Patna High Court
State vs Tribhuvan Nath Verma on 30 July, 1958
Equivalent citations: AIR1959PAT262, 1958(6)BLJR802, 1959CRILJ754, AIR 1959 PATNA 262, 1958 BLJR 802 ILR 37 PAT 1130, ILR 37 PAT 1130
JUDGMENT K. Sahai, J.
1. The opposite party, Tribhuvan Nath Verma is a pleader, and he w;is practising at Sitamarhi under the judgeship of Muzaffarpur. The proceeding in Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9 of 1957 was started by an order of this Court, dated 4-0-1957, on the basis of a letter of the District Judge of Muzaffarpur, forwarding a report dated 18-7-1956, of Mr. S.K. Basu, Munsif, 1st Court, Sitamarhi. Four documents marked annexures A, B, C and D were attached to the report. This Court order directed notice to issue to the opposite party "to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of Court for making contemptuous statements touching upon the judicial integrity of Mr. S.K. Basu. Munsif 1st Court, Sitamarhi."
2. The opposite party addressed a letter dated 31-3-1958, to the Chief Justice of India with a copy to the Chief Justice of this Court. The proceeding in Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7 of 1958 was started by an order of this Court dated 15-4-1958, whereby a notice was directed to issue to the opposite party "to show cause why he should not be convicted for the contempt of Court for scandalising the dignity of this Court in general and some of its Judges in particular," in the letter lust referred to.
3. Both the cases have been heard together with the consent of the parties and for the sake of convenience.
4. It is necessary to mention some facts in order to appreciate the points which arise for consideration. The opposite party was appointed guardian ad litem for the minor defendants in Title Suit No. 48 of 1954 of the Munsif 1st Court as Sitamarhi. On 10-12-1954, he made a prayer before Mr. N.K. Jha, the then presiding officer of the Court, for permission to go to the residence of the minor defendants; but the Munsif, for reasons given by him in his order, rejected the prayer.
On 25-1-1955, the opposite party filed a bill for the alleged expenses incurred by him in going to the residence of the minor defendants, and made a prayer for payment of the bill. Mr. S.K. Basu had succeeded Mr. N.K. Jha, and was the presiding officer of the Court on that date. As Mr. Basu found that the opposite party's prayer for permission to go to the locality had been refused by his predecessor-in-office, he rejected the opposite party's prayer for payment of his bill.
On the 26th January, the opposite party addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of this Court, forwarding a copy to the District Judge of Muzaffarpur. A copy of this letter is annexure A. One of the allegations made by the opposite party in this document is that he filed an additional written statement and a petition for time on behalf of the minor defendants in Title Suit No. 48 of 1954 on 25-1-1955; but the suit was decreed ex parte against all the defendants which led him to suspect that either the bench-clerk had not attached the papers to the file of the suit or "if it has been so attached, the Court has neglected to go through the papers in the file," The District Judge sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Basu, who in reply, categorically denied the allegations made by the opposite party against him.
5. The opposite party sent a letter dated 14-9-1955, to the District Judge. A copy of this letter is annexure B. He made some suggestions in it as to the issue of commissions by the Munsifs at Sitamari to the pleaders and also regarding other matters. In Small Cause Court Suit No. 108 of 1955, the opposite party was one of the pleaders whom the plaintiff had appointed on his behalf.
On the 28th June, the plaintiff filed a petition before Mr. Basu, making certain allegations against the conduct of the opposite party and praying for permission to cancel the power held by him. Mr. Basu called for a report from the pleader on the allegations made in this petition, and fixed the 29th June, for hearing as the suit was also to be finally heard on that date. The suit was taken up for hearing in the early hours on the 29th June.
The opposite party was not present in the Court room at that time, and another pleader conducted the suit on behalf of the plaintiff. After the parties and their lawyers had ieit the Court room, the opposite party appeared and staged that the plaintiff had not paid him his fees. Mr. Basu told him about the plaintiff's petition as well as the allegations made therein against his professional conduct.
