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[Cites 6, Cited by 8]

Supreme Court of India

Navneet Ram Batra vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors on 17 September, 1975

Equivalent citations: 1975 AIR 2144, 1976 SCR (1) 826, AIR 1975 SUPREME COURT 2144

Author: A. Alagiriswami

Bench: A. Alagiriswami, P.K. Goswami, N.L. Untwalia

           PETITIONER:
NAVNEET RAM BATRA

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/09/1975

BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:
 1975 AIR 2144		  1976 SCR  (1) 826


ACT:
     Land   Acquisition	  Act-Sec. 4  (1) 5A  17  (1)	 and
17(4)-Urgency	  Clause.-.  Dispensing	  with	meaning	  of
objections-Person entitled  to object-whether  any person in
the locality  can  object  or  person  interested  ill	land
concerned only an object.



HEADNOTE:
     The  appellant   is  a   tenant  or  Plot	No.  428.  A
notification was   issued  under Section  4 (1)	 of the Land
Acquisition   Act   for setting	  up an industrial estate in
respect of  Plot No.	428    and  Plot    No.	 436.  By  a
notification under Section 17 (4) the  provisions of section
5A were	 dispensed with	 in the	 ground that  provisions  of
section 17(1)  (Urgency) were  applicable.  The	   appellant
filed a	 Writ Petition	in Hugh	 Court challenging  the said
notification issued  under section  17 (4)  The Single judge
dismissed the  Writ    Petition.  An  appeal  filed  to	 the
Division Bench	was  also dismissed.
     On	  an appeal  by Special	 Leave, it  was contended by
the appellant	that  there was a pucca construction on Plot
No.   436 which	 was also notified for acquisition under the
impugned notification	and  consequently the  provisions of
Section 17   (4)  would not be applicable to that land as it
was not	 arable or  waste land and  could not be acquired by
dispensing with	 the  enquiry  under section 5A and as such,
the whole notification is bad and  should be quashed.
     Dismissing the appeal,
^
     HELD:
     1. Admittedly  the appellant's  land  is  a  waste	 and
arable land   and thus falls under section 17(1). The person
who   could have   taken  objection  to	 the  enquiry  under
section 5A   being   dispensed:	  with was the owner of Plot
No. 436.  He has  not	objected to   the acquisition it is,
therefore, not	open to	 the   appellant to    question	 the
validity of the notification. If the  owner  of Plot No. 436
had objected  to the  notification different  considerations
might arise.  Sarjoo Prasad  v. State  of U.P. (AIR 1965  SC
1763) distinguished. [1827E-F]
     2. Section	 5A should  be understood in the back ground
of section  4(1). Section 4 ( I ) requires only the locality
in which  the land  is	situate,  to  be  mentioned  in	 the
notification. But   in	actual	practice  the survey numbers
of the	lands	sought	 to   be acquired  are given in such
notifications. The  question of	  notifying    the  locality
might probably	arise when  all the  lands in	village	 are
sought to  be acquired.	 Otherwise. the word  locality is  a
word of	 such indefinite  import that  it is   difficult  to
conceive of  any locality  in any  particular village  being
notified for  acquisition. When a locality in the sense of a
village or  a group  of villages in notified for acquisition
any person  interested in any land in that locality would be
entitled to  be, heard	under	section	 5A.  But where land
proposed to   be  acquired  is specifically mentioned in the
notification it	 is only  the person interested in that land
who is	entitled to  be heard under section 5A.	 That is why
section 5A provides that any  person  interested may  object
to   the acquisition  of land  or of  any   land   in	 the
locality   as	the case may be. The latter part would apply
to   a case  where lands in. any locality are notified under
section 4   (  1  ) . That is the significance of the use of
the words   "as	  the  case  may be." Any person unconnected
with land  cannot object   to the acquisition of the land in
the locality  since he	would not  be a	 person	 interested.
[828-F-H 829A-C]



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1154 of 1972.

Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated 18th December, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 324 of 1962.

827

Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga and Miss Rani Arora, for the appellant.

