M/S Ishwar Chand Suresh Kumar vs Smt. Sunita Garg on 23 January, 2009

[Cites 21, Cited by 1]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

M/S Ishwar Chand Suresh Kumar vs Smt. Sunita Garg on 23 January, 2009

The defendant has approached this Court by filing the present petition challenging the order dated 8.9.2007, passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Narwana in an application filed under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, `the CPC'), whereby the defence of the petitioner- defendant was struck off.

Briefly, the facts are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for possession and penalty for use and occupation of the shop in question against the petitioner-defendant with the plea that the respondent was the owner of the shop in question which was rented out to the petitioner on 1.6.2001 at a half yearly rent of Rs. 20,000/-. It was further pleaded therein that a notice for termination of tenancy had been sent to the petitioner and the rent was also due from 1.12.2001. Thereafter, the petitioner gave a cheque of Rs. 20,000/- towards rent payable upto 30.5.2002. The suit was filed on 6.6.2002 with the plea that the respondent was entitled to Rs. 40,000/- as rent and penalty for use and occupation for six months from 1.6.2002 and also the possession of the suit property.

It was pleaded by the petitioner-defendant that he was in possession of the upper portion of the shop from the year 1998 @ Rs. 18,000/- per annum and on 1.6.2001, the upper portion was vacated and the ground floor was taken on rent @ Rs. 20,000/- per annum. It was further pleaded that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid vide cheque No. 692820 dated 15.6.2001 drawn on State Bank of Patiala as rent from 1.6.2001 to 31.5.2002. For another year, rent of Rs. 20,000/- was paid C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [2] vide cheque No. 652896 dated 15.5.2002 drawn on State Bank of Patiala from 1.6.2002 to 31.5.2003. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent filed an application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC with the plea that the petitioner-defendant having failed to deposit the rent from 1.6.2002 onwards, his defence was liable to be struck off. The same was contested by the petitioner pleading the same to be belated as the evidence of the parties was going on and also that the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC are not mandatory but directory. It was further stated that rent upto 31.5.2003 had already been paid and the petitioner was ready and willing to pay the balance as well. The learned court below while accepting the application filed by the respondent struck off the defence of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 8.9.2007.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the shop in question was taken on rent by him at Rs. 20,000/- per annum and not at Rs. 20,000/- for six months. The provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 PC provide for payment of admitted rent and in the present case, the admitted rent was already paid by him. He further submitted that otherwise also, the exercise of power under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC is discretionary. The suit filed against the petitioner should not go uncontested by striking off his defence. The petitioner, in fact, was always ready and willing to pay rent even for the period subsequent thereto, but the respondent disputing the rate of rent never accepted the same. During the pendency of the present petition, the petitioner had already paid the admitted rent for the period from 1.6.2002 till date. Under these circumstances, the delay, if any, in tendering the rent be condoned and the impugned order be set aside. Reliance was placed upon M/s Mangat Singh Trilochan Singh Thr. Mangat Singh (D) thr. Lrs. and others v. Satpal, 2004(2) PLR 225 and Govind Singh and others v. M/s Mynah International Ltd., 2006(2) RCR (Civil) 9.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it was merely a vague stand of the petitioner that he had paid the rent upto 31.5.2003, but as is noticed by the learned court below in the impugned order, no receipt was ever produced. Even if the stand taken by the petitioner that he had paid the admitted amount of rent upto 31.5.2003, still thereafter not a single penny of even admitted rent was paid by the petitioner. Keeping in view this default by the petitioner, no illegality was committed by the learned court below in striking off his defence under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC as it is specifically provided therein that a tenant is under obligation to pay the rent regularly throughout the continuation of the suit every month within a week from the date of its accrual and in case of failure, the court may strike off the defence. In the present case, the C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [3] period of default is not for a few days for which the petitioner could seek condonation. It is running into years. On the one hand, the respondent is deprived of the possession of the property, whereas on the other hand, the petitioner is enjoying the possession of the property exploiting the same for commercial purpose but still not paying a penny to the respondent. It was categorically denied by learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner ever tendered the rent for the subsequent period to the respondent. In any case if the respondent-plaintiff had refused to receive the rent, as alleged, the same could very well be deposited in court. The petitioner having not done so cannot wriggle out of rigorous of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Before the respective claims of the parties is considered, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I deem it appropriate to refer to the enunciation of law thereon first.

