Delhi High Court
Union Of India vs Pt Munshi Ram & Associates Pvt Ltd on 3 September, 2025
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 21.08.2025
Judgment delivered on: 03.09.2025
+ FAO(OS) 1/2014 & CM NO. 93/2014
UNION OF INDIA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Farman Ali, SPC and Ms.
Usha Jamnal, Advocates.
versus
PT MUNSHI RAM & ASSOCIATES PVT LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Ms. Anusuya Salwan, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR J.
1. The present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 1 , arises from the Judgment dated
21.12.2012 2 , passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in
O.M.P. No. 432/2011. By the said judgment, the petition filed by the
Appellant under Section 34 of the A&C Act was partly allowed
against the Arbitral Award dated 24.02.20113, passed in Case No.
ARB/RJB/122 by the Sole Arbitrator.
2. At the outset, it is apposite to recount the chequered procedural
history of the matter. The present appeal was initially disposed of by
1
A&C Act.
2
Impugned Judgement.
3
Arbitral Award.
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this Court on 08.01.2014. Dissatisfied with that decision, the
Appellant preferred Review Petition No. 323/2015, which, however,
met with the same fate and was dismissed on 02.09.2016. Against
these Orders, the Appellant thereafter invoked the jurisdiction of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Civil Appeal Nos. 1050-1051 of
20254.
3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 27.01.2025, set
aside the aforesaid orders and directed restoration of the present
appeal to the file of this Court. While so directing, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court rendered certain observations and issued directions in
the following terms:-
"1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
3. An award was made by the Arbitral Tribunal against the
appellant. A petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, 'the Act') was dismissed.
4. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal under
Section 37 of the Act. By the impugned order, the appeal has been
dismissed only on the ground that the impugned award has been
executed.
5. On first principles, the appeal could not have been dismissed on
that ground. If the award is set aside, principles of restitution will
apply. The impugned order is set aside only on that ground and
FAO No (OS) No.1/2014 along with CM No.93 of 2014 is restored
to the file of the High Court.
6. The restored case shall be listed before the Roster Bench on 14'"
February, 2024 in the morning. Parties who are represented today
shall be under an obligation to remain present before the Roster
Bench on that day and no further notice will be issued by the High
Court. All questions on merits are left open to be decided by the
High Court in that behalf.
7. The High Court shall proceed to decide the application for
condonation of delay in accordance with law. Registry to
communicate this order to the Registrar (Judicial) of the High
4
SLP(C) No. 17307-17308/2017.
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Court at Delhi who will ensure that the restored petition is listed
as directed above.
8. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."
4. In compliance with the aforesaid directions, at the outset,
without going into the factual controversies of the appeal, we now
propose to examine the Appellant's application seeking condonation
of delay in filing the present appeal bearing C.M. No. 93/2014.
5. It is, therefore, appropriate to set out the material averments
contained in the application for condonation of delay, which read as
follows:-
"1. That Appellant above-named has preferred the present appeal
against the judgment and order dated 21.12.2012 passed by Ld.
Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court in a Original Miscellaneous
Petition bearing number OMP No. 432 of 2011 disposing of the
objections petition preferred by the Appellant herein under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, titled "Union of
India versus Pt. Munshi Ram & Associates Pvt Ltd.", and thereby
upholding arbitration award, dated 24.02.2011, passed by the Ld.
Arbitrator. The detailed facts are set out in the appeal are not being
repeated herein for sake of brevity.
2. That the government counsel forwarded his opinion on
11.02.2013 following which the file was sent to the DG, CPWD for
further approval and sanction.
3. That the aforesaid sanction of the DG CPWD was received by
the Appellant Department vide letter no. 60(2011)/SE-TLC/48
dated 18.03.2013 and the same was forwarded to the Department
of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice for seeking further
consent/approval.
4. That accordingly on 08.04.2013 vide diary no. 871, Department
of Legal Affairs, Ministry of law and Justice rendered their opinion
for challenging the impugned order dated 21.12.2013.
5. That immediately thereafter on 09.04.2013 the Appellant
Department requested. Ministry of Law and Justice for
appointment of a Government Counsel for filing the present appeal.
