Delhi District Court
Also At : 3482 vs The State (Nct Of Delhi) on 2 May, 2019
IN THE COURT OF Dr. KAMINI LAU: SPECIAL JUDGE
(P.C. ACT) CBI01 (CENTRAL):TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 760/2018
Mahesh Khandelwal
S/o Late Puran Chand Khandelwal
R/o 20, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi.
Also at : 3482, Hauz Qazi, Delhi06.
................ Revisionist
VERSUS
1. The State (NCT of Delhi)
2. Brajender Khandelwal
S/o Late Rajender Prasad Khandelwal
R/o C801, Munirka Apartment
Plot No. 11, Sector9,
Dwarka, New Delhi.
.............. Respondents
Date of Institution : 26.10.2018
Judgment Reserved on : 02.05.2019
Judgment Pronounced on : 02.05.2019
JUDGMENT:(Oral) (1) This revision petition impugns the order dated 18.08.2018 passed by Ld. CMM (Central) in CC No. 535603/16 titled "Mahesh Khandelwal vs. Brajender Khandelwal" dismissing the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.PC filed by the complainant Mahesh Khandelwal (i.e. revisionist before this Court). (2) The brief facts of the case as put forth before the Ld. Trial Court are that one firm M/s. Rajendra Iron Mart has been in existence Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 1 of 19) since 15.01.1945, with partners Lal Puran Chand (i.e. father of the complainant / revisionist), Babu Atar Chand and Lal Rajender Prasad (i.e. father of father of the accused / respondent). As per the clauses of the partnership deed, after the death of a partner, his heirs shall become partners and a partnership was to continue and therefore, upon the death of the original partners, their LRs were joined in the partnership firm. A disputes arose between the LRs of the partners upon which Smt. Bhagwati Devi the mother of the accused, filed a suit for partition and rendition of account against the firm and its partners including the complainant, in 2004, wherein the accused herein claimed that he had refused to become partner in the firm M/s. Delhi Hardware Store (another firm with the same partners). Further, in 2005, Smt. Ravi Bala Mathur filed another suit against M/s. Delhi Hardware Store and others including Smt. Bhagwati Devi. According to the complainant, no will of the father of the accused was in existence till 2004 or 2005 when the said suits were filed, as no such will finds mention in those pleadings and the said suits were withdrawn as compromise. It is alleged that in October/November, 2007, the complainant demanded from accused NOC from all the LRs or to provide will of his father showing him as only beneficiary and that he would be inducted in the partnership only thereafter. It is the case of the revisionist / complainant that an unregistered will, claimed to be forged, was given to the complainant by the accused in January, 2008, on the basis of which he was inducted as partner w.e.f. 15.01.2008 and similarly, a registered Will was given by Smt. Ravi Bala Mathur, on the basis of which she Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 2 of 19) was inducted as partner but she voluntarily retired on 19.01.2010. The complainant further alleged that in January 2012, during discussion with Sh. Amit Mathur (witness to the will of father of accused) the complainant came to know that the said Amit Mathur had never signed any will and claimed that he had signed a blank stamp paper when he was in need of money which he took from the accused in September 2001. This being the background, the complainant claims that the Will had been forged by the accused in his favour, on the basis of which he took monetary benefit of Rs.28,24,515/ from the firm. (3) The case of the complainant is that the respondent / accused and Smt. Ravi Bala Mathur asked the complainant and Smt. Sneh Lata Khandelwal to give them Rs.1,65,000/ each after which they would retire from the firm. It is alleged that the said payment was made on 19.01.2010 and they accordingly retired, under intimation of the Registrar of Firms, however, one notice dated 21.02.2012 was received by the complainant from the accused wherein he maintained that he had never retired and alleging that his signatures had been obtained on blank papers. It is further alleged by the complainant that the accused has committed various offences and created a forged will of his father on the basis of which he got monetary benefit of Rs.28,24,515/ and therefore a complaint was made to the police on 30.04.2015 and 12.10.2015 but when no action was taken, complaint was filed by the complainant (i.e. revisionist before his court) in the Ld. Trial Court along with an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.PC but after considering the material placed before it, the Ld. Trial Court vide Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 3 of 19) impugned order dated 18.08.2018, dismissed the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.PC and granted liberty to the complainant to lead presummoning evidence. Being aggrieved by the said dismissal, the complainant has preferred present revision petition on the following grounds: ➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned order dated 18.08.2018 mechanically and without application of judicious mind and without appreciating the evidence against the accused person, hence the order dated 18.08.2018 is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. ➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned order dated 18.08.2018 in a routine manner without appreciating the law cited by the revisionist/petitioner.
➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the police has mentioned in Paraiv of Status Report on 10.03.2016 that the witness of the Will namely Amit Mathur and Sudhir Garg were examined whereas on the examination of the said Amit Mathur, he has stated that he had signed the blank Stamp Paper on which the Will in question was prepared.
➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has further failed to appreciate that the other witness to the Will in question i.e. Sh. Sudhir Garg has stated that he knows alleged Brajender Khandelwal very well since 25 years and he had signed the "Will' in good faith without going through its contents and that at the time of signing the "Will" his father was not Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 4 of 19) present.
➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned order in a routine manner without appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case and one of the instances of non applicability of the judicious mind in passing the impugned judgment is that on the one hand the Ld. MM mentioned the judgment that ".....In another case titled Lalita Kumari vs. Government of U.P. (2014) 2 SSC 1, which mandates the police register the FIR, whereas, this judgment is squarely applicable for giving directions for registration of the FIR.
➢ That the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that serious crime has been committed against the revisionist/petitioner as on the bare perusal of the contents of the complaint, it is evident that serious cognizable offences have been committed against the revisionist/petitioner. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of "Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors." reported as (2006) 1 SCC (Cri.) 678 & "Lallan Chaudhary & Ors.
Vs. State of Bihar & Anr" reported as (2007) 1 SCC (Cri.) 684.
➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the police have miserably failed to do its fundamental duty to register the FIR on the complaint of the revisionist in spite of commission of serious cognizable offences.
Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 5 of 19) ➢ That the Ld. Trial Court has further failed to appreciate that the forged Will is required to be produced from the possession of accused and because the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that opinion of FSL on forged Will is required to be obtain.
➢ That the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the status report of the police does not give any cogent reason for not lodging the FIR on the complaint of the revisionist/petitioner rather appeal finding is mentioned that no case is made out. In this regard reliance is placed upon the judgment in the case of "Radha vs. State"
reported as II (2011) DLT (Crl.) 658.
(4) Notice of the revision were issued to the respondents. The respondent no. 1 / State has not filed any reply to the revision petition.
In so far as the respondent no. 2 is concerned, he in his reply has stated that he had not been impleaded by the present Petitioner as party to the case in the Ld. Trial Court in the proceedings out of which the present Revision Petition has been filed, after the Trial Court declined the application of the petitioner under Section 156 (3) Cr.PC leaving the petitioner to prima facie prove before the Ld. Trial Court if any cognizable offence is made out against the respondent. It is averred that the petitioner ought not to be allowed to use the State Machinery to go out on witch hunting against the replying respondent, who had challenged the illegal actions of the petitioner as partner with respondent and civil litigation is pending between the parties. It is Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 6 of 19) further averred that in fact the petitioner had in the said case been restrained by the High Court of Delhi, by order dated 18.12.2012 from entering into negotiations regarding dealing with or selling or transferring or encumbering in any manner the property of the firm. It is also averred that the petitioner in complete disregard and in utter contempt and violation of the orders of the High Court for stay, negotiated for sale of the property of the partnership firm and received substantial disclosed amount of Rs. 2.87 Crores declared, without disclosing the same to the partners including the present respondent. It is further averred that when the present respondent came to know of the said illegal actions of the petitioner, the respondent filed contempt petition in the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the Hon'ble High Court after verifying the facts issued notice to the petitioner for contempt, and also recorded that it was a case of perjury by the petitioner and appropriate proceedings would have to be initiated against the petitioner. It is submitted that finally the petitioner has been fined for a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs for having committed contempt, and the disputes with respect to the rights of the replying respondent are pending adjudication in the said civil litigation. It is further submitted that the petitioner is guilty of willful suppression of material facts and of withholding of material documents relating to the successive partnership deeds of both Delhi Hardware Stores, and also of Rajendra Iron Mart, in which the parties and their respective predecessor have been partners. It is pointed out that in fact Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 7 of 19) fresh partnership deed was executed by the petitioner with the respondent in January, 2018 with respect to the firm Delhi Hardware Stores and in case if the Will was allegedly forged, why then the petitioner executed the said fresh partnership deed in January, 2018. It is alleged that in each of the partnership deeds of each of the said two firms, there was a specific stipulation that in the event of death of any partner, his heirs shall become partner in his place, and the partnership shall continue. It is averred that in accordance with the said stipulation contained in the partnership deeds, as and when any partner of the said firms expired, the legal heirs of