Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Alka Agarwal vs Akshay Agarwal on 7 February, 2014
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari, P.K. Lohra
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
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:: JUDGMENT::
Alka Agarwal Vs. Akshay Agarwal
D.B. CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.1286/2010
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER:
February 07, 2014
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. LOHRA
Mr. Haider Agha, for the appellant.
Mr. R.R. Vyas, for the respondent.
BY THE COURT (PER HON'BLE LOHRA, J):
This is an appeal by appellant wife Smt. Alka under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, 1984 against the judgment and decree for divorce passed by the Judge, Family Court, Jodhpur in Civil Original Case No.56 of 2003 laid by the respondent husband Akshay Agrawal under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, 'the Act of 1955').
Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that the [2] respondent husband filed a petition under Section 13 alleging therein that nuptial between both the parties was solemnized at Jodhpur on 6th of February 1998 as per Hindu rites and rituals, but out of wedlock no child was born. According to the averments in the divorce petition, earlier the appellant got married with one Bhanwarlal but the marriage ended sadly due to her cruel behavior and finally annulled. Castigating appellant, the respondent has pleaded in the petition that she falsely implicated her former husband in a criminal case which was ultimately closed by the police after investigation. It was further averred in the petition that after solemnization of marriage, appellant neither discharged her marital and social obligations, nor cooperated with respondent and his family members and due to her cantankerous behavior, the life of the respondent and his family members became miserable. As per respondent's version, despite his affability and altruistic behavior, the appellant continued her recalcitrant attitude vis- à-vis him and his family members and neglected all of them. In order to substantiate the allegation of cruelty on the part of appellant, the respondent has pleaded in the petition that she never wanted to live at her matrimonial home and always insisted for staying with her parents. Even the appellant pressurized the respondent to leave his parents and join her to live at her parent's place. The respondent very specifically averred in the petition that appellant always impressed upon him that she is unable to develop rapport with her in-laws' family and is keenly interested to enjoy company of her own [3] family members. While asserting her said liking, as per version of the respondent, the appellant has time and again warned the respondent that if he will not yield to her desire, the marriage will have the same fate as that of her first marriage. In terms of the pleadings, the appellant has also exerted pressure on respondent to stake his claim for his share in the joint family property and live separately from his parents and other family members. Highlighting the dubious conduct of the appellant, the respondent has stated in the petition that she has harassed and humiliated him on trivial issues and by treating his parents and other family members with disrespect has committed a grave act of cruelty. Attributing many insinuations against the appellant to prove cruelty on her part, the respondent has alleged in the petition that the appellant used to address him and his family members as illiterate, uncultured and rustic fellows with the sole intent to defame all. As per the respondent, appellant was in habit of quarrelling and abusing him and her defiant posture took an ugly turn on 15th of April 2000 when marriage ceremony of his sister was going on. She made a conscious attempt to malign him and his family members and threatened to commit suicide. Although the behavior of appellant was objectionable but according to the respondent, he and his other family members have shown great patience in sorting out the matter, however, all efforts made by him and his family members went in vain and the appellant left matrimonial home after three days and ultimately on the date [4] of marriage after great persuasions she came back and attended the marriage. Categorizing all these acts of the appellant, the respondent has also alleged that she was in habit of practicing superstitious activities.
Besides relying on the ground of cruelty for seeking divorce, the respondent has also taken shelter of the other ground i.e. desertion. For substantiating the plea of desertion, the respondent has pleaded in the petition that during the short span of matrimony of two years, the appellant on umpteen occasions left the matrimonial home without any cause and stayed at her parent's place for more than 20 to 25 days. For such longer stay the appellant always resorted to lame and implausible excuses.
