Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Polam Sarojini Devi vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 5 March, 2026
APHC010078182026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY,THE FIFTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 4980/2026
Between:
1.POLAM SAROJINI DEVI,, W/O POLAM VENKATA NARAYANA, AGED
ABOUT 77 YEARS. RESIDENTS OF LAKSHMIPURAM VILLAGE,
NUZENDIA MANDAL, PALNADU DISTRICT.
2.CHAVALI PADMA,, W/O LATE SRINIVASA RAO, AGED ABOUT 54
YEARS RESIDENTS OF LAKSHMIPURAM VILLAGE, NUZENDIA
MANDAL, PALNADU DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER(S)
AND
1.STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS,
VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT 522237
2.THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, PALNADU DISTRICT AT
NARASARAOPET-522601.
3.THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, INAVOLU POLICE STATION,
INAVOLU, PALNADU DISTRICT-522647.
4.SRI GUNDALA VENKATESWARLU, R/O LAKSHMIPURAM VILLAGE,
NUZENDIA MANDAL, PALNADU DISTRICT. 522660
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner(S):
1.KOCHIRI RAJA SHEKAR
2
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.GP FOR HOME
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
The Writ Petition has been filed for the following relief:
"...to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the action of the 3rd respondent in not considering our representation dated 27.1.2026 to provide police protection to the petitioners and their property being an extent of Ac.0.16 cents of land out of Ac.3.10 cents in Sy.No. 1661/2 of Botlagatia Village, Putchanuthala Panchayat, Nuzendia Mandal, Palnadu District from the highhanded acts of the 4th respondent and his henchmen as illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondents 2 and 3 to provide police protection/aid to the petitioners and their property forthwith..."
2. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Government Pleader.
3. Mr. Kochiri Raja Shekar, learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that by Judgment and decree dated 03.06.1996, the learned Munsif Magistrate, Vinukonda, in O.S. No.12 of 1988, granted specific performance of the agreement along with consequential relief of permanent injunction. Later, at the behest of respondent No.4 and his followers, the petitioners' right of enjoyment of the immovable property was infringed by third parties and respondent No.4.
4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Vanaparthi Subramanyam v. State of A.P1 wherein at paragraph No.11 it is held as under:
"11. It is well settled law that when a permanent injunction decree was passed by the competent civil Court, the plaintiff in the said suit is entitled for grant of police aid either by an order passed by the Court which passed the said decree or by an order passed by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 226 of the Constitution of India. The law in this regard is not res integra and the same has been 1 W.P.No.20555/2022 3 dealt with inthe case of Rai Naramma v. State of Andhra Pradesh.,2 wherein this Court held at para 7 as follows:
"7. It is now well settled law that only when there is a decree for permanent injunction and only when there is an order of temporary injunction in an interlocutory application which is made absolute after hearing both the parties, then only the Courts usually either the civil Court or the Writ Court, would grant police aid for effective implementation of the said permanent injunction decree or a temporary injunction order which is passed on merits. But when the ex parte ad-interim injunction is granted without hearing the respondents and when the same is not made absolute granting a temporary injunction order, till the disposal of the suit, on merits, the Courts will not usually order for grant of police aid for implementation of the ex parte ad-interim injunction order. Since it is not an order on merits after hearing both the parties, the Courts would be very slow in granting police aid, till the possession and rights of the parties are determined after enquiry based on evidence."."
5. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader, on written instructions, submits that there is no order from the learned Civil Court granting police protection to the Petitioners.
