Jharkhand High Court
Md.Ferdous Anjum vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 30 July, 2012
Equivalent citations: 2013 LAB. I. C. 1099, 2013 (1) AJR 775
Author: D. N. Patel
Bench: D. N. Patel
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 2011 of 2012
Md. Ferdous Anjum ...... Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Another ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D. N. PATEL
For the Petitioner : Mr. Nagendra Tiwari, Advocate
For the State : J.C. to G.P.VI
For the J.A.C. : Mr. Suhail Anwar, Sr. Advocate
Mrs. Ruby Parween, Advocate
th
09/Dated: 30 July, 2012
1.Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has applied for the post of Post Graduate Teacher in pursuance of the public advertisement dated 23/24th December, 2011, which is at Annexure2 to the memo of the present petition. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that as per condition no. Ka (ii) of the said advertisement those candidates, who are appearing in the B.Ed. examination can also appear in the examination to be conducted by the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi, but, the outer limit was that before the result of the written test was published such candidate must have cleared the B.Ed. examination. In the facts of the present case, the result of the examination for the post in question conducted by the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi was published on 15th February, 2012 before this time as per the aforesaid condition, the petitioner had to submit the B.Ed. clearance certificate, which the petitioner could not because the petitioner's result of B.Ed. examination was declared on 19 th March, 2012 and therefore, this period merely of about 01 month and 04 days should have been condoned by the respondentauthorities. The petitioner's candidature cannot be rejected only on this ground because the petitioner has otherwise secured higher marks than the lastly selected candidate in the category in which the petitioner has appeared in the examination for the post in question.
2. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that declaration of the result of B.Ed. examination is beyond the control of the present petitioner. This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the respondentauthority and therefore also, the petitioner may be declared as selected candidate for the post in question and the respondents may be directed to appoint the petitioner as Post Graduate Teacher in 2 Higher Secondary School.
3. Counsel for the respondents vehemently submitted that the cutoff date prescribed by the respondentState may not be altered by this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is a policy decision of the respondentState that what should be the cutoff date for submission of the certificates. In the facts of the present case, looking to the conditions as stated in Annexure2 especially in clause Ka(ii) those candidates, who are appearing in the B.Ed. examination can also apply for the post in question, but, they must present the B.Ed. clearance certificate prior to the result published by the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi for the post in question. The result was published by the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi on 15th February, 2012 and the result of the B.Ed. examination of the petitioner was declared on 19 th March, 2012. Thus, there is a clear violation of the condition as stated in Annexure2 to the memo of the present petition.
4. Counsel for the respondents is relying upon the following decisions:
(a) (1975) 1 SCC 305;
(b) (1990) 3 SCC 368;
(c) (1996) 10 SCC 536;
(d) (1997) 6 SCC 614;
(e) (2004) 2 SCC 76;
(f) (2008) 14 SCC 702
It is submitted on the basis of the aforesaid decisions that this Court may not change the cutoff date prescribed for submissions of certificate and therefore, the petition may not be entertained by this Court.
5. Having heard counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no reason to entertain this writ petition mainly for the following facts and reasons:
(i) The respondents floated a public advertisement dated 23/24 th December, 2011 for the post of Post Graduate Teacher in the Higher Secondary School, which is at Annexure2 to the memo of the present petition and as per condition Ka(ii) those candidates, who are appearing in the B.Ed. examination can also prefer an application for the post in question, but, the 3 outer limit has also been prescribed that before the result of the post in question is published by the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi the candidates must present their certificates of B.Ed. clearance examination before the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi.
(ii) Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the respondents have published the result for the post in question on 15th February, 2012. The petitioner could not present B.Ed. clearance certificate before the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi before the aforesaid date. The result of the B.Ed. examination of the petitioner was declared on 19th March, 2012 and therefore, there is a clear breach of the condition imposed in Ka(ii) of Annexure2 to the memo of the present petition.
