, as this violates the Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:29032 16 MCRC-33877-2023 mandatory procedural safeguards of Section 138 of NI Act. The trial Courts cannot allow such additions, treating them as bypassing statutory prerequisites. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Probal Kumar Mishra (2016) 3 SCC 491 clarified that vicarious liability under Section 141 requires prior compliance with Section 138 of NI Act with the Company and amendments cannot introduce the Company post facto without notice. In P. Mohanraj(supra) , the Court reiterated that procedural defects like absent company notice are not curable by amendment.

28. In the light of above discussion, the Company cannot be added by amendment prior to taking cognizance or after taking cognizance despite notice was issued to the Director. Without statutory notice to the Company, prosecution against the Director/Signatory is not maintainable.

29. Under the Circumstances, all the petitions deserve to be and are hereby allowed. The complaints filed under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of NI Act against the petitioners and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.

(B. P. SHARMA) JUDGE PG Signature Not Verified Signed by: PARMESHWAR GOPE Signing time: 27-04-2026 18:44:25