Madras High Court
S.V.M. Nagavairava Sundaram vs S. Bageerathan And Anr. on 15 December, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)2MLJ28
ORDER S.S. Subramani, J.
1. Second respondent in H.R.C.O.P. No. 68 of 1989, on the file of Rent Controller, Pondicherry, is the revision petitioner. Revision is filed under Section 25 of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Parties hereinafter will be referred according to their rank in the rent control petition.
2. Landlord filed eviction petition on two grounds, viz., (1) First respondent who is the tenant has sub-let the building and the second respondent is in exclusive possession of the shop, and (2) The schedule mentioned shop premises is required as additional accommodation for the purpose of landlord's business.
3. There are four shops under the same roof. One shop room is occupied by the landlord, and three other shop rooms were given to various tenants. Except the shop room which is now with the revision petitioner herein, the other two shop rooms have been vacated. The present position is, that at the two ends of the building, landlord is having business and in between the tenant is occupying his shop. The building which was in the occupation of the other two tenants was obtained possession during the pendency of this rent control proceedings, and it has come out in evidence that the landlord had to file eviction petition against those tenants also to get possession. The same business which is run in the shop room in the occupation of the landlord is carried on the shop rooms, the possession of which the landlord obtained.
4. In the rent control proceeding, the tenant contended that there was no sub-lease and the first respondent is a firm and due to change in the constitution of the firm, second respondent came into possession and, therefore, there cannot be any question of sub-lease. Regarding additional accommodation, in the original petition, it was stated that there was no necessity for the landlord to evict him. According to the tenant, after possession was obtained in respect of two other shop rooms, it will be sufficient for the requirement of the landlord, and the claim is not bona fide. He has also put forward a contention that if he is evicted, he will be put to great hardship and that will outweigh the hardship that might be caused to the landlord.
5. Originally, the Rent Controller allowed eviction on both the grounds. The appellate authority confirmed that order only in respect of the ground for additional accommodation. The matter was taken to this Court by the tenant in C.R.P.No. 2964 of 1991. P.S. Mishra, J., as he then was, set aside the judgments of the Authorities below and remitted the matter back to the Rent Controller.
6. After remand, additional evidence was adduced. Thereafter, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition. Landlord filed an appeal as M.A.No. 43 of 1992. The appellate authority found that the claim of the landlord for additional accommodation is bona fide and if eviction is denied, landlord will be put to greater hardship. Eviction was, therefore, allowed.
7. In regard to claim of eviction on the ground of sub-lease, both the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority have concurrently held that there was no sub-lease.
8. In this revision by the second respondent, the only question raised is, whether the finding of the appellate authority that the landlord requires the schedule shop room for additional accommodation is illegal, irregular and improper, and whether the finding regarding comparative hardship is liable to be interfered with.
9. The question of sub-lease is not a matter for consideration in this revision.
10. Before going to the evidence in this case, I will have to first consider the limitations of a fevisional court. Section 25 of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act enables a person aggrieved against the judgment of the appellate authority to move the High Court, and the High Court may, on the application of the aggrieved person, call for and examine the record of the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act is also similarly worded. As per various decisions of this Court as well as the Honourable Supreme Court, it could be seen that even though the language appears that this Court is given wide power, it is essentially a revisional jurisdiction, i.e., supervisory in nature. The statute itself provides a distinction between an appeal and a revision. So, naturally, it pre-supposes that Section 25 should not be made use of to convert this Court as an appellate court, for re-hearing the entire matter. The power also should not be used merely because the revisional court does not agree with the findings of fact rendered by the authorities below. Even in regard to the conclusion, interference of this Court is possible only in cases where the conclusion is reached by taking into consideration irrelevant materials or the authority concerned omitted to consider relevant materials. Merely because another conclusion is possible on re-appreciation of evidence, the power under Section 25 of the Act is not to be invoked. Merely because another opinion could be formed, that cannot also be a reason to hold that the decision of the appellate authority is wrong and the same is liable to be set aside.