Narrating with full emphasis the event of 20th May 2000, when the appellant left matrimonial home perpetually without any justifiable reason, the respondent has asserted in the pleadings that soon thereafter he and his other family members made sincere endeavour to enquire about her. It also transpires from the averments in the petition that the respondent and his family members were seriously concerned about the well-being of the appellant and therefore efforts were made to locate her. On enquiry, it was revealed that she had left for Haridwar by bus. Efforts made by some of the acquaintances of the respondent proved fruitful and the appellant was finally located at Ajmer. Ultimately on great [5] persuasions the appellant returned back to Jodhpur. However, according to the respondent, after returning back from Ajmer, she never came back to her matrimonial home to resume cohabitation. With a view to assert animus deserendi on the part of the appellant, the respondent has highlighted her dubious conduct that after leaving matrimonial home on 20th of May 2000, she never came back and even during hour of crisis when his sister was hospitalized due to accident and was under convulsance in the hospital, she has not visited the hospital nor mend her ways to return back to her matrimonial home. The respondent has also stated in the petition that he himself made sincere endeavour to persuade appellant to return back to matrimonial home but no heed was paid by her to his request. Even the efforts made by the family members and friends of the respondent proved futile and the appellant after 20th of May 2000 never returned back to her matrimonial home. Quoting incident of 10th of June 2002, the respondent has stated in the petition that on that day his friend accompanied by his wife went to her parental house for persuading her to return back but she misbehaved with them and categorically informed them that she is not ready and willing to return back to resume her marital obligations. Thus, on these averments, precisely while taking shelter of the ground of cruelty and desertion, the respondent has craved for a decree for divorce.
The petition for divorce was contested by the [6] appellant and a detailed reply is submitted. While countering the allegation of cruelty attributed to her, the appellant has castigated the respondent and his family members for their atrocious behavior vis-à-vis her. According to the appellant, she has always performed her marital obligations with sincerity and devotion but never experienced reciprocal behavior from the respondent and his family members. Castigating the respondent and his family members for their cruel behavior vis-à-vis her, the appellant has also alleged in the reply that she was harassed for not bringing adequate dowry. According to the appellant, she was forced to leave matrimonial home because of the atrocious behavior of the respondent and his family members inasmuch as she was abused and even given beating for not bringing adequate dowry. The appellant has also attributed many acts of cruelty on the part of her mother-in-law and pleaded that the atmosphere at her maternal home was not congenial for her and therefore she had to leave her matrimonial home due to certain compelling circumstances. Asserting that she is ready and willing to live with her husband, the appellant has pleaded that respondent is keenly interested to get rid of her and the entire edifice of the divorce petition is based on wholly false and concocted narrations. The allegation of desertion was also refuted in reply to the divorce petition.
On the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the learned Family Court framed following two issues for [7] determination:
(i) Whether non-applicant wife has treated applicant husband with cruelty in terms of the averments contained in the petition?
(ii) Whether non-applicant wife has deserted applicant husband without any just and reasonable cause since last two years preceding the filing of divorce petition?
In order to prove the grounds for divorce, set out in the petition, the respondent himself appeared in the witness box as AW1. To support the cause of the respondent, his father Dushyant Kumar (AW2), Sanjay Kachhawah (AW3) and Mukul Gupta (AW4) also testified on oath for substantiating the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Mother of the respondent, Rameshwari (AW5) also deposed on oath. For defending her cause, appellant herself appeared in the witness box as NAW1 and for strengthening her defence also produced her mother in the witness box Smt. Vijay Laxmi as NAW2.
The learned trial Court, after conclusion of the evidence of the rival parties, heard final arguments and by its impugned judgment and decree recorded categorical finding that both the issues are proved by the respondent and on the basis of that finding annulled the marriage.
