Delhi High Court
Arjun Aggarwal vs Union Of India And Anr on 12 June, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 DEL 1023
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Hima Kohli, Subramonium Prasad
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 12.06.2020
+ W.P.(C) 3449/2020 & C.M. No.12224/2020 (stay)
ARJUN AGGARWAL
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Apratim Animesh Thakur, Mr.
Sugam Kumar Jha and Ms. Nikita
Chitale, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR
....Respondents
Through: Ms. Maninder Acharya, ASG with
Mr. Jasmeet Singh, CGSC, Mr.
Srivats Kaushal and Mr. Viplav
Acharya, Advocates for UOI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
1 The instant Public Interest Litigation (PIL) challenges the order dated
30.05.2020 bearing No.40-3/2020-DM-I, issued by the Government of India,
Ministry of Home Affairs. By the impugned order, in exercise of powers under
Section 6 (2) (i) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, the Government of
India has extended the lockdown which had initially been issued by an order
bearing the same number, dated 25.03.2020 for containment of COVID-19 in
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 1 of 23
the country up to 30.06.2020, in containment zones and to reopen activities in a
phased manner outside containment zones.
2 In the wake of the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, by an order dated
16.03.2020, Government of India ordered closure of educational institutions,
shopping malls, theatres, gyms etc. in the entire country. In furtherance of the
endeavour to stop the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of India
by an order dated 25.03.2020 bearing No.40-3/2020-DM-I announced a 21 days
lockdown w.e.f. 25.03.2020 till 14.04.2020. Pursuant to this announcement, the
entire country came to a standstill. All offices Government and private, all
industries, construction activity and all other activities in the country were
shutdown/stopped. All means of transport i.e. air, rail and roads were closed.
The country came to a grinding halt.
3 The 21 days period ended on 14.04.2020. The Government of India
announced extension of the lockdown from 14.04.2020 till 30.04.2020.
However, some relaxations were given in areas in which the COVID-19 disease
had not spread. The said lockdown was to end on 30.04.2020.
4 The lockdown was further extended till 15.05.2020 by an order dated
01.05.2020. By the said order, the country was divided into red (hot spot),
orange and green zones based on the spread of the pandemic. Certain
relaxations were given for activities depending upon the zones in which the area
fell.
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 2 of 23
5 The lockdown was further extended to 31.05.2020 by an order dated
17.05.2020. There were further relaxations for opening up certain more
activities depending on the spread of COVID-19. The relevant portion of the
guidelines read as under:-
"Guidelines on the measures to be taken by
Ministries/Departments of Government of India, State/ UT
Governments and State/UT Authorities for containment of
COVID-19 in the country upto 31st, 2020.
{As per Ministry of HOme Affairs (MHA) Order No.40-3/2020-
DM-I (A) dated 17th May, 2020}
1. Lockdown shall continue to remain in force upto 31st May,
2020.
2 The following activities shall continue to remain
prohibited throughout the country:
(i) All domestic and international air travel of passengers,
except for domestic medical services, domestic air ambulance and
for security purposes or purposes as permitted by MHA;
(ii) Metro rail services;
(iii) Schools, colleges, educational and training/coaching
institutions; will remain closed. Online/ distance learning shall
continue to be permitted and shall be encouraged.
(iv) Hotels, restaurants and other hospitality services, except
those meant for housing health/police/Government
officials/healthcare workers/ stranded persons including tourists
and for quarantine facilities, and running of canteens at bus
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 3 of 23
depots, railway stations and airports. Restaurants shall be
permitted to operate kitchens for home delivery of food items.
(v) All cinemas, shopping malls, gymnasiums, swimming pools,
entertainment parks, theaters bars and auditoriums, assembly
halls and similar places. Sports complexes and stadia will be
permitted to open, however, spectators will not be permitted.
(vi) All social,
political/sports/entertainment/academic/cultural/religious
functions/other gatherings and large congregations.
(vii) All religious places/places of worship shall be closed for
public. Religious congregations are strictly prohibited.
3 The following activities shall be permitted with
restrictions, except in the Containment Zones.
(i) Inter-State movement of passenger vehicles and buses, with
mutual consent of the State(s)/ UT (s) involved.
(ii) Intra-State movement of passenger vehicles and buses, as
decided by the States and UTs.