the said deceased partner or any one of the said heirs, as decided amongst the heirs of the deceased partner, were taken in as partner in place of the deceased predecessor, with the same rights and interest as that of the deceased partner, without disturbing the shares of the other surviving partners. It is that when Sh. Rajendra Prasad Khandelwal, father of the replying respondent expired on 08.10.2001, the replying respondent was in the employment of a Nationalized bank, and therefore, according to service regulations and restrictions, a bank employee during the course of his employment, could not become a partner in any business nor carry any business. It is averred that time decided amongst the heirs of late Sh. Rajendra Prasad Khandelwal, that Smt. Bhagwati Devi, mother of the respondent be allowed to become a partner in the said firm in place of her deceased husband, to which arrangement all the heirs of Late Sh. Rajendra Prasad Khandelwal agreed. Thus with the consent of all the heirs of Late Sh. Rajendra Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 8 of 19) Prasad Khandelwal, his widow was taken in as partner, and remained a sleeping partner in the said firms. It was in that context that the said Smt. Bhagwati Devi had in her suit averred that her son had refused to become a partner. Since the affairs of the partnership were later found to be mismanaged and funds were being diverted, she was constrained to file the suit referred to in the present Revision Petition in which an Arbitrator was appointed for adjudication of the disputes. It is alleged that the conduct of the petitioner in trying to cheat the mother of the respondent in the affairs of the said partnership concerns, it was later thought proper that for effective pursuit of the affairs of the said partnership, the respondent should join as partner in the said firms in place of his mother Smt. Bhagwati Devi, to which even the mother and her other daughters agreed. It is averred that the respondent thereafter, took the permission of its employer to become a sleeping partner in the firms in place of his deceased father, and that the mother would no longer remain the partner in the said firms. Thus by such arrangement the respondent become the partner in the said firms in place of his mother, though only remaining a sleeping partner, to watch his interest and hence the fresh partnership deeds dated 15.01.2008 were executed with respect to both the said two firms. It is further alleged that all the original deeds are in the possession and control of the revisionist / petitioner which for malafide reasons have been withheld. It is also alleged that the factum of the execution of the will dated 21.09.2001, left behind by the deceased father of the replying respondent was all throughout in the knowledge of the petitioner and also the fact that Sh.
Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 9 of 19) Amit Mathur was one of the witnesses of the said will and copy of the said will was with petitioner all through out after the death of Sh. Rajendra Prasad Khandelwal. It is submitted that the story now sought to be put up by the revisionist/petitioner in collusion and conspiracy with the other partner Amit Mathur is false and concocted and an afterthought to illegally oust the respondent as the respondent had challenged the illegal actions of the petitioner to stealthily dispose off the property of the partnership in which the replying respondent has valuable interest. It is alleged that since the respondent was a sleeping partner in the said firm as he was actively engaged in Government Bank Service, the revisionist/petitioner used to take from the respondent signatures on blank papers some plain and some stamped which the respondent used to leave with the petitioner in good faith, not knowing that the revisionist/petitioner would at any time misuse the same. It is averred that the revisionist/petitioner however by illegally fabricating some documents and misusing the blank signed papers, tried to dispose off the property of the partnership and when the respondent got wind of the said mischief, the respondent filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi in which orders for stay as already mentioned herein above, were passed and on violation of the said stay orders contempt action was taken against the petitioner. It is further averred that the petitioner in order to coerce the respondent to succumb to his illegal designs, has ever since then been trying to harass the respondent and his family members by misusing the state machinery and that the revisionist had also made several false complaints to different Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 10 of 19) investigating agencies, who repeatedly interrogated the respondent, his sisters and mother of the respondent and also examined and questioned other persons, and came to the conclusion that the respondent had committed no offence, much less a cognizable offence, and no criminal case was made out against the respondent.
(5) I have considered the rival contentions and also perused the Trial Court record and the written synopsis of arguments filed by the parties. At the very Outset I may observe that it is settled law that the provisions of Section 156 (3) Cr.PC cannot be permitted to be misused by anybody to get police case registered even in those cases which are not of very serious nature (reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment in the case of "Skipper Beverages Pvt. Ltd vs. State" 2001 (92) DLT 217.
(6) Secondly, the powers granted under Section 156 (3) Cr.PC aught to be exercised primarily in those cases where the allegations are serious or evidence is beyond the reach of the complainant or custodial interrogation appears to be necessary for recovery of some articles and disclosure of facts. In a case where no custodial interrogation appears to be necessary for recovery of articles and disclosure of facts or allegations are nonserious or can be proved by summoning the witnesses by the complainant itself, the Ld. Magistrate is justified in holding an inquiry under Chapter XV to proceed against the accused, if required.
