Orissa High Court
State Of Odisha vs Radha Krisna Dash on 20 November, 2025
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
W.A. No.693 of 2025
In the matter of an Appeal under Article 4 of
the Odisha High Court Order, 1948
read with
Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting
the High Court of Judicature at Patna
and
Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII
of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948
***
1. State of Odisha Represented through The Principal Secretary to Government Housing and Urban Development Department 3rd Floor, Kharavel Bhawan Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha.
2. Director, Municipal Administration And Ex-Officio Additional Secretary to Government Housing and Urban Development Department Bhubaneswar District: Khordha ... Appellants (Opposite party Nos.1 and 2 in writ petition)
-VERSUS-
1. Radha Krisna Dash Aged about 60 years Son of Nityananda Dash WA No.693 of 2025 Page 1 of 96 At: Kaibalya Vihar PO: Nuabazar District: Cuttack;
Junior Assistant Cuttack Municipal Corporation At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack. ... Respondent.
(Petitioner in writ petition)
2. Commissioner Cuttack Municipal Corporation At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack.
3. Mayor, Cuttack Municipal Corporation1 At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack.
4. Dwarikanath Nayak now working as Senior Assistant under Cuttack Municipal Corporation At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack.
5. Dhirendra Kumar Lenka Junior Assistant (Retd.) Cuttack Municipal Corporation At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack.
1 The appellants made "Mayor, Cuttack Municipal Corporation" as party to the writ appeal, though the learned Single Judge vide Order dated 04.02.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No.16335 of 2018 following order:
"*** Dr. J.K. Lenka, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has no grievance against opposite party No.4 and therefore, he wants to delete the name of opposite party No.4 from the cause list. In view of the above, opposite party No.4 be deleted from the cause list and opposite party No.5 to 8 be treated as opposite party Nos.4 to 7."WA No.693 of 2025 Page 2 of 96
6. Udayabhanu Mishra Senior Assistant (Retd.) Cuttack Municipal Corporation At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack.
7. Rashmi Ranjan Singh Senior Assistant (Retd.) Cuttack Municipal Corporation At/P.O.: Choudhury Bazar District: Cuttack. ... Pro forma Respondents.
(Opposite party Nos.3 to 7 in writ petition) Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Appellants : Mr. Saswat Das,
Additional Government Advocate
For the Respondent Dr. Jitendra Kumar Lenka,
No.1 : Pratap Kumar Behera,
Dr. Satyapriya Dash,
Advocates
For the other Respondents: None
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. HARISH TANDON
AND
HONOURABLE JUSTICE
MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of Hearing : 15.10.2025 :: Date of Judgment :20.11.2025 J UDGMENT WA No.693 of 2025 Page 3 of 96 MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.--
The mighty State-Municipal Administration has preferred this appeal questioning propriety of the decision taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide Judgment dated 29.10.2024 delivered in W.P.(C) No.16335 of 2018 apparently in order to thwart extension of pensionary benefits to the respondent, who worked in the Cuttack Municipal Corporation since 1990 on daily wage basis till his absorption in service with effect from 14.08.2015 instead of initial date of engagement, i.e., 01.11.1990, ignoring to acknowledge his yeomen service rendered to the Organisation for more than 25 years.
1.1. This intra-Court appeal is directed against the Judgement dated 29.10.2024 rendered by a learned Single Bench in an application, bearing W.P.(C) No.16335 of 2018, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with the following prayer(s):
"Under these circumstances, the Appellants most humbly pray that this Hon‟ble Court be graciously pleased to Admit this Appeal, call for the records and after hearing the parties, be pleased to set-aside the impugned judgment dated 29.10.2024 passed by the Hon‟ble Single Judge in WP(C) No.16335 of 2018 under Annexure-2 in the interest of justice;WA No.693 of 2025 Page 4 of 96
And further be pleased to pass such other order/orders as the Hon‟ble Court deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case;
And for this act of kindness the Appellants shall as in duty bound ever pray."