(iii) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for movement of
persons, as mentioned in Annexure I, shall continue to operate.
4 National Directives for COVID-19 Management.
National Directives for COVID-19 Management, as specified in
Annexure II, shall be followed throughout the country.
5 Containment, Buffer, Red, Green and Orange Zones.
(i) The delineation of Red, Green and Orange Zones will be
decided by the respective State and UT Governments, after taking
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 4 of 23
into consideration the parameters shared by the Ministry of
Health & Family Welfare (MoHFW), Government of India (GoI).
(ii) Within the Red and Orange Zones, Containment Zones and
Buffer Zones will be demarcated by the District authorities, after
taking into consideration the guidelines of MoHFW.
(iii) In the Containment Zones, only essential activities shall be
allowed. There shall be strict parimeter control to ensure that
there is no movement of people in or out of these zones, except for
medical emergencies and for maintaining supply of essential
goods and services. Guidelines of MoHFW shall be taken into
consideration for the above purpose.
(iv) In the Containment Zones, there shall be intensive contact
tracing, house-to-house suveillance, and other clinical
interventions, as required.
xxxxxxxxxx
8 All other activities will be permitted, except those which
are specifically prohibited.
However, in Containment Zones, only essential activities shall be
allowed, as mention in para 5 (iii) above.
Further, States/UTs, based on their assessment of the situation,
may prohibit certain other activities in the various zones, or
impose such restrictions as deemed necessary.
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 5 of 23
6 On 30.05.2020, Government of India issued the impugned guidelines
which ware framed as 'Guidelines for Phased Reopening in lockdown-I'. The
relevant portion of the phased reopening read as under:-
"1 Phased re-opening of areas outside the Containment Zones.
In areas outside Containment Zones, all activities will be permitted,
except the following which will be allowed, with the stipulation of
following Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to be prescribed
by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), in a
phased manner.
Phase I
The following activities will be allowed with effect from 8 June,
2020:
(i) Religious place/places of worship for public.
(ii) Hotels, restaurants and other hospitality services.
(iii) Shopping malls.
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) will issue
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the above activities, in
consultation with the Central Ministries/Departments concerned
and other stakeholders for ensuring social distancing and to
contain the spread of COVID-19.
Phase II
Schools, collges, educational/training/coaching institutions etc.,
will be opened after consultations with States and UTs. State
Governments/UT administrations may hold consultations at the
institution level with parents and other stakeholders. Based on the
feedback, a decision on the re-opening of these institutions will be
taken in the month of July, 2020.
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 6 of 23
MoHFW will prepare SOP in this regard, in consultation with the
Central Ministries/Departments concerned and other stakeholders,
for ensuring social distancing and to contain the spread of COVID-
19.
Phase III
Based on the assessment of the situation, dates for re-starting the
following activities will be decided:
(i) International air travel of passengers, except as permitted by
MHA
(ii) Metro Rail.
(iii) Cinema halls, gymnasiums, swimming pools, entertainment
parks, theatres, bars and auditoriums, assembly halls and similar
places.
(iv)
Social/political/sports/entertainment/academic/cultural/religious
functions and other large congregations.
xxxxxxxx
4 Lockdown limited to Containment Zones.
(i) Lockdown shall continue to remain in force in the
Containment Zones till 30 June, 2020.
(ii) Containment Zones will be demarcated by the District
authorities after taking into consideration the guidelines of
MoHFW.
(iii) In the Containment Zones, only essential activities shall be
allowed. There shall be strict parimeter control to ensure that there
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 7 of 23
is no movement of people in or out of these zones, except for
medical emergencies and for maintaining supply of essential goods
and services. In the Containment Zones, there shall be intensive
contract tracing, house-to-house surveillance and other clonical
interventions, as required. Guidelines of MoHFW shall be taken
into consideration for the above purpose.
(iv) States/UTs may also identify Buffer Zones outside the
Containment Zones, where new cases are more likely to occur.
Within the buffer zones, restrictions as considered necessary may
be put in place by the District authorities."
7 Along with the guidelines, directives were also issued to ensure that
adequate precautions are taken to avoid spread of COVID-19 which read as
under:-
"National Directives for COVID-19 Management.
1. Face coverings: Wearing of face cover is compulsory in
public places; in workplaces; and during transport.