The pleader replied that he was entitled to compensatory lees, whereupon Mr. Basu told him to fiie a petition. Accordingly, the opposite party filed a petition on the same date. The Munsif recorded the order in the margin, "Seen. Call for a report from the plaintiff in reference of these contentions of the pleader. Fix 30-6-56." This order was sen! to the opposite party for information. Thereupon, the opposite party made an endorsement in the margin as follows :
"This order is just different. When I went to move the matter to the Court at 9.15 hours the Court uttered that, my power has been cancelled on account of professional misconduct and afterwards passed contrary orders. I take this action of Court as defamation and I have moved the Bar Association to consider over the matter after which I shall take such steps as I think proper.
Sd. Illegible. Twenty-ninth 29-6-56 Ten A. M."
A copy of the opposite party's petition with Mr. Basil's order and his own endorsement is annexure C. It appears that the Bar Association refused to entertain the opposite party's resolution against Mr. Basu.
6. On the 30th June, the plaintiff of the suit filled a petition in reply to the opposite party's petition for compensatory fee. Thereupon, Mr. Basu started a miscellaneous case No. 134 of 1956, This case purports to be under the Legal Practitioners Act; but it was started specifically for determination of the question of compensatory fee raised by the opposite party in his petition,
7. The opposite party filed a petition in the aforesaid miscellaneous case, No. 134 of 1956, on 11-7-1956. A copy of this petition is annexure D. It appears that Mr. Basu was on leave for a few days in June, 1956. During his absence, the opposite party inspected the record of Small Cause Court Suit No. 108, and found that the presiding officer's signatures were wanting under the orders dated the 1st, 8th and 9th June. He accordingly, made an endorsement to that effect on the margin of the order-sheet.
On his return from leave, Mr. Basu signed these orders on the 19th June, giving that date under his signatures. Among; other things the opposite party mentioned in his petition of the 11th July in Miscellaneous Case No. 134 that the aforesaid three orders were not signed by the presiding officer on the dates which they bore. He also stated that he had brought certain irregularities in the publication of cause list, etc., in the Courts at Sitamarhi to the notice of the District Judge of Muzaffarpur. In paragraph 10, he stated :
"10. That on 22-6-56 your honour called Shree Shampat Lal Kama pleader commissioner in your honour's chamber and asked him to submit some report against myself and your honour promised to appoint him commissioner in two cases if Shree Shampat Lal Kama helped your honour in taking unscrupulous pre-conceived revenge."
He further stated that the plaintiff in the small Cause Court suit had made allegations against him in his petition ot the 28th June, at the instance of his (opposite party's) clerk, Alakh Prasad, with whom, he had a dispute. In paragraphs 15, 16 and 19, the opposite party stated as follows :
"15. That I also moved the matter in Court before your honour on which your honour was pleased enough to pass the toliowing verbal orders:
Tour power has been cancelled on account of professional misconduct.'"
"'16. That your honour erred in passing such.
order because your honour was prejudiced against me from before as will appear from the tacts stated in some of the preceding paras and many other matters already in the knowledge of the aulhorities."
"19. That from the facts stated in preceding, paras it appears to me that your honour assumed. the powers of a Judge of a High Court in passing, such orders without such power ever having been notified in the Bihar Gazette. I do not know whether any letter of vesting of such powers has been received by your honour. In this way your honour disposed of the matter very quickly ignoring the Legal Practitioners Act itself."
8. Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9 of 1957, was placed for hearing in this Court before a Bench consisting of K. Ahmad and K. Singh, JJ. on the 10th March, 1958. In an order passed by the Bench on that date, it was stated that the notice issued to the opposite party referred to a report, of the District and Sessi as Judge o£ Muzaffarpur as the basis of information to this Court relating to the allegations against Mr. Basu, and no copy of Mr. Basu's report was supplied to him with the result that the opposite, party objected that he could not show cause until a copy of the report of the District and Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur was supplied to him, and that, so far as he was aware, the District Judge had made no enquiry in the matter.
In these circumstances, it was directed by the Bench that a copy of Mr. Basu's report along with its enclosures be made over to the opposite party by the 14th March, 1958, that the contempt matter against the opposite party be put up on 14-4-1958, and that, if the opposite party so wished, he was free to file an additional show cause in the meantime. The endorsement of the opposite party's Advocate shows that the papers required to be served upon him were served on 13-3-1958.
