Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs R.C.Dayal on 28 April, 2023
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Reserved Court No. - 19 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 28 of 1986 Appellant :- State of U.P. Respondent :- R.C.Dayal Counsel for Appellant :- C.S.C.,Ratnesh Chandra,S.K.Kalia Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.Mishra,Anand Dubey,Prabhakar Tiwari,Pradeep Kumar Singh Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.
1. The State of U.P. has preferred this first appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "Act of 1894") assailing the award dated 27.09.1985 passed by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act whereby the Reference Court has enhanced the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
2. Certain facts relevant for deciding the instant appeal are being noticed hereinafter:-
3. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 28.02.1970 which was followed by a Notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 dated 29.08.1971. The matter relates to plot No. 161 measuring 3 Biswa and 10 Biswansi which was acquired by the State for the purposes of the Roadways Bus Station and its workshop in the Raebareily city. The land in question is situate in Mohalla Bhikampur, Pargana, Tehsil and District Raebareli. The land acquired under the aforesaid notification also had a construction in the shape of a room and a varandah as well as few trees and a Nala.
4. The Special Land Acquisition Officer had awarded a sum of Rs. 15,040/- for the land and for the room, Varandash and Nala, a composite sum of Rs, 35,250/- was awarded and a sum of Rs, 1,070/- was awarded as compensation for the trees vide award dated 11.11.1974.
5. Being aggrieved, the land owners filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 on 14.12.1974 and the award passed by the Reference Court whereby the Court enhanced the compensation and has awarded a sum of Rs. 28,560/- towards the land, a sum of Rs. 14,740- has been awarded towards Room and Varandah while a sum of Rs. 31,497/- has been awarded for the Nala, Rs. 3,000/- has been awarded for the trees and Rs.1,000/- has been awarded for the cost of the boundary wall and it is on account of the aforesaid enhancement that the State has filed the instant appeal.
6. The record would also indicate that the acquisition was made for the benefit of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (UPSRTC) and subsequently upon an application, UPSRTC was also impleaded as appellant no. 2. The original respondents/the land owners expired during the proceedings and they are now substituted by their legal heirs, however, for the sake of convenience, the Court shall refer to the parties as State, the UPSRTC, the beneficiary and the private respondents as the land owners.
7. Sri Deepak Mehrotra, learned Standing Counsel for the State and Sri Ratnesh Chandra, learned counsel for the UPSRTC, the beneficiary have contended that the award passed by the Reference Court is bad on three counts:-
(I) It is urged that the Reference Court has merely relied upon a Commissioner's report which relates to the year 1985 and takes note of the value as existing on the said date whereas the Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was of the year 1970 and the Notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was of the year 1971 and the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 11.11.1974, thus, the value as shown by the Commissioner could not be treated to be the correct valuation and the enhancement on the aforesaid basis is per-se bad and as such the award to the extent of enhancement made is liable to be set aside.
(II) It is also urged that the Reference Court has failed to take note of the evidence which was considered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer including exemplar sale deeds and even without adverting to the said evidence on record, it has enhanced the award by relying upon certain sale deeds which were not relevant and did not relate to the proximity of time, hence, the award to that extent is bad.
(III) It is also urged that the Reference Court has erred in granting the solatium and interest at a higher amount by holding that the amendment of 1984 is retrospective in operation and as such the said view is contrary to the settled legal position, hence, the award of the Reference Court is clearly unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.
8. Sri Anand Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents while controverting the aforesaid submissions submit that the Reference Court has rightly enhanced the amount, inasmuch as, the land owners were the recorded owners of a large piece of land. Even in the year 1956, some part of their land was acquired for the very same purpose and for the beneficiary UPSRTC and its workshop and the potentiality of the land since then had risen.
9. It is further submitted that the Commissioner's report, if seen, would indicate that appropriate depreciation has been made from the value calculated and thereafter the final value has been arrived in a scientific manner regarding the constructions and other aspects and the amount has been enhanced. Even the amount given for the trees have been properly appreciated. The witness of the State who was examined corroborated the evidence filed by the land owners and it is only thereafter that the Reference Court has enhanced the amount which in any case does not suffer from any error which may require interference from this Court.
10. It is also urged that solatium as well as the interest which has been granted in terms of the Amending Act 1894 is also appropriate as the said amendment has a retrospective operation and it has also been held by the Apex Court in Panna Lal Ghosh and Others Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Other; (2004) 1 SCC 467. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, it is urged that the appeal deserves to be dismissed and the State be directed to release and pay the outstanding amount along with up to date interest within a time frame to be fixed by the Court.
11. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record.
12. The facts which are not disputed between the parties is that the land which is the subject matter of acquisition is Plot No. 161 measuring 3 Biswa and 10 biswansi. The date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is 28.02.1970 and the notification under Section 6 of the Act 1894 is dated 29.08.1981. The Special Acquisition Officer made his award on 11.11.1974. The land owner filed a Reference on 14.12.1974 which came to be decided on 14.10.1985 which is under challenge before this Court.
13. At the outset, it may be noticed that it is not disputed between the parties that in the year 1954, 1.75 acres of land situate in Village Bhikampur along with trees, one pakka Room and a pakka well was acquired. The predecessors in interest of the present land owners had filed a reference case which came to be registered as Misc. LA Case No. 28 of 1954 wherein the Reference Court had enhanced the compensation by means of its judgment dated 27.04.1956 and a certified copy of the said judgment was placed on record as Exhibit-6.
14. It is not disputed that in the said case which relates to the year 1954, the predecessors-in-interest of the present land holders were awarded compensation at the rate of 75 paisa per square feet. It is in the aforesaid backdrop when the subsequent notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was issued in the year 1970 followed by the the Notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 in the year 1971 i.e. almost 20 years after the initial acquisition. The subject matter of the present case had already been subjected to development since the bus station had already been made on the land acquired. The area during the 20 years prior to the Notification was subjected to laying of sewer lines and laying of roads and at the time of the notification made in the year 1970, the land had come within the municipal limits of Raebareli and apart from having the bus station, it also had the City Civil Courts, a Cinema Hall, College and other amenities in the proximity and vicinity of the land in question.
15. The aforesaid backdrop could not be disputed by the learned counsel for the State as it can also be seen from the evidence which was led before the Reference Court and the lekhpal namely Sri Brij Kishore had examined himself and had corroborated and confirmed the existence of such amenities and development around the land acquired.
16. It would also be relevant to notice that this being the situation that the land in question did have the requisite potential. The claimant/the land holders before the Reference Court had filed the sale deeds which relate to the year 1963 and was of Plot No. 157 situate in the same Mohalla measuring 1078 square feet. The total sale consideration as indicated in the said sale deed of 1963 bearing Paper No. C-49 was Rs. 1,467/-. Another sale deed bearing Paper No. C-50 indicated that an area of 856 square feet was sold for Rs. 500/- in the year 1956 which was in turn again sold in the year 1951 for Rs. 1,000/- indicating the sharp escalation of prices and it is on the basis of aforesaid documents that it was urged that the award be enhanced and the Reference Court has awarded a sum of Rs. 28,500/- for the said land at the rate of Rs. 6 per square feet.
17. Considering the aforesaid documents, it would indicate that the said sale deeds of the year 1963 and 1961 relating to the same Mohalla had shown an increase in prices of land. It cannot be said that the Reference Court committed any error by relying upon the aforesaid sale deeds. The said sale deeds definitely belonged to the same Mohalla and the plots nearby and even though if they are of the year 1961 and 1963 but the fact remains that they have been failed to establish an upward rise in the prices of land contagious especially when some part of the land belonging to the same Mohalla admittedly was acquired for the purposes of the bus stand previously for which the the predecessors-in-interest of the present land holders had filed a reference case and in the year 1954 was given a compensation at the rate of 75 paisa. Over a period of 20 years, there has been a quantum jump and the Lekhpal Brij Kishore also deposed and confirmed the spiralling trend in the rise of prices of the real estate as well as the existence of the amenities and development in an around the acquired land.
18. Even from the perusal of the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer which is available on record bearing Paper No. Ga-1, it would indicate that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had referred to certain sale deeds which were prior to the date of issuance of Notification of Section 4 of the Act of 1894. It also observed that certain sale deeds were executed but they were not relied upon as they had not disclosed the correct valuation and an attempt was made to suppress the prices to avoid the registration fee, however, it relied upon the same sale deeds and took the rate as indicated in the said sale deeds to deliver its award dated 11.11.1974.
19. The fact remains that there was no material available on record nor any reason was indicated by the Special Land Acquisition Officer as to what was reflected in the sale deeds or from what material it could conclude that the said sale deeds were executed for suppressing the amount and this aspect of reasoning adopted by the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not inspire confidence.