11. In K.A. Anthappaiv. C. Ahammed A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1696, Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act came for consideration. While considering the same, the Honourable Supreme Court stated in paragraph 5 thus:
At this stage, it may also be mentioned that in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act, the High Court can "call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit." It is no doubt true that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 20 is wider than that conferred under Section 115, C.P.C. But at the same time, a revision under Section 20 cannot be equated with an appeal. Moreover, the revisional power conferred under Section 20 also embraces an order passed by the appellate authority. While considering the provisions conferring revisional power couched in a language similar to that contained in Section 20 of the Act, this Court has laid down that the power conferred on the High Court is essentially a power of superintendence and despite the wide language employed, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of fact of the subordinate authority merely because it does not agree with the said findings....
...The revisional court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the court below.
[Italics supplied] If it is only supervisory jurisdiction, it cannot upset the conclusion of facts, however, erroneous those may be, unless the conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no court could ever reach conclusions like them.
12. In Rajbir Kaur v. Choke Siri and Co. , in paragraphs 42 and 43, their Lordships have said thus:
The scope of the revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the statute conferring the revisional jurisdiction. Revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction and cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. Though the revisional power depending upon the language of the provision might be wider than revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet, a revisional court is not a second or first appeal. When the findings of fact recorded by the courts below are supportable on the evidence on record, the revisional court must, indeed be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the courts below....
[Italics supplied] In Rafat Ah v. Sugani Bai and Ors. (1998)8 Supreme 555, which is a case under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the Honourable Supreme Court had occasion to consider the revisional powers. Why I am referring to this decision is, because, Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act corresponds to Section 25 of our Act. Their Lordships have said that even if the section is widely worded, that will not give the revisional court the power of reappreciation of evidence. In para 7, their Lordships have held thus:
The appellation given to the section makes it unmistakably clear that the power conferred thereunder is revisional which means, it is a power of supervision. It is well neigh settled that a revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters. The power to call for and examine the records is for the purpose of the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality, regularity or propriety" of the order of the lower authority. Even such a widely worded frame of the Section may at best indicate that the revisional powers are not so restricted as in the enactments wherein the words are not so widely framed. Nonetheless, they remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction. In a recent decision we had occasion to consider the scope of revisional jurisdiction under certain Rent Control enactments vide:
Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. . Reference was then made to a decision wherein similar words used under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 were considered (vide: Sri Raj Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy . A two Judge Bench has observed therein that "dispite wide language employed in the Section, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with the findings of fact merely because it does not agree with to the finding of the subordinate authority." After adverting to it we have stated in Sarla Ahuja:
The High Court in the present case has reassessed and re-appraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a re-appraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact finding court is wholly unreasonable.
13. In. this connection, it must also be understood that the Rent Control Act is a social legislation. The interpretation of such enactment has been recently declared by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Malpe Viswanatha Acharya v. State of Maharashtra thus:
Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent Control Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the Society.
14. Similar was the view taken in an earlier decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in K.S. Sundararaju Chettiar v. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu , wherein, in paragraph 10, their Lordships have said thus:
We may also indicate here that the contention that the Rent Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant will be oversimplification of the legislative import of the Rent Act. In our view, it will be more appropriate to hold that the Rent Act regulates the incidence of tenancy and inter se rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant.
15. Once a ground has been made out for eviction, the court should not refuse to grant that relief to the landlord only on the ground that the person is liable to be dispossessed from the building. Hyper-technical arguments should not be taken into consideration in such cases. On a reading of the entire legislation, it is clear that if the landlord proves the bona fides of his claim, and if the court finds that the ground is genuine, eviction has to be ordered. Of course, when we come to the question of additional accommodation, comparative hardship also will have to be considered. With these limitations in power, I have to consider the legality, propriety and regularity of the judgment of the appellate authority in this case.
