Madras High Court
Minor S. Vijayakumar (Died) vs R. Subbarayan on 10 July, 2002
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 10/07/2002
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P. SHANMUGAM
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. SAMPATH
A.S.No.371 of 1992
1. Minor S. Vijayakumar (Died)
2. Minor S. Karthikeyan
Both minor sons of R. Subbarayan
are represented by their next
friend and natural guardian/mother
S. Devaki, 3rd appellant)
3. S. Devaki W/o R. Subbarayan,
K.C. Kumarasamy Gounder Thottam,
Minnapalayam Post,
Sivagiri Via, Erode Taluk,
Periyar District.
(Impleaded as legal representative
of deceased 1st appellant – vide
Order in C.M.P.No.8710/87 dated
8-4-1992) ... Appellants
Vs.
1. R. Subbarayan
S/o C.M. Ramasamy Gounder,
8-B, Muruganathapuram,
Karur Town, Trichy District.
2. Perumal Gounder
S/o Karuppanna Gounder,
Anoor, Thumbivadi Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
3. Pavayee Ammal W/o Perumal Gounder,
Anoor, Thumbivadi Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
4. Muthuveera Gounder S/o Ramana Gounder,
Kothamplayam, Pavithiram Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
5. Malayammal W/o Muthuveera Gounder,
Kothampalayam, Pavithiram Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
6. Palaniappan S/o Ramasamy Gounder
Sellandipalayam,
Pallapalayam Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
7. Nachayee Ammal
W/o Late V.K. Arumugha Gounder,
Veerarakkiyam Post,
Balarajapuram Village,
Kulithalai Taluk,
Trichy District.
8. A. Samiappan
S/o Late V.K. Arumugha Gounder,
Veerarakkiyam Post,
Balarajapuram Village,
Kulithalai Taluk,
Trichy District.
9. A. Karuppannan
S/o Late V.K.Arumugha Gounder,
Veerarakkiyam Post,
Balarajapuram Village,
Kulithalai Taluk,
Trichy District.
10.Nallammal W/o V.A. Ammaiyappan,
Arulandavar Lorry Service,
16, "Anbu Nilayam",
Rathinam Street,
Karur Town.
11.Leelavathi W/o Pushparaj,
82-A, Dindigul Road, Karur.
12.M. Mariyammal W/o C.M.R. Muthusamy,
Thumbivadi Village & Kasba & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
13.Muthusamy S/o Renga Moopan,
No.9, Chinnapalli Street,
Karur Town.
14.Poornammal W/o Kalianna Gounder,
No.1, Lakshmipuram North Street,
Karur Town.
15.Kaliammal W/o Rangasamy,
Pallapalayam Village & Kasba,
Pallapalayam P.O., Karur Taluk.
16.Nallasamy
17.Muthusamy
Both sons of A.P. Ramasamy
Gounder (R16 & R17) residing at
Thumbivadi Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk, Trichy District.
18.Palaniappan @ Mattukothukarar
S/o Karuppanna Gounder,
Mudukanam Post,
P.Anapalayam Village,
Karur Taluk.
19.C. Marappa Gounder
S/o Sellappa Gounder,
Chellandipalayam,
Pallapalayam Village & P.O.,
Karur Taluk.
20.M/s Raja Auto Stores – Rep. by
one of its partners K. Raju
S/0 Karumana Gounder,
Bypass Road, Karur Town.
21.Cheran Transport Corporation -
Rep. by its Managing Director,
Mettupalayam Road,Coimbatore.
22.Cheran Engineering Corporation -
Rep. by its Managing Director,
Pollachi, Coimbatore District.
23.Sri Vasavi Corporation (P) Ltd.,
Jawahar Bazaar, Karur – Rep. by
its Managing Partner G.V. Srinivasan.
24. State Bank of India,
Main Office – Rep. by its
Manager (Sub Division),
Coimbatore-18.
25. Subbulakshmi
W/o Ponnambalam Pillai,
1, Narasimhapuram East Street,
Karur Town.
26. P. Vijaya D/o Ponnambalam Pillai,
No.1, Narasimhapuram East Street,
Karur Town.
27. P. Sivasubramaniam
S/o P. Ponnambalam Pillai,
No.1, Narasimhapuram East Street,
Karur Town. ... Respondents
For Appellants: ... Mr.V.K. Muthuswamy,
Senior Counsel.
^For Respondents 7 to 9 } ... Mr.T.R. Rajagopalan,
14, 16, 17, 19 and 25 } Senior Counsel for
to 27: } Mr.N. Damodaran
For Respondents 21 & 22: ... Mr.G. Munirathnam
For Respondent 24: ... M/s R. Sreekrishnan &
S. Krishnamoorthy
This appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated
27-10-19 86 made in O.S.No.148/83 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Karur.
:JUDGMENT:
K. SAMPATH, J.
The plaintiffs in O.S.No.148/83 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Karur, filed the appeal. Pending appeal, the first appellant/first plaintiff died and his mother has come on record as the third appellant. The plaintiffs filed the suit as indigent persons for declaration that the alienations of A to C Schedule properties made by the first defendant father in the names of defendants 2 to 23 were not binding upon the joint family of the plaintiffs and the first defendant and consequential relief for possession of the said schedule properties to the plaintiffs' next friend, guardian and mother for past damages against defendants 2 t 23 to the tune of Rs.4-1/2 lakhs and for future damages. There is also an alternative prayer for partition and separate possession of the suit properties into three equal shares and allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs.