2. Social distancing: Individuals must maintain a minimum
distance of 6 feet (2 gaz ki doori) in public places.
Shop will ensure physical distancing among customers and
will not allow more than 5 persons at one time.
3. Gatherings: Large public gatherings/congregations
continue to remain prohibited.
Marriage related gatherings: Number of guests not to
exceed 50.
Funeral/last rites related gatherings: Number of persons
not to exceed 20
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 8 of 23
4 Spitting in public places will be punishable with fine, as
may be prescribed by the State/UT local authority in accordance
with its laws, rules or regulations.
5 Consumption of liquor, paan, gutka, tobacco etc. in public
places is prohibited.
Additional directives for Work Places
6 Work from home (WfH): As far as possible the practice of
WfH should be followed.
7 Staggering of work/business hours will be followed in
offices, work places, shops markets and industrial and
commercial establishments.
8 Screening & Hygiene: Provision for thermal scanning,
hand wash and sanitizer will be made at all entry and exit points
and common areas.
9 Frequent sanitization of entire workplace, common
facilities and all points which come into human contract e..g
door handels, etc., will be ensure, including between shifts.
10 Social distancing: All persons in charge of work place will
ensure adequate distance between workers, adequate gaps
between shifts, staggering the lunch breaks of staff, etc."
8 The writ petitioner has averred that he is a 5th year student of B.A. LLB
(Hons.) course, studying in Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University and has
the means to pay, if any cost is imposed by the Hon'ble Court. The instant writ
petition challenges the guidelines on the ground that phased reopening will
result in rampant spread of COVID-19 in the country. It is contended in the
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 9 of 23
writ petition that the impugned Notification will deprive the citizens of their
basic fundamental rights such as life and it ignores the health of its citizens by
exposing them to the threat from COVID-19. It is stated in the writ petition that
the reopening has been done only keeping in mind economic considerations
while endangering its citizens to the extent of succumbing to a contagious
disease in the absence of any proven medical cure for it. It is stated that there
was no need or justification for reopening the prohibited activities.
9 Mr. Thakur would contend that opening of activities in the country would
lead to the spread of COVID -19 pandemic; that the Government has driven
only by economic considerations at the costs of lives of people; that opening up
of economic activities will force labour to go for work thereby exposing them to
COVID-10 for which no cure has been found; that it is impossible to enforce
social distancing norms in malls; finally that the guidelines for observing social
distancing norms were put up on the website of the respondent much after the
impugned Notification was issued.
10 We have heard Mr. Apratim Animesh Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner.
11 This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the lockdown has
resulted in loss of jobs for several lakhs of people. Scores of people were forced
to walk considerable distance during the lockdown and stand in long queues at
Food distribution centers just to have two square meals a day. Several have
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 10 of 23
gone hungry and were not able to get one meal. Many were left shelterless.
Several lakhs of migrant labour had to walk on foot and go back to their native
places. The economic situation of the country has taken a terrible hit due to the
lockdown. In fact, many analysts have opined that the lockdown has caused
more human suffering than COVID-19 itself. Economists have forecasted that
Indian economy will shrink as a result of the steps taken to contain Corona virus
pandemic. Indian economy virtually came to a standstill during nationwide
lockdown. Production in the country came to a grinding halt during the
lockdown period. Construction activities in the country have stopped. People
have become unemployed which raises grave concerns regarding the law and
order situation in the country.
12 A series of orders have been passed starting from the month of March,
2020 to tackle the situation and decisions have been taken by the Government to
ensure minimum hardship to the people. Several economic packages have been
announced to regenerate the economy. This Court can also take judicial notice
of the fact that world over, the trend is now to reduce the restrictions which
were imposed due to lockdown and to return to normal life. In order to ensure a
proper balance between containing the spread of COVID-19 pandemic and at
the same time make certain that people are not forced to starvation the
Government has issued the impugned order. The re-opening has been directed
in a phased manner and is not a decision that appears to have been taken in
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 11 of 23
haste. The Government is expected to remain cognizant of the situation and
evaluate it closely. If it is found that the rate of infection is going up, they can
always review their decision and impose curbs, depending upon the situation.
13 The scope of judicial review of Government policies is well known.
Courts do not and cannot act as an appellate authority examining the
correctness, suitability and appropriateness of the policy; nor are courts advisors
to the executive in matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate.