6. That on 11.04.2013 the below-named advocate was appointed
for the purpose of drafting and filing this appeal.
7. That upon receipt of the said appointment letter the undersigned
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counsel requested the Appellant-Department to forward the
necessary documents for drafting the present appeal and
accordingly the same were sent to the office of the undersigned
counsel on 24.05.2013. However, the Clerk of the counsel
inadvertently tagged all the necessary documents with the other
similar matter titled as Pt. Munshi Ram Versus Union of India Ex.
Pet. No. 149/2011. The fact of these documents having delivered to
the office did not come to the knowledge of the counsel till 3rd week
of August when the said execution matter was next listed on
21.08.2013.
8. That the counsel sent the first draft of the present appeal to the
department for approval subsequent to which a meeting was held
in 16.09.2013 to discuss corrections and changes to the same.
9. That the final appeal and affidavits including changes were
forwarded to the department for signature on 14.11.2013 for
vetting and signatures.
10. That there is a delay of 303 days in filing the appeal that has
occurred due to the reasons mentioned hereinabove. It is neither
deliberate nor intentional. It is submitted that the delay in filing the
appeal may be condoned in view of the reasons explained above."
ANALYSIS:
6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both
parties and upon a careful perusal of the record, this Court now
proceeds to address the questions arising for determination. The
foremost issue that falls for consideration is whether the present appeal
has been instituted within the period prescribed by law, and if not,
whether the Appellant has demonstrated "sufficient cause" to warrant
condonation of the inordinate delay.
7. In relation to an appeal preferred under Section 37 of the A&C
Act, no specific period of limitation is provided therein. Consequently,
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 19635 stand attracted, a position
which now stands conclusively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
5
Limitation Act.
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Represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers &
Contractors Pvt. Ltd. 6 . The relevant observations from the said
judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"23. Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, when read with Section 43
thereof, makes it clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act will
apply to appeals that are filed under Section 37. This takes us to
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, which provide for a
limitation period of 90 days and 30 days, depending upon whether
the appeal is from any other court to a High Court or an intra-
High Court appeal. There can be no doubt whatsoever that Section
5 of the Limitation Act will apply to the aforesaid appeals, both by
virtue of Section 43 of the Arbitration Act and by virtue of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act.
*****
25. When the Commercial Courts Act is applied to the aforesaid
appeals, given the definition of "specified value" and the
provisions contained in Sections 10 and 13 thereof, it is clear that
it is only when the specified value is for a sum less than three lakh
rupees that the appellate provision contained in Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act will be governed, for the purposes of limitation, by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act. Shri Deshmukh's
argument that depending upon which court decides a matter, a
limitation period of either 30 or 90 days is provided, which leads to
arbitrary results, and that, therefore, the uniform period provided
by Article 137 of the Limitation Act should govern appeals as well,
is rejected............
*****
27. Even in the rare situation in which an appeal under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act would be of a specified value less than three
lakh rupees, resulting in Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act
applying, the main object of the Arbitration Act requiring speedy
resolution of disputes would be the most important principle to be
applied when applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
are filed to condone delay beyond 90 days and/or 30 days
depending upon whether Article 116(a) or 116(b) or 117 applies.
As a matter of fact, given the timelines contained in Sections 8,
9(2), 11(4), 11(13), 13(2)-(5), 29-A, 29-B, 33(3)-(5) and 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act, and the observations made in some of this
Court's judgments, the object of speedy resolution of disputes
would govern appeals covered by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act.
*****
6
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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32. Thus, from the scheme of the Arbitration Act as well as the
aforesaid judgments, condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has to be seen in the context of the object of speedy
resolution of disputes.
33. The bulk of appeals, however, to the appellate court under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, are governed by Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act provides the forum for appeals as well as
the limitation period to be followed, Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act being a special law as compared with the Limitation Act
which is a general law, which follows from a reading of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act lays down a period of limitation of 60 days uniformly
for all appeals that are preferred under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act. [As held in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd.,
(2020) 4 SCC 234, whereas Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
provides the substantive right to appeal, Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act provides the forum and procedure
governing the appeal (see para 13).]