9. In his letter dated 31-3-1958, to the Chief Justice of India, the opposite party stated that his case was first placed for hearing before B. P. Jamuar and H.K. Chaudhuri, JJ., on 2-9-1957; but they did not hear it on the ground that they had something to do with the opposite party's case in their administrative capacity, presumably as Judge in charge of the English Department and Registrar, respectively. He further stated that he demanded some information from the Chairman of the Standing Committee of this Court, which expression appears to refer to the Judge in charge of the English Department, and that he was asked to see the Registrar but that he could not see the Registrar as he was busy otherwise. He has then stated in paragraph 6 :
"6 That thereafter Mr. B.P. Jamuar told1 something to my lawyer and as a result he began to avoid working for me on some hackneyed reason."
Referring to what happened at the time of hearing on 10-3-1958, which the opposite party has referred by mistake as 14-3-1958, in paragraph 11, he has stated :
"I am very much pained to note that during the course ot hearing Mr. Justice K. Ahmad made such remarks as cannot be expected from any sane man. However he found that there was absolutely no report of the District Judge on whose basis the High Court had been harassing me since July 57 but instead ot dropping the proceeding and awarding me costs and compensation ordered to amend the notice which is peculiar to law and the case has been fixed up for hearing on 14-4-58."
Paragraph 13 of the letter runs as follows:
"13. That Contempt of Courts Act, L. P. Act. Bar Councils Act, Judicial Officers Protection Act have never been introduced by the Legislature with a view to afford protection to the corrupt officers. In any view of the matter I beg to say that I do not expect justice from Patna High Court and seek your Lordships interference in the matter."
10. When this Court directed on 15-4-1958. that a notice be issued to the opposite party to show cause against committal for contempt of Court, it was ordered that a copy of the petitioner's letter to the Chief Justice of India would form part of the Show cause notice.
11. Appearing in support of the rules issued by this Court, the Additional Standing Counsel, Mr. K.P. Varma, has relied upon the passages which I have quoted from annexures A, C and D as amounting to contempt of the Court of Mr. Basu, Munsif 1st Court, Sitamarhi, and the passages which I have quoted from the opposite party's letter to the Chief Justice of India as amounting to contempt of this Court and some of its Judges.
12. Appearing on behalf of the opposite party, Mr. Sri Narayan Sahay has not challenged the fact that it was the opposite party who filed the petitions, copies of which are annexures A to D. He has also not challenged the fact that the opposite party made the alleged offensive endorsement in the margin of his petition dated the 29th June. The fact that the opposite party sent the letter dated the 31st March to the Chief Justice of India has also not been disputed. Mr. Sahay has, however, taken the preliminary point that the notices issued to the opposite party in both the cases were defective and Inadequate.
13. The opposite party has filed a number of show cause petitions on different dates. When the case was taken up for hearing before my learned brother and myself on the 14th July, it was complained on behalf of the opposite party that a copy of the paper-book had not been supplied to him. We, therefore, ordered that a copy be supplied to him bv the 15th July, and the case be adjourned to the 17th.
A copy of the paper-book was, accordingly, supplied to the opposite party, and, when the case was taken up for hearing again on the 17th, a fresh show cause petition was filed in connection with Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9 of 1957. On the 18th, a fresh show cause petition was filed in connection with Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7 of 1958. In the course of his arguments on merits in the two cases, Mr. Sahay confined himself to these two show cause petitions.
14. In Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9, Mr. Sahay has taken the point that the impugned passages in annexures A, C and D may amount to libel against Mr. Basu personally; but they do not amount to contempt of his dignity in his judicial capacity or, in other words, to contempt of Court. In Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7 of 1958, he has put forward the argument that the allegation against Jamuar, J. is nothing more than a libel in his personal capacity.
