Gujarat High Court
Prakash Robin Nayudu vs Rev. Imanuel S. Kant on 20 January, 2023
Author: Nikhil S. Kariel
Bench: Nikhil S. Kariel
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10424 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10426 of 2022
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL Sd/-
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
to see the judgment ? YES
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
YES
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy
of the judgment ? NO
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution NO
of India or any order made thereunder ?
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PRAKASH ROBIN NAYUDU
Versus
REV. IMANUEL S. KANT
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Appearance:
MR YN RAVANI(718) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2
for the Respondent(s) No.
1,10,10.1,10.2,10.3,10.4,10.5,11,12,13,14,18,19,2,20,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
MR SURESH B BHATT(5669) for the Respondent(s) No. 15,16,17
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
Date : 20/01/2023
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned Advocate Mr.Y.S. Ravani appearing on behalf of the petitioners and learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Asim Pandya appearing with learned Advocate Mr.Bhatt for the respondents No.15, 16, and 17 in Special Civil Application No.10424 of 2022 and for the respondents No.9 and 12 in Special Civil Application No.10426 of 2022.
2. Since both the petitions challenge the very selfsame decision i.e. the judgement and order dated 6.5.2022 in CMA No.18 of 2022 and No.19 of 2022, both the petitions are taken up for hearing jointly and decided vide the present common order.
3. It appears that CMA No.18 of 2022 had been filed by the original defendants No.15 to 19 in Regular Civil Suit No.46 of 2019 and whereas the judgement passed by the learned lower Appellant Court in CMA No.18 of 2022 is challenged in SCA No.10424 of 2022 and CMA No.19 of 2022 had been filed by the original defendants No.9, and 11 to 14 in Regular Civil Suit No.46 of 2019 and whereas the judgement passed by the learned lower Appellant Court in CMA No.19 of 2022 is challenged in SCA No.10426 of 2022.
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4. Brief facts leading to filing of the present petitions, shorn off unnecessary details, are mentioned herein below:-
4.1. It appears that the Regular Civil Suit No.93 of 2001, Regular Civil Suit No.104 of 2001 and Regular Civil Suit No.108 of 2010 had been preferred by the Methodist Church of India, praying for various reliefs. RCS No.93 of 2001 had been preferred inter alia praying for a declaration that the plaintiff was in occupation of the suit property as the lessee and that the possession of the plaintiff upon the said property was legal and proper. The plaintiff had also sought for an injunction against the respondents against obstructing the plaintiff in enjoying the suit property in any manner whatsoever.
It appears that during the pendency of the said suit, since the defendants appear to have transacted with regard to the property in question, therefore, amendment had been prayed for bringing subsequent developments on record and whereas it appears that a sale deed dated 29.7.2011 by the defendants No.3 and 4 in favour of the defendants No.5 to 9 was called into question. 4.2. Insofar as RCS No.104 of 2001 was concerned, the said suit was in the nature of challenging two revenue entries being Entry No.4261 and Entry No.15076. RCS No.108 of 2010 challenged a registered sale deed dated 25.6.2008, whereby the defendant No.1 had Page 3 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined conveyed the property in favour of the defendants No.2 and 3. Consequential interim prayers had also been sought for. It appears that certain interim orders had been passed and whereas the same had been challenged, which challenge does not appear to have succeeded and whereas, since those aspects are not much relevant for deciding the present petitions, the same are not being referred herein. 4.3. It appears that later on the parties i.e. the plaintiff and the defendants had arrived at a settlement and whereas a settlement deed had been submitted in the lead matter being RCS No.93 of 2009 by way of Exh.116 dated 8.10.2018 and based upon such settlement, while RCS No.93 of 2001 had been decreed and whereas RCS No.104 of 2001 and RCS No.108 of 2010 had been withdrawn by the plaintiffs. It appears that while the settlement purshis had been signed by the respondent No.1 herein, more particularly in his capacity as Executive Secretary of Gujarat Regional Conference of Methodist Church in India and whereas it also appears that later on the said decision had been ratified by the Church itself. 4.4. It appears that the present petitioners, who are claiming to be beneficiaries of the Methodist Church in India, had preferred Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2019, whereby the plaintiffs had challenged the settlement on basis of which the settlement purshis had been Page 4 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined tendered before the learned Civil Court. Various other prayers also had been sought for in the said Civil Suit being RCS No.46 of 2019 filed on 20.5.2019. It appears that vide judgement and order below Exh.5 and Exh.107, the learned 4th Additional Sr. Civil Judge, Nadiad vide judgement and order dated 2.3.2022 had allowed the said applications and the defendants No.9, 11 to 14 and 15 to 17 were injuncted from making any further construction on the suit property. The said defendants being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said order of the learned 4th Additional Sr. Civil Judge dated 2.3.2022 had challenged the same before the learned District Court, Kheda at Nadiad by preferring RCS No.18 of 2022 and RCS No.19 of 2022. Since a general description of the Civil Suits is given herein above, in the considered opinion of this Court, no elaboration is required with regard to the appeals.