Courts cannot interfere with the policy either on the ground that it is erroneous
or on the ground that a better or a wiser alternative is available. Illegality of the
policy and not the wisdom and soundness of the policy is the subject matter of
judicial review. (see: Union of India v. J.D. Suryavanshi, (2011) 13 SCC 167
and Directorate Of Film Festivals & Anr. vs Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors,
(2007) 4 SCC 737.)
14 It is also well settled that judicial review of a policy framed by the
Government is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in
which the decision has been made. The Supreme Court in Centre for Public
Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India and Others (2016) 6 SCC 408 has held as
under:-
21. Such a policy decision, when not found to be arbitrary or based on
irrelevant considerations or mala fide or against any statutory
provisions, does not call for any interference by the courts in exercise
of power of judicial review. This principle of law is ingrained in stone
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 12 of 23
which is stated and restated time and again by this Court on numerous
occasions. In Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd. v. K.P. Sharma [Jal Mahal
Resorts (P) Ltd. v. K.P. Sharma, (2014) 8 SCC 804] , the Court
underlined the principle in the following manner:
"137. From this, it is clear that although the courts are
expected very often to enter into the technical and
administrative aspects of the matter, it has its own limitations
and in consonance with the theory and principle of
separation of powers, reliance at least to some extent to the
decisions of the State authorities, specially if it is based on
the opinion of the experts reflected from the project report
prepared by the technocrats, accepted by the entire hierarchy
of the State administration, acknowledged, accepted and
approved by one Government after the other, will have to be
given due credence and weightage. In spite of this if the court
chooses to overrule the correctness of such administrative
decision and merits of the view of the entire body including
the administrative, technical and financial experts by taking
note of hair splitting submissions at the instance of a PIL
petitioner without any evidence in support thereof, the PIL
petitioners shall have to be put to strict proof and cannot be
allowed to function as an extraordinary and extra-judicial
ombudsman questioning the entire exercise undertaken by an
extensive body which includes administrators, technocrats
and financial experts. In our considered view, this might lead
to a friction if not collision among the three organs of the
State and would affect the principle of governance ingrained
in the theory of separation of powers. In fact, this Court
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 13 of 23
in M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P (1997) 7 SCC 592 , at
p. 611 has unequivocally observed that:
„41. ... The power of judicial review of the executive and
legislative action must be kept within the bounds of
constitutional scheme so that there may not be any
occasion to entertain misgivings about the role of judiciary
in outstepping its limit by unwarranted judicial activism
being very often talked of in these days. The democratic set-
up to which the polity is so deeply committed cannot
function properly unless each of the three organs
appreciate the need for mutual respect and supremacy in
their respective fields.‟
138. However, we hasten to add and do not wish to be
misunderstood so as to infer that howsoever gross or abusive
may be an administrative action or a decision which is writ
large on a particular activity at the instance of the State or
any other authority connected with it, the Court should
remain a passive, inactive and a silent spectator. What is
sought to be emphasised is that there has to be a boundary
line or the proverbial "Laxman rekha" while examining the
correctness of an administrative decision taken by the State
or a Central authority after due deliberation and diligence
which do not reflect arbitrariness or illegality in its decision
and execution. If such equilibrium in the matter of
governance gets disturbed, development is bound to be
slowed down and disturbed specially in an age of economic
liberalisation wherein global players are also involved as per
policy decision."
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 14 of 23
22. Minimal interference is called for by the courts, in exercise of
judicial review of a government policy when the said policy is the
outcome of deliberations of the technical experts in the fields inasmuch
as courts are not well equipped to fathom into such domain which is
left to the discretion of the execution. It was beautifully explained by
the Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (2000) 10
SCC 664 and reiterated in Federation of Railway Officers
Assn. v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 289 in the following words:
(SCC p. 289, para 12)
"12. In examining a question of this nature where a policy is
evolved by the Government judicial review thereof is limited.
When policy according to which or the purpose for which
discretion is to be exercised is clearly expressed in the statute,
it cannot be said to be an unrestricted discretion. On matters
affecting policy and requiring technical expertise the court
would leave the matter for decision of those who are qualified
to address the issues. Unless the policy or action is
inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or
irrational or abuse of power, the court will not interfere with
such matters."