20. The Reference Court on the other hand has taken note of the sale deeds which comparatively were little anterior in point of time but the fact would also indicate that if there was an escalation of prices at an anterior point of time, there was nothing to suggest that there was any stagnation or suppression of the land prices subsequent thereto. On the other hand, the material and the evidence clearly indicates that there has been an ongoing development in an around area including coming up of a Cinema Hall, Colleges etc. which had the impact of raising the land prices. Noticing the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the Reference Court has erred in awarding the aforesaid sum of Rs. 6 per square feet.
21. The submission of the learned counsel for the State-appellant that the Reference Court had erred merely by not referring to the sale deed as considered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not impress this Court for the reason that merely by not referring to a sale deed any prejudice has been caused whereas on the other hand, there is ample evidence to indicate that the property prices have been rising, large scale development has occurred in an around the area including when some part of the land was earlier acquired in the year 1954, right adjacent to the said acquired land, the predecessors-in-interest of the land owners had also raised certain constructions and being contagious to the earlier acquired land, there was huge potential and the rate which has been awarded does not appear to be exorbitant and for the aforesaid reasons, the first contention of learned counsel for the State-appellant fails.
22. The other ground raised by the learned counsel for the State-appellant is in respect of the Commissioner's report and from the perusal thereof which is bearing Paper No. Ga-88, it would indicate that the report is dated 17.07.1985 and taking note of the extent of the construction and applying the rates as provided by the P.W.D relating to the year 1984, valuation was made and also a provision for depreciation was made thereafter the valuation has been worked out. There does not appear to be any error in the manner in which the valuation has been made by the Commissioner who is a registered valuer and in contradiction to the aforesaid, it would be seen that there is no basis upon which the Special Land Acquisition Officer had furnished the valuation in his award dated 11.11.1974.
23. The record would further indicate that though a request was made by Special Land Acquisition Officer to the Public Works Department for getting the construction valued but it was not done and thus the valuation which has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer appears to be on the basis of his own estimation without any corroborating material or any basis.
24. Accordingly, this Court find that there is no error, inasmuch as, the Commissioner, though, visited the site but after making the valuation has reduced the value after applying the requisite depreciation as per the valuation norms. Significantly, it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the State-appellant that the mode of calculation is bad. The only objection appears to be that the Commissioner inspected the property in the year 1985 and therefore the value is of the year 1985 rather it should be of the time when it was acquired. This objection for the aforesaid reasons as mentioned above is not tenable as the valuation has been worked out providing the necessary depreciation relating back to the value at the time of acquisition as per the settled norm and the learned counsel could not point out any error or discrepancy in this regard. Thus, the said contention also fails.
25. Now, coming to the last submissions that the Reference Court has erred by granting the enhanced solatium and interest by relying upon the amending Act of 1894 and giving it a retrospective operation. The learned counsel for the UPSRTC-beneficiary Sri Ratnesh Chandra has pointed out that though the amending Act of 1894 which was incorporated in Section23-(1A) gave a limited retrospective operation but nevertheless it also contained certain dates and since the instant case does not fall within the said parameters, accordingly, grant of higher solatium and interest is not in accordance with law.
26. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the land owner submits that it has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Panna Lal Ghosh (supra) that the effect of the amending Act is retrospective and would apply to all pending cases and since in the instant case, the Act which came into effect in the year 1984 while the instant Reference Court decided the matter on 14.10.1985 and on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, the reference was pending, consequently, they are entitled to the benefit and for the said reason, the decision of the Reference Court on this account deserves to be upheld.
27. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it will be relevant to notice the Section 23-(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended in the year 1984 and which reads as under:
"Section 23(1A) [(1A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation. In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded.]"
28. Significantly, the said amendment came to be considered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Union of India and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 and in paragraphs nos. 32 to 34, the Constitution Bench held as under:-
"32. The question is : What is the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award?" Are they limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against "any such award". The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words "any such award" mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 -- in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the words "any such award" cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of fora contemplated in the parent Act those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words "any such award" are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9-1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(1985) 1 SCC 582] , and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [(1985) 3 SCC 737] . The expanded meaning given to Section 30(2) in the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word "such" in the collocation "any such award" in Section 30(2). Due significance must be attached to that word, and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.
33. We find substance in the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, as he says, the terms in which Section 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of Section 30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium. The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior Courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory enhancement. It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1), and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium. Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on that date, and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value.