4.5. It appears that the learned 4 th Additional District Judge, Kheda at Nadiad vide a common judgement and order dated 6.5.2022 had set aside the order below Exh.5 and Exh.107 dated 2.3.2022 passed by the learned Civil Court in Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2009. 4.6. The petitioners - original plaintiffs being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court have challenged the said decision by way of preferring the present petitions. Page 5 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023
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5. Heard learned Advocates for the parties.
6. Learned Advocate Mr.Ravani, at the outset, would submit that the present Civil Suit i.e. Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2019 had been filed in representative capacity and whereas the present petitioners have no personal interest involved, more particularly the grievance of the petitioners being that the Trust has suffered immense loss on account of settlement arrived at between the parties. Assailing the impugned decision, learned Advocate Mr.Ravani would submit that the learned lower Appellate Court had committed a grave error by interfering with the order passed by the learned Civil Court. Learned Advocate Mr.Ravani would submit that the decision of the learned Civil Court was well reasoned and whereas under such circumstances, there was no requirement for the lower Appellate Court to have interfered in the order passed by the learned Civil Court. Learned Advocate Mr.Ravani would further submit that while the learned lower Appellate Court prima facie comes to a conclusion that the present suit itself may not be maintainable and whereas, according to the learned Advocate Mr.Ravani, such a finding was erroneous, more particularly since the present petitioners have not challenged the compromise decree, and whereas the petitioners have challenged the actual compromise between the parties and whereas according to the learned Advocate Mr.Ravani, the compromise arrived at between the parties was independent of Page 6 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined decree, which had been passed and whereas under such circumstances, the challenge to the compromise was a valid challenge and, therefore, no interference was called for.
6.1. Learned Advocate Mr.Ravani would further submit that since the compromise deed had taken into its ambit the proceedings of RCS No.93 of 2001, RCS No.104 of 2001 and RCS No.108 of 2010 and whereas the compromise deed had been passed by the learned Civil Court only in RCS No.93 of 2001 and whereas the present petitioners had withdrawn RCS No.104 of 2001 and RCS No.108 of 2010 and, therefore, under such circumstances, since the present petitioners - original plaintiffs do not have any other remedy to challenge such withdrawal apart from filing of the present suit, therefore, the Civil Suit preferred by the plaintiffs was the only remedy available. Learned Advocate Mr.Ravani would also make submissions as regards the merits of the Civil Suits, more particularly placing heavy reliance upon observations made by the learned Civil Court in judgement and order dated 2.3.2022 below Exh.5 and Exh.107 granting interim injunction in favour of the original plaintiffs - petitioners herein and whereas, in the considered opinion of this Court, since the said submissions would not have any bearing on the final decision of this Court, having regard to the discussion which would follow, this Court deems it appropriate not Page 7 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined to record or even issue its findings as regards the submissions on the merits of the case.