2. The case as set out in the plaint is as follows:
The first defendant is the father of the plaintiffs. He married the plaintiffs' mother Devaki on or about 12-9-1965. Two sons and a daughter were born to them, the sons being the minor plaintiffs. They are the undivided sons of the first plaintiff. The first defendant is the Manager and Kartha of the Hindu Undivided Joint Family. He owned considerable ancestral joint family properties set out in Schedule A. He and his brother entered into a partition deed on 11-9-1969 in which the B Schedule properties were allotted to the former's share. Of the properties, 8-1/2 acres were double crop wet lands, 15 acres garden lands and the rest were valuable manavari punja lands. There would be an annual net income of not less than Rs.75,000/- from the ancestral joint family properties. The family also owned cattle wealth worth not less than Rs.50,000/- and they are set out in the C Schedule to the plaint. From the cattle wealth, the annual net income would be Rs.10,000/-. Except a meagre loan obtained from the Land Mortgage Bank, Karur, by the first defendant for development purpose, there were no debts to be discharged by the joint family. There were no commitments for the first defendant. There was no legal necessity for the first defendant to borrow any amount from anybody. From and out of the income of joint family ancestral properties in A Schedule and also the income from the cattle wealth in C Schedule properties, the first defendant acquired the B Schedule sites for the benefit of the joint family. B Schedule sites were also treated and enjoyed by the first defendant as joint family properties throwing the same into common hotchpot. The first defendant started new ventures known as "The Karur Auto Stores" at Karur, "The Karur Auto Engineering Works" also at Karur and "Shri Ganeshar Auto Stores" at Tiruchirappalli. Later on, the first defendant started "Vijaya Auto Parts" at Coimbatore. Apart from these new ventures, the first defendant also started Shri Balaji Bus Service at Anaikatti, Kerala State. All these ventures were highly speculative in nature and the first defendant did not have any training whatsoever. The family 'Kulachara' of the first defendant was only agriculture. Apart from these, the first defendant was addicted to drinking, gambling and womanizing. The plaintiffs came to know that he was admitted in the Christian Medical College Hospital at Vellore in or about 1969 for ill health on account of high degree of alcohol. Again, in 1972 he was admitted in C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore, for mental disorder on account of heavy alcoholic effect. For the above illegal and immoral purposes and for new ventures, the first defendant without any reason and for no binding necessity alienated the joint family ancestral properties in favour of defendants 2 to 23 and their predecessors in respect of A Schedule properties and also the properties purchased from the joint family properties in the B Schedule. The alienation will not bind the plaintiffs and the first defendant as they were not for family necessity. The illegal and immoral way of living of the first defendant was known to defendants 2 to 23. They are therefore not entitled to any right in A to C Schedule properties. The first defendant had acted against the interest of the minors and squandered the family properties. The alienations will not bind the joint family. The plaintiffs are entitled to ignore the alienations as void ab initio. In any event, the alienation will not bind the 2/3 share of the plaintiffs in the suit properties. The plaintiffs caused notice to be issued to the defendants calling upon them to deliver possession of A and B Schedule properties and also pay the damages for the illegal possession and enjoyment of the properties. The defendants had issued reply notice with false and untenable allegations. The common stand in the reply notices on behalf of the defendants is that the first defendant is behind the suit. This is absolutely false. Equally, the stand that the alienations were not made for illegal or immoral purposes and that the income from the joint family properties was not sufficient to meet both ends, is untrue.
3. It is not necessary to notice the various alienations at this stage. If and when occasion arises, the individual alienations will be dealt with.
4. Defendants 2 to 5, 10 to 12, 16 and 17 remained ex parte.
5. The defence of the other defendants in substance is as follows:
The value of the properties and income therefrom have been highly exaggerated. The wet lands are single crop lands and mostly in the enjoyment and possession of tenants and on account of the agrarian unrest and disputes,there has been no income at all. The wet lands are fed with water from river Amaravathi, which is a very precarious source depending upon the vagaries of nature. The garden lands and the ' manavari' lands are only rain fed punja lands. The meagre income from the properties were not sufficient 'to meet both ends', with the result debts were incurred for family and cultivation expenses. It is not correct to say that out of the alleged income from A and C Schedule properties, the B Schedule property was purchased. The businesses were all joint family businesses. They were not speculative in nature. The first defendant had been leading a proper family life and managing the properties. He was not leading any immoral life. The sale deeds were executed for legal necessity and binding purposes. The alienations cannot be ignored as void ab initio. The first defendant was not given to gambling, drinking or womanizing. The defendants and their predecessors in title are bona fide purchasers for value. The suit item 26 is stated to have been purchased by the father of the first defendant and his brother Muthusamy on 7-1-1957. The tenant then was an Advocate paying Rs.50/- per month. The first defendant and his brother borrowed Rs.6000/- on 21-2-1966 and executed an usufructuary mortgage in favour of the 14th defendant. The first defendant had been owning a lorry only and the 14th defendant was not aware of the several ventures of the first defendant. After partition between the first defendant and his brother Muthusamy, the first defendant sold item No.26 to the 6th defendant towards the usufructuary mortgage. A sum of Rs.7000/- was received in cash for trade and family expenses. The sale is pre-partition document and hence the suit without impleading the first defendant's brother as party is legally unsustainable. The sale in favour of the 14th defendant was long before the birth of the plaintiffs. Hence the plaintiffs have no locus standi to challenge the truth and validity and binding nature of the sale by the first defendant. The first defendant and the plaintiffs including their mother are living in Kamatchiamman Koil Street. The suit is clearly barred by limitation. The suit is bad for non-joinder of the plaintiffs' paternal uncle and the brother of the first defendant.
6. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed by the lower Court for trial:
"1. Whether the alienations made by the first defendant in favour of defendants 2 to 24 are binding upon the plaintiffs?
2. Whether the alienations are made for the family necessity?
3. Whether the alienations are true and supported by consideration?
4. Whether the alienations and debts are incurred by the first defendant for his immoral and illegal purposes?
5. Whether defendants 2 to 24 are bona fide purchasers?
6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to past and future damages?
7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of the suit A to C properties?
8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the partition and separate possession of 2/3rd share of the properties?
9. Whether the defendants are entitled to the equity as prayed for?
10. To what relief?
An additional issue was framed on 16-9-1986 and it is as follows:
Whether the suit as framed without setting aside the alienation is maintainable?
7. On the side of the plaintiffs Exs.A-1 to A-57 were marked and five witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 to 5, the plaintiffs' mother being examined as P.W.1. On the side of the defendants Exs.B-1 to B-52 were marked and D.Ws.1 to 29 were examined. Exs.X-1 to X-20 were marked as the documents of the witnesses.
8. On the materials placed, the learned Subordinate Judge found that the alienations were made for family necessity, that they were true and supported by consideration, that they were not incurred by the first defendant for his alleged immoral and illegal purposes, that defendants 2 to 24 were bona fide purchasers,that the plaintiffs are not entitled to either the relief of possession or the relief of partition and that the suit as framed without a prayer for setting aside the alienations is not maintainable. So holding by judgment and decree dated 27.1.1986, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit.
9. Aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed.
10. Mr.V.K. Muthuswamy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, made the following submissions:
There should be a distinction drawn between the alienees who remained ex parte and those who contested the case. So far as the alienees who remained ex parte are concerned, the evidence on the side of the plaintiffs remains unchallenged and the suit ought to have been decreed at least in respect of them. The evidence on the side of the plaintiffs even with regard to the contesting defendants is adequate to show that the first defendant was given to immoral and illegal ways, that he was treated for alcoholism in Vellore Christian College Hospital during the years 1969 to 1972, that the family `Kulacharam' was only agriculture, that the first defendant had indulged in speculative business ventures resulting in enormous loss and compelling him to sell away joint family properties for token prices. The alienees have not established that there were debts in the family, to discharge which the first defendant had to sell joint family properties. The evidence on the side of the plaintiffs regarding the immoral habits of the first defendant ought to have been accepted by the lower Court. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the learned Judge has also not given any finding on the various transactions entered into by the first defendant.
The learned Senior Counsel relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions:
1. SETH KISHORI LAL AND ANOTHER VS. BHAWANI SHANKAR AND OTHERS (AIR 1 940 Privy Council 145) and
2. SMT. RANI AND ANOTHER VS. SMT. SANTA BALA DEBNATH AND OTHERS (1971 SC 1028).
11. Per contra, Mr.T.R. Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, submitted as follows:
The first defendant is behind the suit. He is the Sutradari. The best witness to speak to the various transactions is the first defendant and he conveniently avoided the box. The evidence regarding illegal and immoral habits of the first defendant is next to nothing. In any event, after 1972 there is no evidence to show that the first defendant was given to drinks. As regards his association with other women, there is no evidence. On the speculative nature of the businesses, the first defendant had started a Lorry Transport Business even in the year 1961 when the joint family of his father, his brother and himself had not divided among themselves, that the businesses subsequently started and carried on by the first defendant are only allied businesses and that they were not speculative ventures. The plaintiffs have not let in any evidence regarding the income from the alleged joint family properties. The first defendant had a good name in business circles and with financing banks would be evident from Ex.B-52 , which is the certificate giving the remarks and recommendations issued by Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Coimbatore. In any event, the plaintiffs having been eo nomine parties to the various transactions without seeking to set aside those transactions, the suit is not maintainable.
The learned Senior counsel relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions:
1. SETH KISHORI LAL AND ANOTHER VS. BHAWANI SHANKAR AND OTHERS (AIR 1 940 Privy Council 145)
2. RAGHUBANCHMANI PRASAD NARAIN SINGH VS. AMBICA PRASAD SINGH ((AIR 1 971 SC
776)
3. SANTANAVENUGOPALAKRISHNAN AND OTHERS VS. K.V. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS (1976-II MLJ 134) and
4. BALU @ BALAKRISHNAN VS. MINOR B. SASIKUMAR AND OTHERS (2002(3) MLJ 15).
12. In the light of the rival submissions, the following points arise for determination in the appeal:
1. Whether the plaintiffs have proved that the transactions entered into by their father are tainted with illegality immorality?
2. Whether the suit without the prayer for setting aside the alienations is maintainable?
3. Whether defendants 2 to 24 are bona fide purchasers?
13. We have already noticed that the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.K. Muthuswamy wanted us to draw distinction between the alienees who remained ex parte as the evidence of the plaintiffs in regard to the said alienations stands unchallenged by the alienees concerned and those alienees who contested the case. We do not think that this contention by the learned Senior Counsel can be countenanced at all. The larger question is whether the alienations had been made by the first defendant for his illegal or immoral purposes. This the plaintiffs have to prove. If they succeed in proving the same, all the alienations will go, otherwise they will prevail.
14. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs are eo nomine parties to the various transactions by the father in favour of the different parties. In BALU @ BALAKRISHNAN VS. MINOR B. SASIKUMAR AND OTHERS (200 1(3) MLJ 15) E. PADMANABHAN, J. has considered the question on this point by referring to a number of decisions and has held that if a person is an eo nomine party to a document, he should seek for setting aside the alienations or should have sought for cancellation of the alienations as well as the encumbrances. The failure to seek cancellation would be fatal to his case. It is not in dispute that possession in the instant case has passed on to the alienees.
15. In RAMASWAMY AIYANGAR VS. RENGACHARIAR (1940(I) MLJ 32 = ILR 19 40 Madras 259 (FB)) referred to by the learned Judge it has been held that "in a case where possession has passed on to the alienee, there should be a prayer for setting aside the transactions before the plaintiff could recover possession from the said alienee."
16. In SANKARANARAYANA pILLAI VS.KANDASAMIPILLAI (AIR 1956 Madras 6 70 = 1956(2) MLJ 411) it has been held by the subsequent Full Bench without any room for doubt that if the minor is an eo nomine party to a sale deed or other documents of alienations, he should sue for the cancellation of the documents and it is not enough if he applies for possession. The hypothesis would be the same whether the father as guardian of the minor and not as the Manager of the joint family executes the deed.
17. The position therefore is that the present suit having been filed by the plaintiffs for a mere declaration that the alienations are not binding on them without specifically seeking to set aside the alienations, is not maintainable. The appeal can be dismissed on this short ground. However, we will discuss the materials available on record with regard to the other points, which have been raised for consideration.
18. It is settled law that minors' impugning alienations by joint family Manager/Father should allege and prove that they were for immoral or illegal purposes. The onus is on them to show that the recitals in the deeds are false and that the vendor did not receive consideration or that the consideration was for immoral or illegal purposes.
19. In matters like this where the minors challenge alienations by father/Manager on the ground that the alienations were brought about by the father for illegal or immoral purposes, that there were no antecedent debts for the family, that there was no compelling necessity or that no benefit accrued to the estate, there are certain basic and rudimentary requirements to be satisfied.
20. It is incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove that there was income from the family properties, that it was adequate and that "after meeting the generality of the expenses connected with the family there could have been available surplus, the existence of which cannot prompt reasonable persons to borrow unnecessarily or to mortgage unnecessarily the family properties, so as to ultimately burden them." - SANTANAVENUGOPALAKRISHNAN AND OTHERS VS. K.V. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS (197 6(2) MLJ 134).