It may be noted that, in the petition filed on the 18th July, there is an omission relating to Mr. Varma's argument on the basis of the allegation made against Jamuar, J. Mr. Sanay hag also argued that, the statements in paragraph 15 oi the opposite party's show cause petition dated the 2nd July, 1958, which was received in this Court on the 4th July, are correct, that what the opposite party meant in his statement against K. Ahmad, J. was that the observations which he (Ahmed, J.) made were not observations which a sane man like him could make and not that Ahmad, J. was insane, and that, when the opposite party stated that he did not expect justice from the High Court, he merely meant the Bench consisting of (K. Ahmad and Singh, JJ.) and, not the High Court in general, as stated by him in paragraph 47 of the same petition. Paragraph 15 of that show cause petition reads:
"15. That during the course of hearing Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ahmad remarked as follows:
(a) Lawyers today have become indisciplined.
(b) This lawyer seems to be a judicial reformer.
(c) Such lawyers must go out.
(d) Your client requires mental treatment than legal treatment."
15. I first take up the preliminary point which Mr. Sahay has rai.ed in both cases. He did not argue that the opposite party did not know the facts of the cases which he had to meet; but he argued: as a purely technical point that the order directing, issue of notice to an alleged contemner to show cause must contain all the allegations on which the proceeding is based, or the notice issued in pursuance: of that order must refer to all of them.
He has based this argument on the mere fact that a contempt of Court matter is a proceeding of a criminal nature. In support of his argument, he has relied upon Jayantilal Hiralal and Co. v. Waman Narayan, 34 Bom LR 1416: (AIR 1932 Bom 638). The notice of motion in that case merely stated that the Court would be asked for an order to commit the respondent to jail for contempt of the Court's order, and the particular contempt which was alleged was not stated. It was, therefore, argued that the notice of motion was defective.
This argument was upheld on the ground that the proceedings for contempt of Court were of a criminal nature, and hence tne precise nature of the contempt should have been set out in the notice of motion itself so that the respondent might not be left to ascertain the necessary facts from the affidavit relied upon in support of the motion. As pointed out by Kania, J. in Kilachand Devchand and Co. v. Ajudhia Prasad, ILR 59 Bom 10: (AIR 1934 Bora 452) a notice of motion, though it has to be lodged under the rules with the Prothonotary and Senior Master, does not acquire the character of a process of the court but continues to be a notice given by onei party to the other.
In the present case, the notices which were issued to the opposite party were proce ses issued by this Court and not notices of motion issued by one party to another. The observations in Jayantilal's case 34 Bom LR 1416: (AIR 1932 Bom 638) relating to the particulars which a notice of motion must contain which were accepted in Kilchand's case, also have, therefore, no application to this case.
16. I entirely agree that a proceeding for contempt of Court is of criminal nature. For the sake of justice and fair-play therefore, it is necessary that an alleged contemner must know all the facts alleged against him before he is called upon to meet them and to defend himself. It is undisputed that copies of Mr. Basu's report and its enclosures were supplied to the opposite party in pursuance of the order of a Bench of this Court dated 10-3-1958.
As I have mentioned, a copy of the entire paper-book was also supplied to him before his learned Counsel. Mr. Sahay, was called upon to argue in his deience. In fact, he filed fresh show cause petitions in both cases after being supplied with the paper-book. It is, therefore, clear that he cannot claim that he did not know any relevant fact when he was required to defend himself.
17. There appears to me to be no warrant in law for saying that the preliminary order issued by a High Court or the no ice issued in pursuance of it directing an alleged contemner to show cause, must contain all necessary particulars relating to the alleged contempt of Court. Such an order or a notics cannot take the place of a charge which is to be framed under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
A contempt of Court proceeding is summary in nature, and the law does not require any formal charge to be framed. So long as the contemner is informed of the case which he has to meet, he cannot complain that the notice issued to him was defective. Even if, however, an order or notice has to contain particulars of the kind which a formal charge in a criminal case has to contain, Sections 535 and 537 of the Code make it clear that an omission to frame a charge, or an error, omission or irregularity in framing a charge, cannot by itself vitiate a conviction unless failure of justice has been occasioned thereby.
I asked Mr. Sahay what useful purpose would be served by dropping the proceedings which have been drawn up against the opposite party and directing fresh notices to issue to him with full particulars, and be was unable to give any reply. When I enquired whether it can be said that any prejudice would be caused to the opposite party, he attempted to avoid an answer and then replied that, the opposite party having confined himself to the defect in the order and the notice issued by this Court to him, the prejudice to him would be that he did not trouble to prepare himself with other points.