7. The present petitions have been vehemently contested by the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Asim Pandya appearing along with the learned Advocate Mr.S. B. Bhatt on behalf of the respondents No.9 to 12 and 15 to 17 respectively as co-relatable with Special Civil Applications No.10426 of 2022 and 10424 of 2022 respectively. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Pandya would submit that the learned Lower Appellate Court had committed no error whatsoever in coming to the conclusion that since the suit itself was not maintainable, therefore, there was no question of the original plaintiffs having either prima facie case in their favour or balance of convenience being in their favour and consequently, set aside the judgement and order passed by the learned Trial Court, granting interim injunction in favour of the present petitioners and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the order passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Pandya would submit that the legal position as regards challenge to a decree based upon a compromise being not maintainable by way of an independent suit is well settled and whereas merely by clever drafting, if a decree based upon a compromise decree is not challenged and whereas the compromise itself is challenged would not make the suit maintainable. Learned Sr. Advocate would submit that Rule 3A of Order XXIII of the CPC bars filing of a Page 8 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined suit for setting aside a decree on the ground that compromise upon which the decree was based was not lawful. Learned Sr. Advocate would submit that while the original plaintiffs have in the Civil Suits questioned the compromise as not being valid, merely by not challenging the decree the suit would not be maintainable more particularly since the consequent effect of setting aside the compromise upon which the decree was based would be rendering the decree itself being a nullity and, therefore, such a suit would be barred by Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC. Learned Sr. Advocate would submit that since the suit itself was not maintainable, the learned Trial Court had misdirected itself by entering into the merits of the Civil Suits and coming to a conclusion on merits of the case and granting interim injunction in favour of the original plaintiffs - petitioners herein. Learned Sr. Advocate would in support of his submission as regards maintainability of the Civil Suits itself relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) Th. Lr.Smt. ... vs Rajinder Singh & Ors, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 566, whereby according to the learned Sr. Advocate, the Hon'ble Apex Court being concerned with an issue with regard to provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC inter alia held that no independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3A. Page 9 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined 7.1. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Pandya would further rely upon law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above decision, whereby it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that a consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the Court, which passed the consent decree by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order XXIII. Learned Sr. Advocate would elaborate by submitting that since a consent decree could be set aside only by the Court which passed the consent decree and the consent decree operating as an estoppel, therefore, in an independent suit which indirectly questions the compromise decree by questioning the legality and validity of the compromise, the learned Civil Court was not empowered to grant any interim injunction, which would have the effect of nullifying or keeping the compromise decree in abeyance.
7.2. Relying upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) Th. Lr.Smt. (supra), learned Sr. Advocate would submit that since the suit itself was not maintainable, therefore, there was no question of granting any interim injunction in favour of the original plaintiffs, more particularly as held by the Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiffs neither had a prima facie case in their favour, nor balance of convenience would be in their favour. Thus, supporting the decision Page 10 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined of the learned Lower Appellate Court, learned Sr. Advocate would request this Court not to interfere in the impugned decision.
8. Heard learned Advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents on record.
9. The question that arises for consideration of this Court is whether the order passed by the learned First Appellate Court is required to be interfered with or not, more particularly having regard to the observations of the learned Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief since the suit itself was not maintainable. It would be required to be noted here that the legal position insofar as challenge to a compromise decree is well settled, yet there are certain discernible differences in the facts on hand, which would require detailed consideration. The discernible difference between the case on hand and facts of decision relied by the learned Counsel for respondents being that the original plaintiffs were not party to the original proceedings in which the compromise decree was based. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not challenged the decree based upon the compromise and whereas the plaintiffs have only challenged the compromise claiming the same to be unlawful.
9.1. Thus, two questions arise for consideration of this Court namely; Page 11 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined (1) whether a suit where a decree based on compromise is not challenged but the compromise itself is called into question, would be barred by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC; and (2) whether a third party, i.e. a party who was not party to the compromise decree, would be entitled to file an independent suit questioning the compromise on basis on which the decree was passed.