21. As pointed out in RAGHUBANCHMANI PRASAD NARAIN SINGH VS. AMBICA PRASAD SINGH )AIR 1971 SC 776), alienation by Manager of joint Hindu Family even without legal necessity is voidable and not void.
22. The onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that the recital in the document as to payment of consideration is false and in fact the executant did not receive consideration. - SMT. RANI AND ANOTHER VS. SMT. SANTA BALA DEBNATH AND OTHERS (AIR 1971 SC 1028).
23. It is also well settled by precedents that even if there was no binding purpose, even if the alienation was not for discharging antecedent debts, for necessity or benefit of the estate as long as there is a debt and it had not been incurred for any immoral or illegal purpose, on the theory of pious obligation, the sons would be liable to discharge the debts out of the joint family property in their hands.
24. What is the material available regarding the income in the present case? In paragraph 6 of the plaint it is averred that there was an annual net income of not less than Rs.75,000/- from the ancestral joint family properties, that from the cattle wealth there was an annual net income of Rs.10,000/-. These averments are disputed in the written statements by the various alienees. According to them, there was agrarian unrest and what the family got was a pittance. The next friend and guardian of the plaintiffs, viz. their mother/P.W.1 got married to the first defendant in 1965. At that time the family was undivided and the first defendant was only a junior member. If the share of his income was Rs.75,000/- or even if it was the joint family income of the three, viz. the father and the two sons, there would have been assessment for agricultural income-tax. P.W.1 has not produced any assessment order in support of the agricultural income in the family. She has also not produced the adangal extract for the relevant period. Only for faslis 1389 to 1392, the adangal extract (Ex.A-5 7) has been produced and it is for item 19 alone. In her oral evidence, she has reiterated the averments in the plaint. She also admitted that her husband, his brother Muthusamy and her mother-in-law had to borrow money from Karur Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank in 1961 and 1963 by mortgaging items 14 and 15 of the plaint schedule. This is evident from Ex.X-13 and items 14 and 15 had to be sold to the 13th defendant for discharging the debts mentioned in Ex.X-13. P.W.2, who has been examined in support of the plaintiffs' stand regarding income, was the Village Karnam of Thumbivadi from 1948 to 1980. Though he says that the wet lands were cultivated with sugarcane plantain, turmeric and groundnut crops, he admits that there was a separate Karnam for Pallapalayam Village where the wet lands of the family were situated. Therefore, P.W.2 was not competent to speak what was grown in the wet lands or as to the income therefrom. He had also kept company with the first defendant during his drinking sessions. He also admits that the first defendant is an agnate. At one stage, he has said that no sugarcane crops were raised in Pallapalayam. P.W.4 was the Cane Inspector in Pugalur Sugar Factory from 1954. He has spoken to the first defendant raising sugarcane during the period 1961 to 1963. This period is rather irrelevant for our purposes. The family had not become divided in 1961 to 1963 and only in 1969 the first defendant got divided from his brother. The witness has also not produced any document to show that he was appointed as Cane Inspector in the villages of Thumbivadi and Pallapalayam. We have already noted that P.W.1 had prevaricated. Thus, there is absolutely no material produced oral or documentary on the plaintiffs' side to show the income from the properties.
25. The plaintiffs have put forward another contention that ` Kulachara' of the plaintiffs' family was only agriculture and the first defendant had indulged in speculative business enterprises. This contention has to be summarily rejected. It is on record that even in 1961 the first defendant as junior member started a lorry transport business and in 1966 before there was any partition in the family, he started two other businesses, one at Karur and the other at Tiruchirappalli. Thereafter, he started other businesses. The `Kulachara' of the family cannot be therefore stated to be only agriculture. He started lorry transport business in 1961. The spare parts venture was only an allied domain and cannot be stated to be speculative. It has already been noticed that the plaintiffs have not proved that there was adequate income from the joint family properties. In those circumstances, the first defendant was well within his rights to embark on other enterprises. He had experience in the automobile field, while he was running the lorries. So the stand by the plaintiffs that he did not have enough experience in the field and that his starting allied businesses was speculative cannot be accepte d.
26. In BHUPATIRAJU SREERSMARAJU AND OTHERS VS. NADIMPALLI PULLAM RAJU AND ANOTHER (AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 403) it has been laid down as follows:
"Where a new business is started by a sole surviving co-parcener of Mithakshara family the business becomes from its origin a family business and the minor members of the family born subsequently are not competent to say that the risk and liability of the new business cannot be imposed on them. The risk and liability has been taken by the family and the new comers in the family must share the debts and the new business along with other assets and liability of that family."
In that case also, the father of the plaintiffs was an agriculturalist and he started a new business and the debts incurred by the father were attacked. In those circumstances, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the alienations were binding on the plaintiffs.
27. In RAJASEKARAN AND OTHERS VS. NAGARATHINAMMAL AND OTHERS (92 LW 249) where the Manager took up film distribution as a business enterprise, it was contended that it was not a `Kulachara' of the family and any liability in connection with such a business could not be fastened to the other co-parceners. The learned Judge observed as follows:
"Whatever may be said of an activity involving production of films, it is not possible to accept the bald contention on the subject that a contract to take distribution of films already produced should automatically be viewed with suspicion and be branded as a speculative enterprise. In a progressive society like ours and particularly in days where advancement is adopted as the watchword for progress, it cannot be stated that the involvement or association of the father manager or the managers of a Hindu family in an activity though not the Kulachara of the family but which is not harmful, which is not speculative and which no rational being could characterise as a commercial activity which would invariably result in prejudice to the other members, is by itself an indicia that such a trade or business should invariably be characterised as a speculative trade and the debts which the father manager involved in connection thereto should be held to be not binding on the other co-parceners, minors and majors."
28. Having regard to the materials on record and the established legal position, it cannot be said that the businesses started by the first defendant were speculative in nature. It has already been noticed that the family did not have enough income from agriculture properties and in 1961 and 1963, the first defendant, his brother and mother had to mortgage some of the suit items in favour of Karur Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. There was therefore nothing wrong in the first defendant having started business in lorry transport and spare parts.
