Madras High Court
Singaravel vs Murugesa Udayar (Died) on 24 January, 2014
Author: Pushpa Sathyanarayana
Bench: Pushpa Sathyanarayana
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 24 01 2014
CORAM:
THE HONBLE TMT. JUSTICE PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA
S.A. No. 648 of 2006
and
M.P. No. 1 of 2006
Singaravel .. Appellant
Vs.
1. Murugesa Udayar (Died)
2. Minor Sathiyamurthy
3. Annapoorani .. Respondents
(R3 brought on record as LR of the deceased R1 vide order of Court dated 13.9.2013 made in M.P. No. 1 of 2013)
Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree passed in A.S. No. 80 of 2003 on the file of the Subordinate Judge at Kallakurichi confirming the judgment and decree passed by the I Additional District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi, in O.S. No. 526 of 1998 on 31.12.2002.
For Appellant : Mr. V. Raghavachari
For RR 1 & 2 : No appearance
For R 3 : Mr. P. Valliappan
JUDGMENT
The appellant, plaintiff in O.S. No. 526 of 1998 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi, who sued for declaration of title to the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, has filed this Second Appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 25.7.2005 passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S. No.80 of 2003 wherein and by which the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2002 made in O.S. No.526 of 1998 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi, was confirmed thereby dismissing the First Appeal at the instance of the defendants.
2. The plaintiffs case was that the suit properties are the common family properties also belonging to the first defendant, who is none else than his father and though they have been in enjoyment of the same, pursuant to a Panchayat, it was divided among themselves through an oral partition. Accordingly, item Nos. 1 to 6, 8 and 9 of the suit properties were allotted to the plaintiff while item No. 7 of the property was allotted to the first defendant, who, according to the plaintiff, on 14.8.1989, gave possession of the same to the plaintiff through a Gift Settlement Deed. Since then the plaintiff has been in absolute enjoyment and possession of the property by paying Government tax. It is the further case of the plaintiff that though the defendants have no right over the suit properties, due to enmity, they have denied his right by creating false documents and obstructed his peaceful enjoyment since 01.6.1998. Hence, the suit.
3. The defence of the defendants was that the plaintiff does not have complete enjoyment and possession of the suit properties and that the same were enjoyed by the plaintiff and the defendants jointly. According to the defendants, no settlement was effected in respect of the 7th item of the property, which is a well and that in order to obtain service connection for the well situated in 7th item, settlement was meant to be effected in respect of the well. It is further stated by the defendants that the plaintiff has wrongly included the entire property and that due to family compulsion, item Nos. 2 to 5 were sold on 01.4.1998 to the second defendant which sale will bind the plaintiff. On these grounds, the defendants sought for dismissal of the suit.
4. Before the trial Court, on the above pleadings, the parties took oral and documentary evidence. The plaintiff examined himself and marked Exs. A.1 to A.8. On the side of the respondents / defendants, no witness was examined and no document was marked.
5. Trial Court, after evaluating entire evidence, finding that the plaintiff has not proved possession and title in respect of item Nos. 1 to 6, 8 and 9 of the suit properties, held that he is not entitled to any decree of declaration and dismissed the suit. In respect of item No. 7 of the suit schedule, the trial Court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff has proved his possession. The defendants took the matter on appeal in A.S. No. 80 of 2003 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kallakurichi, and the Lower Appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the Appeal. It is against the said judgment, the Second Appeal is preferred at the instance of the plaintiff.
6. When the Second Appeal was listed for admission, notice alone was issued on 23.6.2006. The following substantial questions of law that arise for consideration in this Second Appeal:-
(i) Whether the Courts below are right in dismissing the suit in respect of suit items 1-6, 8 and 9 when the appellants right to those properties as a sharer is not disputed?
(ii) When it is found that the first defendant had allegedly sold items 2 5 on 01.4.1978 (documents not exhibited) in favour of the second defendant, are not the Courts below bound to extend the equitable relief of injunction?
7. Heard Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. P. Valliappan, learned counsel for the third respondent and perused the records.
8. The plaintiff has based his claim on a oral partition between him and his father and the plaintiff has stated that the oral partition was effected before the Panchayatdars and the division was done based on their advice. In paragraph 3 of the plaint, it has been pleaded as follows:-"...
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9. Though the plaintiff has stated that the Panchayatdars were present during the oral partition, in his evidence, he has admitted that no panchayatdar was present and only his maternal uncle was present, which is contra to the case pleaded. Excepting the gift deed Ex. A.1 dated 14.08.1989 executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff, the other Exhibits are only service connections which may not go to prove the factum of oral partition. Even in Ex.A.1, Gift Deed, there is no mention about the oral partition, which is alleged to have been executed 15 years prior to the filing of the suit. Therefore, excepting the interested testimony of P.W.1, there is no evidence to show that there was an oral partition in and by which the plaintiff got item Nos. 1 to 6, 8 and 9. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of the Courts below in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of his right and title in the suit items 1 to 6, 8 and 9. For the foregoing reasons, question No. 1 is answered against the plaintiff.