In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by LRs. and others, (2003) 1 SCC 123, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that the benefits conferred on the tenants under the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. Merely because the rent was deposited late, a lenient view cannot be taken. Relevant paragraphs 5 and 8 are extracted below:

"5. Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in court, it should be taken as compliance with Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is substantial compliance with Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [4] only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. to deposit rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal, (1996) 1 SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu, (1996) 6 SCC 228.

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8. Admittedly, the tenant did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8. The only submission that was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that since the deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought to be taken. We are unable to agree with this."

[Emphasis supplied] In Nasiruddin and others v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that where the Act does not provide for extension of time or for condonation of default in deposit of the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have any power to do so as in the absence of any provision, the court could not extend the period for deposit. In case where statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom.

In Balwant Singh and others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and others, (2003) 3 SCC 433, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that Rent Control Act is not only a beneficial enactment for tenants but also for the benefit of landlords and the provisions for timely payment of rent by the tenant under the Act are mandatory in nature. Relevant paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 13 are extracted below:

"5. Recently, in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, (2003) 1 SCC 123, a Division Bench of this Court observed: (SCC p. 127, para 5) "The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [5] statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters."

6. It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Control Act is not only a beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the benefit of the landlord. (See Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum, (1994) 2 SCC 671).

7. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It is a well-settled principle that if a thing is required to be done by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 3, at p. 107, it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance with the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as follows:

"As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive."

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13. In CA No. 5077 of 1998, which we have decided today, we have held that where a statute empowers the court to extend time or further time when a tenant fails to deposit rent within the stipulated time, only in such cases, the court possesses power to extend time and in no other cases."

In Atma Ram v. Shakuntala Rani, (2005) 7 SCC 211, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that the consistent view of the court in Rent Control legislation is that in case a tenant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial provision, he must strictly comply with them. Relevant paragraph 19 of the judgment is extracted below:

C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [6]

"19. It will thus appear that this Court has consistently taken the view that in the Rent Control legislations if the tenant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Act, he must strictly comply with the requirements of the Act. If any condition precedent is to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must strictly comply with that condition. If he fails to do so he cannot take advantage of the benefit conferred by such a provision."

In Sayeda Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad, (2003) 7 SCC 52, it was opined that though in terms of the provisions of Section 13 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the court had the jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of rent by a tenant, but the same could be on an application filed for the purpose, showing sufficient cause as to why the deposit could not be made within the time granted by the court. The time is not extended or delay condoned on mere sympathy. The exercise of judicial discretion can be only if the same is made out on the basis of sufficient cause shown.

In Aero Traders (P) Ltd. v. Ravinder Kumar Suri, (2004) 8 SCC 307, the Court dealt with an issue of exercise of judicial discretion in the matter of condonation of default in payment of rent by a tenant. Considering the fact that a small amount of rent was not paid for a long time, the court opined that it was not a case where discretion should be exercised. Relevant paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof are extracted below:

"6. The question which, therefore, requires consideration is whether the appellant has made out any ground for exercising discretion in his favour of not striking out his defence. According to Black's Law Dictionary "judicial discretion" means the exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law; a court's power to act or not act when a litigant is not entitled to demand the act as matter of right. The word "discretion" connotes necessarily an act of a judicial character, and, as used with reference to discretion exercised judicially, it implies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule, and it requires an actual exercise of judgment and a consideration of the facts and circumstances which are necessary to make a sound, fair and just determination, and a knowledge of the facts upon which the discretion may properly operate. (See 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 289). When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [7] to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It only gives certain latitude or liberty accorded by statute or rules, to a judge as distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating on matters brought before him.

7. In the present case, the finding of the Rent Controller and also of the Rent Control Tribunal is that the appellant set up a totally false plea of his having sent the rent through cheques to the landlord. Apart from pleading that he had sent the amount through cheques, he pleaded no other fact which could be taken into consideration by the Rent Controller for exercising discretion in his favour. It may be noted that the premises are commercial and are situate in Karol Bagh, which is a prime business area of Delhi and the rent is a paltry sum of Rs. 30 per month. But the appellant did not pay even this small amount of rent, which is virtually a pittance, and has remained in arrears for a long period of time. There is absolutely no ground on which any discretion could be exercised in his favour. The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in setting aside the order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal and restoring that of the Rent Controller."

In M/s Mangat Singh Trilochan Singh's case (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that it is a discretion to be exercised by the court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case while considering the prayer of the landlord to strike off the defence on account of delay of deposit of rent.