16. Before going to the same, it may be mentioned that even while narrating the facts, I have said that on an earlier occasion the unsuccessful tenant preferred C.R.P.No. 2964 of 1991 and P.S. Mishra, J., as he then was, set aside the orders of the authorities below and remitted the entire matter to the Rent Controller. In paragraph 16 of the order, the learned Judge considered the question of additional accommodation and held thus:
I have quoted the findings of the Court of Appeal below on this question. It is not possible to give credence to the statement in the appellate judgment that the requirement of the additional space by the landlord has, however, been conceded by the tenant. The tenant disputed this claim of the landlord and contesting it even to the extent of indicating that having obtained additional accommodation in the same building, the landlord had satisfied his need. Indeed, how the accommodation has been found inadequate in possession of the landlord when his shop and the show room that existed could/can be expanded to the additional accommodation that the landlord obtained, however, had not been gone into by the Court of Appeal below or the Rent Controller. On the question of comparative hardship, it is almost no consideration at all when it is said in the appellate order that, "the landlord does require the demised premises for additional accommodation and the demised premises being situated adjacent to the present premises, it can easily be annexed and enlarged and can be converted into a single premises for running the business. Once the landlord has proved his bona fide intention for additional accommodation, the tenant cannot resist the petition." This is an erroneous view of the law. The Court of Appeal below was required to take notice of the evidence adduced on behalf of the landlord and see whether there has been any chance of undue hardship to the tenant, whereas no hardship would be caused to the landlord. This the Court of Appeal below has not done at all.
Finally, the learned Judge has concluded thus:
On the facts of the instant case, since I have come to the conclusion that the decree has not been passed in accordance with law and it is a fit case in which the case should be remitted to he original court of controller for further hearing and disposal, in accordance with law, I hereby order as follows:
(1) The judgment of the courts below are set aside;
(2) The case is remitted to the court of Rent Controller for a decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment;
(3) The controller shall dispose of the matter as quickly as possible, preferably within a period of two months;
(4) If there is any delay in the disposal of the matter, it shall however be open to the petitioner to apply to the court for restitution; in case, there is a likelihood of a delay in the disposal of the matter and the petitioner applies for restitution, the Controller shall favourably consider the application of the petitioner for restitution.
(5) There shall be however no order as to costs.
17. Now I come to the pleadings in the case.
18. It is said that one shop room is in the occupation of the landlord, and three other shop rooms situated in the building have been let out to three tenants, including the revision petitioner. Landlord has to make only an opening in the two dividing walls in order make it as one shop room, which would be sufficient for improving his business. Landlord has informed the tenant about his requirement and there was also an assurance on his part, i.e., by the tenant, that he will surrender possession of the shop room in his occupation. But he has not done so. It is an admitted fact that the landlord is a leading textile businessman in Pondicherry and he has developed his business, and the premises in his occupation at present is inadequate. He is dealing in silk sarees, cloth and textile goods. Due to stiff competition in textile business, landlord has to necessarily exhibit his goods to the customers. Landlord is unable to improve and expand his business more, for want of additional space. He is also unable to stock more goods to impress upon the customers and sell the same. He also intends to have a separate shop room for exhibition of silk sarees to his customers. Therefore, he requires the shop room in the occupation of the tenant, revision petitioner herein, as additional accommodation.
19. In the counter statement, the bona fides of the landlord are disputed. In the original statement, tenant has said thus:
...The landlord need not necessarily concentrate on the demised premises for the improvement of his business....
In the additional counter, it is said thus:
The respondent submits that the financial means of the respondent is very low and the advance amount of Rs.10,000 is still lying with the petitioner. The respondent has no way and no means to start any business anywhere at Pondicherry. The business in the demised premises is the only business run by the respondent and only for this business the respondent has come from Nilakkottai village in Madurai District. The respondent's entire family is depending upon the income from the shop in the demised premises and now the respondent is still residing at Pondicherry in order to maintain the faith on him before his creditors and debtors and with a hope to continue to run the business in the demised premises.
20. The first question that requires consideration is, whether the landlord requires the building bona fide for additional accommodation. As rightly contended by learned senior counsel for the landlord, I do not find that this Court has set aside the findings of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority with respect to the bona fides of the landlord for claiming additional accommodation. On a reading of paragraph 16 of the Order extracted above, it is clear that the only question that requires consideration is, whether the obtaining of possession of two shops would meet the requirement of the landlord. In spite of the same, I feel that it is only proper to consider as to whether the claim of the landlord is bona fide as found by the appellate authority is correct.