34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh [(1986) 1 SCC 365] , but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh [(1985) 3 SCC 737] , but the judgment in Bhag Singh [(1985) 3 SCC 737] as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a rehearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word ''or' has been used in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and on an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30-4-1982 to 24-9-1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word "or" is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984."
29. The said amendment came into controversy once again as there were certain conflicting views and the matter was once again referred to another Constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornan Vs. State of Kerala (1994) 5 SCC 593. The Apex Court decided the question referred in the case of K.S. Paripoornan by 3:2 opinion, however, the majority opined as under:-
"74. If sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1-A), by itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enactment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1) Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act."
30. From the perusal of the aforesaid two Constitution Bench decisions of the Apex Court, it would be clear that the award to attract the higher rate as per the amended provisions then the award must have been passed between the dates as mentioned therein i.e. between 30.04.1982 and 29.09.1984.
31. In the aforesaid backdrop, if the decision of the Panna Lal Ghosh (supra) is seen wherein in paragraphs nos. 8 to 14, a Division Bench of the Apex Court relied upon the decision of K.S. Paripoornan (Supra) and has held as under:-
"8. The second issue relates to the payment of solatium @ 30% under Section 23(2) of the Act.
Solatium is "money comfort" quantified by the statute and given as a conciliatory measure for the compulsory acquisition of land of the citizen, by a welfare State such as India. [Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, (1991) 4 SCC 212] Thus the statutory amount of solatium is intended to compensate the owner for his disinclination to part with his property.
9. The main aspect that arises for consideration is the issue of the rate of solatium. By an amendment in 1984, the rate was increased to 30% from the original 15% by virtue of Section 30(2) of the amending Act. This increase was given a limited retrospectivity, in the sense that the amending Act, under Section 30(2) provided that the increased solatium is applicable to those awards passed by the Collector or the court between 30-4-1982 and 29-9-1984. Can it be said that the present case would be entitled to this additional benefit?
10. The award was made by the LA Collector way before the said period i.e. in 1974. However, the Reference Court passed its award after the said period, i.e. in 1985. Therefore, the issue is whether the amendment would apply to a case pending during the period of 2 years from 30-4-1982 to 29-9-1984.
11. This precise issue has come up for consideration a number of times before this Court. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 754] it was held that the benefit of enhanced solatium would apply only in cases where the award by the Collector or court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 or appeals against such awards are decided by the High Courts or this Court, whether rendered before 24-9-1984 or after that date. This Court found that the language of the section ruled out the applicability of the benefit to all pending proceedings.
12. In Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama [(1990) 1 SCC 277 : AIR 1990 SC 981] the issue was whether the amendment would apply to an award made subsequent to 24-9-1984 even though the acquisition proceedings had commenced prior to the date. This Court looked at the intention behind giving retrospective effect to the amending section. If the literal interpretation is taken, it was held, it will result in an anomaly. In order to avoid it, regard must be had to the purpose of Section 30(2). Consequently, this Court awarded higher solatium even though the Reference Court made the award in 1985.
13. Again in K.S. Paripoornan case [(1994) 5 SCC 593 : AIR 1995 SC 1012] this Court widened the restricted interpretation given in Raghubir Singh case [(1989) 2 SCC 754] . It held that the enhanced solatium would apply even to a case pending at the time the Act came into force.
14. Following this train of thought, the benefit of enhanced solatium would extend to the present case. During the period between 30-4-1982 and 29-9-1984, the reference was pending in the Reference Court. The court's award was passed in 1985. Following the above interpretation, the appellants are thus entitled to enhanced solatium @ 30% and interest under Section 23(2) of the Act."
32. It is relying upon the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court that the learned counsel for the land owners submits that since the reference was pending on the date of commencement of the amending Act and accordingly in light of the decision of the Apex Court in Panna Lal Ghosh (supra), the land owners are entitled to the enhanced solatium and interest.
33. The Court has considered the aforesaid two Constitution Division Bench decisions of Raghuvir Singh (supra) and K.S. Paripoornan (supra) as well as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Panna Lal Ghosh (supra) and this Court finds that the observations made in the case of Panna Lal Ghosh (supra) is a reference to an opinion contained in the minority view of the Constitution Bench decision of K.S. Paripoornan (supra).
