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[Cites 10, Cited by 2]

Madras High Court

K.N. Nagarajan And Anr. vs The Special Deputy Collector, Land ... on 15 July, 1995

Equivalent citations: 1995(2)CTC142

Author: Ar. Lakshmanan

Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan

ORDER
 

Srinivasan, J.
 

1. In this Writ Petition, the validity of acquisition of 61 cents in R.S.Nos.29 and 30, Velacherry, Madras under Notification dated 19.5.1973 Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is challenged. The acquisition is for the purpose of formation of a by-pass road connecting Murmalong Bridge and Irumpuliyur Road. The property originally belonged to one Bagyalakshmiamma, who sold it on 20.11.1955 to one Pallat Sankaran Nair. Though the purchase was in the year 1955, the said Sankaran Nair did not get the revenue records mutated in his favour. However, he got copies of the proceedings of acquisition Under Section 4(1) of the Act and he sent a communication to the Special Deputy Collector on 10.10.1975 by which he informed that portions of the property had been sold. He did not however take care to give the particulars as to the sales made by him. He did not even mention the names of the purchasers. Yet another letter was sent by him on 18.12.1982, in which, he had categorically stated that he had no objection in acquiring the land in his possession.

2. The declaration Under Section 6 was published on 6.5.1976. An amendment was also made to the survey numbers on 31.3.1982. A notice of award enquiry was sent to the erstwhile owner; but nobody appeared and a fresh date was fixed for the award enquiry, as 18.12.1982. That notice was served on the original writ petitioner and he filed the present writ petition on 10.12.1982. The prayer in the writ petition was for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to proceed any further with respect to the land acquisition proceedings pursuant to the notification Under Section 9(1) of the Act. The only ground on which the original writ petitioner claimed the relief is that he had no notice at the stage of enquiry Under Section 5-A or subsequently and that the first notice received by him was the notice Under Section 9(1) of the Act. The 1st petitioner has claimed that the purchased the property under sale deed dated 28.2.1974 from Pallet Sankaran Nair. Admittedly that sale was about nine months after the notification Under Section 4(1) of the Act.

3. Subsequently, the original writ petitioner sold the property to his nephew by name N.R. Mahesh under a sale deed dated 18.8.1984. The new purchaser filed W.M.P. No.13564 of 1990 for impleading himself as a party to the writ petition and W.M.P. No. 13565 of 1990 for raising additional grounds. In the additional grounds, it is urged that the award passed in the proceedings is vitiated in view of the fact that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed by virtue of the provisions of Section 11(A) of the Act. It must also be mentioned here that when the writ petition was filed in 1982, an interim order of injunction was passed restraining the respondents from in any manner proceeding with the acquisition pursuant to the notification. By order dated 3.2.1987, the interim injunction was made absolute, but was confined to the dispossession of the writ petitioner. It was also made clear that there will be no stay in other respects. But even before that order was passed, an award had been passed on 22.9.1986, i.e., within a period of two years from the date on which Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force.

4. The contentions in the writ petition filed by the petitioner, are (1) that the entire proceedings is vitiated for want of notice to him, as he is a purchaser of the property and a person interested in the proceedings. He placed reliance on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Seethalkshmi Ammal v. State of Tamil Nadu . The Full Bench construed the words 'person aggrieved' and observed that the meaning may vary according to the context of the statute and that even a stranger could be found to have locus standi although he may not have any personal interest of his own, provided he is not a busybody or meddlesome interloper and although a stranger, and he should move the Court for a right in connection with the general public. This decision will not help the petitioner in the present case. The question here is not as to whether the petitioner is a person aggrieved but the question is whether a person, who has purchased the property subsequent to the notification Under Section 4(1) of the Act can challenge the notification or the acquisition proceedings on the ground of want of notice. That has been considered in P.C. Thanikavelu v. Special Deputy Collector, L.A. Madras (FB). The Full Bench has taken care in that decision to say that if the erstwhile land owner brings to the notice of the Collector the names of interested person not named in the revenue records, the Collector, as a statutory functionary, cannot decline to afford an opportunity of the person, who is really interested in the land and close the enquiry. In the present case, we have already pointed out that the registered owner, whose name is itself not found in the revenue records, has not chosen to disclose even the names of the persons, who have purchased the plots from him. In that situation, the petitioner cannot claim that notice ought to have been given to him at the stage of enquiry Under Section 5-A of the Act or later.

5. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the rights of a person, who has purchased the property subsequent to the notification Under Section 4(1) of the Act in Mir Fazeelath Husain v. Special Deputy Collector, L.A. Hyderabad . The Court held that when the original owner did not choose to challenge the acquisition inspite of repeated notices, the person who purchased the property subsequent to the notification Under Section 4(1) of the Act, cannot challenge the proceedings in acquisition. The above judgment will govern this case and put an end to he arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

6. The next contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the award is barred by limitation, in the sense, that it has been passed beyond the period contemplated Under Section 11-A of the Act. There is no substance in this contention, as we have pointed out that the award has been passed before the expiry of two years from the date of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Besides, the original writ petitioner had obtained interim injunction restraining the respondents from taking further proceedings in acquisition, on 10.12.1982 and the interim order was later on 3.2.1987 modified and restricted to dispossession only. Even if there is any order of stay of dispossession only, it has been held that it would prevent the authorities from proceeding further with acquisition within the meaning of the Explanation Under Section 11-A of the Act. Such a stay would fall within the Explanation. It has been held so in Government of Tamil Nadu v. Vasantha Bai (1975 (2) SCALE 849 SC). The supreme Court has referred to its earlier rulings in Y.N. Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Sangappa G. Sajjan v. State of Karnataka . In the view of the above ruling of the Supreme Court, there is not merit in the above contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner.

7. Finally, it is argued that the purpose of acquisition has been defeated in view of the fact that formation of the by-pass road has been abandoned. There is no merit in this contention. Learned Government Pleader has brought to out notice that the by-pass road is almost complete and excepting the portion to which the present writ petition relates, the road has been formed in all other portions. If the stay of dispossession is vacated, the entire road would be completed. Learned Government Pleader has produced before us the relevant sketch and pointed out that the portion involved in the writ petition is marked in 'red' and that is the only portion in which the road is yet to be formed. We find that it is a very small portion of the road and in other respects, the road has been almost complete. Hence, this contention of the writ petitioner also has no merit and it is rejected. No other point was urged. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.