Insofar as question No.1 it would be required to be mentioned here that while the original plaintiff had questioned the compromise as being unlawful, the plaintiff had not sought a prayer for setting aside the decree on basis of such compromise. In the considered opinion of this Court, such a prayer by the original plaintiff was nothing but a 'clever drafting'. Such a conclusion is arrived by this Court by considering the effect of granting of the prayer as prayed for by the original plaintiff. A prayer questioning the compromise based upon which the decree was passed without any challenge to the compromise decree itself would, if granted, lead to the decree itself being rendered non est and ineffective and, therefore, irrespective of there being no challenge to the decree, considering the resultant effect, it could be observed that ultimately, it was the decree which Page 12 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined was being questioned without any prayers explicitly made for setting aside of the said decree.
9.2. In case of Ram Singh & Ors vs Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan & Ors., reported in (1986) 4 SCC 364, the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that when a suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by which the suit is barred. Relying upon the said proposition it could be observed that while a suit challenging the decree on the ground that a compromise on basis of which the decree was passed was unlawful would be barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, in the instant case, the plaintiffs by resorting to clever drafting had questioned the compromise as being unlawful without praying for the decree based upon such compromise to be set aside and whereas since the effect of grant of such prayer would be virtually setting aside the decree itself, it could be stated that the plaintiffs by resorting to clever drafting had not prayed for setting aside of the decree, which would have rendered their suit being barred by Rule 3A.
10. Thus, since it prima facie appears that the petitioners herein had resorted to clever drafting while filing the suits in question, more particularly to evade rigors of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, and Page 13 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined whereas in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ram Singh & Ors (supra), such a suit whereby the plaintiff has, by clever drafting, circumvented the provision by which the suit would be barred, not being permissible, therefore, the instant suit where the plaintiff has questioned the compromise on basis of which the suit had been decreed without challenging the decree itself would also be barred under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC.
11. As far as the second question is concerned i.e. whether a third party i.e. a person who was not party to the compromise decree, would be entitled to file an independent suit questioning the compromise on basis of which the decree was passed, in the considered opinion of this Court, such an issue also is no more res integra, more particularly the issue in question being decided by a Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court in case of Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) and Ors. Vs. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj and Ors., reported in AIR 2020 Guj
12. One of the issues which arose for consideration of the Hon'ble Full Bench was what would be the remedy available to a third party who was not party to the suit or to the compromise, but is aggrieved by the compromise decree. Observations of the Hon'ble Full Bench as relevant for the present purpose being paragraphs 30, 31, and 32 as well as paragraph 40(vii) are quoted herein below for benefit:- Page 14 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined "30. Still there could be one more situation, where the third party who was not the party to suit or the party to the compromise but had an interest in the subject matter of the compromise, is aggrieved by the decree passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties to the suit. So what remedy would be available to him ? It cannot be gainsaid that the decree based on the compromise between the parties under Order XXIII, Rule 3, if remains unchallenged would be a "consent decree" binding to the parties to suit. However, when the person aggrieved is third party who was neither a party to the suit nor a party to the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed by the Court in the suit, would not be bound by such decree. Such a decree could not be said to be a "consent decree" qua such third party, and therefore, neither the bar contained in Section 96(3) nor the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII would be application to him. Such an aggrieved party, with the leave of the Court can always file an appeal under Section 96(1) against the decree passed by the Court on the basis of the compromise, and can contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not have been recorded by the Court in view of Rule 1A(2) of Order XLIII of CPC. When the third party is vitally and adversely affected by the decree passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties to the suit on the subject matter or otherwise of the suit, he can certainly, with the leave of the appellate Court, prefer an appeal and can contest such a decree passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3. One of the grounds to contest the decree could be that such a compromise should or should not have been recorded by the Court.
31. At this juncture, the word "party" used in Sub-rule (1) and the word "appellant" used in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII assume importance. The Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1A relates to the order passed against the 'party' to the suit, and the appeal filed by 'such party', whereas the Sub-Rule (2) of the said Rule 1A relates to the appeal filed by the 'appellant'. Such appellant may or may not be a party to the suit. The Sub-rule (2) is not confined to the appeal filed by the "party" to the suit. Hence, the third party, in the appeal against the decree passed in the suit under Rule 3 of Order XXIII can also contest such decree on the ground that such a compromise should not have been recorded.
