Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dilip Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 November, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930
1 MCRC-42865-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 42865 of 2025
DILIP SHARMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Jitendra Kumar Sharma, Senior Advocate with Shri Abhishek
Parashar, learned counsel for the petitioner [P-1].
Shri Samar Ghuraiya Dy Ga appearing on behalf of Advocate
General[r-1].
Shri Daya Ram Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent [R-2].
Reserved on : 17.11.2025
Pronounced on : 9.01.2026
This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, Hon'ble Shri Justice
Milind Ramesh Phadke, Judge pronounced the following:
ORDER
1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure / Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 for quashing the FIR and consequential proceedings relating to Crime No. 292/2024 registered at Police Station Hazira, District Gwalior for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(N), 354(gha), 294 and 506 of IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner and the complainant are known to each other and their families. The petitioner had Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 2 MCRC-42865-2025 given financial help to the complainant and her family several times, either personally or through his relatives. When he asked for return of his money, the complainant and her father did not return the same and instead started threatening the petitioner to implicate him in false criminal cases. Due to these threats, the petitioner made a complaint at Police Station Maharajpura, where the statement of the complainant was also recorded. Thereafter, the applicant submitted a written application to the SHO, P.S. Maharajpura. Earlier also, the complainant had made a false complaint before the Superintendent of Police, District Niwari, which was investigated by University Police Station, Gwalior, and later the complainant herself withdrew the said complaint. On 14.08.2023, when the petitioner refused to give more money, the complainant again made a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, District Datia, which was also later withdrawn by her. In January 2024, when the petitioner again went to the complainant's house to demand his money back, a false FIR was lodged against him by the complainant's father at Police Station Hazira, which is Annexure P/1.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complainant and her family are repeatedly filing false complaints at different police stations only to avoid returning the money and to harass and blackmail the applicant. The petitioner was arrested in Crime No. 036/2024, but later enlarged on bail, as there is no substance in the allegations. It is submitted that a bare reading of the prosecutrix's statement shows that there is no clear allegation against the present petitioner. The SHO, P.S. Hazira issued a notice dated 21.05.2024, to which the petitioner submitted a detailed reply.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 3 MCRC-42865-2025 The petitioner also submitted a representation to police authorities on 24.05.2024. It is further submitted that the wife of the petitioner also made complaints to the Superintendent of Police, Niwari. From the above facts, it is clear that the petitioner has been falsely implicated only to pressurize and blackmail him and to avoid repayment of money.
4. It has been argued that the FIR has been lodged with a clear intention to harass, blackmail and pressurize the petitioner and to avoid returning the money borrowed from him. It has further been argued that the complainant has filed multiple false complaints at different places, most of which were later withdrawn by her. This shows clear misuse of the legal process. Even if the FIR and statements are taken as they are, no ingredients of the alleged offence are made out against the present petitioner. There is no clear and specific allegation against the petitioner in the statement of the prosecutrix. The entire case arises only because the petitioner demanded his money back. To bolster his submission learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision passed in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2019) 9 SCC 608, and thus, prayed that the proceedings instituted against the present petitioner be quashed in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra).
