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[Cites 6, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Hari Narayan Malviya vs High Court Of M.P. And Anr. on 24 March, 2022

Author: Chief Justice

Bench: Ravi Malimath

            IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                  AT JABALPUR
                                       BEFORE
                  HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH,
                                   CHIEF JUSTICE
                                            &
        HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
                           ON THE 24th OF MARCH, 2022
                      WRIT PETITION No. 3604 of 2003

              Between:-

              HARINARAYAN MALVIYA, SON OF SHRI
              MISHRILAL, DATE OF BIRTH 25-1-1960,
              PEON (SINCE REMOVED), SHUJALPUR
              SHEETLA COLONY, JAIL ROAD, SHAJAPUR
              (M.P.)
                                                                     .....PETITIONER

              (BY SHRI ADITYA NARAYAN SHUKLA - ADVOCATE)

                                          AND

      1.      HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,
              THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL,
              JABALPUR (M.P.)

      2.      DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, SHAJAPUR
              (M.P.)
                                                                  ....RESPONDENTS

              (SMT. SHOBHA MENON - SENIOR ADVOCATE ASSISTED BY MS.
              ANCHAL SARAF -ADVOCATE)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       This petition coming on for hearing this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice
Ravi Malimath, passed the following:
                                        2
                                   ORDER

The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as a Peon on 12.01.1982 in the Office of District & Sessions Judge, Shajapur. It is his case that he was falsely implicated in Sessions Case No.131 of 2000 before the Sessions Judge, District Shajapur. On trial, the petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 326, 324 and 323 read with Section 34 of I.P.C and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs.500/- and rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.250/- respectively.

2. Aggrieved by the same, he preferred a Criminal Appeal No.495 of 2002 before the Indore Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Based on the order of conviction by the Sessions Court, the respondents passed the impugned order dated 13.05.2002 (Annexure P/1) terminating him from service. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal to the appellate Authority which was dismissed. Questioning both these orders, the instant petition is filed.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order passed by the authority dismissing him from service is unsustainable. That the petitioner was convicted and sentenced for the offence punishable under Sections 326, 324 and 323 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs.500/- and rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.250/- respectively. That the same does not involve an offence of moral turpitude, as a consequence whereof, his termination from service is too harsh a consequence of being convicted.

3

In support of his case, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Hazarilal reported in (2008) 3 SCC 273. He also placed reliance on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court passed in Writ Appeal No.955 of 2018 dated 11.03.2019 (The State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Sita Ram Sharma). He therefore, contends that since the offence for which he has been convicted does not involve moral turpitude or he has not been punished for any heinous offence, the punishment of dismissal from service is unwarranted. Hence, he pleads that the petition be allowed by setting aside the order of termination.

4. The same is disputed by Smt. Shobha Menon, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the counsel representing respondents No.1 and 2. It is contended that the order of termination is just and appropriate. That the question of moral turpitude or one of a heinous offence is quite alien to Rule 19 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1966 (for short "the Rules of 1966"). Therefore, the contention of the petitioner on this count cannot be accepted. That the punishment awarded of dismissal from service is a consequence of his conviction in a Court of law, hence, no interference is called for.

5. Heard learned counsels.

6. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.131 of 2000, the writ petitioner has since filed Criminal Appeal No.409 of 2002, before the Indore Bench of the High Court of M.P. Thereafter, it was transferred to the Principal Bench at Jabalpur and has been renumbered as Criminal Appeal No.8105 of 2021. By the order dated 24.03.2022, the appeal was dismissed and the order of conviction was modified and 4 confirmed. However, the sentence was modified as can be seen from the said order. Therefore, the conviction of the petitioner continued.

7. So far as the reliance on the judgment in the case of Hazarilal (supra) is concerned, the same is with reference to paras 7 and 8 which read as follows:-

"7. By reason of the said provision, thus, "the disciplinary authority has been empowered to consider the circumstances of the case where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge", but the same would not mean that irrespective of the nature of the case in which he was involved or the punishment which has been imposed upon him, an order of dismissal must be passed. Such a construction, in our opinion, is not warranted.
8. An authority which is conferred with a statutory discretionary power is bound to take into consideration all the attending facts and circumstances of the case before imposing an order of punishment. While exercising such power, the disciplinary authority must act reasonably and fairly. Respondent occupied the lowest rank of the cadre. He was merely a contingency peon. Continuation of his service in the department would not bring a bad name to the State. He was not convicted for any act involving moral turpitude. He was not punished for any heinous offence.
5

8. We have considered the contentions. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 reads as follows:-

"19. Special procedure in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 14 to Rule 18 :-
(i) where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or
(ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, or
(iii) where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold any inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit:
Provided that the Commission shall be consulted where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule."

9. The same would indicate that if there is a conviction imposed on a Government servant on a criminal charge, the same can constitute a ground for imposing a penalty on him. However, what was held in para 7 is to the effect that only because the Government servant has been convicted does not necessarily lead to his termination. It was further held that in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant therein was not convicted for 6 any act involving moral turpitude nor was he punished for any heinous offence.

10. On considering the same, we are of the view that so far as the Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 is concerned, the same does not indicate any moral turpitude or any reference to any heinous offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment have not indicated that Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 has to be read to mean an act involving moral turpitude nor does the judgment indicate that a person has to be punished for any heinous offence alone to attract a penalty by the employer. It is an observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the given facts and circumstances of the case. The further observation made therein is that while exercising the power under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966, the disciplinary authority must act reasonably and fairly. That the Court would have to see the manner in which the offence was committed or otherwise and the findings recorded by the criminal Court and consequently whether the findings recorded would have any nexus with the order of dismissal.

11. In the instant case, the act alleged against the writ petitioner- Harinarayan Malviya is of causing grievous injury on the injured persons. In fact, one of the injuries caused is on the skull of one of the injured persons. The doctor's report as well as the radiologist's report indicate to the said effect. It is for this reason he was convicted for the offence for which he was charged. He having committed certain offences, in our considered view would justify his dismissal from service. Therefore, we find that while considering the order of dismissal as well as the manner in which the offences were committed and the conviction of the writ petitioner, the act of dismissal imposed on the petitioner can be said to be reasonable and fair.

7

Therefore, we find that so far as the exercise of discretion is concerned, the same does not run contrary to the provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966. So also is the judgment to the similar effect in Writ Appeal No.955 of 2018 dated 11.03.2019. The aforesaid judgment in the case of Hazarilal (supra) was also considered therein. The finding recorded by the Division Bench therein was that the employer did not exercise its powers fairly, justly and reasonably and that the manner in which the offence has been committed, was not taken into consideration appropriately. So far as the facts herein are concerned, we have no hesitation to hold that the act of the respondents in terminating the services of the petitioner is just and appropriate. That the provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1966 have been completely adhered to.

12. Under these circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere in the order of dismissal.

13. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

                    (RAVI MALIMATH)                              (PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
                      CHIEF JUSTICE                                          JUDGE

pb.


      Digitally signed by PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE
      Date: 2022.03.28 17:54:04 +05'30'