32. In the opinion of the Court, such an aggrieved third party Page 15 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined would also have an option to file an application for Review of the order recording the compromise or for Review of the decree based on the compromise between the parties to the suit, under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC, if the conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. It has been held by the Supreme Court in case of Board of Control for Cricket, India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club, reported in AIR 2005 SC 592, that an application for Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence, or when there exists an error apparent on the face of record but also if the same is necessary on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order XLVII, Rule 1 are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or by an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking he doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit", which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no one. Therefore, it any person considers himself aggrieved by the order or decree passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3 may for sufficient reason apply for review of such decree or order under Order XLVII, Rule 1, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. When an application for review is granted, the Court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit, as contemplated in Rule 8 of Order XLVII of CPC.
33 to 39 xxx
40. The upshot of the above may be summed up as under:-
(i) to (vi) xxx
(vii) If the aggrieved party was not the party to the suit, the remedy available to him to challenge the decree passed by the Court on the basis of compromise between the parties to the suit (consent decree), would be to file an appeal under Section 96(1) of CPC, with the leave of the appellate Court, or to file a review application before the Court, which passed the decree, as may be permissible under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC."
12. Thus, having regard to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Full Page 16 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined Bench, it would appear that the remedy available to an aggrieved party, who was not a party to the suit or the compromise, would be to challenge the decree passed by the Court on basis of the compromise between the parties to the suit would be to file an appeal under Section 96(1) of CPC albeit with the leave of the appellate Court. Such a party could also file a review application before the Court which passed the decree, as may be permissible under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the CPC. Thus, it would appear that the party who is aggrieved by a consent decree and was not party to the suit or the compromise could invoke either of the remedies as noted herein above, whereas the party certainly did not have the remedy of filing an independent suit as being one available to the party concerned. In the instant case, it appears that the plaintiffs, having not availed the remedies as enumerated by the Hon'ble Full Bench had sought to ventilate their grievance by filing an independent civil suit, which in the considered opinion of this Court, would not be maintainable.
13. Having come to the prima facie conclusion as above, both the questions raised by this Court at paragraph No.9 are answered as below :-
13.1. A suit where a decree based on compromise is not challenged, but the compromise itself is called into question, would Page 17 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined also be barred by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, more particularly in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ram Singh & Ors (supra) .
13.2. A third party i.e. a party, who is not a party to a compromise decree would not be entitled to file an independent suit questioning the compromise on basis of which the decree was passed, rather as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court in case of Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) and Ors.
(supra), the remedy available to the third party is to challenge the decree by filing an appeal under Section 96(1) of CPC with the leave of appellate Court or to file a review application before the Court which had passed the decree.
14. Furthermore, in the considered opinion of this Court, in the context of the observations, discussions and findings, though prima facie in nature, it would appear that the three ingredients to be considered for grant of interim injunction i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are not in favour of the present petitioners - original plaintiffs, more particularly since the suit itself not being maintainable, the petitioners could not claim any prima facie case in their favour, nor could they claim that the balance of convenience in their favour or that any irreparable injury would be cause to them, if the Page 18 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10424/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/01/2023 undefined order of the learned First Appellate Court is not interfered with. 14.1. Again, as noted herein above, since the learned First Appellate Court was also concerned with regard to the aspect of maintainability of the civil suit itself and having regard to the observations of this Court, more particularly since it appears that the suit itself would not be maintainable, therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, no interference whatsoever is called for in the impugned judgement and order passed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgement and order dated 6.5.2022 in CMA No.18 of 2022 and No.19 of 2022.
15. Consequently, the present Special Civil Applications are disposed of as rejected.
Sd/-
(NIKHIL S. KARIEL,J) V.V.P. PODUVAL Page 19 of 19 Downloaded on : Sun Sep 17 21:00:48 IST 2023