Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Banshidhar And Anr. vs Smt. Sita Bai And Anr. on 7 March, 1986
Equivalent citations: 1986(2)WLN86
JUDGMENT Kishan Mal Lodha, J.
1. The learned Single Judge by his order dated February 6, 1986 allowed the writ petition filed by Thaker Mal (deceased) His legal representative is respondent No. 1 and quashed the order Annx. 2 dated October 15, 1981 of the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar passed in revision under Section 17 of the Rajashan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957 (Act No. XXVIII of 1957) ("the Act" here in) by which he reserved the order of the Debt Relief Court Sri Ganganagar (Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar) holding that the appellants who were applicants are not agriculturists within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act. The Debt Relief Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence and the definitions of " agricultrist" in Section 2(b) and that of 'debtor" in Section 2(cc) held that the appellants Bansidhar and Rameshwardas are not agriculturists. The appellants went in revision under Section 17 of the Act. The learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar while exercising revisional powers under Section 17 of the Act reappreciated the evidence and came to a contrary conclusion from the one arrived at by the Debt Relief Court (Civil Judge) Sri Ganganagar. Aggrieved a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was filed by the creditor Thaker Mal who was non-applicant before the Debt Relief Court. The learned Single was of the opinion that the learned District Judge should not have interfered with the finding of the Debt Relief Court holding that the appellants are not agriculturists as he has a limited jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Act while hearing revision. In view of this he quashed the order dated October 15,1981 of the District Judge and restored that of the Debt Relief Court (Civil Judge) Sri Ganganagar. The appellants have filed this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. We have heard Mr. H.N. Calla learned Counsel for the appellants. He urged that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in interfering with the order of the learned District Judge passed in revision while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for, according to him the scope of revision under Section 17 of the Act is wide and the learned District Judge was competent to interfere with the order of the Debt Relief Court as it was covered by Clause (a) of Section 17 of the Act. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on Deepchand v. Surta (1966) ILR XVI Raj 477.
2. We have duly considered the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants Section 17 of the Act is as follow:
Section 17.--Revision of order of Debt Relief Court -- Any person aggrieved by an order of a Debt Relief Court, may within ninety days of such order, apply to the District Court for revision of the order on any of the following grounds:
(a) that the order is contrary to law:
(b) that the court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by laws;
(c) that the instalments fixed under Sub-section (3) of Section 11 are inequitable but, subject to the orders of the District Court on such application and further subject to the provision of Section 18, the order of the Debt Relief Court shall be final.
Explanation--For the purpose of the Section (and Section s 18, 18A and 19) the District Court shall be deemed to be the Court of the District Judge within whose civil jurisdiction the Debt Relief Court is situate.
3. Admittedly Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 17 are not attracted in the presents case.
4. Mr. H.N. Calla, learned Counsel for the appellants, pressed that since the order of the Debt Relief Court holding that the appellants were not agriculturists was contrary to law, the learned District Judge was right in setting aside the former's order.