29. Let us now go to the immoral and illegal ways attributed to the first defendant. It is averred in the plaint that the first defendant was given to bad ways, drinking, gambling and womanizing and that the alienations were made and debts incurred for such illegal and immoral purposes. In her evidence P.W.1 has stated that the first defendant used to drink and bring other women to the house. P.W.2, who was the Village Karnam at Thumbivadi Village from 1948 to 1980, has stated in his evidence that the first defendant used to drink heavily and play cards and also bring ladies to village for being kept in company for drinks. We have already noticed that P.W.2 had not spoken the truth with regard to the income from the agricultural properties and that he is not a trustworthy witness.
30. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the first defendant was given to drinking and that there was a set back in his health and he was hospitalised. These things happened between 1969 and 1972. There is absolutely nothing to show that after 1972 the first defendant continued to drink. Apparently, he had got over the habit. As regards his affairs with other women, there is no reliable evidence. The plaintiffs have not placed any evidence worth the name for taking a view that the first defendant was given to immoral and illegal ways. In the absence of any acceptable evidence on this aspect, it is very unsafe to conclude that he was given to bad ways and that the alienations were for meeting the expenses relating to those bad ways.
31. The indisputable facts that emerge on the pleadings and the oral and the documentary evidence are as follows:
The first defendant was a junior member of the joint Hindu Family consisting of his father Ramasamy, elder brother Muthusamy and himself. The family had ancestral properties. Even as a junior member in 1961, the first defendant started a lorry transport business. He married P.W.1 Devaki in 1965. In 1966 still as an undivided junior member, he started a lathe under the name and style of Karur Auto Engineering Works at Karur and Trichy Auto Stores at Trichy (Vide P.W.1's evidence in cross-examination). Under the original of Ex.A-1 dated 7-5 -1967 there was a partition among the members – father Ramasamy on the one hand and the brothers Muthusamy and the first defendant on the other. Under the original of Ex.A-2 dated 11-9-1969 there was a further partition between the two brothers Muthusamy and the first defendant. The first plaintiff was born on 5-8-1969 (Ex.X3) at Karur and the second plaintiff on 7-10-1971 (Ex.X-4) also at Karur. The first defendant purchased B Schedule sites under the originals of Ex.A-11 dated 26-4-1968 and Ex.A-12 dated 26-10-1970 for Rs.20,000/-. At the time the original of Ex.A-11 came into existence, both the plaintiffs had not been born. The first defendant also had not separated from his brother. He was still a junior member. At the time the original of Ex.A-12 came into existence the second respondent had not been born. The mother of the plaintiffs as P.W.1 would say that she had nothing to do with the first defendant after 1972. The documents marked belie the truth of such a stand. There is not even a modicum of truth in her case that her financial requirements for running the family, maintaining and educating the minors were taken care of by her father. Absolutely nothing was produced to show her father's monetary capacity. A suggestion was put to her that he was working as car driver to a retired High Court Judge. The plaintiffs were put to school in Brindhavan Public School in Conoor, another school in Coimbatore and a third school at Karur. Even in the 1970s putting the children in schools, which catered to the needs of people in the higher echelons of society involved a lot of money and was a costly affair. The applications for admission to those schools are found to have been signed by the first defendant. P.W.1 in her evidence has gone to the extent of saying that after 1972 she had not seen the first defendant and that the children themselves were born only at the native village and not at Karur. It is very significant that when the first defendant is in Karur, the boys would be studying in Karur. When he is in Coimbatore, the boys would be studying in Coimbatore. But they will not be staying with their father. P.W.1 wants us to believe that she had nothing to do with the first defendant after 1972. The birth extracts relating to the birth of the two plaintiffs have been produced through the Registrar of Births in Karur Municipality and marked as Exs.X-3 and X-4. They show that the plaintiffs were born only in Karur and not in Thumbivadi as spoken to by P.W.1.
32. Now let us to go the various alienations made by the first defendant. The lower Court has exhaustively dealt with the alienations from paragraphs 44 to 56 of its judgment. The details as to alienations have been furnished by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and they are extracted below:
CHART GIVING PARTICULARS OF IMPUGNED ALIENATION BY THE APPELLANTS
-----
------------------------------------------------------------ Sl. Exhibit Date Value Eextent No. Rs. In item Vendor Vendee Judg-
Nos.16,17 ment
21,22,23 Paras
1. A-3 22-7-74 29000 2.31 D-1 and D-2 to 41
14000 Minor D-5 44
Mortgage plaintiffs
15000
cash
paid
2. A-5 7-3-73 14000 Item 15
A Schedule -do- Ukirandi
1.43 Chettiar,
his son
DW23
44
examined
A-5 to
A-6 5-6-78 18590 -do- Ukirandi D-6 44
(B.42) Chettiar
(Not a
party)
B. Schedule
Item 1
3. A11,A12 23-4-68 20000
Acquisition
26-10-70
purchased
by D1
Alienation
A13 7-4-71 Ramayee be settled on her
9 ft.x173 7000 husband D15 under A18,
Ramayee 29-8-81 L.Rs. 25 to 28
added after the death
D15
D15 – D18 (D29
examined)
A7 26-6-73 7000
1/3 of
Schedule - to K.C. Ramasamy,
Item No.1 Karur.
A14 26-6-73 23000
2/3 of B Schedule - Ammaiyappan
Item No.1
A10 19-1-74 13500 by
Ammaiyappan from K.C. Ramasamy (A7).
Thus, Ammaiyappan become a full owner
of B Schedule Item No.1 (excluding
A13)
A17 20-2-76 45000 by Arumugha Gounder from
Ammaiyappan. Whatever is owned
by Ammaiyappan under A10 and A14
was purchased by Arumugham, who is
L.Rs./as D-7 to D-11.