5. Per contra, Counsel for the respondent/State as well as Counsel for the respondent No.2 had opposed the submissions so made by counsel for the petitioners and it was submitted that there are specific allegations against the present petitioner, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief and inherent Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 4 MCRC-42865-2025 powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent no.2 further submitted that the complaint clearly discloses serious offences such as sexual exploitation, criminal intimidation, blackmail, assault, misuse of obscene photos/videos, and continuous harassment. The petitioner was a family friend and misused the trust of the complainant and her family. Taking advantage of her young age and innocence, he established physical relations and later, along with his wife Rekha Sharma, continued to sexually exploit and threaten her. The accused persons have illegally kept private photos and videos of the complainant and are continuously threatening to make them viral. This is a grave offence and causes continuous mental torture, fear and social danger to the complainant. The petitioner have threatened to kill the complainant, to defame her, to destroy her marriage, and have already succeeded in breaking her engagement by contacting the groom's family and spreading false information. The petitioner came to the complainant's house with a licensed gun, abused them and assaulted her father with the butt of the gun. This shows that the petitioner is dangerous and has no respect for law. It is further submitted that the wife of petitioner is fully supporting her husband, threatening the complainant, sending messages, pressurizing her to meet petitioner and helping in blackmail and defamation. Due to continuous threats, blackmail and harassment, the complainant had gone into depression. It is submitted that the complaint, statements and circumstances clearly show that a strong prima facie criminal case exists against the petitioner. The defence story of the petitioner cannot be examined in detail under Section Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 5 MCRC-42865-2025 482 Cr.P.C. / Section 528 BNSS and all these issues require proper trial and evidence. The petitioner have already threatened that they have political connections and can manage the police and administration. If proceedings are quashed, the complainant's life and dignity will be in serious danger. It is settled law that in cases of serious offences, especially involving sexual exploitation, blackmail and threats, FIR should not be quashed at the initial stage. To bolster his submission learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has placed reliance in the case of Anurag Soni Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in AIR 2019 SC 1857 and prays for dismissal of the present petition.
7. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anurag Soni (supra) in para 10 has held as under:
10. While considering this appeal on merits further, some of the decisions of this Court on Section 375 and Section 90 of the IPC and on the consent/consensual sex are required to be referred to and considered:
10.1 In the case of Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (2013) 9 SCC 113, this Court has explained the essentials and parameters of the offence of rape. In the said decision, in para 12, this Court observed and held as under:
"12. Section 375 IPC defines the expression "rape", which indicates that the first clause operates, where the woman is in possession of her senses, and therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will; and second, where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth, when there is consent, but it is not such a consent as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her on any person in whom she is Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 6 MCRC-42865-2025 interested in fear of death or of hurt. The expression "against her will" means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent" is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of an act complained of. Section 90 IPC refers to the expression "consent". Section 90, though, does not define "consent", but describes what is not consent. "Consent", for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. (See State of H.P. v. Mango Ram (2000) 7 SCC 224"
10.2 In the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675, this Court observed and held in paragraphs 21 and 24 as under:
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence.Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 7 MCRC-42865-2025 There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."
10.3 In the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 615, this Court also considered the amendment made in the Indian Evidence Act - Section 114A of the Evidence Act. In that case, the sexual intercourse was committed with the prosecutrix by the accused. As per the prosecutrix, the accused used to come to her sister's house in between 11 a.m. and 12 noon daily and asked her for sexual intercourse with him. She refused to participate in the said act but the accused kept on persisting and persuading her. She resisted for about 3 months. On one day, the accused came to Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 8 MCRC-42865-2025 her sister's house at about 12 noon and closed the doors and had sexual intercourse forcibly, without her consent and against her will. When she asked the accused as to why he spoiled her life, he gave assurance that he would marry her and asked her not to cry, though his parents were not agreeing for the marriage. It was found that on the basis of the assurance given by the accused this process of sexual intercourse continued and he kept on assuring that he would marry her. When she became pregnant, she informed about the pregnancy to the accused. He got certain tablets for abortion but they did not work. When she was in the third month of pregnancy, she again insisted for the marriage and the accused answered that his parents are not agreeable. She deposed that had he not promised, she would not have allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. The question was raised before the Panchayat of elders and the prosecutrix was present in the Panchayat along with her sister and brotherinlaw. The accused and his father both attended the Panchayat and the accused admitted about the illegal contacts with the prosecutrix and causing pregnancy. The accused asked for two days' time for marrying the prosecutrix and the Panchayat accordingly granted time. But after the Panchayat meeting the accused absconded from the village and when the accused did not fulfil his promise which was made before the Panchayat, the prosecutrix lodged the complaint. Considering the aforesaid facts and after considering Section 90 of the IPC, this Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. While convicting the accused, this Court in paragraphs 9, 10,15 and 16 observed and held as under:
"9. The question in the present case is whether this conduct of the accused apparently falls under any of the six descriptions of Section 375 IPC as mentioned above. It is clear that the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with the accused on the representation made by the accused that he would marry her. This Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 9 MCRC-42865-2025 was a false promise held out by the accused. Had this promise not been given perhaps, she would not have permitted the accused to have sexual intercourse. Therefore, whether this amounts to a consent or the accused obtained a consent by playing fraud on her. Section 90 of the Penal Code says that if the consent has been given under fear of injury or a misconception of fact, such consent obtained, cannot be construed to be a valid consent. Section 90 reads as under:
"90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or [Consent of insane person] if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or [Consent of child] unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age."