34. The vexed question which faces us is whether, first and
foremost, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
excluded by the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, as has been
argued by Dr George. The first important thing to note is that
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain any
provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. Section 13(1-
A) of the Commercial Courts Act only provides for a limitation
period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order appealed
against, without further going into whether delay beyond this
period can or cannot be condoned.
*****
43. The next important argument that needs to be addressed is as to
whether the hard-and-fast rule applied by this Court in N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 is correct in
law. Firstly, as has correctly been argued by Shri Shroti, N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, does not notice
the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act at all and can be said
to be per incuriam on this count. Secondly, it is also correct to note
that the period of 90 days plus 30 days and not thereafter
mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act cannot now
apply, the limitation period for filing of appeals under the
Commercial Courts Act being 60 days and not 90 days. Thirdly, the
argument that absent a provision curtailing the condonation of
delay beyond the period provided in Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act would also make it clear that any such bodily lifting of
the last part of Section 34(3) into Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
would also be unwarranted. We cannot accept Shri Navare's
argument that this is a mere casus omissus which can be filled in
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by the Court.
*****
52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating arguments made
in these appeals, we are of the view that N.V. International v. State
of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 has been wrongly decided and is
therefore overruled.
53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still arises
as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals
which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. At
one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V. International v. State of
Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 which does not allow condonation of
delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an open-
ended provision in which any amount of delay can be condoned,
provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes
that we have to steer a middle course.
*****
55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as
a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is
read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section
13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context
provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy
disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To
read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid
object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression
"sufficient cause" means in the context of condoning delay in filing
appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
*****
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to
be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act
or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond
90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way
of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party
has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a
short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court,
be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the
picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity
and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction,
negligence or laches."
(emphasis supplied)
8. It must further be noted that the present appeal was instituted
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prior to the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 7, and
therefore, the threshold of limitation envisaged under the CC Act does
not govern the present matter.
9. We are guided by the dictum laid down in Borse Brothers
Engineers (supra), which leads us to Article 117 of the Schedule to
the Limitation Act, for determining limitation in the present case.
Article 117 provides as follows:-
Description Period of Time from which period
limitation begins to run
117. From a decree or Thirty days. The date of the decree or
order of any High order.
Court to the same
Court.
10. The present appeal, being an intra-court appeal against an order
of the learned Single Judge of this Court, squarely falls within the
ambit of Article 117 of the Limitation Act, and was therefore required
to be instituted within thirty days from the date of the Impugned
Judgment.
11. The Impugned Judgment by the learned Single Judge was
delivered on 21.12.2012. Accordingly, the last date for filing the
appeal was 20.01.2013. However, the present appeal came to be filed
only on 20.11.2013, well beyond the statutory period, amounting to a
delay of 303 days. The computation is set out hereinbelow for ready
reference:-
Event Date Remarks
Impugned Judgement 22.12.2012 Starting point for limitation.
passed by the learned
Single Judge
7
CC Act
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Expiry of the 30-day 20.01.2013 Last date for filing appeal,
limitation without seeking
condonation of delay.
Actual date of filing 20.11.2013 303 days beyond expiry of
limitation (i.e., from
21.01.2013).
12. The sole question that arises, therefore, is whether the Appellant
has established "sufficient cause" so as to justify condonation of this
extraordinary delay. It is trite law that such discretion under Section 5
of the Limitation Act is to be exercised with circumspection, sparingly,
and only where exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. The
burden lies squarely upon the Appellant to furnish a cogent, credible,
and convincing explanation for the delay.
13. Although the present appeal does not fall within the ambit of the
CC Act, the legislative intent underlying the A&C Act is to ensure
speedy and efficient resolution of disputes. Consequently, condonation
of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right nor granted as a matter
of routine, lest the object of expeditious arbitral resolution be defeated.
In this context, reference may be made to Dilshad Khan v. Govt. of
NCT of Delhi8, where this Court emphasized that condonation of delay
under Section 37 of the A&C Act can be granted only upon showing
of proper and sufficient cause. The Court categorically held that
adherence to prescribed timelines is integral to the legislative intent of
arbitral law, and the phrase "sufficient cause" cannot be employed to
condone negligence or stale claims.