(iii) The question is to be decided by this Court is whether this Court can change the cutoff date prescribed by the respondents for submission of certificate. The answer is negative because fixing cutoff date for submission of the certificate of the educational qualification is a policy decision. Court is not sitting in appeal before the policy decision of the respondents nor the Court can alter the said policy decision even for better reasons. Court cannot replace a better policy that what is in existence. What should be the cutoff date for submission of the education certificate is left out at the wisdom of the respondentauthorities. Wholesale, lumpsum, or general relaxation cannot be granted by this Court otherwise;
(a) there will be an outer limit of time for submission of the documents of the educational qualification of the applicants;
(b) it will lead to uncertainty about the publication of the final result because at every time some applicants will come and submit their educational qualification result.
How long the respondents shall wait for those 4 candidates. In this eventuality, if the Court permits such type of wholesale, lumpsum or general relaxation then perhaps, final result never be published by the respondents for the post in question;
(c ) if this type of concession is granted by this Court by giving relaxation in the time limit it will be unfair to those candidates, who have never preferred an application because there was no chance for them to submit B.Ed. certificate examination result within time limit given by the respondentsState Thus, relaxation given to the petitioner will be unfairness to those who are honest and those who have not applied for the post in question keeping in view the condition Ka (ii) of the advertisement.
(iv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another v. M/s Parameswaran Match Works & others, as reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305, at paragraph no.10 as under:
"10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Dr Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co.5
v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes."
(Emphasis supplied) Thus in view of aforesaid decision, the classification, created by the cutoff date with those Constables, who are st overaged, because of the cutoff date i.e. 1 January, 2004, and those, who are not overaged, cannot be said to be arbitrary classification.
(v) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, as reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368, in paragraph no.8, as under:
"8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court's attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cut off date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government's action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary."
(Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also, merely because 6 some of the petitioners will be accommodated if the cutoff date is shifted, which by itself is no reason for holding that the earlier cutoff date fixed by the authority is arbitrary or irrational.
(vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary & ors., as reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536, in paragraph no.21, as under:
"21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31121993, as fixed by notification dated 2161995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D. or M. Phil. degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31121993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cutoff date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view.
......................................"
(Emphasis supplied) Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision, the choice of cut off date as a basis for classification cannot be held as arbitrary, even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice of that cutoff date.
(vii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan & ors., as reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614, in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17, as under:
"5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the 7 first place the fixing of a cutoff date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cutoff date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rulemaking authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cutoff date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cutoff date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cutoff date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cutoff date. That cannot make the cutoff date, per se, arbitrary unless the cutoff date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cutoff date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, "when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications".
This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cutoff date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cutoff date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age.
xx xx xx
7. In the present case, the cutoff date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cutoff date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date 8 is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The timegap between the advertisement and the cutoff date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cutoff date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cutoff date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cutoff date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cutoff date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cutoff date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cutoff date may well contend that the cutoff date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cutoff date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cutoff date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cutoff date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cutoff date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain.
xx xx xx
11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum agelimit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are agebarred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner 9 contended.
xx xx xx
17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cutoff date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cutoff date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs."
(Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision also, whenever there is a cutoff date, given for determining maximum or minimum age for the post, in question, there are bound to be some candidates, who will be overaged or who are agebarred, but, this alone cannot be the reason for holding that the cutoff date, fixed by the respondent authorities is arbitrary.
Here also, keeping in mind the cutoff date as 1 st January, 2004, candidate like the petitioner will be overaged or will be agebarred and, thus, there cannot be any cutoff date, so precise that there cannot be any candidate, who will not be overaged or agebarred.
(viii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrao & others v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association & others, as reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76, from paragraph nos. 29 to 36, as under:
"29. It is now well settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless a cut-off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut-off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious.
30. The learned counsel could not point out as to how the said date can be said to be arbitrary and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary it has been observed:
(SCC p. 546, para 21) "21. ... It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is 10 shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances.
When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, SCC at 310 : SCR at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, SCC at 66 : SCR at p. 269.)"