Facts culled out from the record:
2. Having joined in the post of Junior Assistant on 01.11.1990 on daily wage basis under the Cuttack Municipality (presently, Cuttack Municipal Corporation), he was allowed to work till 31.03.1992 along with others by virtue of Office Order dated 04.03.1992 issued pursuant to Council Resolution dated 15.02.1992. By issue of Office Order dated 30.03.1996 he was allowed enhanced allowance in pursuance of the Agreement made by the Management with Cuttack Mehentar Sangh and Cuttack Municipal Corporation.
2.1. The Director, Municipal Administration vide Letter dated 29.10.1996 instructed Executive Officer of all Urban Local Bodies to sponsor applications of such Junior Assistants who were irregularly appointed by the Council between 10.09.1982 to 30.06.1992. Since name of the respondent did not find place in the list furnished, nevertheless the case of his junior (NMR) was considered vide Letter dated 22.04.1998, he made application addressed to the Director, Municipal Administration and WA No.693 of 2025 Page 5 of 96 Executive Officer of the Corporation. Selection test being conducted, 148 in-service candidates, engaged between 15.09.1982 and 30.06.1992, have been selected and were allowed to draw regular scale of pay. They were shown in the seniority list from the date of their initial engagement vide Order No.LFS (SB) 4/95 (Pt.)-- 16998/HUD, dated 17.05.1999.
2.2. It is asserted that though the respondent Nos.4 and 7 (Dwarikanath Nayak and Rashmi Ranjan Singh) did not face test held on 28.09.1997, their services have been regularised with seniority. Subsequently, 18 other similarly situated employees joined later to the respondent have been regularised. Though certain juniors have been regularised in service, the case of the petitioner has not been considered.
2.3. Since no heed to his grievance was paid by the authority concerned, the respondent filed writ petition, O.J.C. No.8928 of 1999, which was disposed of by an Order dated 27.01.2009 with a direction to the authorities to consider the representation. The said representation came to be rejected by the authority on the plea that "The Cuttack Municipal Corporation did not sponsor the name of the petitioner to this Department [Housing and Urban Development Department]. Therefore, this Department has no scope at this stage to regularise the WA No.693 of 2025 Page 6 of 96 services of the petitioners as requested in their representation". Aggrieved thereby, a writ petition, W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009, being filed, this Court observed vide Order dated 06.07.2015 as follows:
"Considering the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and on perusing the material available on record, it appears that the name of the petitioner has been duly recommended to the State Government for regular absorption vide Annexures-8 and 11 as he was rendering service during the period from 10.09.1982 to 30.09.1992. Without considering such documents, the impugned order has been passed in Annexure-13 by stating the reason that the Cuttack Municipal Corporation has not recommended the case of the petitioner, which is an outcome of non- application of mind by the State authorities. At the same time, similar question came up for consideration before this Court referred to supra wherein this Court directed to regularise the services of the petitioner at par with his juniors. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 14.09.2009 vide Annexure-13 is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the authority to reconsider the case of the petitioner on the basis of the recommendation made vide Annexure-8 and 11 in the light of the judgments referred to supra2. "
2.4. Though counterparts and juniors were considered to be regularised in service with the date of initial engagement 2 Ashok Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of Odisha, 2013 (II) OLR 451; Gajendra Prasad Behera, W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, disposed of on 27.03.2014; Kailash Chandra Maharana Vrs. State Odisha, W.P.(C) No.20298 of 2013, disposed of on 08.05.2015.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 7 of 96and placed in the seniority list, the petitioner was absorbed in the regular post of Junior Assistant under the Local Fund Cadre by Office Order No.20632-HUD- LFS-HR-10/2014/HUD, dated 14.08.2015 of the Housing and Urban Development Department, on the recommendation of the Selection Board constituted under Rule 7 of the Odisha Local Fund Service Rules, 1975. Accordingly Office Order dated 25.08.2015 was issued by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation indicating that the petitioner is "absorbed in regular post of Junior Assistant under Local Fund Service Cadre in the scale of pay Rs.5,200/- - Rs.20,200/- with Grade Pay Rs.1,900/- with effect from 14.08.2015". Protesting the effective date so assigned for reckoning regularisation in service, representation dated 09.06.2017 was submitted before the Director, Municipal Administration, citing that non- sponsoring of the name of the petitioner gave rise to move writ petition(s) and the Order dated 06.