Assailing the findings and conclusions recorded in the impugned judgment by the learned Family Court on Issue [8] No.1, the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Haider Agha has argued that a cumulative reading of the evidence tendered by the respondent makes it crystal clear that the same is not in consonance and conformity with the pleadings of the respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that there is apparent variance in pleading and proof and therefore the findings and conclusions of the learned Court below on Issue No.1 are wholly perverse and cannot be sustained. Mr. Haider Agha, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that to constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be grave and weighty so as to conclude that the suffered spouse cannot reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. Critically analyzing the evidence tendered on behalf of the respondent, learned counsel for the appellant would urge that so called acts and omissions, which are attributed to the appellant, are more or less ordinary wear and tear of the married life and cannot be construed as so serious to bring it within the purview of cruelty in matrimonial sense. With these submissions, the learned counsel has urged that findings on Issue No.1 are based on mere ipse dixit of the learned Court below, which cannot be sustained. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nanak Ram Vs. Santoshibai [2000(1) HLR 2011). The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh, while construing the term "cruelty" so as to make it a basis for dissolution of marriage, made following observations in Para 8:
[9]
8. The same holds true about the second issue of cruelty. After all, every act or conduct of either spouse does not tantamount to cruelty merely because it causes some tension in the process. For seeking a decree of dissolution on the ground of cruelty it becomes necessary to show that the continuous conduct of the party concerned affected the health or was likely to affect the health of the other party who was allegedly being treated with cruelty. Such cruelty indeed requires to be proved on the preponderance of probability and not beyond the reasonable doubt. But ordinary wear and tear of married life, as observed by the first Appellate Court, does not amount to such cruelty and would not surely constitute a basis for dissolution of marriage.
Learned counsel Mr. Agha, while making scathing attack on the pleadings of the respondent on the issue of cruelty, has urged that the allegations are absolutely vague, mellow and unspecific and there is nothing on record to substantiate all these allegations. Mr. Agha would contend that on such vague, cryptic and unspecific allegations no reasonable man can draw an inference about the alleged cruelty by the appellant, and therefore, finding on Issue No.1 is based on mere conjectures and surmises. For substantiating this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in B Vs. A [1992(2) All India Hindu Law Reporter 546]. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court, while taking note of the vagueness in the pleadings vis-à-vis grounds of cruelty in a divorce petition, made following observations in Para 5 of the verdict:
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5. Before we take up the first submission of the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the wife was guilty of cruelty, it would be advantageous to see the provision of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short, 'the Act') which is applicable to the parties in order to appreciate the material placed before this Court to come to a conclusion as contended by the appellant. Sub-section (1)(ia) of Section 13 provides that marriage could be dissolved on the ground that the other party has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. The Act does not define the word "cruelty". However, the Full Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider this provision of law in Dr. Keshaorao Krishnaji Londhe v. Mrs. Nisha Londhe, reported in 1984 All India Hindu Law Reporter 629 (Bombay) (F.B.), and has laid down that "cruelty"
contemplated under this provision is "a conduct of such type that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent". In the said decision, the Full Bench has approved the following observation of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ashvini Kumar Sehgal v. Smt. Swatantar Sehgal, reported in (1978) All India Hindu Law Reporter 594 (Pb. & Hry.).
"Cruelty in such cases has to be of the type which should satisfy the conscience of the Court to believe that the relations between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of one of the spouses that it has become impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress."
For the said preposition, learned counsel has also relied on a decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Rajinder Singh Vs. Smt. Kamlesh alias Rajni [1987(2) HLR 435].