34. This minority opinion was authored by Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. where in paragraph 104 and 110, His Lordship held as under:-
"104. What remains to be considered is if the benefit under Section 23(1-A) could be extended even in those cases where appeals were pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against the award made by the Court under Section 18 of the Act. The word ''Court' used in Section 23(1-A) appears to refer to the Court under Section 18, only, as the Court under this provision has been empowered to award additional compensation on such market value as is determined by taking into consideration Section 23 of the Act. The word ''Court' in Section 23(1-A) does not appear to have been used in the wider sense as including the court of appeal or the Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Zora Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 673] it was observed rightly by this Court that the legislature's intention was to award additional compensation only at the stage of award made by the Collector or the Court under Section 18. The construction of the word ''Court' in the wider sense would not be in consonance with the purpose and objective of the legislation the background of which has been traced in detail. It is thus clear that the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is available only in those cases where the matter was pending for determination of compensation at the stage of reference under Section 18 in respect of acquisitions which had started even before 1982.
110. For all these reasons the questions raised in these petitions are answered as below:
(1) Section 23(1-A) providing for additional compensation is attracted in every case where reference was pending under Section 18 before the Court [Section 23(1-A)].
(2) No additional compensation is payable in appeals pending on or after 24-9-1984 either in High Court or this Court.
(3) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is also payable in all those cases where the proceedings were pending and the award had not been made by the Collector on or before 30-4-1982 [Section 30(1)(a)].
(4) Similarly every landowner is entitled to additional compensation where the land acquiring proceedings started after 30-4-1982 whether the award by the Collector was made before 24-9-1984 or not [Section 30(1)(b)].
(5) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is liable to be paid by the Collector as well (Section 15 of the Act).
Order of the Court [Ed.: Signed by all the five Hon'ble Judges Constituting the Bench] (Per Majority)"
35. Thus, from the above, it would reveal that the majority view which has opined on the proposition of law which has been recorded in paragraph nos. 74 and 75 as already re-produced in the preceding paragraphs and on its careful reading it would give a different picture altogether than as projected by the learned counsel for the respondents.
36. Significantly, even in a subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Giani (2011) 11 SCC 480, the Apex Court again relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) and has explained the applicability of the amending Act in paragraph nos. 7 to 9 which read as under:-
"7. In support of the said contention reference was made to the decision of the Constitutional Bench of this Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala [(1994) 5 SCC 593] in which this Court upon a combined reading of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1) of the Act held as follows: (SCC pp. 639-40, para 74) "74. ... A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1) Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act."
8. A similar issue again came up for consideration before this Court in Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 10 SCC 458 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 212] wherein reference was made and reliance was placed on the decision of K.S. Paripoornan [(1994) 5 SCC 593] .
9. In the present case the acquisition proceedings commenced with the Notification under Section 4 issued on 6-3-1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 9-7-1980 i.e. before 30-4-1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in K.S. Paripoornan [(1994) 5 SCC 593] the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A)."
37. From the aforesaid examination of the decisions and what has been culled out and applying it to the instant case, it would indicate the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is dated 11.11.1974 and though the reference was pending on the date when the amending Act came into the picture but the award is not within the two dates as mentioned above, accordingly, the retrospectivity which has been ascribed to the amending Act being limited in nature and the instant case does not fall within the said parameters, accordingly, this Court in its humble opinion is bound by the proposition laid by the Constitution Bench of Raghuveer Singh (Supra), K.S. Paripoornan (supra) and further explained in the decision of Giani (supra) thus is unable to accept the contention of the land owners in this regard.
38. In view of the aforesaid, the Reference Court clearly erred in granting the enhanced solatium and interest and to the aforesaid extent, the submission of the learned counsel for the State-appellant finds favour with this Court.
39. In light of the detailed discussions, the instant appeal is partly allowed. The award passed by the Reference Court is upheld subject to the payment of the outstanding sum along with interest and solatium at the rate of 9% and 15 % per annum respectively as existed prior to the amendment in the year 1984 and the award passed by the Reference Court is modified to the aforesaid limited extent that the amount awarded by the Reference Court is affirmed and it shall carry the rate of interest and solatium as applicable prior to the amendment in the year 1984 i.e. it shall be payable along with interest at the rate of 6 % and solatium at the rate of 15 % per annum, from the date of possession. Any amount already paid to the land owners shall be deducted and the remaining shall be paid alongwith full applicable interest by the appellants to the claimants-respondents within a period of two months from the date, a certified copy of this order is placed before the Authority concerned.
40. With the aforesaid, the appeal stands partly allowed. Costs are made easy. The record be returned to the Tribunal expeditiously.
Order Date :- 28th April, 2023 Asheesh