21. Landlord wants the entire ground floor of the premises to do his textile business. Landlord is one of the leading textile dealers is not disputed even by tenant. According to the landlord, in view of the stiff competition from various sources, it has become absolutely necessary that he should get more space for doing the business, as otherwise, he cannot thrive in the locality and his business cannot prosper. It is also not disputed by tenant that in the very same locality, there are other textile dealers and they are also having very big showrooms. Naturally, when there is competition in the business, landlord desires to expand his business and attract his customers to the maximum extent possible. That intention cannot be said to be lacking in good faith. The intention is a consequence of the competition and the same is necessary for his very existence. The approach should not be, whether the existing premises is convenient; for his requirement. The approach has to be whether the claim is bona fide. In such a case, the court will have to import something more than convenience.
22, In Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the scope of Section 13 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. There, the words used are:
Premises are reasonably and bona fidely required by the landlord for occupation." The question that came for consideration was, what is meant by the word 'reasonable'. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, their Lordship said thus: "It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". It is often said that "an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space." The author of Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.,) has quoted from Nice & Scheriber, In re.:, to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He says "the expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined." It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly something more than that. While interpreting the word "reasonable in Section 13 of the Act, the Bombay High Court has suggested in Kishinchand Murjimal v. Bai Kalavati that the word ' reasonable' cannot mean equally convenient or luxurious, though it may not necessarily exclude ideas of convenience and comfort." However, the expression reasonable can be taken as providing an angle which is comfortable or agreeable to reasons, having regard to the facts of the particular controversy.
[Italics supplied]
23. While considering the scope of additional accommodation, law requires that the landlord's requirement for additional accommodation must be bona fide.
24. While assessing the requirement, the court will have to consider whether the claim is reasonable. If that is the scope of the assessment of the word 'requirement' as was held by the Honourable Supreme Court, we cannot restrict the meaning to 'convenience' alone, and something more is required. May be, if circumstances are against him, the landlord may have to satisfy himself with the present space. He might have to make it convenient for the purpose of his business.
25. In the entire building, now two portions are occupied by the landlord. It is in between the tenant is occupying a portion. According to landlord, he wants the entire block for himself. In between the shops, there is an intervening wall. So, naturally, the landlord cannot do business so as to attract the customers from the same shop. The customers also will have to take the trouble of visiting two shop rooms and that will put the customers as well as the owner of the shop to inconvenience. To avert that inconvenience and also to attract the customers, and also to do the business more conveniently [Italics] if additional accommodation is required, such requirement can never be said to be lacking in good faith. Evidence is also such that by providing an opening in the intervening walls, the entire ground-floor could be made use as a single shop. The very purpose of the business is to give the customers satisfaction by providing them more convenience.
26. An argument was taken by learned senior counsel for the tenant that the landlord wanted the shop room in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of exhibiting silk sarees to customers. Now that his demand has been met by taking possession of two shop-rooms at the southern end and the requirement does not exist any more. At the time when eviction petition was filed, all the shop rooms were in the occupation of tenants. A reading of the entire rent control petition makes it clear that what the landlord wanted was the entire ground floor for his use. He got two showrooms vacated. Immediately thereafter a portion of it is used for exhibiting silk sarees. That only shows that bona fides of the landlord, that he has come to court with a genuine claim. In fact, the business was also expanded it has improved, is also clear from the subsequent event. It is only for this purpose, he wanted the showrooms for additional accommodation.
27. An argument was advanced by learned senior counsel for revision petitioner (tenant) that at present the landlord has said that his requirement is true, making use of the schedule showrooms for the purpose of sale of readymade garments. This, according to him, is a new case. I do not think that the said submission of learned senior counsel also could be accepted. The eviction petition was filed in the year 1989, and, after remand, landlord has examined himself in the year 1992. The sale of ready-made garments is also part of textile business. Merely because the landlord wanted to make use of a portion of his showroom for selling readymade garments, that will not show that the claim was made without any bona fides. The court can take into consideration the subsequent events. In fact, once the claim is shown to be bona fide, for what purpose the premises should be used, is a matter to be decided by the landlord, arid the tenant cannot dictate anything to the landlord regarding that. As to what is the business the landlord has proposed to do, is a matter of evidence and not a matter of pleading. Taking into consideration the long delay in disposing of the eviction petition, a tenant cannot contend that the landlord should always stand by what he has said in the pleading, unless a prejudice is caused to the tenant by the change in the nature of business. In this case, while stating that the landlord is making use of his shop-room for sale of ready made garments also, tenant has case that he is prejudiced. In fact, that is stated as a inconsistency to the stand taken by landlord. If sale of readymade garments is part of textile business, the claim is only to be upheld.
