Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ashutosh Kumar Mishra vs M.P. Board Of Secondary Education, ... on 14 October, 1999
Equivalent citations: AIR2000MP188, 2000(2)MPHT237, AIR 2000 MADHYA PRADESH 188, (2000) 1 MPLJ 395
Author: Dipak Misra
Bench: Dipak Misra
ORDER Dipak Misra, J.
1. By this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashment of Annexure P-1 whereby the Board of Secondary Education. Bhopal, the sole respondent, has rejected the prayer of the petitioner for scrutiny of the answer papers in certain subjects on the ground that the said application was barred by limitation and further to command the said respondent to scrutinise the marks of the petitioner' and recheck his result.
2. It is averred in the writ petition that the result of the petitioner who appeared in the examination of Class-XII from the Centre, Government Higher Secondary School, Belwa, Badgaiyan in the Distt. of Rewa was initially withheld and eventually was published on 8-7-1999. As the petitioner was dissatisfied with regard to the award of marks in Hindi, Chemistry, Physics and Higher Mathematics he applied for revaluation on 21-7-99 but the Board expressed its inability to deal with the application as it was not Filed within a month from the date of declaration of the main result which was done in the month of May, 1999.
3. A return has been filed by the answering respondent contending, inter alia, that the result of the main examination was published in May, 1999 but there was delay in publication of results of the school in question as the marks in Practical Examination was not despatched in time. It is also explained by the Board that the delay had occurred due to the fault of the school inasmuch as the teacher who functioned as the internal examiner was not competent to be so and therefore, Practical Examination was conducted again with competent teacher as examiner. It is also putforth by the Board that as delay had occurred due to the mistake on the part of the Principal of the School, the Board cannot be put to blame and as the application was not presented within 30 days from the declaration of the result of the examination the same was not entertained.
4. Mr. M. P. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner could have applied for scrutiny of marks as contemplated under Regulation 119 of the M.P. Board of Secondary Education only after the declaration of the result of the examination as far as he is concerned and in any case, the results were published on 8-7-99 and he applied on 21-7-99 and hence, there is no justification on the part of the Board to negative the prayer for scrutiny.
5. Combating the aforesaid submission of Mr. Shukla. Miss Laxmi Iyer. learned counsel for the Board has placed heavy reliance on the provision enshrined under Regulation 119 and has submitted that 30 days of limitation has to be computed from the date of declaration of the result of the main examination. Submission of Miss Iyer is that the language of the aforesaid Regulation being clear and unambiguous should be strictly construed and if the action of the Board is tested on the anvil of the strict construction of the Regulation the same cannot be found fault with.
6. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, it is apposited to refer to Regulation 119 of the M.P. Board of Secondary Education. It reads as under :
"119. Verification of marks obtained by a candidate in a subject:
(1) Any candidate who has appeared at the examination may apply to the Secretary for verification whether the candidates' answers, in any particular subject, have all been examined and that there has been no mistake in totalling of marks in that subject and transferring marks correctly, but not for revaluation of answers. Such an application must be made by the candidate to the Board within 30 days (thirty) from the date of declaration of the examination results and must be accompanied by a fee as may be prescribed from time to time by the Board.
(2) No candidate shall claim or be entitled to re-examination of his answer(s) or disclosure or inspection of the answer books or other 'documents treated by the Board as most confidential."
The moot question that requires to be answered is whether an application for rechecking scrutiny of marks has to be filed within 30 days from the date of declaration of the examination results and what would be the terms declaration of the examination" mean in the obtaining context. For scrutiny or rechecking of the answer papers two conditions precedent are essential, namely, the candidate must apply within 30 days and the application must be accompanied with the fee as may be prescribed. On a purposive reading of the Regulation it is plain as noon day that an application has to be submitted by a candidate who has the grievance in respect of certain aspects which have been enumerated under the Regulation. A candidate can only agitate his grievance after he knows the result and is aware of the marks awarded to him. If the results of a candidate have been withheld it would be preposterous as well as inconceivable to require an examinee to apply before the publication of his result. The language employed in the Regulation can only have one acceptation that the period of limitation prescribed from the date of declaration of the examination results would mean declaration of the results of the candidate aggrieved.
A grievance cannot be agitated in vacuum and a remedy cannot be taken recourse to without an existing cause of action. The submission of Miss Iyer is that the declaration of the examination results have to be given the meaning 'declaration of results of the main examination' or for that matter the initial of the results is not only acceptable but would be totally unpurposive.
7. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the order passed vide Annexure P-5 does not stand scrutiny and the same is accordingly quashed.
8. As far as the prayer for revaluation of the answer papers is concerned, I find that there is no substance in such a prayer as there is no provision in the Regulation for revaluation. In absence of any provision a direction cannot be issued to revalue the answer papers. In this context, I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of M.P. Board of Secondary Education v. Ku. Vinita Rupra, 1998 (1) MPLJ 595 wherein, a Division Bench has held as under :
"13. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents (petitioners) that the Board in its return and during the course of arguments pleaded before the learned Single Judge that the task of revaluation is an impossible task where lacs of students appear in the Secondary and Higher Secondary examinations and it will be hazardous to undertake exercise of revaluation. It is true that it is a big task and if interpretation which is sought to be given is accepted then it will cause greater hardship than advance the cause of justice. Be that as it may, hardship may be one of consideration but that is not decisive of the matter. However, we have examined ourselves the provisions of the Regulations as well as the guidelines framed by the appellant-Board and we are satisfied that the expression 'scrutiny of marks' of 'retotalling of answer books' does not mean revaluation of the whole of the answer sheet. With great respect, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge does not appear to be correct and we set aside the order dated 1-10-1996 passed by the learned Single Judge."
9. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the question of revaluation of the answer papers does not arise. However, it isi directed that the rechecking/retotalling of marks in respect of the papers in question of the petitioner should be done within a period of six weeks from today and the petitioner should be apprised of the results. If the bank draft submitted by the petitioner has been returned by the Board, the petitioner shall submit a fresh draft for such rechecking/ retotalling within a period of three weeks from today.
10. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.