Delhi High Court
Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors. vs Rajpal Singh on 11 April, 2002
Equivalent citations: 100(2002)DLT385, 2002(64)DRJ181, 2003(1)SLJ130(DELHI)
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha, A.K. Sikri
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. Interpretation of Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1980 is in question in this writ petition which arises out of a judgment and order dated 4th February 2000 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench in OA No. 1161/1996 dismissing the petitioner's Original Application whereby and whereunder he had questioned an order of dismissal dated 15th January 1991 passed by the disciplinary authority as also an order dated 10th April 1991 passed by the appellate authority, dismissing the appeal preferred by him.
2. Shorn of all unnecessary details, the fact of the matter is as follows:
The petitioner, at all material times, was posted as Constable in Delhi Police. Allegedly, he had gone to the jhuggi of Smt. Ram Murthi and outraged her modesty and on her protest and statement to the effect that she would disclose the same to her husband, he allegedly threatened that in that event, her husband would be assaulted. On the basis of the said allegation, departmental proceedings as also a criminal case were started against him. In the departmental proceedings, the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct and by an order dated 15th January 1991, a penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on him. However, he was acquitted in the criminal trial having been given the benefit of doubt. As against the said order of dismissal, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. The said appeal was, however, dismissed whereupon he filed the Original Application before the Tribunal which was marked as Oa 1593/1991.
3. The question raised before the Tribunal was that having regard to the fact that an order of acquittal has been passed in favor of the respondent in the said criminal trial, the order imposing punishment in the departmental proceedings was not maintainable.
4. The learned Tribunal in its judgment took note of the decision of the apex court in Management of RBI, New Delhi v. B.S. Singh Panchal, wherein it was held that the action of the employer in refusing to reinstate an employee who had been acquitted by the High Court by giving benefit of doubt, was not vitiated in law as the same was not an honourable acquittal as is required under Regulation 46(4) of RBI (Staff) Regulations, 1948, but passed the impugned judgment on the basis that the appellate order did not satisfy the requirement of law stating:
"Merely stating that registration of a criminal case Under Section 354 IPC, prima facie suggests the applicant's gross misconduct, and further observing that the unbecoming conduct of the applicant having been fully established, the punishment inflicted is adequate, cannot be said to be a proper and detailed consideration of the grounds of appeal. In this particular case, the Appellate Authority should have taken up each ground of appeal one by one, and after examining them carefully and in detail, he should h ave come to a considered finding. A perusal of the appellate authority order indicates that this not being done and without giving reasons, he has summarily dismissed all the pleas taken in the appeal petition characterizing them as irrelevant and devoid of force. Such an appellate order which summarily rejects all the grounds taken in the appeal without assigning any reasons, is bad in law and cannot be sustained. It therefore has to be struck down."
5. The Tribunal, by reason of the impugned judgment without interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority merely quashed the appellate order dated 10th April 1991 and remitted back the mater to appellate authority in the light of the observations made therein. Pursuant thereto and in furtherance thereof, the appellate authority again considered the matter by an order contained in Annexure R/4 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent herein and dismissed the said appeal by a speaking order.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed the said Original Application. The learned Tribunal, by reason of the impugned judgment, inter alia, held that having regard to the fact that an order of acquittal has been passed in favor of the respondent, in terms of Rule 12 of the said Rules, the order of punishment became unsustainable.
7. Mr. Anoop Bagai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the learned Tribunal passed the impugned judgment on mis-construction and mis-interpretation of Rule 12 of the said Rules. The learned counsel would contend that even assuming Rule 12 to be applicable in the instant case the departmental proceedings could not h ave been held to have become vitiated as the criminal charge had failed on technical grounds.
8. Mr. Shyam Babu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend that Rule 12 in this case was attracted in view of the fact that the appeal against the impugned judgment was pending. The learned counsel would contend that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and in view of the fact that the order of punishment would have attained finality only upon disposal of the appeal, Rule 12 would be attracted as the order of acquittal was passed before the appeal was disposal of on 10th April 1991.
Rule 12 of the said Rules reads thus:
"12. Action following judicial acquittal.-- When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:-
(A) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, or
(b) in the opinion of the court, or on the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and the suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available."
9. The learned Tribunal, inter alia held that in terms of the said Rule, a delinquent officer could not be punished departmentally on the same charge after he has been acquitted by a criminal court.
10. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, misconstrued and mis-interpreted the said Rule. In terms of Rule 12 aforementioned, a delinquent officer cannot be punished departmentally, if on the same charge he has been acquitted by a criminal court. In the instant case, departmental proceedings had already been initiated and he had been punished departmentally. The order of acquittal by a criminal court came into existence at a later date.
11. We may notice that in terms of Section 21(3) of the Delhi Police Act, a criminal prosecution is not barred even if the delinquent officer has been departmentally proceeded with.
Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 21 of the said Act read thus:
"21. Powers of Punishment.--(1) Subject to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and the rules, the Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police Training College or of the Police Training School or any other officer of equivalent rank, may award to any police officer of subordinate rank any of the following punishments, namely:-
(a) dismissal;
(b) removal from service;
(c) reduction in rank;
(d) forfeiture of approval service;
(e) reduction in pay;
(f) withholding of increment; and
(g) fine not exceeding on month's pay.
(3) Nothing in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall affect any police officer's liability for prosecution and punishment for any offence committed by him."
12. Having regard to the said provisions, we are of the opinion that Rule 12 of the Rules must be construed having regard to the purport and object of the Statute.
13. The heading of the said Rule is: "Action following judicial acquittal". Thus, what is prohibited is that no departmental action shall be taken in terms whereof the departmental action had been taken on the charge whereupon the police officer had been tried and acquitted by a criminal court. Ex-facie, therefore, the same does not debar initiation of departmental proceedings as also a criminal trial. Only in the event departmental proceedings had not been initiated and/or the same had not culminated in imposition of punishment, Rule 12 afore-mentioned, could be held to be attracted. Only because an appeal was pending, the same would not mean that the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority remained under animated suspension. It had for all intent and purport remained operative.
14. The principle that an appeal is a continuation of proceedings has nothing to do with interpretation of Rule 12 afore-mentioned. As is well known, a statute has to be interpreted literally.
15. The apex court in Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadit and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., , has categorically held as under:
"26. Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute."
16. In Vijaylakashmamma and Anr. v. B.T. Shankar, , the apex court has again held:
"22. The extent to which and the areas and aspects or facets of old Hindu law which required modernisation, modification and alteration are matters of legislative policy and merely because a particular change has been brought into effect in respect of one facet of law in force and a provision has been made specifically only to that limited extent, the courts can neither by means of an interpretative process nor under the guise of ensuring parity in what it may seem to the court would be desirable to achieve uniformity (an area once again exclusively pertaining to policy of legislation) add to or alter the language, structure and content of a provision by reading into it what was not specifically intended or what perhaps was deliberately and consciously avoided by Parliament itself."
17. The rule of purposive construction of an enactment, as is well known, in case of any doubt dispute shall be applicable. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors., reported in 2nd (2001) AP 1 (FB), it was held:
"22. The note appended to a scheme framed under the statute must be construed having regard to the fact that it is a purposive enactment. It is a well settled principle of law that where the law is not clear, recourse must be taken to purposive interpretation. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless Co. it was held:
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we known why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything in its place.'
23. In Anantha Kumar v. State of West Bengal (1999 (4) SLR 661) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has noticed the authorities as regards purposive construction. In Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation, Second edition, as regards the rule of 'purposive' construction', it has been stated at Section 304 as under:
"A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by-
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-literal construction),
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction)."
18. Even assuming that Rule 12 as afore-mentioned, is attracted, Clause (a) thereof makes out an exception as regards applicability of the Rule in a case where the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds.
19. Furthermore, it is well settled that the standard of proof in a criminal case and domestic enquiry is different.
20. A departmental proceeding is also maintainable where additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available.
21. The learned Tribunal, unfortunately, has not considered this aspect of the matter in its impugned judgment. It is now a well-settled principle of law that while interpreting a Rule, the basic principles of law should be borne in mind. The effect of the departmental proceedings on an acquittal made in a criminal charge fell for consideration before the apex court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., . The apex court in the said decision upon taking into consideration a large number of its earlier decisions, held:
"13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in the those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance.
22. Rule 12 of the said Rules should also be interpreted having regard to the aforementioned dicta of the Apex Court.
23. Furthermore, even assuming that two interpretations are possible, it is now well known that the interpretation which would give effect to the object and purport of the Act should be favored by taking recourse to the doctrine of purposive construction. So construed, we are of the opinion that Rule 12 would not be attracted when an order of punishment had already been imposed before the judgment of acquittal was rendered in favor of the respondent.
24. For the reasons afore-mentioned, the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and the Writ Petition is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.