28. In P. Sriramurthy v. Vasantha Roman , which is a case under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, a subsequent event was taken into consideration even without a pleading. In that case, eviction was sought only on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. When the matter came before the Honourable Supreme Court, a counter affidavit was filed by landlord that the lease itself was only for 11 months with an intention that after the retirement of the respondent's husband, they could come back from the United States of America and settle down permanently in Madras in the demised premises. It was also said in that counter that the wife and husband sustained injuries in a car accident and due to severe back pain, particularly during winter season, they had decided to come back, and in the meanwhile, the husband retired from service. This statement in the counter-affidavit was taken as sufficient to hold that the house is required for personal occupation. Then their Lordships held thus:
When the respondent's husband retired from service, they decided to permanently come back and settle down in Madras. Thus, it is obvious that they needed their house for personal occupation. It is true that the need for personal occupation was not pleaded. It is settled law that for moulding the relief, subsequent events can be taken note of. Under those circumstance, the relief of eviction could be granted on the ground of personal occupation.
[Italics supplied]
29. Why I am relying on this decision is, even where there was no pleading, the Honourable Supreme Court has taken into consideration the reality and has taken into account subsequent even for moulding the relief. Their Lordship did not give importance to the pleadings. If relief could be granted in the absence of pleading, it goes without saying that relief could be granted in case where it is found that the claim is found to be bona fide even if the purpose is different from what was stated earlier. In this case, it is not a different purpose, but it is an allied business. Therefore, I find that the claim of the landlord is bona fide.
30. The next question is, whether taking possession of the two rooms at the southern end will satisfy the requirements of the landlord.
31. From the eviction petition, it is clear that the landlord wanted to make use of the entire ground floor for his business. Even the Rent Controller, after remand, has only said that the requirement of the landlord is substantially [Italics] satisfied. Once the requirement is found to be bona fide there cannot be any question of substantial satisfaction. If the entire ground-floor is required bona fide by landlord for his occupation and if the tenanted portions are required by him for additional accommodation and the requirement is also found to be Bona fide, then there is no scope for any riding that the landlord must satisfy himself with the existing parameters.
32. In one of the earlier decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan , in paragraph 13, their Lordships have held thus:
...The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term "need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to gel a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country....
[Italics supplied]
33. In a recent decision of the Madras High Court reported in Srinivasan v. K.S. Muthu Mudaliar & Sons , AR. Lakshmanan, J. has said that it is for the landlord to decide about the sufficiency of his requirement, and the tenant cannot dictate terms that the landlord must confine himself with the available space. Taking into consideration the evidence that has been let in this case, and also the discussion made by the appellate authority, I hold that the two rooms which were obtained possession of, by the landlord, are not sufficient for his requirement.
34. In a recent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Akkanissery Govindan Nambiar v. Kariyath Raghavan , which was a case under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the landlord wanted possession of another building which fell vacant subsequently. There is a proviso to Section 11 of that Act debarring the Rent Controller from ordering possession of the landlord had another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the rent control court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. The question that came for consideration in that case was, how to assess the suitability of another building. Eviction was denied on the ground that in the alternative building, landlord can make necessary changes and make it convenient. This finding of the High Court was not accepted. The Honourable Supreme Court stated in paragraph 5 that 'requirement of law is that the building which has been vacated should be of such a character which would meet the requirements of the landlord and not that the building which fell vacant could meet his requirements after reconstruction/renovation, etc." Their Lordships said that the alternative accommodation will not meet the requirement of the landlord and, therefore, that is a special reason for ordering eviction. Following the same principle, it must be held that getting possession of the two shop-rooms in this case will not satisfy the requirement of law, and the same will not meet the requirement of the landlord. As was found by the Rent Controller, it is not the substantial satisfaction that has to be looked into. Substantial satisfaction is not equivalent to meeting the requirement. The finding of the appellate authority that taking possession of the two rooms will not satisfy the requirement of the landlord is, therefore, confirmed.
35. One of the main arguments advanced by learned senior counsellor the revision/petitioner was that the landlord has not taken any pleading regarding relevant hardship and that itself is sufficient to dismiss the eviction petition.