In Manik Lal Majumdar and others v. Gouranga Chandra Dey and others, (2005) 2 SCC 400, Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that a literal construction is to be given to the provisions of the Rent Act which require for payment of rent by the tenants during the pendency of the proceedings as otherwise unscrupulous tenants may continue to enjoy the premises without paying any rent to the landlord protracting the litigation. Relevant paragraph 6 of the judgment is extracted below:

"6. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 specifically provides that the Appellate Authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [8] fixing of arrears of rent. Section 13 is a general provision which applies both during the pendency of eviction proceedings under Section 12 of the Act before the Rent Control Court and also to proceedings before an Appellate Authority in an appeal under Section 20 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 lays down that any tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord shall not be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the said court unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent, admitted by the tenant to be due and continues to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building in question until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. The expression "all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due", if interpreted literally, would mean that unless the tenant specifically admits any arrears of rent to be due to the landlord, the condition to make the payment of arrears of rent in order to contes the original proceedings before the Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal as provided under Section 13 of the Act would not arise. The High Court in Binapani Roy v. State of Tripura, (1994) 1 Gau LR 98 has held that giving literal meaning to the words "admitted by the tenant to be due" would frustrate the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and make the same nugatory or otiose. The object of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act is to avoid litigation for realisation of arrears of rent which is likely to accumulate during the course of litigation, which may be a long period and also to deter the tenant from resorting to an unfair practice to use and occupy the tenanted premises without payment of any rent so long as the litigation continues. The High Court was of the opinion that the reasonable meaning of the words "admitted by the tenant to be due" is the inference of admission from the material on record. If the material on record prima facie discloses the admission of relationship of landlord and tenant and the rate of monthly rent payable, the tenant would be required to pay or deposit arrears of rent and continue payment of current rent during the pendency of the litigation, as C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [9] enjoined under Section 13 of the Act. Dharmadhikari, J. has expressed his concurrence with the aforesaid view taken by the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Binapani Roy. We are also of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court on this point is perfectly sound as giving a literal meaning to the expression "all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due" may defeat the very object of enacting Section 13 of the Act and an unscrupulous tenant may continue to enjoy the premises without payment of any rent to the landlord by protracting the litigation and the landlord may have to wait till the final decision of the case to recover his dues by taking execution proceedings."

In Suresh Kumar v. Prem Chand, AIR 1994 P&H 203, this Court opined that Rule 5 was specifically added for Punjab and Haryana in Order 15 CPC to penalise recalcitrant lessee. It is a penal provision along with a remedy. The object is to avoid harassment of the lessor as well. The object should not be lightly defeated. Paragraph 10 thereof can be referred to, which is as under:

"10. Such is not the situation in the present case. A specific provision has been made by the Legislature to penalise a recalcitrant lessee. In a nut-shell, it has been provided that if a lessee fails to pay the admitted amount on the first date of hearing or by the prescribed date and also fails to show good cause therefor, his defence can be struck off. It embodies a penal provision along with a remedy. The specific provision has been made apparently with the object of avoiding harassment to a lessor. This object cannot be defeated by invoking the so-called inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The special must override the general. In Jai Bhagwan v. Chandra Mohan and others, AIR 1996 P&H 52, this Court opined that in case of default in compliance to the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, the Court has to exercise the judicial discretion while ordering striking off the defence.

In M/s Saras Paper Pack v. Shyam Sunder Arora, AIR 2000 P&H 278, this Court upheld the order passed by the learned court below, where the tenant had failed to tender the admitted rent on the first date of hearing and also deposit the monthly rent due during the pendency of the suit. Paragraphs 19 and 23 of the judgment, which are relevant, are extracted below:

"19. As referred to above, in both the cases, the defendant had neither deposited the arrears of rent admitted by him on the first date C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [10] of hearing nor he had deposited the monthly rent due during the pendency of the suit, whether or not he was admitting any amount to be due. Merely because the defendant had taken the plea in the civil suit filed by Shyam Sunder that there was no relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the parties would not entitle the defendant not to deposit the monthly amount due during the pendency of the suit (even if the defendant had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties). This is specially so, when prima facie there is material on the record to show that defendant M/s Saras Paper Pack had issued two cheques dated 10.10.1996 and 9.11.1996 for Rs. 8000/- each in favour of Shyam Arora-plaintiff towards the rent. Photo copies of two cheques for Rs. 8000/- each issued by M/s Saras Paper Pack in favour of Shyam Arora dated 10.10.1996 and 9.11.1996 were produced before me at the time of arguments to show prima facie that M/s Saras Paper Pack had admitted Shyam Arora to be the landlord and for that reason the cheques in question towards the payment of rent for the building in question were issued.

