Jharkhand High Court
Balu Fire Clay Mines vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 13 January, 2003
Equivalent citations: [2003(97)FLR272], [2003(1)JCR664(JHR)], (2003)IILLJ672JHAR
Author: Vikramaditya Prasad
Bench: Vikramaditya Prasad
ORDER Vikramaditya Prasad, J.
1. Heard both sides.
2. This writ has been filed for quashing Annexure 3 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 (hereinafter the Act), whereby and where under the review petition of the partitioned to review the order as contained in Annexure 1 has been rejected. Annexure 1 has also been sought to be quashed on the ground that this has been passed on erroneous appreciation of the documents of the petitioner particularly the Exhibits E/5 and E/6.
3. The short case of the petitioner is that the petitioner ran a business in the name and style of M/s. Balu Fireclay Mines at Balumath, Palamau through Sri K.C. Garg. According to the petitioner his business came to a closure because of certain Nexal activities going on within area and consequently information thereof had been given to the authorities concerned. Then the authorities under the Act passed the order Annexure 1 and in that proceeding the documents filed by the petitioner as well as the attendance register of the concerned establishment were examined and by Annexure-1 a demand of Rs. 30,324/-was raised against the petitioner. Thereafter, it transpires that the petitioner filed a review petition under Section 7B of the Act and by Annexure 3 that review petition was rejected.
4. The main ground taken by the petitioner for review was that the petitioner was a mining Engineer and a consultant and in that capacity he earned and consequently filed income tax returns. Those income tax returns were also exhibited before the authority concerned who was exercising his power under the Act for purpose of assessment but those documents i.e. Exts. E/5 and E/6 were wrongly construed by the authority concerned as the authority concerned construed those documents to" be income tax returns filed in respect of the establishment concerned and, thus, according to the petitioner that authority committed an error apparent on the face of record by considering these documents in respect of the establishment and not as the document of income tax returns of the petitioner in his individual capacity and, therefore, the assessment was wrongly done. The further case of the petitioner is that though the review petition was filed on this ground but this matter was not discussed in review and the same was rejected by a summary order without answering the objection raised by the petitioner.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that Annexure 3, which is sought to be quashed, has, in fact, dealt with every aspect of the matter as it says that the original order Annexure 1 has dealt with every aspect of the matter. He further argued that these orders (An-nexures 3 and 1) read together clearly go to show that the review order has been passed after consideration of the entire objection raised by the petitioner. Further argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that as appeal lies against the original order Annexure 1, if the petitioner was aggrieved by Annexure 1, he had to file an appeal under Section 7A of the Act.
6. Review is a statutory remedy. As no appeal though provided under the Act, has been filed, the petitioner is entitled to avail his remedy of Review provided under Section 7A of the Act. So, the contention of the respondent that he should have filed appeal instead of Review is not acceptable. If two forums are granted to the petitioner under the Statute then if the petitioner has chosen one of them and filed review then he has rightly filed the review against the order as contained in Annexure 1.
7. Coming to passing of a speaking order, I find that the review order Annexure 3, is a very short order, it does not itself give any reason but it refers back to Annexure 1 and says that in Annexure 1 the cogent reasons for passing the order has been given and, therefore, there is no reason for passing a speaking order.What is the speaking order is a matter of consideration. All the Courts most often do direct the authorities to pass a speaking/reasoned order. Speaking order is an order which meets all the contentions raised by the contesting parties so that neither of the contesting party has any grievance that his submissions and arguments were not considered, even though a superior Court/ authority may differ with the conclusion arrived at by the authority which passed it. The essence of the speaking order is that both the parties should feel satisfied to the extent that whatever pleas were taken, whatever arguments were made and whatever documents were placed all were considered and then the Court concerned came to a finding. There is no dispute that a review petition should also be disposed of by a speaking order. Though generally it is expected of any judicial/quasi-judicial Court to pass a speaking order. So if an order which in its face is summary refers to an earlier order passed by it and gives reason for passing a summary order because the point raised had been thoroughly dealt with in earlier order then that summary order is also a speaking order.
8. In the present case Exts. E/5 and E/6 were exhibited before the original Court of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner. According to the petitioner, they were the individual income tax returns of Mr. K.C. Garg and not the income tax returns filed by the establishment. The grievance of the petitioner as stated earlier is that it was wrongly construed by the authority concerned that those were the income tax returns of the establishment and, therefore, the review petition was filed. The grievance of the petitioner is that in the impugned order Annexure 3, objection raised by the petitioner was not considered.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents argued before this Court that on perusal of Annexure 1, it is more clear that these two documents were properly considered by the concerned authority.
10. I have also gone through the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner annexing Annexures 13, 14 and 15. Annexure 13 shows pan No. ACGPG 6752R. The petitioner has neither filed the pan no of the establishment here nor before the original Court, which passed the original order in Annexure 1. Pan No. ACGPG 6752R is in the name of K.C. Garg. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to impress that this Pan No. is the individual pan No. of the petitioner Krishna Chandras Garg and not of the establishment. But surprisingly the learned counsel for the petitioner did not file pan No. of the establishment concerned. In item No. 14 of Annexure 13 the name of the business/profession shown against this Pan No. is "Dealing in Fire Clay". The establishment concerned undisputedly is proprieted by Mr. K.C. Garg and it undisputedly functions in the name and style of M/s. Balu Fire Clay Mines. Therefore, by all ordinary mode of consideration and on plain reading of document i.e. Annexure 13 it shows that it is the income tax return filed on behalf of the firm dealing in Clay business run by the petitioner. Because in this column no where the petitioner has written that it is the consultancy business run by the petitioner. I do not want to observe more because any observation made may prejudice the appellate Court, if the petitioner chooses to file an appeal.
11. As such prima facie there is no apparent error on the face of record as al leged by the petitioner in Annexures 1 and 3 therefore, I find no reason to interfere with Annexures 1 and 3. Consequently, I find no reason to admit this writ. It is, accordingly, dismissed at the stage of ad mission itself.