(7) Thirdly, the short ground on which Ld. Counsel for the revisionist has assailed the impugned order is that the alleged forged Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 11 of 19) 'Will' on the basis of which the complaint has been filed, is in the possession of the respondent no. 2 Brajender Khandelwal and for the production of the said 'Will' before the Court, the revisionist/petitioner needs police assistance.
(8) Now coming to the provisions of Section 91 Cr.P.C. which provides that:
91. Summons to produce document or other thing.
(1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order.
(2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed
(a) to affect sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872 ), or the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 (13 of 1891 ) or
(b) to apply to a letter, postcard, telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the postal or telegraph authority (9) The Hon'ble Delhi High Court had an opportunity to deal with the scope and applicability of the provisions of Section 91 Cr.P.C.
Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 12 of 19) in the case of Young Indian vs Subramanian Swamy & Anr. along with other petitions (Crl. M.C. 671/16, 672/16, 1317/16, 1319/16 & 1321/16) decided on 12.07.2016 wherein the Hon'ble Court has observed and I quote as under:
"....... 14. The other aspect is the applicability of Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. which could be invoked during the pendency of the investigation, inquiry, trial or any other proceedings under the Code. The present case we are dealing with the trial of the petitioners which is at the stage of precharge evidence.
Though, it is mentioned that power under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. could be invoked at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial but it is still to be examined by the Court, the purpose and the object of exercising the power envisaged under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. There could be various situations. Firstly, the documents could be summoned at the instance of the prosecution or the complainant to prove its case at the time of examination of the prosecution witnesses and to get it exhibited and proved through the witness who is under the oral examination. Similarly, it could be summoned at the instance of defence to confront the prosecution witnesses during crossexamination and similarly by the defence at the time of leading the defence evidence to put to the defence witnesses for the purpose of exhibition and establishing its plea in the defence.
Apart from the same, the Court on its own can summon the documents to clear any ambiguity or for the purpose of clarification of any disputed fact or discrepancies in the documents so exhibited by the prosecution/complainant or by the defence, in other words for clarification for reaching a just decision.
In the present case, none of the situations Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 13 of 19) discussed above had arisen to summon the documents.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the orders passed in the present case do not reflect any necessity or desirability. On this point, judgment in the case of Ashok Chawla v. Ram Chander Garvan, Inspector CBI MANU/DE/1243/2011 has been referred in which it was observed that Section 91 Cr.P.C. provides that whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons or such officer a written order, requiring the person in whose possession or power such documents are believed to be to attend and produce the same. On similar point, various other judgments have also been relied upon:
(i) "The power given under Section 91 of the code is a general and wide power which empowers the court, the production of any document or any other thing at any stage of any investigation, inquiry or other proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is no doubt true that the legislature has circumscribed this power to be exercised only where the court considers that the summoning of such document or things was necessary or desirable in its view, then the court could pass an order both in favor of the accused as well as the prosecution. It is no doubt true that such power would not be exercised where the documents or thing may not be found relevant or it may be for the mere purpose or delaying the proceedings or the order is sought with an oblique motive."
[Neelesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan
MANU/RH/0569/2005]
(ii) "As per Section 91 of the Code of Criminal
Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 14 of 19) Procedure, when the Court considers that production of any document is necessary or desirable for the purpose of trial of a criminal case, such Court may issue summons for the production of the document sought for. The Court has to judicially consider whether production of the document is relevant for the purpose of trial. Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not confer an absolute right on the accused to seek for production of any documents. The party who prays for issuance of summons for production of document has to necessarily demonstrate before the Court that production of such document is material for arriving at a just decision in the case. If the petitioners fail to establish that a particular document is necessary and desirable to be summoned, then the Court shall not summon the document."
[Alagesan and others v. State (2008) Cri.L.J. 3300 (Madras)]
(iii) "Section 91 Cr.PC envisages production of any document or other thing which according to the court or police officer in charge of the police station is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, enquiry or trial or other proceedings under the Code. The width of the powers under this section is unlimited. The only limitations are as regards to the such documents or things to be necessary or desirable for the purposes mentioned therein. Though the case of Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) pertained to the stage of framing of charges and the Apex Court held that at that stage, the case of production of documents was not made out, but the plain and literal reading of provisions of section 91 Cr.PC would reveal that the court was empowered to order for production of document or other thing only when that may be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enquiry, trial or other proceedings. The Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 15 of 19) court has to deal with this issue to satisfy itself as regard to the necessity or desirability of the documents sought to be produced."