14. The averments in the application for condonation of delay, as
already extracted hereinabove, reveal that the Appellant's explanation
rests essentially on two grounds: first, the necessity of obtaining
8
FAO (COMM) 206/2025
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administrative approvals and internal procedural clearances; and
second, a lapse on the part of the clerk of the counsel, who allegedly
misfiled the relevant papers by tagging them with another connected
matter.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the
law of limitation binds Government authorities no less than private
litigants. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.9, the Apex
Court unequivocally held that explanations predicated merely on
impersonal machinery or procedural red tape are no longer acceptable
in the modern era. The Apex Court stressed that condonation of delay
is an exception, not a rule, and cannot be mechanically extended
merely because the Government is a litigant. The following
observations of the said judgement are particularly instructive:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of
filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that
in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
9
(2012) 3 SCC 563
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bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation
that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to
be dismissed on the ground of delay.
31. In view of our conclusion on issue (a), there is no need to go
into the merits of the issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised
is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.
32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are
dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs."
(emphasis supplied)
16. Similarly, in Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools
Admn.10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again deprecated the casual
and lethargic approach of Government Departments, observing that
they cannot walk into courts at their convenience, ignoring statutory
timelines. The Hon'ble Court went on further to caution that unless
officers responsible for such lapses are held accountable, the tendency
of delay will persist unchecked. The relevant paragraphs of the said
judgment read as under:-
"5. We have repeatedly been counselling through our orders
various Government Departments, State Governments and other
public authorities that they must learn to file appeals in time and
set their house in order so far as the Legal Department is
concerned, more so as technology assists them. This appears to be
falling on deaf ears despite costs having been imposed in a number
of matters with the direction to recover it from the officers
responsible for the delay as we are of the view that these officers
must be made accountable. It has not had any salutary effect and
10
(2021) 11 SCC 557
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that the present matter should have been brought up, really takes
the cake!
6. The aforesaid itself shows the casual manner in which the
petitioner has approached this Court without any cogent or
plausible ground for condonation of delay. In fact, other than the
lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which
has been put on record. We have repeatedly discouraged State
Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that
they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please
ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the statutes, as if
the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice
to refer to our judgment in State of M.P. v. Bherulal. The leeway
which was given to the Government/public authorities on account
of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court
which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus,
greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent
and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment
of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. Despite this, there seems to be a little change in the approach
of the Government and public authorities."
(emphasis supplied)
17. The explanation offered by the Appellant, premised on factors
such as inter-departmental approvals, procedural red tape, and an
alleged clerical lapse in the counsel's office, does not inspire our
confidence and leaves a substantial part of the inordinate 303-day
delay wholly unexplained. It is a settled principle that in proceedings
under the A&C Act, strict compliance with statutory timelines is
central to the legislative scheme. The A&C Act was enacted with the
avowed objective of securing expeditious adjudication of disputes
through arbitration, and any laxity in adhering to limitation periods
would undermine this very purpose.
18. While courts may, in exceptional cases, condone delays upon a
showing of "sufficient cause", the Appellant has failed to demonstrate
any such compelling justification. Vague references to bureaucratic
procedures or internal administrative hurdles cannot constitute a valid
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excuse for non-compliance with mandatory statutory timelines.
Likewise, attributing part of the delay to a clerical lapse in the
counsel's office only points to negligence, and even if such lapse is
assumed, the department's failure to exercise timely oversight and
follow-up cannot be condoned. Such explanations neither establish
sufficient cause nor entitle a litigant to the indulgence of condonation.
19. Accordingly, the reasons advanced in the present case are
inadequate and run contrary to the spirit and purpose of the A&C Act.
They cannot be accepted as credible grounds to overcome the
statutory bar of limitation.
CONCLUSION:
20. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the application
for condonation of delay filed with the present appeal is devoid of any
cogent or persuasive grounds. The explanation tendered does not
constitute "sufficient cause" in law.
21. Consequently, without examining the merits of the case, the
appeal stands dismissed solely on the ground of delay and limitation.
22. The present appeal, along with the pending application, is
disposed of in the above terms.
23. No order as to costs.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. SEPTEMBER 03, 2025/sm/rn Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA FAO(OS) 1/2014 Page 13 of 13 Signing Date:08.09.2025 12:23:48