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 though clearly reflected that the refusal of the Government to regularise the service of the respondent in the similar manner by which his juniors and couterparts were absorbed in service gave rise to direction to reconsider the case of petitioner, the same has not been followed while fixing the effective date for absorption and placing the respondent at appropriate stage in the seniority list.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 8 of 962.5. After much persuasion and submitting further representations, the Cuttack Municipal Corporation in its Meeting dated 14.11.2017 passed resolution in favour of the respondent, wherein it was decided that the respondent, working since 01.11.1990 efficiently, being engaged between 10.09.1982 and 30.06.1992, his service was required to be regularised inasmuch as other employees who joined after the petitioner have been regularised by virtue of Housing and Urban Development Department communication vide Letter dated 17.05.1999. Therefore, the period spent by the respondent is to be computed for the purpose of pension. Accordingly, a suggestion has been made to the Housing and Urban Development Department vide communication dated 07.02.2018 by stating thus:
"As regards the claim of Sri Dash for regularisation of his service from the date of his initial entry, i.e., 01.11.1990 and his nature of duties being clerical as ascertained from the source of official records, the case of Shri Dash may be considered on the same standing as his junior counterparts namely Dhirendra Kumar Lenka and other Udayabhanu Mishra (both Junior Assistants) have been allowed by the Government to get their services regularised from their initial entry with pensionary benefits as recruitees to the post during 15.09.1982 to 30.06.1992 period as per Government in Housing and Urban Development Department Order No.LFS 16998/HUD dated 17.05.1999 (Serial Nos.136 and 137) and accordingly the seniority of Sri WA No.693 of 2025 Page 9 of 96 Dash may be counted above the place of his junior counterpart Sri Lenka and Sri Mishra as per facts above."
2.6. Such suggestion/recommendation has been turned down by the Director, Municipal Administration vide Order No.12164-HUD-LFS-OP-33/17/HUD, dated 17.05.2018 by citing reason that "his name has not been sponsored by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation, Cuttack at that time".
2.7. Questioning propriety and legality of said Order dated 17.05.2018 of Director, Municipal Administration, the petitioner has filed the writ petition, with the following prayer(s):
"In the circumstances, the petitioner, therefore, most humbly prays that your Lordship‟s would be graciously pleased to admit the writ application and to issue rule NISI calling to the opposite parties to show cause as to:
a) Why the order dated 17.05.2018 passed by the Opp.
Party No.2 atAnnexure-21 will not be declared illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory and quash the said order dated 17.05.2018.
b) Why the Opp. Party Nos.1 to 3 should not be directed to regularize the service of the petitioner against the post of Junior Assistant from the date 17.05.1999, the date on which junior persons (opposite party Nos.5 to 8) and others have been regularized with seniority and all financial benefits as due and admissible be extended to the petitioner WA No.693 of 2025 Page 10 of 96 by modifying the regularization order dated 14.08.2015 at Annexure-15.
c) Declare that the petitioner is entitled to get pension as per old Orissa Local Fund service (Pension) Rules, 1980 by counting the said NMR/DLR service into consideration and GPF deduction as has been made applicable to CMC employees and extended to private opposite parties junior to the petitioner be extended to the petitioner.
And if the opposite parties fail to show cause or sufficient cause the rule be made absolute;
And issue any other appropriate order / direction which would afford complete relief to the petitioner;
And for this act of kindness, the petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray."
The present writ appeal:
3. Upon appreciation of evidence available on record and having regard to Secretary, State of Karanataka Vrs.
Umadevi, AIR 2006 SC 1806 = (2006) 4 SCC 1; Om Prakash Banerjee Vrs. State of West Bengal, (2023) 20 SCC 93, the learned Single Judge held as follows:
"9. It is essential to examine the present case through the lens of fairness and justice. The petitioner‟s regularization has been repeatedly delayed due to circumstances entirely beyond his control, making it inequitable for the State to turn a blind eye to his legitimate hardship. It would be unjust for the State WA No.693 of 2025 Page 11 of 96 to disregard his enduring plight, particularly given the inordinate delays that contributed to his prolonged uncertainty and hindered his rightful progression.