10. In respect of item Nos. 2 to 5, the first defendant had stated that he, along with his wife Sarathambal, had sold them to the second defendant on 01.4.1998. However, the said document is not marked before this Court and the suit is filed two months immediately thereafter, ie., on 01.6.1998. In view of the finding in the above question of law No. 1 and the act of the first defendant in selling the properties in item Nos. 2 to 5 in favour of the second defendant, it can easily be inferred that the properties were never divided and the alleged oral partition by the plaintiff is not established as a result of which, the plaintiff cannot get the relief asked for in the plaint.
11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that based on the above findings of the Courts below, the suit should not have been dismissed with respect to the other items excepting item No. 7. Instead, ought to have granted a lesser relief. To this effect, learned counsel relied on the decision in Natarajan vs. R.Muthukrishnan [2001 (4) CTC 513] and more particularly, referred to paragraphs 13 and 14, which read as under:-
"13. While considering the scope of Order 7, Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Apex Court in the decision in Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1994 (2) SCC 594, has held as follows;-
6. It is seen that the appellant sought for declaratory relief that the rates being charged are wholly unjust and unreasonable and for a direction to the railways to charge reasonable rates on the basis of actual distance of 568 km together with other consequential relief. It is to be remembered that the relief otherwise cognisable by Civil Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the CPC has been, statutorily conferred on the Tribunal with powers of a Civil Court to decide the claims under the Act. Order 7, Rule 7, CPC provides that every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, and the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement. Order 2, Rule 2 enjoins to claim the relief in respect of a cause of action and under clause 3 of Order 2, Rule 2, if he omits to seek the relief, except with the leave of the court, he shall be precluded thereafter for any relief so omitted.
14. So, under Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code, an equitable relief has to be granted, in such cases, to the parties concerned. It is only to avoid unnecessary multiplicity of suits in case where relief can be granted in the facts and circumstances of particular case even if not so restrictly pleaded or a relief sought for on such facts. The objection now raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the lower appellate court could not have declared that the suit wall is a common wall as the plaintiff is claiming only absolute right. When the Court is able to come to such a conclusion on the basis of the evidence available on record, the Court should not drive the plaintiff to file any other suit without deciding the same in the present suit. In view of the abovesaid fact, the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the lower appellate court has no jurisdiction to come to the conclusion that the suit wall is a common wall cannot be sustained."
12. Learned counsel also drew the attention of this Court to the judgment rendered in Angammal and 2 others vs. Komara Gounder and 2 others [2002 (1) CTC 472] and relied on paragraphs 8 and 9, which is extracted below:-
"8. From the pleadings as well as the evidence adduced before the Court it is fairly clear that the appellants/ plaintiffs are entitled for 3.48 acres. Now the question is as to whether the suit has to be dismissed in its entirety because appellants/ plaintiffs filed a suit claiming declaration and enjoyment for the entire extent of 3.58 acres in survey No.299/8. To put it differently, when the respondents/defendants themselves admit before the Court the title of the appellants/plaintiffs for an extent of 3.48 acres, can the Court refuse to declare that on the ground that the appellants/plaintiffs have not come forward before the Court with the claim for a larger area.
"9. Way back in the year 1867, in Pitambar v. Ram Joy, 1867 South W.R.93, the Courts have held that where plaintiff claims more than what he is entitled to, the Court will not dismiss the suit but give the plaintiff only such relief as he is entitled to. This view was later on affirmed in Lakshman v. Hari, I.L.R. 4 Bom 584; Venkataramana v. Verabalu, A.I.R. 1940 Mad 308; Khamta Mandalassi v. Hem Kumari, A.I.R. 1941 Pat 29; Bhiku v. Puttu, (1905) 8 Bom L.R. 106 (D.B.).
This Court is inclined to point out certain rulings of the Supreme Court at this juncture which will further clarify the legal position.