Challenging the finding of the learned Family Court on Issue No.2 i.e. desertion, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the respondent has miserably failed to prove the necessary ingredients of desertion as according to learned [11] counsel there is no semblance of proof that the appellant wife by her deeds has intentionally and permanently abandoned the respondent. Mr. Haider Agha would contend that a cumulative reading of the pleadings and the proof in the form of evidence makes it amply clear that necessary ingredient for construing desertion, namely, animus deserendi by the appellant is conspicuously missing in the matter. Learned counsel for the appellant, while buttressing submissions with full emphasis, has urged that as a matter of fact the appellant was always ready and willing to discharge her marital obligations but the respondent and his other family members created an atmosphere of serious acrimony and developed a sense of discord vis-à-vis her, which has ultimately compelled her to leave home. With these submissions, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Court below has not appreciated the evidence, which was available on record while recording finding on the issue against the appellant. To substantiate the argument on the issue of desertion, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Urmila Devi Vs. Deepak Kumar Vyas [II (1999) DMC 52]. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while examining necessary elements of desertion and burden of proving desertion, made following observations in Para 14 & 15 of the verdict:
14. It is well settled that the burden to prove desertion lies on the respondent/ husband, who filed the petition for divorce. The word 'desertion' has been defined in explanation to Section 13(1) of the 'Act', which reads as below:-[12]
"Explanation- In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means the desertion of the petitioners by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and with- out the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly."
15. Thus desertion as per explanation of Section 13 of the 'Act' implies intentional and permanent abandonment of one spouse by the other without his or her consent and without reasonable cause. Therefore, to constitute desertion, following elements are necessary:
(1)The factum of separation;
(2)Intention to bring the cohabitation permanently to an end;
(3)Absence of consent;
(4)Absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to quit the matrimonial home;
Therefore, the question of desertion cannot be decided by merely ascertaining as to which party left the matrimonial home, and the person who actually withdrew from cohabitation is not necessarily a deserting party. It may be that the party withdrawing from cohabitation may have been forced by the conduct of the other to leave the home.
For substantiating this contention, learned counsel has also placed reliance on a decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Archna Vs. Ajay Kumar [I (1999) DMC 23].
Laying stress on animus deserendi, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Division Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nanak Ram's case (supra). In the said verdict, the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court made following observations in Para 7: [13]
7. Heard learned Counsels and examined the evidence on record. It is true that notice dated 18.4.1991 was not brought on record by respondent but it certainly is borne by the record of the case. It was also admitted to have been received by appellant's Counsel Ku. Yeotikar and on her own showing it was annexed by appellant to one of the pleadings before the Trial Court. That apart respondent had been repeatedly expressing her desire and willingness to return to the society of appellant before the Courts and before this Court also, and that by itself shows that she has no animus deserendi to desert appellant for good and to end her relationship with him. In any case there was no evidence on record to show that she had willingly neglected to discharge her marital obligation towards appellant and, therefore, first Appellate Court had rightly held that issue of desertion not proved.
For strengthening this contention, learned counsel has also placed reliance on Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court in B Vs. A (supra). In this verdict, the Division Bench of Bombay High Court has turned down the ground of desertion for divorce, which was based on improper pleadings and incoherent evidence.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent Mr. R.R. Vyas has urged that the learned Family Court has thrashed out the matter in its entirety and has thereafter rightly concluded that the respondent has discharged his burden to prove both the grounds for divorce, and therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment and decree is warranted. Learned counsel for the respondent, while stoutly defending the impugned judgment and decree, has contended [14] that cruelty in matrimonial sense cannot be given an extended meaning akin to that of a criminal act defined under the criminal law. Mr. Vyas has urged that cruelty in common parlance denotes a state of attack which is painful and distressing to another. While referring to the word "cruelty" occurring in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955, Mr. Vyas would contend that it means an act committed by one spouse to other with intention to cause sufferings. With these submissions, learned counsel has argued that the acts and omissions attributed and proved against the appellant, cannot be construed as insufficient to prove cruelty on her part and as such finding on Issue No.1 recorded by the learned Court below requires no interference in the instant appeal.