10. In consideration of the aforementioned circumstances, this Writ Petition is hereby allowed. The appropriate authorities are directed to effectuate the retrospective regularization of the petitioner‟s service from 1999 and to disburse all consequential benefits to which the petitioner is entitled within a period of three months from the date of this order."
3.1. Assailing such direction of the learned Single Judge, the appellants have filed the instant intra-Court appeal.
Hearing:
4. The writ appeal at the behest of the State Government has been filed with a delay of 113 days and in consideration of interlocutory application for condonation of delay in filing appeal, upon hearing counsel for respective parties, this Court condoned the delay by Order dated 15.10.2025.
4.1. On consent of the counsel for the parties, the writ appeal was taken up for final hearing. Upon hearing arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellants as well as the respondent on 15.10.2025, the matter stood reserved for preparation and pronouncement of Judgment/Order.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 12 of 964.2. Heard Sri Saswat Das, learned Additional Government Advocate for the appellants and Dr. Jitendra Kumar Lenka, Advocate for the respondent.
Rival contentions and submissions:
5. Sri Saswat Das, learned Additional Government Advocate reiterating the reason ascribed to by the Director, Municipal Administration, in his Order dated 17.05.2018 (Annexure-21 to the writ petition) urged that the learned Single Judge committed gross error in appreciating facts emanating from the evidence on record. Driving the attention of this Court to the legal approach in the cases of Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Nanu Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 494 = (2006) Supp.9 SCR 544 and Chaman Lal Vrs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCR 311 submitted that even if sufficient numbers of vacancies of posts are available in granting regularisation, negative equality cannot be claimed stemming on Article 14 and a wrong benefit granted cannot be a ground for extending similar benefit within the sweep of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
5.1. It is vociferously argued that number of factors enumerated, as illustrated, in Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Chiggan Lal, (2022) 19 SCC 662 would have to WA No.693 of 2025 Page 13 of 96 be considered for absorption and it is the prerogative of the employer to fix the date of regularisation in service. Essentially, the learned Additional Government Advocate would submit that no parity can be claimed based on regularisation made in respect of similarly circumstanced employees in the earlier years.
5.2. It is emphasised by the learned Additional Government Advocate that allowing regularisation with retrospective effect, i.e., from the date of initial engagement of the respondent as NMR/DLR would open floodgate for others to claim for similar benefit as a matter of right. Since the regularisation in service has been considered by duly constituted Selection Board under Section 7 of the Odisha Local Fund Service Rules, 1975, in pursuance of whose decision Office Order has been issued by the Housing and Urban Development Department on 14.08.2015, no irregularity or infirmity could be imputed by the respondent in issuing Office Order dated 25.08.2015 absorbing him with effect from 14.08.2015. It is the domain of the employer to decide the date from which an employee is to be regularised/ absorbed in service. Amplifying further, Sri Saswat Das, learned Additional Government Advocate emphatically submitted that the name of the respondent being not sponsored by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation as a WA No.693 of 2025 Page 14 of 96 result of which the respondent did not appear before the Selection Board in the year 1997, at this belated stage, no retrospective effect can justifiably be given by ante- dating the date of regularisation in service.
6. Dr. Jitendra Kumar Lenka, learned Advocate referring to Order dated 06.07.2015 in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 advanced valiant arguments to counter the contentions of the appellants and submitted that the writ appeal is devoid of merit inasmuch as the facts set forth in said order of this Court could not be construed as out of context in order to deny the legitimate claim of the respondent. So long as the observation contained in said order is not varied or interfered with by the appropriate competent Court, the ground to reject the claim of the petitioner is liable to be disgorged.