4. A8 23-11-78 16860 Items 1 & 2
in Schedule D1 and D12
Punjai Acre plaintiff Mariammal
11.86 & 7.96 (Exparte) 49
5. A9-B9 13-3-70 18000 Item D13 Muthu-
Rs.110147.22 Nos.13&14 samy exa-
Mortgage and Nanjai A -do- mined as
2 pronotes in Schedule DW.15,DW.16
favour of Bank Offi-
Vellaiyappa cial to prove
by D1 and his Exs.X-13,
brother X-14 DW17 -
Pronote
holder
examined 50
6. A16-B6 11-2-67 13000 Item No.26 D-1 and D-14 55
in plaintiff
A Schedule
Note: This item is originall mortgaged under D5 (A15) dated 21-2-66 by D1 and his brother Muthusamy. The samewas sold out to mortgage under A-16 dated 11-2-67 D14 examined as D.W.5.
7. A19 7-3-79 11000 Item No.18 D-1 and D-16 A Schedule plaintiff (Ex- 52 Nanjai parte) 82.50 cent
8. A20 22-1-75 3200 Item No.5 -do- Ramasamy
(i)B31 A Schedule Brother-
in-law 53 of DW14
(ii)A21 23-6-76 3200 -do- -do- By Ramasamy to D17 & D18 53
(iii)A22 5-3-79 4856 -do- -do- -do- 53 Note: D-1 purchased the portion on the item under B34 dated 29-3-74. The same was sold out with minor sons to Mr. Ramasamy under A20. The said Ramasamy sold to D17 and D-18 under A21. The same person purchased under A-22 dated 5-3-79. DW21 was examined. D-17 and D-18 his father alone was examined.
9. B38 29-3-74 13500 Item No.24 D1 brother D20 S.F.547 and Marappa 1.43 Nanjai Soliammal Gounder examined 54 as DW21 Note: D35 in favour of Soliammal D36 Lease deed and D37 Agreement for sale referred to. 54 Item Nos.10 to 12 sold to D19 Mr. Palaniappan, who remained ex parte,however, no sale deed was marked as exhibit.
D2 to D5, D10 to D12, D16 and D19 ex parte, no sale deed marked.
A3 in favour of D2 to D5. A8 in favour of D12 and A19 to D16 was not challenged.
============================================================
33. Ex.A-3 is the sale deed dated 22-4-1974 executed by the first defendant for himself and as guardian of the minor plaintiffs in favour of defendants 2 to 5, subject matter of items 16, 17, 21, 22 and 23 . Ex.A-3 provides that out of the total consideration of Rs.29,000/-, Rs.14,000/- was paid towards discharge of an earlier usufructuary mortgage and the balance of Rs.15,000/- was paid by cash. The recitals in the document say that the sale was for family expenses, maintenance of minors and improvement of lands. The earlier mortgage is dated 22-5-1968. After the sale in their favour under Ex.A-3, the purchasers effected a partition among themselves as could be seen from Ex. A-4 dated 9-5-1979. The sale under Ex.A-3 was for discharge of prepartition debts. We have already noticed that the recital in a sale deed to the effect that full consideration has been paid has to be accepted, unless the person impugning the sale deed proves by acceptable evidence that the recital is false and the vendor did not in fact receive the consideration.
34. It has been held in SMT. RANI AND ANOTHER VS. SMT.
SANTA BALA DEBNATH AND OTHERS (AIR 1971 SC 1028) that, "the weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. Where the evidence which could be brought before the Court and is within the special knowledge of the person who seeks to set aside the sale is withheld, such evidence being normally not available to the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force and the Court may be justified in appropriate cases in raising an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially, when he withholds evidence in his possession."
35. In the instant case, there can be absolutely no doubt that the first defendant is the Sutradari as pointed out a Bench of this Court in SANTANAVENUGOPALAKRISHNAN AND OTHERS VS. K.V. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS (1976-II MLJ 134) In paragraph 5 of the said judgment this is what is stated:
"We may also in passing refer to the decided cases making another general observation in cases like the one under consideration. It is the common feature in such cases that the father who is responsible for the litigation, who, though is living with the minor, keeps himself safely outside the witness-box. He can easily be presumed to be a person who is encouraging this litigation as a sutradari. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the hand of the father is always there in this litigation and he just brings into the witness box his brother's sons, minor children and others so as to gamble in litigation, by challenging his own alienations through them. It is this conduct of the parents which is condemned in the following lines in MASITULLAH VS. DAMODAR PRASAD (AIR 1926 P.C. 105 = 51 MLJ 792 = 98 I.C. 1031 = 53 I.A.
204). The learned Law Lords state that:
"The only sum that was left unaccounted for was Rs.2000/- odd, as found by the Subordinate Judge. Janki Prasad, the plaintiff's father, admittedly received the whole consideration, and was the man who used the largest part of the money for the discharge, of the ancestral debts. He could have told in his evidence how the sum of Rs.2000/- was applied. There is no evidence that it was used for immoral or unauthorised purposes. His testimony was therefore most material in the case. ........... Efforts were made to get him into the witness box, but he studiously avoided appearing in court."
36. The Bench also referred to another decision of the Privy Council in JAGANNATH VS. SHRI NATH (AIR 1934 PC 55 = 66 MLJ 321 = 61 I.A. 1
50). In that case an old father alienated certain family properties and the sale deed was attested by the eldest members of the family. In a suit brought by the minors challenging such alienations, the Privy Council said that the attestors who were the eldest members of the family and who were intimately connected with it were in a better position than anyone else to say whether the money was applied for the necessary purposes of the family. They had allowed their children to figure as plaintiffs and got themselves impleaded as defendants. The Privy Council held that the suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the elders afforded ample corroboration of the other evidence that the same was effected for necessary family purposes.
37. The Bench has referred to a Division bench ruling of the Oudh High Court in SANT BAKSH VS. LACHHMAN PRASAD (AIR 1946 Oudh 92) wherein it has been observed as follows:
"Where the father executes a sale deed by which he alienates joint family property to satisfy his previous liabilities and his son, on attaining majority, files a suit to set aside the sale deed on the ground that it was executed without any legal necessity impleading the father as defendant and the father does not come forward to give evidence whether all or any of the debts borrowed by him were not for legal necessity, it must be held that the suit is a collusive suit filed at the instance of the father and the failure of the father to come into the witness box and to state the real facts raises a presumption against the plaintiff that the money must have been needed for legal necessity."
38. Thus we have been able to see that the first defendant is behind the litigation. He is the puppeteer pulling the strings from behind the scene and his wife (P.W.1) has deposed to his bidding.