10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her.Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 10 MCRC-42865-2025 for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent. .......
15. In this connection reference may be made to the amendment made in the Evidence Act. Section 114A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114A reads as under:
"114A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.--In a prosecution for rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) of sub section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent."
16. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutrix and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the instant case as per the statement of PW 1, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry her."
10.4 In the case of State of U.P. v. Naushad (2013) 16 SCC 651, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court reversed the acquittal by the High Court and convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. This Court observed Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 11 MCRC-42865-2025 and held as under:
"17. Section 376 IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of rape. Section 375 IPC defines the offence of rape, and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The description "secondly" speaks of rape "without her consent". Thus, sexual intercourse by a man with a woman without her consent will constitute the offence of rape. We have to examine as to whether in the present case, the accused is guilty of the act of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix "against her consent". The prosecutrix in this case has deposed on record that the accused promised marriage with her and had sexual intercourse with her on this pretext and when she got pregnant, his family refused to marry him with her on the ground that she is of "bad character".
18. How is "consent" defined? Section 90 IPC defines consent known to be given under "fear or misconception" which reads as under:
"90.Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception;" (emphasis supplied) Thus, if consent is given by the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact, it is vitiated.
19. In the present case, the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to the prosecutrix that he would marry her. After she got pregnant, he refused to do so. From this, it is evident that he never intended to marry her and procured her consent only for the reason of having sexual relations with her, which act of the accused falls squarely under the definition of rape as he had sexual intercourse with her consent which was consent obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 IPC. Thus, the alleged consent said to Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 12 MCRC-42865-2025 have been obtained by the accused was not voluntary consent and this Court is of the view that the accused indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by misconstruing to her his true intentions. It is apparent from the evidence that the accused only wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and was under no intention of actually marrying the prosecutrix. ........." 10.5 Even in the case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, in paragraph 23, this Court has observed that there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception, this Court observed and held as under:
"23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 13 MCRC-42865-2025 motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the IPC."
10.6 The High Court of Delhi in Sujit Ranjan v. State [Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2011 decided on 27.01.2011], after referring to and considering several decisions of this Court, ultimately in paragraph 16, observed and held as under:
"16. Legal position which can be culled out from the judicial pronouncements referred above is that the consent given by the prosecutrix to have sexual intercourse with whom she is in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be considered as given under "misconception of fact". Whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary or whether it is given under "misconception of fact" depends on the facts of each case. While considering the question of consent, the Court must consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances before reaching a conclusion. Evidence adduced by the prosecution has to be weighed keeping in mind that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence. Prosecution must lead positive evidence to give rise to inference beyond reasonable doubt that accused had no intention to marry prosecutrix at all from inception and that promise made was false to his knowledge. The failure to keep the promise on a future uncertain date may be on account of variety of reasons and could not always amount to "misconception of fact" right from the inception."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anurag Soni (supra) as well as in other cases has repeatedly held that consent must be free, voluntary and given with full understanding. It must be a conscious and informed choice. If a woman agrees because she is cheated, threatened, or misled, then such consent is not valid consent in the eyes of law. Every Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 14 MCRC-42865-2025 physical relationship is not rape. If two adults willingly and knowingly enter into a relationship, it is consensual. However, if a man gets physical relations by lying, cheating or giving a false promise, then it is not real consent. If a man never intended to marry from the very beginning, and only pretended that he would marry the woman to get physical relations, then the woman's consent is based on misconception of fact. Such consent is invalid under Section 90 IPC. And such sexual act amounts to rape under Section 375 IPC. It has also been held that If the man honestly wanted