This amounts to saying that a party to a litigation is entitled to proceed upon the assumption that one point to be taken on his behalf will be sufficient for his defence, and he need not trouble about other grounds of defence until the Court has overruled his first point. In my opinion, the alleged prejudice as given out by Mr. Sahay is no prejudice at all.
18. I may also add that the notices issued by this Court give sufficient indication to the opposite marry of a substantial part of the case which he had jto meet. In the notice of Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9, it was stated that be had made "false and malicious allegations against Mr. S. K. Basu, Munsif 1st Court, Sitamarhi, during the course of an enquiry made in connection with S. C. C, Suit No. 108/55".
Along with the notice which was issued to him in Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7, a copy of his letter to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India was attached, and it contained all such statements as could be said to amount to "scandalising the dignity of this Court in general and some of its Judgesi in particular".
19. It is manifest that, for the reasons given above, there is no merit at all in the preliminary point, artel it is, therefore, rejected.
20. The jurisdiction to award punishment for contempt of Court is an extraordinary jurisdiction, find it is exercised in a summary fashion. Though it cannot be denied that it is necessary in proper cases to exercise this power. It is manifest that recourse should be had to it after serious deliberation. The Court has to be very astute and has to take scrupulous care that the power is not misused. In re Sudhir Chandra AIR 1952 Cal 258 (S.B.) Harries, C J. has quoted the observations of Sir George Jessel, M. R. in In re Clements, (1877) 46 LJ Ch 375. Those observations sufficiently stress this point, and they are as follows:
"It seems to me that this Jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched, and exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges, to see whether there is no other mode which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness and which can be brought to bear upon the subject. I say that a Judge should be most careful to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on accusations of contempt should be adopted. I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men's rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found."
21. It is difficult to enumerate the acts which may amount to contempt of court. The overriding question in all cases of contempt of Court must, however, be whether the action or. remark of the alleged contemner is or is not calculated to interfere with, interrupt or thwart the course of justice. Unless the question can be answered in the affirmative there can be no case of contempt of Court. Generally speaking there are two kinds or this offence : one direct and another indirect. If a person takes any action to prejudice a party to a pending litigation by. for example, telling the trial Judge something beyond the record of the case, or publishing an article in a paper purporting to give what the writer deems the true facts of the case, his action tends directly to interfere with justice. If he makes any remark derogatory to the dignity of the Judge, and if that remark is calculated either to put the Judge in an embarrassing position so that free administration of justice is jeopardised or to make the litigant public lose confidence in him, he thwarts justice indirectly' and commits contempt of Court of the kind which, has been called scandalising a Court or a Judge. In this connection. I may refer only to the observation^ of Lord Russell of Killowen in The Queen v. Gray, 0900) 2 Q. B. 36, which have been quoted by Harries C. T. in In re Sudhir Chandra's case AIR 1952 Cal 258 (supra). They are as follows:
"Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke L. C. characterised as 'scandalising a Court or a judge' In re Read and Huggonson, (1742) 2 Atk 409. That description of that class of contempt is to be taken subject to one and an important qualification, Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat tbat as contempt of Court."
In a case where criticisms, even severe criticisms, are levelled against a Judge, the Court has to be very circumspect. No action can be held to be called for it the criticism in reasonable and is ottered tor the public good. Confidence in Court cannot be maintained by stifling entirely justified and bona fide criticims. The Court has further to consider whether the criticism amounts merely to a libel against the Judge in his personal capacity or it is calculated indirectly to interfere with the due course of justice. If it is merely a libel, it is for the Judge to tollow such remedy as is legally open to him. The criticism can form the basis for committal for contempt of Court only if it is made against the Judge in his judicial capacity in the exercise of his judicial functions. I can do no better than to quote the observations of B.K. Mukherjea, J. in Brahma Prakash v. "State of U. P. AIR 1954 SC 10:
"The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeller in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well-established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law, Mr. Mookerjea T. In re Motilal Ghose. AIR 1918 Cal 988 at p. 994."