Learned counsel, Mr. Vyas, would contend that umpteen materials are available on record to show that respondent was deserted by his wife appellant without any just and reasonable cause. Mr. Vyas submits that the evidence available on record clearly indicates animus deserendi by the appellant towards total abandonment of marriage and willful neglect of her husband. Mr. Vyas submits that the appellant by leaving matrimonial home in the year 2000 has shown her intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, and thereafter she has never shown any repentance for her act by repeatedly declining the offers of the respondent to resume cohabitation clearly goes to show that she has completely repudiated the marriage. Mr. Vyas [15] submits that animus deserendi on the part of the appellant can be conveniently inferred from her stubborn and inhumane act of not returning back to her matrimonial home during hour of crisis when respondent's sister met with an accident and was hospitalized. With these submissions learned counsel has submitted that appellant has completely abandoned the marriage by her conduct and therefore finding on Issue No.2 is just and proper warranting no interference in this appeal. Substantiating his submissions to prove desertion, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a decision of Apex Court in Geeta Jagdish Mangtani Vs. Jagdish Mangtani [(2005) 8 SCC 177]. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said verdict, while examining true purport of animus deserendi, made following observations in Para 5 of the verdict:
5. We are of the view that these observations of the High Court are fully justified in the facts of the present case. One has to particularly note the fact that the parties knew even prior to marriage whatever they were earning. The earnings of the wife from a government job before the marriage was more than double of that of the husband. With the knowledge of this fact the parties entered into matrimonial alliance. The marriage survived only for a brief period of about seven months. After 2-
6-1993 till the exchange of notices and replies during September to December 1996 and filing of the divorce petition ultimately by the husband on 31-12-1996, there has been no attempt on the part of the wife to stay with the husband. She is a school teacher and it is common knowledge that in schools there are long vacations during summer months, more so, in government schools where the wife teaches. At least during those holidays she could have visited the husband at Ulhasnagar along with her son and stayed with him. There is nothing on record to show that any such attempt [16] was ever made by her to visit the husband during this entire period. She has stated in her evidence that the husband used to come and stay with her during her vacations. This has been denied by the husband. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable, that there was never any attempt on the part of the wife to go to her husband's house i.e. matrimonial home of the parties after she left on 2-6-1993. From this fact alone animus deserendi on the part of the wife is clearly established. She has chosen to adopt a course of conduct which proves desertion on her part. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that this desertion on the part of the wife was with a reasonable cause. Such a course of conduct over a long period indicates total abandonment of marriage and cannot be justified on the ground of monetary consideration alone as a reasonable cause to desert. It also amounts to wilful neglect of the husband by the wife. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the High Court appears to be absolutely correct in the facts and circumstances of the case. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and the materials available on record.
Adjudication in the instant appeal is vital and of great significance as in this appeal we are called upon to decide the fate of matrimony between the rival parties. While examining the institution of marriage under Hindu Law, we are not unmindful that marriage is a sacred ceremony and endeavor of a matrimonial Court is to make all sincere efforts for reconciliation of the couple. As transpires from the record, efforts were made before this Court but despite persuasion the spouses have declined to reconcile. Now, in [17] this background, the onerous duty of this Court is to re- appreciate the evidence, which is available on record for evaluating both the grounds of divorce, on which the learned Family Court has recorded an affirmative finding vis-à-vis respondent husband for dissolution of marriage.
The first ground of dissolution of marriage is cruelty. While construing "cruelty" in matrimonial jurisprudence, the Court would apply the common sense of the English language and the ordinary standard of human conduct. In common parlance, cruelty may be inferred from whole facts and matrimonial relations of the parties and interaction in their daily life disclosed by the evidence. In general, cruelty is in its character a cumulative charge. For ascertaining the true purport of the act "cruelty", every such act must be judged in relation to its attending circumstances and the physical and mental condition, or susceptibility of the innocent spouse and offender's knowledge of the actual or probable effect of his conduct on the other. It goes without saying that existence of cruelty depends not merely on the magnitude but at times also on the consequence of the offence, actual or apprehended.