39. Let us now go back to the alienations.
40. Ex.A-5 is dated 7-3-1973. Item 15 of A Schedule has been sold by the first defendant and the minor plaintiffs in favour of Pukkarandi Chettiar for Rs.14,000/-. The first defendant and his brother had executed an usufructuary mortgage on 7-4-1966 in respect of the 15th item and another item. Pukkarandi Chettiar after purchasing the 15 th item, had sold the property to the 6th defendant under Ex.A-6 on 5-6 -1978. Ex.B-40 is the usufructuary mortgage deed dated 27-4-1966 in respect of two items of property for Rs.18,100/-. The first defendant had sold one of the items mentioned in Ex.B-40 to the 6th defendant, one of the sons of Pukkarandi Chettiar, who was examined as P.W.23 in this case. Under Ex.B-41 the first defendant had sold only the fifth item. While the property was sold to Pukkarandi Chettiar, one half of the mortgage amount was given credit to, towards the mortgage dues, that is to say, Rs.9050/- was deducted for the sale under Ex.B-4 1 and the balance of Rs.4050/- was paid by Pukkarandi Chettiar to the first defendant for his family and business expenses. It could thus be seen that a major portion of the consideration had been utilised for discharging antecedent pre-partition debt. It is also stated that the balance amount was for family necessity and business purposes.
41. From the above, it would be clear that properties covered in the A Schedule had been sold for binding purposes. The plaintiffs have not shown by any acceptable evidence that they were not for discharging antecedent debts or for meeting family expenses.
42. Let us now go to B Schedule. B Schedule consists of house sites. They were acquired by the first defendant under Ex.A-11 dated 26-4-1968 and Ex.A-12 dated 26-10-1970. A portion of the sites was alienated under Ex.A13 dated 7-4-1971 by the first defendant to one Ramayee Ammal, who in her turn settled that property in favour of her husband Ponnambalam (D-15) under the original of Ex.A-18 on 29-8-1981. Ponnambalam died pending suit and his legal representatives including the settlor Ramayee Ammal were added as defendants 26 to 29. She also died pending suit. D-29 was examined as D.W.18. Under Ex.A-7 dated 26-6-1973 1/3rd of B schedule item 1 was sold by the first defendant in favour of one K.C. Ramasamy examined as D.W.1 for Rs.7000/-. Under Ex.A-14 2/3rd of B Schedule item 1 was sold in favour of Ammaiyappan on 2-6-1973 for Rs.23,000/-. Under Ex.A-10 dated 17-1-1974 D.W.1 K.C. Ramasamy sold what he purchased under the original of Ex.A-7 to Ammaiyappan on 19-1-1974 for Rs.13,500/-. Ammaiyappan sold what he purchased under the originals of Exs.A-14 and A-10 to one Arumugha Gounder on 20-2-1976 for Rs.45,000/- under the original of Ex.A-17. The legal representatives of Arumugham are defendants 7 to 11. Ammaiyappan was examined as D.W.2. One Raju Naidu, who is the attestor to the documents was examined as D.W.3.
43. It can be immediately seen that at the time the first defendant purchased a portion of B Schedule properties under the original of Ex.A-11 from Pavayee Ammal, he was not yet divided from his brother Muthusamy. Further, the plaintiffs had not been born at the time of Ex.A-11 sale deed. As noticed previously, the first defendant was only a junior member and there is nothing to show that for purchasing Ex.A-11 property, the first defendant utilised any joint family funds. Though it is possible to contend that when he purchased the rest of B Schedule property under the original of Ex.A-12 on 26-10-1970, he could have utilised joint family funds. But, we have found that the joint family did not derive any substantial income, which would leave any surplus to enable a member of the joint family to acquire properties. It is on record that the first defendant started an independent lorry transport business in 1961, followed it with spare parts shop at Karur and at Trichy in 1967. In these circumstances, it must be deemed that the acquisitions by the first defendant under the originals of Exs.A-11 and A-12 were his separate properties and the alienations by him cannot be questioned by the plaintiffs.
44. Be that as it may, the sale by the first defendant under the original of Ex.A-13 in favour of Ramayee Ammal (D.26) was only in respect of 9 feet by 1.73 feet. Her husband Ponnambalam (D-15) owned a property immediately to the west of the B Schedule property and the purchase under the original of Ex.A-13 was required to annexe the same with her husband's property. D.W.1 K.C. Ramasamy has spoken to the discussions that took place prior to his purchasing the property. They were vacant sites yielding no income and the first defendant was already doing business and in Exs.A-7 and A-14 he has stated that the properties were being sold for the family expenses, maintenance of minors and improvement of business. D.Ws.1 and 2 have deposed that they enquired about the necessity for selling the property. D.W.3, the attestor has deposed that the entire sale consideration was paid to the first defendant in his presence and in the presence of the other witness. They have further deposed that P.W.1 was present at the house at Karur at that time and she knew about the transaction. The dictum by the Supreme Court and other Courts that in appropriate cases, an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially can be raised when he withholds evidence in his possession.
45. We have already found that the first defendant is behind the suit. Having set up his sons represented by their mother to file the suit, he has avoided the box and evidence has been withheld. In these circumstances, we have to uphold the alienation by the first defendant as one for necessity and in our view, of his separate property. The purchasers had also verified about the necessity for selling the property and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in `RADHAKRISHNADAS VS. KALURAM (AIR 1967 SC 574 = 1963-I SCR 648), "Where an alienation by way of a sale of the family property made by a Hindu father is challenged by his sons on the ground of want of legal necessity therein, it is now well established that what the alienee is required to establish is legal necessity for the transaction and that it is not necessary for him to show that every bit of the consideration, which he advanced was actually applied for meeting family necessity. The reasons that the alienee can rarely have the means of controlling and directing the actual application of the money paid or advanced by him, unless he enters into management business."
46. The original of Ex.A-8 is a sale deed by the first defendant and the plaintiffs on 23-11-1978 of A Schedule items 1 and 2 for Rs.16,860/- in favour of the 12th defendant. It is recited in Ex.A-8 as the sale was for family expenses, agricultural expenses, maintenance of minors and discharge of sundry debts. By then, the first defendant had closed his business started at Coimbatore and there were suits filed against him by the 24th defendant. It can be safely concluded that the sale was for necessity and binding purposes.