22. Keeping in view the principles mentioned above, I propose now to consider the merits of both the cases. I first take up Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9 of 1957. Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, makes it perfectly clear that this Court has precisely the same jurisdiction and power to punish person for contempt of subordinate Courts as to punish them for contempt of itself. It is well established that contempt may be committed in respect of a case which is pending or one which has just concluded provided that the criticism advanced against the Judge concerned is calculated to interfere with the course of justice. I need refer only to the observations of Mookerjee, J. In the matter of the Amrita Bazar Patrika, ILR 45 Cal 169: (AIR 1918 Cal 988) as follows:
"It is immaterial whether the attack on the Judge is with reference to a case about to be tried, or actually under trial, or recently adjudged; in each instance the tendency is to poison the fountain of justice, to create di trust, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the Courts. which are of prime importance to them in the protection of their rights and liberties."
Annexure A is a complaint sent to Mr. Basil's administrative superiors the Chief Justice of this Court and the district Judge of Muzaffarpur, very shortly after the conclusion of Title Suit No. 48 of 1954 in which Mr. Basu passed an ex parte decree.
23. With reference to the cancellation of power given by a client to his pleader, Rule 4(2) of Order III of the Civil Procedure Code provides:
"(2) Every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client."
It is clear from Radhika Dcbi v. Ramasray Prasad, 11 Pat LT 371: (AIR 1930 Pat 403) that a pleader is entitled to claim compensatory fee when a client applies for leave of the Court to cancel his appointment, and it is for the Court to consider & lay down the terms on which leave would be granted to the client. The petition which forms part of annexure C and the petition which is annexure D must be held to have been filed in such a proceeding while it was pending before the Court presided over by Mr Basu. In fact, Miscellaneous Case No. 134 was specifically started for determination of the question of leave sought by the plaintiff in Small Cause Court Suit No. 108 to cancel the opposite party's appointment as pleader and the opposite party's claim for compensatory fee.
24. As I have already indicated, Mr. Sahay's argument is that the alleged offensive remarks in annexures A, C and D may be libellous in nature but they do not constitute contempt of Court. In support of his argument, he has relied upon In the matter of a special reference from the Bahama Islands, 1893 AC 138. The question in that case was whether some satirical comments against the Chief Justice in an article published in a newspaper amounted merely to a liable against the Judge in his personal capacity or to a contempt of Court.
Their Lordships gave the opinion that the criticisms amounted merely to a libel. The article has been quoted in the report, and I do not find any remark in it against the Chief Justice in his judicial capacity. While it is clear from that case that an action for contempt of Court does not lie when libellous statements are made against a Judge in his personal capacity, I do not think that it is of any further help in the present case.
25. I do not attach much importance to the impugned passage in annexure A; but it seems obvious that there is a sting in it against Mr. Basu in his judicial capacity for it impugns neglect of duty to go through the papers in the file to him while deciding a case. I do not think that it can be described merely as a libel against Mr. Basu personally. It is also fairly clear that the opposite party made there mark because of Mr. Basu's refusal to order payment of his bill of expenses in going to the minors' residence, though Mr. Sahay has admitted that the refusal was fully justified.
26. I do not think that Mr. Basu could have observed, as stated in the opposite party's endorsement in annexure C, that his power had been cancelled on account of professional misconduct. I am satisfied that Mr. Basu has made a correct statement when he says that he told the opposite party that the plaintiff had filed an application for leave to cancel his power on the ground of professional misconduct. That was factually correct, and I do not see why Mr. Basu would have made any incorrect statement to the opposite party. In any case, it was not for the Munsif to cancel the power held by the opposite party. All that the Munsif was called upon to do was to give or with held leave to the plaintiff to cancel the opposite party's power.
Mr. Sahay has argued that the opposite party misunderstood Mr. Basu's remarks and thought that he had been found guilty of professional misconduct. I do not see how a pleader like the opposite party could fall into an error of this kind. The written order which was communicated to him was a perfectly proper order as it required the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay compensatory fee to the opposite party.
He should have known that the question of his professional misconduct did not arise tor determination betore the Munsif at that stage, and hence he could not and did not pass any order on that question. To say that lie took the action of the Court as defamation and further to say that he had moved the Bar Assocation over the matter and that he would later lake such steps as he thought proper do amount, in my opinion, to an attempt to overawe the Munsif and to get him to decide the mutter in his favour.