On careful examination of the pleadings of the rival parties, more particularly the respondent, and construing the evidence tendered on his behalf, we are at complete loss to say that pleadings of the rival parties on this material issue [18] are absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific. On consideration of the evidence in its entirety, we are afraid, from any stretch of imagination there is no consonance and conformity in the pleading and proof. The conduct of the appellant complained of by the respondent is per-se not grave and weighty which can persuade us to conclude that the respondent spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. In that background, if the findings on issue No.1 recorded by the learned Family Court are examined then in our considered opinion, the findings are vague and infirm. As a matter of fact, while recording affirmative finding, the learned Court below has not properly appreciated the evidence available on record and has not taken care to discuss the term "cruelty" in matrimonial sense. While deciding Issue No.1 against the appellant, the learned Family Court has not recorded any finding worth the name indicating that the acts complained of by the husband against wife were grave and weighty, or not. The acts and omissions attributed to the appellant wife are not serious one to constitute cruelty in matrimonial sense. Moreover, the evidence tendered in this behalf by the respondent husband, in our considered opinion, is grossly inadequate so as to categorize as one which can prick the conscience of a prudent man to conclude that it is not reasonably expected for the offended spouse to live with the offending spouse. Cruelties attributed to the appellant wife are nothing but ordinary wear and tear of the married life, and therefore, we are unable to sustain the findings recorded by [19] the learned Court below on Issue No.1 and we are persuaded to hold that the respondent husband has not been able to prove mental or physical cruelty within the four corners of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955.
Now switching on to the second ground, we have given our anxious consideration to the pleadings and evidence tendered by both the parties. Although at the very outset we are constrained to observe that pleadings of both the parties on the issue are absolutely vague, cryptic and hazy, and evidence on the issue concerned are also tardy, but despite these infirmities the learned Family Court has made sincere endeavor to unearth the truth while deciding the said issue. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the evidence tendered by the rival parties, there remains no quarrel that appellant voluntarily left matrimonial home on 20th of May 2000 and thereafter she never returned back until laying of the petition for divorce by the respondent husband. From the reasons spelt out in reply to the divorce petition by the appellant, and the evidence adduced in this behalf for substantiating those averments if harmoniously construed, then there remains no room of doubt that decision of the appellant to leave matrimonial home was at her own volition and there was apparently no reasonable cause for withdrawing from the society of her husband and to deprive him from right of cohabitation. The efforts made by the respondent to reconcile are also visible from the evidence available on record.
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On a cumulative reading of pleading and evidence of the appellant, it emerges out that she has leveled allegations of maltreatment and an atmosphere which was not congenial for her well-being at the matrimonial home besides complaining the acts of her husband and in-laws in demanding dowry from her and harassing for the same. Although on this aspect she has deposed but her that version has not been supported by her star witness i.e. her mother Smt. Vijay Laxmi (NAW2), who in her statements has very candidly admitted that the respondent or his family members never demanded any dowry from her. One glaring fact, which has obviously pricked our conscience is the fact that the appellant has not shown humanity even when her in-laws were facing an hour of crisis due to accident of her sister-in-law because during her treatment and convulsance also she has not made any endeavor either to visit hospital or her in-laws' place. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that she made some reconciliatory efforts by calling the respondent in a hotel, ought not to have been rejected by the learned Family Court solely on the pretext that she declined to go with the respondent husband from the place itself deserves due consideration. On appreciation, we feel persuaded to construe the said effort as a good gesture but then not acceding to the suggestion of the husband of going with him from the hotel itself; and her declining cannot be considered confined to that place and time only in the light of materials available on record showing credentials and antecedents of the [21] appellant. Thus, in our considered opinion it fortifies animus deserendi and the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant merits rejection. From the evidence tendered by the appellant herself also, it is clearly established that her intention was to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.
Therefore, on evaluation of the facts of the case threadbare and analyzing the evidence tendered by rival parties, we feel persuaded to maintain the finding on Issue No.2 and accordingly confirm the decree for divorce granted by the learned Family Court.
The net result of the above discussion is that the present appeal sans merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs.
(P.K. LOHRA),J. (DINESH MAHESHWARI),J.