6. The learned Assistant Government Pleader relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar3, wherein at paragraph Nos.12, 18 & 19 held as under:
"12. It is one thing to say that in a given case a person may be held to be entitled to police protection, having regard to the threat perception, but it is another thing to say that he is entitled thereto for holding an office and discharging certain functions when his right to do so is open to question. A person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining such disputed questions of fact which were beyond the scope and purport of the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction as it also involved determination of disputed questions of fact. Respondent 1 who sought to claim a status was required to establish the same in a court of law in an appropriate proceeding. He for one reason or the other, failed to do so. The provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure stare on his face. He, therefore, could not have filed a writ petition for getting the selfsame issues determined in his favour which he could not do even by filing a suit. Indeed the jurisdiction of the writ court is wide while granting relief to a citizen of India so as to protect his life and liberty as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution, but while doing so it could not collaterally go into that question, determination whereof would undoubtedly be beyond its domain. What was necessary for determination of the question arising in the writ petition was not the interpretation of the documents alone, but it required adduction of oral evidence as well. Such evidence was necessary for the 2 2021(1) ALT 426 3 (2006) 4 SCC 501 4 purpose of explaining the true nature of the deed of trust, as also the practice followed by this trust. In any event, the impleading applicant herein, as noticed hereinbefore, has raised a contention that he alone was ordained to hold the said office as per the bye-laws of the trust. The qualification of the first respondent to hold the office was also in question. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that such disputed questions could not have been gone into by the High Court in a writ proceeding.
18. In the case on hand, various disputed questions arose based on a deed of trust and the facts pleaded by the writ petitioner and controverted by the other side. The High Court should have normally directed the writ petitioner to have his rights adjudicated upon, in an appropriate suit in a civil court. The fact that a writ petitioner may be barred from approaching the civil court, in view of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or some other provisions, is no ground for the High Court to take upon itself, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the duty to adjudicate on the civil rights of parties for the purpose of deciding whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to the police authorities for the protection of the alleged rights of the writ petitioner. A writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to the person of a writ petitioner can be issued, when the court is satisfied that there is a threat to his person and the authorities have failed to perform their duties and it is different from granting relief for the first time to a person either to allegedly protect his right to property or his right to an office, especially when the pleadings themselves disclose that disputed questions are involved. My learned Brother has rightly pointed out that the High Court was in error in proceeding to adjudicate on the rights and obligations arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and the deed itself. I fully agree with my learned Brother that the High Court should not have undertaken such an exercise on the basis that the right of the writ petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution is sought to be affected by the actions of the contesting respondents and their supporters and that can be prevented by the issue of the writ of mandamus prayed for.
19. A writ for "police protection" so-called, has only a limited scope, as, when the court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil court. It cannot be extended to cases where rights have not been determined either finally by the civil court or, at least at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner, and then too in furtherance of the decree or order."
7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in P.R. Murlidharan supra authoritatively held that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked to adjudicate complex and disputed questions of fact, particularly where the very entitlement of a party to hold an office or assert a civil right is seriously contested and requires a full- fledged evidentiary inquiry. The Court emphasized that the breadth of writ jurisdiction to safeguard life and liberty under Article 21 does not extend to determining civil rights that necessitate examination of 5 documents, oral evidence, or the internal regulatory framework of institutions such as trusts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court unequivocally observed that a party who has failed to establish his status or right in an appropriate civil forum, especially when barred from re- agitating the issue under Order IX Rule 9 of 'the C.P.C.,' cannot circumvent such legal impediments by seeking police protection through a writ petition. The Court further clarified that a writ of "police protection" is permissible only to effectuate rights already crystallized by a decree or a clear and unambiguous interlocutory order of a competent civil court, and not as a mechanism to secure protection for rights that remain unadjudicated, disputed, or yet to be established in law.
8. Be that as it may, the life span of a decree for permanent injunction is limited to a period of 12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Petitioners have not filed any petition under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19084, or initiated any execution proceedings.
9. However, when the representation dated 27.01.2026 was submitted by the Petitioners to Respondent Nos.2 and 3 seeking necessary police protection, such representation ought to have been considered by the Respondent Police in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders.
10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Writ Petition is disposed of directing Respondent Nos.2 and 3 to consider and dispose of the representation dated 27.01.2026 submitted by the Petitioners, in accordance with law within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 4 'the C.P.C.' 6
11. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________ Dr.Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dated: 05.03.2026 PRA 7 164 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO WRIT PETITION NO: 4980 of 2026 Date: 05.03.2026 PRA