36. I do not think that the said submission of the learned senior counsel could be accepted. The very same argument was available to the tenant when he came to this Court in the earlier revision petition. Regarding relative hardship, arguments were advanced before the learned Judge. If the eviction petition could be dismissed due to lack of pleadings, the learned Judge would have dismissed the petition even at that instead of remitting the matter for reconsideration. In fact one of the points enumerated for consideration after remand was, relative hardship of the parties. Both the parties and the rent control court are bound by the order of remand. What the learned judge held was that the approach by the appellate authority regarding relative hardship was not correct, and the consideration should have been as stated in the order of remand, and it was on the basis of this direction the Rent Controller was expected to decide the matter. Lack of pleadings as is now argued by learned senior counsel for revision petitioner may not be a ground for dismissal of the eviction petition. In view of the order of remand, the very contention is barred by res judicata.
37. Even otherwise, I do not think that the rent control petition could be dismissed for the reason stated by learned senior counsel for the tenant. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I have already said that even though there is no pleading by the landlord regarding relative hardship, the tenant volunteered regarding hardship, and the parties joined in issue, regarding the same. This fact was also dealt with and argued before the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority. The purpose of pleading is only to satisfy the principles of natural justice i.e., the opposite party must be made known about the case which he has to meet. If the opposite party himself is aware of what he has to plead and prove, and joins in issue with the landlord, and he has no case of any prejudice even if there is lack of pleading in the rent control petition, no rent control petition could be dismissed on the ground of this technicality.
38. In fact, I had occasion to consider a similar point in the decision reported in G.R. Raghupathy v. Dr. K. Sankar (1996)2 L.W. 494. The said decision has been followed by another Judge of this Court in the decision reported in The Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society v. Uthandi (1998)2 M.L.J. 745. Relevant passage in my judgment has been extracted by the learned Judge in para 6 of his judgment. It reads thus:
I cannot agree with the said submission of the learned Counsel for more than one reason. The contention of lack of pleadings was not raised before the authorities below, and I further find that the lack of pleadings, if any, has not prejudiced the case of the tenant, petitioner herein, in any way. The object of pleading is only to put the parties on notice, of the real matter in issue. But, if the parties are already aware of the real matter in issue and they have also joined in issue over the same, the lack of pleadings can never be treated as a ground to reject the claim. Pleadings before Rent Controller cannot be given that much of importance given to pleadings in a suit before civil court. Proceeding before a Rent Control Court is summary in nature and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not fully made applicable to the extent provided under the statute. We must further note that the rent control court is not a civil court and the Act itself is more or less a self-contained Code, so far as the relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that unless there is a pleading that the landlord or his son has no other building of their own, the statutory conditions or qualifications to file an eviction petition are not fulfilled and, therefore, the tenant is not expected to answer the same. But, unfortunately for the petitioner, I find that the tenant has anticipated the case of the landlord, and in paragraph 9 of the counter, he himself has stated that the petitioner has other buildings of his own and, therefore, he has not-satisfied the statutory conditions. So, he himself is aware of the qualifications to seek eviction, and that is why, he wanted the eviction petition to be rejected on the ground that the respondent/landlord has got other buildings of his own. When he himself is aware of the real matter in dispute, the lack of pleadings, even if any, is not prejudicial to his interest.
Finally, the learned Judge has held thus:
...I find that there is no pleading on the side of the landlord regarding the relative hardships, yet the tenant has chosen to plead in detail on that aspect. Oral evidence is available on both sides on the issues of relative hardship and both the courts below have considered it and come to the conclusion that the relative hardship is in favour of the landlord. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that want of pleadings in this case on the part of the landlord regarding the relative hardship does not affect his case and in any event no prejudice to the tenant has been caused. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner (hat the rent control petition has to be dismissed solely on that ground cannot be sustained....