(a) While dealing with the power of the Court to grant smaller relief in a writ petition, the Supreme Court in B.R.Ramabhadriah v. Secy., F.& A. Deptt. , A.P. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1653, observed thus, "5. It is true that the writ petition contained a prayer for the quashing of the gradation list in sofar as it related to the inter se ranking of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondent Nos.3 to 8 and the petitioner (appellant) had also sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondents Nos.l and 2 to forbear from implementing or acting upon the said gradation list. But, subsequent to the institution of the writ petition, the Central Government had re-fixed the ranks of respondents Nos.l, 4, 5, 7 and 8 (Telengana Officers) and placed them below the appellant thereby redressing the grievance of the appellant in sofar as it pertained to the ranking of the aforesaid respondents. It therefore became unnecessary for the appellant to pursue his claim for relief with respect to the ranks assigned to those five respondents. It was under those circumstances, that the appellant submitted before the learned single Judge of the High Court, at the time of final hearing of the writ petition, that he was pressing the writ petition only in so far as it related to his claim for seniority over the 6th respondent. We fail to see how the fact that the appellant had sought in the writ petition the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondents 1 and 2 to forbear from implementing or acting upon the provisional gradation list will operate to preclude him from seeking a lesser relief, namely, the quashing of the list only in so far as it pertains to the fixation of the inter se seniority between himself and the 6th respondent. The material facts and circumstances had undergone a substantial change subsequent to the filing of the original petition and it was in consequence thereof that it had become unnecessary for the petitioner to pursue his original prayer for the grant of a larger relief. Besides ignoring this crucial aspect, the Division Bench of the High Court has also lost sight of the well established principle that in an action where a party has prayed for a larger relief it is always open to the court to grant him any smaller relief that he may be found to be entitled in law and thereby render substantial justice. The Court can undoubtedly take note of changes circumstances and suitably hold the relief to be granted to the party concerned in order to mete out justice in the case. As far as possible the anxiety and endeavour of the Court should be to remedy an injustice when it is brought to its notice rather than deny relief to an aggrieved party on purely technical and narrow procedural grounds. We do not, therefore, find it possible to uphold the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court that since the writ petition was not pressed in sofar as it related to the officers belonging to the Telengana region the question of inter se seniority between the writ petitioner and the 8th respondent should not have been considered by the single Judge and the writ petition should have seen dismissed.
6. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and remand the writ appeal to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The parties will bear the irrespective costs in this appeal." (Italics supplied)
(b) In the decision in Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 1994 (2) SCC 594, while considering the scope of Order 7, Rule 7, of Civil Procedure Code, the Supreme Court held as under, "6. It is seen that the appellant sought for declaratory relief that the rates being charged are 'wholly unjust and unreasonable, and for a direction to the railways to charge 'reasonable rates' on the basis of actual distance of 568 km together with other consequential relief. It is to be remembered that the relief otherwise cognisable by Civil Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the CPC has been, statutorily conferred on the Tribunal with powers of a Civil Court to decide the claims under the Act. Order 7, Rule 7, CPC provides that every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may 'think just' to the same extent as if it had been asked for, and the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement. Order 2, Rule 2 enjoins to claim the relief in respect of a cause of action and under clause 3 of Order 2, Rule 2, if he omits to seek the relief, except with the leave of the court, he shall be precluded thereafter for any relief so omitted." (Italics supplied) In fact as Orders would put it, where a party cannot be exact, it is wiser to claim too much rather than too little as a Judge does not give more than that which the plaintiff requires - Judex non Reddi injuriam subi datam punire.
But however, the legal position is, where the plaintiff claims less than what he is entitled to, the Court will not grant him any relief he has not specifically claimed unless the plaint is amended before the judgment. It was so held way back in the year 1838 in Sooriah Row v. Cotaghery, 1838 (2) M.I.A. 113 and the said view was later on confirmed in a subsequent ruling of Calcutta High Court in the case Perctval v. Collector of Chittaoong, 1900 I.L.R. 30 Cal 516. At the same time, the Court should not refuse to grant a relief not specifically claimed in the plaint, if such relief is obviously required by the nature of the case and is not inconsistent with the relief specifically claimed and raised by the pleadings. The Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Meher Chand v. Milkhi Ram, A.I.R. 1932 Lah 401 (F.B.) held that it is the duty of the Court to mould the relief to be granted to the parties according to the facts proved which, however, should not be inconsistent with the pleadings."
13. In the cases cited above by the learned counsel for the appellant, the principle stated is where a party cannot be exact in asking for a relief, it is wiser to claim much rather than too little as a Judge does not give more than what the plaintiff requires. However, in the case on hand, the plaintiff has asked for relief of declaration of title based on an oral partition which has not been proved. When the plaintiff failed to establish the oral partition, based on which he has claimed title to the suit items, the relief of declaration cannot be granted and the Courts below also rightly pointed out that it is open to the plaintiff to sue only for partition. No doubt, it is a settled principle that when plaintiff claims a larger interest and is able to establish a lesser extent, to that extent, a decree can be granted. The plaintiff has established his title only regarding item No. 7 and regarding the other items, his entitlement itself has to be proved. Therefore, the Court cannot grant a relief not specifically claimed in the plaint as granting a relief of partition would be a relief inconsistent with what has been pleaded.
14. With regard to the injunction, the plaintiff has not filed any document to show his possession of the suit items excepting few of the electricity service bills. Since the only item for which the title is established is item no. 7, for which he obtained a Gift Deed from his father, viz., the first defendant, he is entitled to any order of permanent injunction.
For the reasons stated above, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.7.2005 passed by the Lower Appellate Court in A.S. No. 80 of 2003 wherein the suit was decreed partly in respect of item 7 of the suit property only and dismissed in respect of items 1 to 6, 8 and 9 of the suit property. However, there shall be no order as costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
24 01 2014 Index : Yes Internet : Yes gri PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA, J.
gri To
1. The I Additional District Munsif Kallakurichi
2. The Subordinate Court Kallakurichi
3. The Record Keeper V.R. Section High Court Madras Pre-Delivery Judgment in S.A. No. 648 of 2006 Delivered on 24 01 2014