G. N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court, was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The appellant is a tenant of plot No. 428 in mauza Dehra Khas, pargana Central Doon, district Dehradun. This land along with some other pieces of land was notified under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on February 8, 1962 for acquisition for the purpose of setting up an industrial estate at Dehradun. By the same notification, under s. 17(4) of the Act it was directed that the provisions of s. 5A shall not apply on the ground that the provisions of s. 17(1) were applicable to the facts of the case. He filed a writ petition out of which this appeal arises for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the notification dated 8th February, 1962. He made various allegations which it is not necessary to go into for the purpose of this appeal. A learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition and an appeal filed by him was dismissed by a Division Bench of the same High Court.

The only point argued before us was that there was a pucca construction on plot No. 436 which was also notified for acquisition under the impugned notification and consequently the provisions of s.17(4) would not be applicable to that land as it was not arable or waste land which could be acquired by dispensing with the enquiry under s.5A and as such the whole notification is bad and should be quashed. Admittedly the appellant's land is a waste and arable land and thus falls under s.17 (1) . There was therefore no objection to the Government dispensing with the provisions of s.5A by resorting to the power conferred by s.17(4). The person who could have taken objection to the enquiry under s. 5A being dispensed with was the owner of plot No. 436. He has not objected to the acquisition. He has taken the compensation awarded to him and walked out. It is, therefore? not open to the appellant to question the validity of this notification. If possibly the owner of the land sought to be acquired but any person in the locality derations might arise. The appellant who is only the owner of plot No. 428 in relation to which s. 17(1) and 17(4) are applicable and therefore enquiry under s 5A could properly be dispensed with, cannot object to the same notification because the notification also relates to another land to which s.17(1) and 17(4) are not applicable when the owner of that land has not chosen to challenge the notification. on behalf of the appellant, however, reliance was placed on certain observations of this Court in Sarju Prasad v. State of U.P.(1) to. the following effect:

"It was contended by Mr. S. P. Sinha appearing on behalf of the Municipal Board, Basti, that a part of the land notified for acquisition was waste or arable and in support of his contention, counsel referred us to certain revenue record. But (1) A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1763.
828

if only a part of the land is waste or arable and the rest is not, notification under s. 17(4) dispensing with compliance with the requirements of s. 5-A would be invalid. It would not be open to the Court to regard the notification as partially good and partially bad, for if the State had no power to dispense with the inquiry in respect of any part of the land notified under s. 4(1), an inquiry must be held s. 5-A giving an opportunity to persons interested in the land notified to raise the objections to the proposed acquisition and in that inquiry the persons interested cannot be restricted to raising objections in respect of land other than waste or arable land "

That case is the converse of the present case. The appellant therein was a person who was entitled to object to the notification. Under those circumstances the question whether the notification is to be quashed completely or only partially might well arise. But such a question cannot arise where a person like the appellant has no right to impugn the notification. It was, however, urged that under s. 5-A(1) it is not only the owner of the land sought to be acquired but any person in the locality may object and his objections will have to be heard. Section 5-A(l) reads as follows:
"5A.(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality. as the case may be. "This section should be understood in the background of the provisions of s.

4(1) which reads as follows s "4.(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality." It may be noticed that under this section what is necessary is that only the locality the land in which appears to the appropriate Government as needed or as likely to be needed for any public purpose need be specified in the notification under that section. But in actual practice always the survey numbers of the lands sought to be acquired are given in such notifications. The question of notifying the locality might probably arise when all the lands in a village are sought to be acquired otherwise the word 'locality' is a word of such indefinite import that it is difficult to conceive of any locality in any particular village being notified for acquisition. Therefore when a locality in the sense of a village or perhaps a group of villages is notified for acquisition any person interested in any 829 land in that locality would be entitled to be heard under s. 5A. But where the land proposed to be acquired is specifically mentioned in the notification it is only the person interested in that land who is entitled to be heard under s. 5A. That is why s.5A provides that any person interested in any land which has been notified under s.(1) may object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality as the case may be. The latter part would apply to a case where lands in any locality are notified under s. 4(1). That is the significance of the use of the words "as the case may be". To give and other interpretation to this section would mean that any person interested in any land which has been notified may object to the acquisition of his land or to the acquisition of any land ill the locality. This cannot be correct because he would not be a person interested in any land in the locality which is a pre-requisite before a person can object to the acquisition of any land. In other words in the background of section 4 (1), section 5A provides that where land in any locality is notified under section 4(1) any person who is interested in any land in the locality may object to the acquisition of his land or any land in the locality as the case may be.

We are therefore of opinion that there are no merits in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.

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