23. Limits of the judicial review were again reiterated, pointing out the same
position by the courts in England, in G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India (2013)
6 SCC 620 in the following manner: (SCC p. 646, para 15)
"15.1. Lord MacNaughten in Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society
of Compositors , 1913 AC 107 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 241 (HL) has
stated: (AC p. 118)
„... Some people may think the policy of the Act unwise and
even dangerous to the community. ... But a judicial tribunal has
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 15 of 23
nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called
upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment.
The duty of the court, and its only duty, is to expound the
language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of
construction.‟
15.2. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service , 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)
(AC p. 414 : All ER p. 954), it was held that it is not for the courts to
determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in
fulfilment of that policy is fair. They are concerned only with the manner
in which those decisions have been taken, if that manner is unfair, the
decision will be tainted with what Lord Diplock labels as "procedural
impropriety".
15.3. This Court in M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P. (1997) 7
SCC 592 held that unless the policy framed is absolutely capricious,
unreasonable and arbitrary and based on mere ipse dixit of the
executive authority or is invalid in constitutional or statutory mandate,
court's interference is not called for.
15.4. Reference may also be made of the judgments of this Court
in Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Admn. (2001) 3 SCC 635, Dhampur
Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 8 SCC 418
and Delhi Bar Assn. v. Union of India [Delhi Bar Assn. v. Union of
India, (2008) 13 SCC 628] .
15.5. We are, therefore, firmly of the opinion that we cannot sit in
judgment over the decision taken by the Government of India, NPCIL,
etc. for setting up of KKNPP at Kudankulam in view of the Indo-Russian
Agreement."
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 16 of 23
24. When it comes to the judicial review of economic policy, the courts are
more conservative as such economic policies are generally formulated by
experts. Way back in the year 1978, a Bench of seven Judges of this Court
in Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India (1978) 3 SCC 459, AIR 1978 SC
1296 : 1978 Cri LJ 1281 carved out this principle in the following terms: (SCC
p. 478, para 24)
"24. We have listened to long arguments directed at showing us that
producers and sellers of oil in various parts of the country will suffer so
that they would give up producing or dealing in mustard oil. It was
urged that this would, quite naturally, have its repercussions on
consumers for whom mustard oil will become even more scarce than
ever ultimately. We do not think that it is the function of this Court or of
any court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as
must necessarily be left to the government of the day to decide. Many of
them, as a measure of price fixation must necessarily be, are matters of
prediction of ultimate results on which even experts can seriously err
and doubtlessly differ. Courts can certainly not be expected to decide
them without even the aid of experts."
25. Taking aid from the aforesaid observations of the Constitution Bench, the
Court reiterated the words of caution in Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI, (1992) 2 SCC 343 with the following utterance:
(SCC p. 375, para 31)
"31. The function of the Court is to see that lawful authority is not
abused but not to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that
authority. It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory
powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep
within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith
and it must act reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 17 of 23
policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts
to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must
necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can
seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide
them without even the aid of experts."
26. It cannot be doubted that the primary and central purpose of judicial
review of the administrative action is to promote good administration. It is to
ensure that administrative bodies act efficiently and honestly to promote the
public good. They should operate in a fair, transparent, and unbiased fashion,
keeping in forefront the public interest. To ensure that the aforesaid dominant
objectives are achieved, this Court has added new dimension to the contours of
judicial review and it has undergone tremendous change in recent years. The
scope of judicial review has expanded radically and it now extends well beyond
the sphere of statutory powers to include diverse forms of "public" power in
response to the changing architecture of the Government [ [See: Administrative
Law: Text and Materials (4th Edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 2011)
by Beatson, Matthews, and Elliott.]] . Thus, not only has judicial review grown
wider in scope; its intensity has also increased. Notwithstanding the same,
"it is, however, central to received perceptions of judicial review that
courts may not interfere with exercise of discretion merely because they
disagree with the decision or action in question; instead, courts
intervene only if some specific fault can be established--for example, if
the decision reached was procedurally unfair".
27. The raison d'être of discretionary power is that it promotes the decision-
maker to respond appropriately to the demands of a particular situation. When
the decision-making is policy-based, judicial approach to interfere with such
decision-making becomes narrower. In such cases, in the first instance, it is to
be examined as to whether the policy in question is contrary to any statutory
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 18 of 23
provisions or is discriminatory/arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations.