32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employees seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
34. In State of W.B. v. Monotosh Roy it was held: (SCC pp. 76-77, paras 13-15) "13. In All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v. Union of India a Bench of this Court distinguished the judgment in Nakara and pointed out that it is for the Government to fix a cut-off date in the case of introducing a new pension scheme. The Court negatived the claim of the persons who had retired prior to the cut-off date and had collected their retiral benefits from the employer. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. P.N. Menon. In State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal Gandhi the ruling in P.N. Menon case was followed and it was reiterated that in matters of revising the pensionary benefits and even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis has to be fixed for extending the benefits.
14. In State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that liberalized provisions introduced after an employee's retirement with regard to retiral benefits cannot be availed of by such an employee. In that case the employee retired voluntarily on 12-4-1976. Later on, the statutory rules were amended by notification dated 18-11-1976 granting benefit of additional qualifying service in case of voluntary retirement. The Court held that the employee was not entitled to get the benefit of the liberalized provision which came into existence after his retirement. A similar ruling was rendered in V. Kasturi v. Managing Director, State Bank of India.
15. The present case will be governed squarely by the last two rulings referred to above. We have no doubt whatever that the first respondent is not entitled to the relief prayed for by him in the writ petition."
35. In Vice-Chairman & Managing Director, A.P. SIDC Ltd. v. R.Varaprasad in relation to "cut-off" date fixed for the purpose of implementation of Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it was said: (SCC p. 580, para 11) "The employee may continue in service in the interregnum 11 by virtue of clause (i) but that cannot alter the date on which the benefits that were due to an employee under VRS were to be calculated. Clause (c) itself indicates that any increase in salary after the cut-off point/date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of payments to which an employee is entitled under VRS."
36. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding of fact that the Association had failed to prove any malice on the part of the authorities of the Bank in fixing the cut-off date. A plea of malice as is well known must be specifically pleaded and proved. Even such a requirement has not been complied with by the writ petitioners."
(Emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid decision also, the whole concept of cut off has been explained and it has been held that the cutoff date cannot be held as arbitrary, irrational, whimsical, capricious or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, merely because some candidates come within the wrong side of the cutoff date, especially when there is no malafide alleged for delayed advertisement. In the facts of the present case, ground of malafide for late advertisement has never been canvassed.
(ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Subbarayudu, as reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702, in paragraph nos. 5 to 9, as under:
"5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cutoff date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cutoff dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cutoff date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.)
6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India this Court had struck down the cutoff date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal1.
7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cutoff date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial 12 restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cutoff date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection.
8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cutoff date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counteraffidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cutoff date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cutoff date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result.
9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain."
(Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, even if no reason has been given in the counter affidavit of the Government that why a particular cutoff date has been fixed or chosen, still the court must not declare it as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, because the fixation of cutoff date has various considerations.
(x) Whenever a cutoff date is prescribed, there are bound to be few candidates, who are falling on the wrong side of the cutoff date, but, that does not mean that such cutoff date is per se arbitrary nor can this Court exercise powers under Article 226 to change the cutoff date because whatever new cutoff date will be prescribed by the High Court, still there will be few candidates, who may be falling on the wrong side of the cutoff date. In view of these facts also, this Court is not inclined to fix a new cutoff date. No cutoff date can be fixed with any mathematical precision that there cannot be any person, who is not aggrieved by that cutoff date and therefore also, whenever a policy decision is taken by the State prescribing any cutoff 13 date, the Court will not change the cutoff date even for any reason whatsoever. If this is allowed by the Court by the way of unguided sympathy, it will lead to fluctuating cutoff date or uncertain cutoff date and there will be uncertainty about the maximum date limit also for submission of the documents.
(xi) It appears that the petitioner has cleared his B.Ed. examination after the publication of the result by the Jharkhand Academic Council, Ranchi. Thus, the petitioner is a fresh candidate of B.Ed. and therefore, he has all chances in future for preferring an application for his selection.
6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this writ application. Hence, the same is hereby, dismissed.
(D.N. Patel, J) VK