to marry, but later could not marry due to unavoidable circumstances, family pressure, or other reasons, then it is not rape, even if the relationship breaks later. If from the start, his intention was dishonest and only to exploit, then it is rape. If from the start, his intention was genuine, but marriage failed later, then it is not rape. If a woman agrees to physical relations only because she believes the man will marry her, and that belief is created by a lie, then: the consent is not voluntary. It is consent under misconception of fact and it has no legal value and on that the Court must look at full facts and conduct and must examine the conduct of the accused, his behaviour before and after the incident, Whether he tried to avoid marriage, Whether he ran away, refused, or made excuses, Whether the promise was just a trick from the beginning. Under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, in serious rape cases, if sexual intercourse is proved, and the woman says she did not consent, then the Court will presume that there was no consent. The prosecution must show that the promise of marriage was false from the beginning, and the accused never intended to marry, and the physical relationship was obtained Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 15 MCRC-42865-2025 only by cheating and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if sex is obtained by a false promise of marriage made with dishonest intention from the beginning, it is rape and if sex is between two consenting adults and marriage fails later for genuine reasons, it is not rape. Each case depends on its own facts and evidence.
10. In the present case, the allegations made in the FIR and in the statements of the prosecutrix are serious in nature. The complainant has specifically alleged that the petitioner misused his position as a family friend, took advantage of her innocence and established physical relations with her on the false promise of marriage. It is also alleged that the petitioner and his wife kept her private photos and videos and were continuously threatening to make them viral in order to blackmail and pressurize her. There are also allegations of criminal intimidation, assault and use of a licensed firearm. It is further alleged that due to continuous threats and harassment, the complainant has gone into depression and her engagement was broken because of the acts of the petitioner. These allegations, if taken at their face value, clearly disclose the commission of cognizable and serious offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(N), 354(gha), 294 and 506 of IPC. At this stage, this Court cannot examine the truthfulness or otherwise of these allegations nor can it accept the defence version of the petitioner that the case is purely a money dispute and that the complainant has falsely implicated him. All these issues require proper evidence and can be decided only during trial.
11. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) does not help the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 16 MCRC-42865-2025 petitioner as the said case is based upon different factual matrix, as to whether the promise of marriage was false from the very beginning or whether the relationship was consensual and later turned sour is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be decided in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
13. On the other hand, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Anurag Soni (supra) clearly shows that if consent is obtained by cheating, false promise or deception, and if from the very beginning the intention of the accused was dishonest, then such consent is no consent in the eyes of law and the act would amount to rape. The prosecutrix in the present case has clearly alleged that the petitioner never intended to marry her and only used her for his lust as he was already married and thereafter started blackmailing and threatening her. This Court also finds force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that the petitioner is alleged to be an influential person and has already threatened the complainant and her family. If such serious proceedings are quashed at the threshold, it would not only cause grave injustice to the victim but would also amount to miscarriage of justice.
14. It is also settled law that in cases involving serious offences like sexual exploitation, blackmail and criminal intimidation, the FIR should not be quashed at the initial stage unless the Court finds that no offence at all is made out. In the present case, this Court is of the clear view that a strong prima facie case is made out against the petitioner.
15. The inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31930 17 MCRC-42865-2025 Section 528 BNSS are to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, and only to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court does not find that the proceedings are an abuse of the process of law. Rather, quashing the proceedings at this stage would seriously prejudice the complainant and would defeat the cause of justice.
16. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and after carefully examining the FIR, the statements on record, and the material placed before this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. / Section 528 of BNSS, 2023. It is well settled law that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial or to examine the defence of the accused in detail. At this stage, the Court has only to see whether the allegations in the FIR and the material collected during investigation disclose a prima facie case or not.
17. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. The petition filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./ Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 is hereby dismissed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) JUDGE (aspr) Signature Not Verified Signed by: ASHISH PAWAR Signing time: 13-01-2026 11:05:12