47. Ex.B-19 is the original of Ex.A-9. It is a sale deed dated 13-3-1970 in respect of items 13 and 14 of A Schedule by the first defendant and the plaintiffs in favour of the 13th defendant for Rs.18,000 /-. There is a debt mentioned in Ex.B-19. It was directed to be discharged by the first defendant at the time of partition. The property was also allotted to him. The debts referred to are: On 18.2.1961 Ra.9500/- borrowed from the bank; on 7-2-1963 Rs.5500/- drawn by the first defendant. Two promissory notes in favour of one Velliappa Gounder for Rs.4000/- and Rs.3500/- each. The mortgage debt comes to Rs.10147.22 and the promissory notes debt Rs.7500/-. After deducting these amounts, a sum of Rs.352.78 was paid to the first defendant. The 13th defendant was examined as D.W.15 and the Bank Official as D.W.1 6. Exs.X13 and X-14 being the loan ledger extracts were marked through D.W.16. The promisee was examined as D.W.17. It must be held that the transaction was for discharge of antecedent debts and Ex.B-19 has to be held to be binding on the plaintiffs.
48. The next item is Ex.B-6, which is the original of Ex.A-16. Item 26 in A Schedule was sold by the first defendant on 11-2-1967 to the 14th defendant. The property was originally mortgaged under the original of Ex.A-15 dated 21-2-1966 by the first defendant and his brother Muthusamy. To discharge the mortgage which incidentally was a pre-partition debt the transaction was brought about. The 14th defendant has also been examined as D.W.5. There can be least doubt that the transaction is binding on the plaintiffs.
49. Under the original of Ex.A-19 dated 7-3-1979 item No.18 of A Schedule was sold by the first defendant and the plaintiffs to the 16 th defendant for Rs.11,000/-. It is seen from the recitals that the sale deed was executed for family expenses and maintenance of minors. The first defendant had prior to the sale transaction, received Rs.35 ,000/- and the balance was paid to him in cash. The recitals are sufficient to hold that the sale was for proper consideration and binding on the minors.
50. Ex.B-31 is the original of Ex.A-20. Under Ex.B-31 the first defendant and the plaintiffs sold item No.5 of A Schedule to one Ramasamy, brother-in-law of D.W.14/D-8 for Rs.3200/- on 22-1-1975. Ramasamy under the original of Ex.A-21 sold a portion of the property to D-17 and D-18. Under Ex.A-22 dated 5-3-1979 the balance extent was sold to D-17 and D-18. The first defendant had purchased a portion of the item under Ex.B-34 on 29-3-1974. D.W.21 was examined. Father of defendants 17 and 18 was examined as D.W.20. He had deposed that the sales were negotiated by him and that he was satisfied. The first defendant was in need of funds for family expenses, agricultural expenses and also maintenance of the minors. Purchaser under Ex.B-20 deposed that Ramasamy and himself were present at the time when Ramasamy purchased the property under B-20. He had verified about the necessity for the sale for family and agricultural expenses and maintenance of minor plaintiff. The first defendant had done the right thing in selling those properties. The purchasers have satisfactorily proved that it was for a legal necessity and bi nding purposes. The sales have to be upheld.
51. Under Ex.B-38 dated 29-3-1974 item No.24 was sold by the first defendant, his brother and Soliammal for Rs.13,500/- to D-20, who has been examined as D.W.21. The grandfather of the first defendant had executed a maintenance deed in favour of Soliammal that she had to enjoy the same till her life time and thereafter the absolute right of the property must go to the first defendant and his brother Muthusamy. Ex.B-35 is the maintenance deed dated 10-1-1921. Soliammal had a personal right in the properties. The properties were enjoyed by one Rangasamy as a tenant. Ex.B-36 is the lease deed executed between Soliammal and Rangasamy. The said Rangasamy relinquished his rights of tenancy. One Ramasamy was examined as D.W.22 and he had deposed that he had attested the document. After evicting the tenant from the 25th item, the first defendant, his brother Muthusamy and Soliammal had executed an agreement to sell the property in favour of the 20th defendant under Ex.B-37 on 18-1-1974 for the said sum of Rs.13,500/-. Soliammal received Rs.1000/- and the rema ining amount on 29-3-1974 , the date of Ex.B-38. The property was sold by the life estate holder and the absolute owner. It is not necessary for the alienee to verify the application of the money whether any other property was purchased. For the reasons stated above it has to be held that the sale deed in favour of the 20th defendant is binding on the plaintiffs the same having been executed for family necessity. As Soliammal was not getting adequate income from the property,she wanted to sell the same to purchase another property to get higher income.
52. The above narration would clearly show that the alienations effected by the first defendant in favour of various alienees were for either discharge of antecedent debs, for family necessity, maintenance of minor plaintiffs or expansion of business, etc. The plaintiffs have not succeeded in proving that the first defendant was given to immoral ways or habits. The only period during which it can be said that the first defendant was given to drinks is 1969 to 1972. We have already noted that prior to 1969 and after 1972 there is practically no evidence as to his alcoholism. As regards his gambling and flirting with other women, there is no evidence to prove the same. In fact, it has to be noted that during the period 1969 to 1972 there is not much of an alienation by the first defendant. He had actually purchased a property in 1969. Ex.A-12 dated 26-10-1970 is the registration copy of the sale deed relating to the B Schedule sites executed by one Ramalingam in favour of the first defendant for Rs.10,000/-. Between 1969 and 1972 under Ex.A-13 dated 7-4-1971 the first defendant had sold a portion of B Schedule property to Ramayee Ammal for Rs.7,00 0/-. Barring that there is no other alienation and so far as Ex.B-3 = Ex.A-13 is concerned, we have already seen that it was for binding purposes.
53. For all the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the appeal. All the points are decided against the appellants. The appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
(P.S.M.,J.) (K.S.,J.) 10-7-2002 Index: Yes Website: Yes IGP To
1. The Subordinate Judge, Karur (with records).
2. The Record Keeper, V.R. Section, High Court, Madras.
P. SHANMUGAM, J.
and K. SAMPATH, J.
Judgment in A.S.No.371/92