39. How to assess the relative hardship? This also has come up for consideration in Bega Begum's case (1979)1 S.C.C. 273. In that case, Their Lordships followed the observations in Kelly v. Goodwin (1947)1 All.E.R. 810, and K. Parasubramaiah v. Pokuri Lakshmamma A.LR. 1965 A.P. 220 and have extracted them also. In Kelly v. Goodwin (1947)1 All E.R. 810, it was observed thus:
The next matter one has to consider is whether there was evidence on which the country court judge could come to the conclusion that there would be greater hardship in making the order than not making the order. He has taken into account, in relation to that question, first, the position*of the landlord, and, secondly, the position of the tenant. He has taken into account the financial means of the tenant. It is argued before us that he was wrong in doing that. In my view, he was quite entitled, in considering hardship, to have regard to the financial means of the tenant in considering whether he would obtain other accommodation because, by reason of his means, he was in a position, not merely to rent, but to buy a horse. It seems to me also that, on this question of hardship, the judge was entitled to take into account the fact that the tenant had taken no real steps to try and find other accommodation or no real steps to buy a house.
[Italics supplied] In Parasuramaiah's case, A.LR. 1965 A.P. 220, the observation was as follows:
Thus the hardship of the tenant was first to be found out in case of eviction is to be directed. That hardship then has to be placed against the relative advantages which the landlord would stand to gain if an order of eviction is passed.... What is however required is a careful consideration of all the relevant factors in weighing the relative hardship which is likely to be caused to the tenant with the likely advantage of the landlord on the basis of the available material on record.... The proviso however should not be read as if it confers a practical immunity on the tenant from being evicted. That would destroy the very purpose of Section 10(3)(c). Likewise, the requirement of the landlord is accordance with that provision alone cannot be given absolute value, because that would mean to under estimate the value of the proviso to that section. Keeping in view therefore the purpose of the provision and the necessity of balancing the various factors each individual case has to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case.
[Italics supplied]
40. In this case, even according to the additional counter-affidavit, what is the hardship that is caused to the tenant? Relevant portion of the additional counter affidavit reads thus:
The respondent submits that the financial means of the respondent is very low and the advance amount of Rs. 10,000 is still lying with the petitioner. The respondent has no way and no means to start any business anywhere at Pondicherry. The business in the demised premises is the only business run by the respondent and only for this business the respondent has come from Nilakkottai village in Madurai District. The respondent's entire family is depending upon the income from the shop in the demised premises and now the respondent is still residing at Pondicherry in order to maintain the faith on him before his creditors and debtors and with a hope to continue to run the business in the demised premises.
Tenant has no case that he cannot get an alternative building. He only says that he has to depend upon the demised building for eking out his livelihood. Landlord does not want him to close down the business. Tenant cannot insist that he will do business only in the demised building or in that locality. In Bega Begum's case, (1979)1 S.C.C. 273, their Lordships have considered a similar question. There, it was argued that if the tenants were evicted, they will be thrown out on the road, and that the hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. Their Lordships refused to accept this contention, and held thus:
...If the defendants had proved that they will not be able to get any accommodation anywhere in the city where they could set up a hotel, this might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants "only shown that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated. There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that even in other business localities there is no possibility of the defendants getting a house To insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible. The defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for 10 years but had overstayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get similar accommodation in the very same locality.
[Italics supplied] Apart from the above statement in the counter, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the tenant made any enquiry about the availability any alternative accommodation in the nearby locality. Mere week financial position of the tenant and merely because he was carrying on business in the demised premises, it cannot be said that the tenant will be put to hardship if he is evicted. At the same time, if the landlord is directed to do business in two portions of the same building, he will be put to great hardship. Any business in a building will have to be conducted in a compact space as a single unit, taking into consideration the nature of business where more space is required. If the schedule premises is also taken possession, that will satisfy the requirement of the landlord. At the same time, if he is not allowed to get possession of the same, he will be put to greater hardship. In fact, the appellate authority has considered taking into consideration his evidence, that the tenant is not doing any business at all. Even though tenant claimed to be a dealer in consumer durables, when evidence was let in, he miserabry failed to show that he was an authorised dealer. From the various reasons given by the appellate authority and after perusing the evidence that was let in by the parties, I do not think that the appellate authority exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering eviction. As I said earlier, taking into consideration the limited jurisdiction of this Court while exercising the powers under Section 25 of the Rent Control Act, I do not think that any ground has been made out for interference under Section 25 of the Act. The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. Connected C.M.P, for stay is also dismissed.