27. The remarks contained in paragraph 10 of annexure D are undoubtedly calculated to lower the Munsif's dignity and to bring his Court into contempt. The opposite party does not allege that Mr. Basu spoke to Shri Shampat Lal Kama in his presence", and he has not referred to the source of his information. The alleged incident is wholly improbable because I do not think that a Munsif presiding in a court at a certain place can speak to a pleader practising in that Court in such a strain as he must apprehend that he would bring dishonour upon himself.
The allegation that Mr, Basu abused his position as Munsif in such a manner for the purpose of "taking unscrupulous preconceived revenge" does, in my opinion, amount to contempt. The remarks in paragraphs 15, 16 and 19 in annexure D are also extremely derogatory to the dignity of Mr. Ba u in his judicial capacity because the opposite party has persisted in attributing a decision to him which he did not make and could not legally make. To say, for instance, that Mr. Basu assumed the powers of a Judge of a High Court is nothing but to attribute complete ignorance of law and his powers to him and to suggest want of ability in him to work as a Munsif,
28. In view of the reasons given above, I hold that the impugned passages amount to contempt of Mr. Basu's Court which is a Court subordinate to this Court, and not merely to libel against him personally,
29. I next take up Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7 of 1958. As I have mentioned. Mr. Sahay has urged that the remark against B. P. Jamuar, J. amounts to a libel against him in his personal capacity. I am unable to agree. The allegation made bv the opposite party means that Jamuar, J. influenced his (opposite party's) lawyer to give up appearing for him. Jamuar, J. could not be expected to exercise such an influence if he had not been a Judge of this Court. The opposite party's allegation, therefore, amounts to a suggestion that Jamuar, J. abused his position as a Judge of the High Court,
30. I do not believe that Alimad, J. made on the 10th March, 1958, the remarks which the opposite party has attributed to him in paragraph 15 of his petition dated the 2nd July. It is significant in this connection that the alleged remarks have not been mentioned in the opposite party's letter to the Chief Justice of India, and they nave been mentioned for the first time more than three months later in the petition dated the 2nd July, 1958.
In any case, to say that a Judge, while sitting in his judicial capacity, made remarks which could not be expected from any sane man does amount, in my opinion, to a serious contempt. The opposite party has further committed contempt by stating that Ahmad. J. was wrong in directing the notice issued to him to be amended instead of dropping the proceeding altogether. It is to be noticed that he has stated that it is peculiar to law and he has said so in connection with a case which was pending. He has thus attempted not only to interfere with the due course of justice indirectly by scandalising the Court but also directly by making the statement in a pending case that an order passed in it was erroneous and "peculiar to law".
31. The explanation that he meant the Bench of Ahmad and Singh, JJ. when referring to the Patna High Court in paragraph 13 of his letter to the Chief Justice of India is clearly wrong. The context in which the words "Patna High Court", have been used makes this perfectly clear. In fact, the context appears to show that the opposite party intended to say that he did not expect justice from; the Patna High Court because it was bent upon affording protection to "corrupt officers". There can be no doubt that this amounts to a serious contempt of this Court.
32. For the reasons given above, I hold that the opposite party is guilty of contempt of the Patna High Court and some of its Judges.
33. The question which now remains is what punishment is to be awarded to the opposite party. He appears to have not the. slightest respect for either this Court or the Courts subordinate to it. He does not exercise any control upon the language which he uses with reference to the Judges and the Courts. In fact he has actually referred to Ahmed J. as "contemner Mr. K. Ahmad" in paragraph 31 of his petition dated the 2nd July, 1958.
It seems to me, in all the circumstances of the case, that he deserves the maximum punishment. I sentence him to simple imprisonment for six months for contempt of the Court of Mr. S.K. Basu, Munsif, 1st Court, Sitamarhi. For the contempt of this Court and some of its Judges. I sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and also to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- or, in default of payment of the fine, to suffer further simple imprisonment for six weeks. The substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.
K. Dayal, J.
34. I agree.