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23. In view of my detailed discussion above, in my opinion, the learned trial court was perfectly justified in striking off the defence of the defendant-petitioner under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC in both the suits, especially when there was persistent default on the part of the defendant in not paying the monthly amount due during the pendency of the suit."

In Govind Singh's case (supra), the issue under consideration before this Court was striking off the defence of the tenant, where the landlord was claiming rent @ Rs. 1,16,200/- per month, whereas the stand of the tenant was that the rent was Rs. 70,630/- per month. As the tenant had tendered the admitted rent before the court below within the period prescribed, this court upheld the order of the court below refusing to strike off the defence.

The enunciation of law, as referred to above, can be summed up to mean that benefits conferred on the tenants under the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. Striking off of defence is not mandatory even if there is any default in compliance to the provisions of the Act/CPC. The Court has to exercise its judicial discretion considering the facts and C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [11] circumstances of each case on the basis of the explanation offered by the defaulting party. Unless there is a power to condone the delay/default, the court cannot exercise such power. In case a particular act is required to be done in a prescribed manner, strict compliance thereof is necessary.

The provisions of Order 15 Rule 5CPC, which are relevant in the present case, are extracted below:

"5. Striking of defence for failure to deposit admitted rent.- (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent. per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence.

Explanation 1. - The expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned.

Explanation 2.- The expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court.

Explanation 3.- The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making on other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor's account.

(2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [12] may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days, of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1) as the case may be."

A perusal of the aforesaid rule shows that in a suit filed by a lessor for eviction of a lessee after the determination of lease and for recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the lessee at or before the first date of hearing deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon @ 9% per annum and whether or not any amount is admitted to be due, the lessee is required throughout the continuation of the suit to deposit regularly monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of default of payment of admitted rent or monthly amount due, the Court, subject to provisions of sub-rule (2), is competent to strike off his defence. Explanation (3) defines the expression "monthly amount due", which means the amount due every month as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent. Sub-rule (2) provides that before making an order for striking off the defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the lessee in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or of the expiry of the week, referred to in sub-rule (1), as the case may be.

In the present case, though the respondent claimed the rent @ Rs. 20,000/- for every six months, the petitioner admitted the tenancy, but claimed that the rent was fixed at Rs. 20,000/- per annum. The suit was filed claiming rent from 1.6.2001 onwards as the tenancy started from 1.6.2001 and prior to that, Rs. 40,000/- was paid by the petitioner. Even if the stand of the petitioner is accepted as such that admitted rent was Rs. 20,000/- per annum, the payment initially made would be valid upto 31.5.2003. Thereafter, in terms of the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, the petitioner was required to pay the monthly rent due within a week from the date of its accrual, which is to be calculated at the admitted rate of rent. Even from 1.6.2003 onwards, the petitioner neither paid even a single penny of the rent due at the monthly intervals nor moved any representation before the court within 10 days of the expiry of one week, as enumerated in Order 15 Rule 5(2) CPC. It was only before this Court that on 4.10.2008, a sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- was paid by the petitioner to the respondent towards rent.

The stand of the petitioner before the learned court below was that the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC are not mandatory. The Court can consider the representation made by the lessee and that the petitioner was ready and willing to pay the remaining amount. Another plea, which was sought to be taken before C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [13] this Court, was that during all this period in fact, the respondent refused to accept the rent. However, none of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner has any merit whatsoever. It has been specifically recorded by the learned court below in the impugned order that no representation of any kind was filed by the petitioner to explain the circumstances under which the rent could not be deposited during the continuation of the suit. The default is not for a month or two, rather, even as per the admitted case of the petitioner, the default is from 1.6.2003 onwards till the impugned order was passed by the learned court below on 8.9.2007.

If the facts of the present case are considered in the light of enunciation of law, as referred to above, the inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner having failed to deposit the monthly amount due calculated at the admitted rate of rent within one week from the date of its accrual and further having failed to file any application within 10 days of the expiry of one week, as referred to above, explaining the circumstances under which the provisions could not be complied with, no discretion for condonation of default can be exercised in favour of the petitioner. The provisions which provided for concession to the petitioner-lessee were required to be strictly complied with and here is a case of a chronic defaulter.

For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find any merit in the present petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.

(Rajesh Bindal) Judge January 23, 2009 mk (Refer to Reporter) C.R. No. 5276 of 2007 [14]

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