[Ravindra Kuman Chandolia v. CBI 2012 SCC Online Del 1263]
(iv) "Any document or other thing envisaged under the aforesaid provision can be ordered to be produced on finding that the same is 'necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code'. The first and foremost requirement of the section is about the document being necessary or desirable. The necessity or desirability would have to be seen with reference to the stage when a prayer is made for the production. If any document is necessary or desirable for the defence of the accused, the question of invoking Section 91 at the initial stage of framing of a charge would not arise since defence of the accused is not relevant at that stage. When the section refers to investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings, it is to be borne in mind that under the section a police officer may move the Court for summoning and production of a document as may be necessary at any of the stages mentioned in the section..... In so far as Section 91 is concerned, it was rightly held that the width of the powers of that section was unlimited but there were inbuilt inherent limitations as to the stage or point of time of its exercise, commensurately with the nature of proceedings as also the compulsions of necessity and desirability, to fulfill the task or achieve the object. Before the trial court the stage was to find out whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding to the next stage against the accused...."
[State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padi (2005) 1 SCC 568] Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 16 of 19)
(v) "Section 91 Cr.P.C. envisages the production of any document or other thing which is required or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code, if the Court is satisfied that such documents are essential and required at the relevant stage of proceedings. For allowing the application for production of documents or other things under Section 91 Cr.P.C., the Court has to deal with the issue of their necessity and relevancy and also whether such documents are required at the stage when they are sought to be summoned by the applicant. Summoning of documents cannot be allowed on a mere asking by the applicant or as a matter of routine. Section 294 Cr.PC provided for admission/denial of the documents filed in the Court by the prosecution or the accused. It also provided that where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed and that the court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved."
[Chandgiram v. State 2012 SCC Online 1740] (10) Ld. Counsel appearing for the the Respondent no. 2 has denied the possession of the alleged Will. According to him, the Will in question had been lost during the investigation which has been initiated on the basis of the false complaint of the present petitioner and this fact was duly disclosed to the police in the year 2012 itself. It is also argued by the Ld. Counsel that the present petition has been filed with the malafide motive in as much as the complainant attempted to dispose off the property of the partnership firms and in this regard the respondent no. 2 had also filed a petition under Section 9 & 11 of Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 17 of 19) Arbitration and Conciliation Act in the Delhi High Court wherein the petitioner had been restrained from disposing off the properties of the partnership, however, the petitioner/revisionist in violation of the said orders of Delhi High Court, disposed off the properties for which contemptuous action was taken against the petitioner. In fact the Hon'ble High Court allowed the said petition under Section 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act and referred the dispute for decision by the Arbitrator wherein the Ld. Arbitrator rejected the contentions of the petitioner / revisionist and delivered the award dated 21.01.2019. I may note that the Respondent No. 2 had also claimed before the Ld. Trial Court that he is no longer in the possession of the Will and the same had lost during the course of investigation in the present case. This being so, it is open to the revisionist to lead secondary evidence on the same to prove the existence / nonexistence of the alleged Will by examining witnesses to the Will and the Ld. Trial Court can take judicial notice of this fact while considering the totality of the circumstances and material placed before it while deciding the complaint at the final stage since no party can be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong and the Ld. Trial Court shall accordingly consider the implications of nonproduction of the same. (11) Lastly, applying the settled principle of law to the facts of present case, I may observe that the order of the Ld. Trial Court in declining the request of the complainant to issue directions to the police under Section 156 (3) Cr.PC as the allegations made by the petitioner / revisionist could be proved by the oral and other evidence by summoning the witnesses, cannot be faulted. The entire allegations are Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 18 of 19) based upon the documentation. This is not a case where the police assistance was required for breaking the case and for discovering some evidence which the revisionist is unable to collect of its own. Also, keeping in view the nature of allegations involved, there is nothing to show that interest of justice requires police to stepin to help the complainant. Hence, under the given circumstances, the impugned order of Ld. MM proceeding further with the inquiry under Chapter XV, cannot be faulted.
(12) In view of my above discussion, I find no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order of Ld. Trial Court. The revisionist shall be at liberty to lead secondary evidence with regard to the existence and nonexistence of the Will in question and regard to the forge and fabrication of the same, as alleged by him. The revision petition is hereby Dismissed being devoid of merits. Copy of this order be sent to the Ld. Trial Court. Digitally signed by KAMINI (13) Revision file be consigned to Record Room. KAMINI LAU LAU Date:
2019.05.02 17:35:19 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Dr. KAMINI LAU) Dated: 02.05.2019 Addl. Sessions Judge02 (Central) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi Mahesh Khandelwal vs. State (GNCTD) (Crl. Revision No. 760/18) (Page No. 19 of 19)