5. This has necessitated us to carefully scrutinise the order of the Debt Relief Court as well as the order of the District Judge passed in revision. The Debt Relief Court in the light of the definitions of "agriculturist" and "debtor" contained in the Act examined the averments in the application and appreciated the statements of the applicants. It minutely examined the statements of the applicants Banshidhar and Rameshwardas. He took into consideration the documentary evidence that was placed on record. On appreciation thereof, it came to the conclusion that both the applicants, namely, Banshidhar and Rameshwardas are not agriculturists. To quote from the order of the Debt Relief Court, with respect to Rameshwardas, the Debt Relief Court has stated as under:
^^Jh jkes'oj ds c;ku ls ;g ugh ekuk tk ldrk gS fd mldh vkthfodk lEiw.kZr% ;k eq[;r% d`f"k ij vk/kkfjr gSA^^ For Banshidar the Debt Relief Court observed:
^^i{kdkjks ds leLr lk{; dk v/;;u djus ij Jh ca'kh/kj dh vkftfodk dk eq[; lk/ku d`f"k dh vis{kk O;kikj gksuk gh izekf.kr gksrk gSA^^ After examining the cases of the applicants appellants Banshidar and Rameshwardas separately, the Debt Relief Court summed up its conclusion as follows:
^^bl rjg nksuks gh vkosnd d`"kd ugh gS vkSj Qyr% _.kh dh Js.kh es ugh vkrs gS vkSj bl dkj.k ;g vkosnu i= fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA^^ It is thus clear that the Debt Relief Court on consideration of the facts pleaded in the application and the evidence led, held that both the applicants appellants are not agriculturists. It appears from the order of the learned District Judge in revision that he reappreciated the evidence and thereafter held as follows:
^^gekjs fopkj ls bu ifjfLFkfr;ks es izkFkhZx.k dh thfodk dk'r ij fuHkZj gksuk iw.kZ :i ls izekf.kr gS blfy, os vf/kfu;e ds vUrZxr _.kh gS A fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us mUgs _.kh ugh ekuus es Hkwy dh gSA^^ A close scrutiny of the order of the District Judge in revision shows that it has been passed on the basis of the reappreciation of the evidence relating to facts. Section 17 of the Act came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this court in Nanda v. District Judge, Jaipur 1972 WLN 575 it was held that there is no doubt that the power of revision under Section 17 of the Act is wider than the power exercised by the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but this revisional power is all the same limited by the expression that the findings of the original court are open to review only if the judgment is contrary to law. The expression "contrary to law" was also considered by the learned Judge. It will be pertinent to quote para 11 of the report which is as under:
The expression "contrary to law" covers an order passed in disregard of the provisions of law applicable to the facts and circumstances of particular case or when a relevant law applicable to the case has been mis-interpreted or mis-applied by the subordinate court. Every erroneous judgment cannot, therefore, fall within the expression 'order contrary to law.' A court commits an error of law if the acts contrary to or fails to apply any logic or any legal principle. The expression used is "contrary to law" in Clause (a) of Section 17 of the Act and not "legality, regularity or propriety of the order" which is wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact. Applying these tests we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant that the order of the Debt Relief court was contrary to law so as to warrant interference in revision under Section 17 of the Act by the learned District Judge. It was not open to the learned District Judge to interfere with the finding of fact merely because on the evidence, he took a different view. In such a situation the order of the Debt Relief Court cannot be called an order "Contrary to law" and in such circumstances, the revisional court had no power under Section 17 of the Act to distrub the finding of fact arrived at by appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken in Nanda's case 1972 WLN 575. Deepchand's case (1966) ILR XVI Raj 47, which was relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants is beside the point. What was held therein was that the so-called revisional powers given to a District Court under Section 17 of the Act are not merely revisional powers but they also include powers given to the appellate court to a limited extent. After referring to Nagendra Nath v. Suresh AIR 1932 PC 165 and Standard Type Foundry v. Venkataramniah AIR 1941 Mad 589, it was held that the revision would be covered by Section 12 of the India Limitation Act. In that case it was contended that the learned District Judge had wrongly refused to exercise his jurisdiction in not deciding a revision application on merit and that he had also committed an error which is apparent on the face of the record in dismissing the revision application as time barred. While considering the question of limitation Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act was considered and for that limited purpose it was held that it will have the similarity to a limited extent as that of appeal.
6. We are not satisfied that the order of the Debt Relief Court which was challenged in revision and which, as stated above, was passed on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence was contrary to law so as to warrant interference in revision under Section 17 of the Act by the learned District Judge. The learned Single Judge was right in quashing the order Annx. 2 dated October 15, 1981 of the learned District Judge which he passed in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 17 of the Act. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants in this regard is devoid of foree and it is consequently repelled.
7. There is no merit in this appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed summarily.