If the particular policy satisfies these parameters and is held to be valid, then
the only question to be examined is as to whether the decision in question is in
conformity with the said policy.
15 The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner who is a law
student without looking at the abovementioned position in law. Nothing has
been shown as to how the impugned order is so arbitrary or is based on such
irrelevant consideration that it deserves to be struck down as being violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is completely
misconceived and has been filed only to gain publicity. It cannot be said that
this instant petition has been filed bonafide. In State of Uttaranchal vs.
Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 402, the Supreme Court has
given guidelines in order to streamline the growing abuse of public interest
litigation which read as under:
" 180. In our considered view, now it has become imperative to
streamline the P.I.L.
181. We have carefully considered the facts of the present case.
We have also examined the law declared by this court and other
courts in a number of judgments. In order to preserve the purity
and sanctity of the PIL, it has become imperative to issue the
following directions:-
(1) The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and
effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous
considerations.
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 19 of 23
(2) Instead of every individual judge devising his own procedure
for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be
appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for
encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with
oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts
who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within
three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is
directed to ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by the High
Court is sent to the Secretary General of this court immediately
thereafter.
(3) The courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the
petitioner before entertaining a P.I.L.
(4) The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding the
correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a
PIL.
(5) The court should be fully satisfied that substantial public
interest is involved before entertaining the petition.
(6) The court should ensure that the petition which involves larger
public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over
other petitions.
(7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the
PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury.
The court should also ensure that there is no personal gain,
private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest
litigation.
(8) The court should also ensure that the petitions filed by
busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be
discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar
W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 20 of 23
novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for
extraneous considerations."
The instant writ petition does not satisfy the dictum of the Guidelines laid by the
Supreme Court and this Court.
16 In Tehseen Poonawalla Vs. Union of India and Another, (2018) 6 SCC
72, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
" 98. The misuse of public interest litigation is a serious matter
of concern for the judicial process. Both this Court and the High
Courts are flooded with litigation and are burdened by arrears.
Frivolous or motivated petitions, ostensibly invoking the public
interest detract from the time and attention which courts must
devote to genuine causes. This Court has a long list of pending
cases where the personal liberty of citizens is involved. Those who
await trial or the resolution of appeals against orders of
conviction have a legitimate expectation of early justice. It is a
travesty of justice for the resources of the legal system to be
consumed by an avalanche of misdirected petitions purportedly
filed in the public interest which, upon due scrutiny, are found to
promote a personal, business or political agenda. This has
spawned an industry of vested interests in litigation. There is a
grave danger that if this state of affairs is allowed to continue, it
would seriously denude the efficacy of the judicial system by
detracting from the ability of the court to devote its time and
resources to cases which legitimately require attention. Worse
still, such petitions pose a grave danger to the credibility of the
judicial process. This has the propensity of endangering the
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credibility of other institutions and undermining public faith in
democracy and the Rule of law. This will happen when the agency
of the court is utilised to settle extra-judicial scores. Business
rivalries have to be resolved in a competitive market for goods
and services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great
hall of democracy when the electorate votes its representatives in
and out of office. Courts resolve disputes about legal rights and
entitlements. Courts protect the Rule of law. There is a danger that
the judicial process will be reduced to a charade, if disputes
beyond the ken of legal parameters occupy the judicial space.
17 During the course of hearing, we had informed learned counsel for the
petitioner that we are not inclined to entertain the petition as we find that it is an
abuse of the process of the law. We had also warned the counsel that if he
presses the petition, we would be constrained to dismiss it with costs. We
cautioned learned counsel only because the petitioner is a law student. Despite
that, counsel for the petitioner upon taking instructions from the petitioner,
continued to addressing arguments, wasting valuable judicial time. We
deprecate this conduct of the petitioner. He has not cared to read the judgments
relating to public interest litigations and the limits on the Court while exercising
its power of judicial review on policy matters.
18 The writ petition is accordingly dismissed along with pending application
with costs of Rs.20,000/- imposed on the petitioner who is directed to deposit
the same in the Delhi High Court Bar Association Lawyers' Security and
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Welfare Fund within a period of two weeks from today, with proof of deposit to
be filed with the Registry of this Court.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
HIMA KOHLI, J. JUNE 12, 2020 A W.P. (C) No.3449/2020 Page 23 of 23