6.1. While disposing of aforesaid writ petition filed at the behest of the respondent, no objection has been raised by the counsel for the appellants for parity of treatment as extended to Gajendra Prasad Behera by virtue of Judgment dated 27.03.2014 in W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005. There could not be any objection by the appellants that juniors who joined later to the respondent have been absorbed from the date of initial engagement.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 15 of 966.2. Learned Advocate for the respondent would submit that only to obviate payment of pension, novel contrivance is adopted by the appellants though counterparts are regularised in their services with effect from the date of initial engagement. There is no reason whatsoever assigned to discriminate the respondent to be accorded with similar benefit. The legitimate expectation of the respondent could not be knuckled on mere flimsy ground that there was no sponsorship by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation to the Selection Board in the year 1997.
6.3. It is submitted that the Cuttack Municipal Corporation tacitly admitted to have committed error in not sponsoring the name of the respondent at the relevant point of time, but later on passed resolution on 14.11.2017 and communicated the decision taken therein to the effect that the petitioner is entitled to be regularised from the date of initial engagement, for he was engaged during 15.09.1982 to 30.06.1992.
6.4. Dr. Jitendra Kumar Lenka, learned Advocate vehemently contended that services of the employees (NMR/DLR) who joined later to the respondent have been regularised with effect from their initial engagement and given seniority as also promotion. As the respondent has been agitating the issue of regularisation in service by way of WA No.693 of 2025 Page 16 of 96 filing writ petitions, and the delay caused in consideration of regularisation by the authorities concerned could not deter them from allowing date of absorption in service with effect from initial date of engagement.
Decisions of Courts on the point of regualarisation and extension of benefit stemming on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India:
7. Before addressing the issue whether the respondent, engaged on daily wage basis in the year 1990, is entitled to be regularised in service from the initial date of his engagement, thereby no infirmity could be imputed to the Judgment of the learned Single Judge, the legal perspective as enunciated by different Courts on the subject deserves discussion.
7.1. Reference can be had to Union of India Vrs. Subhankari Das, 2023 (III) ILR-CUT 979, wherein it has been stated that, "5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, it is admitted that the opposite parties are discharging their duties and responsibilities from the date of their initial appointment in the year 1995 and 2002. In the year 2017, their designations were changed without any change of remuneration. Without regularising their services, the authorities issued a circular on 15.02.2018, WA No.693 of 2025 Page 17 of 96 which is absolutely a camouflaged way of approach to the difficulties of the opposite parties to deprive them of the benefit of their regularisation after utilising their services from 1995 and 2002, i.e., for more than 23 years and 16 years by then.
6. The reliance was placed by the present petitioners before the Tribunal on the cases of State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Government of Tamil Nadu Vrs. Tamil Nadu Makkal Nala Paniyalargal, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 393 and Vibhuti Shankar Pandey Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 91 and submission was made that there was no sanctioned post available for engagement of the opposite parties and that the process of engagement of the opposite parties was not in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the opposite parties have no right for regularisation.
7. The above stand of the petitioners cannot have any application to the case of the present opposite parties, as because, in a case of similarly situated persons, i.e., Basanta Kumar Sahoo Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No.24759 of 2012, disposed of on 31.07.2017, relying on the decisions rendered in Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 and State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Keshari, 2010 (II) OLR (SC) 932 = (2010) 9 SCC 247, direction was issued for regularisation of such employees. Similarly, in the case of Manoj Kumar Jena Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 24758 of 2012, disposed of 31.07.2017, this Court also took the similar view as was taken in the case of Basanta Kumar Sahoo (supra). The order passed in WA No.693 of 2025 Page 18 of 96 the case of Manoj Kumar Jena (supra) was assailed by the authorities before the Apex Court in S.L.P. No.35963 of 2017, which was dismissed vide order dated 05.01.2018. Thereby, the order passed by this Court in Manoj Kumar Jena (supra) got affirmed in the apex Court. Here, it is worth mentioning that in both the cases indicted above, i.e. in the case of Basanta Kumar Sahoo and Manoj Kumar Jena (supra), the orders have been passed by one of us (Dr. B.R. Sarangi, ACJ). The said order having been affirmed by the apex Court, as a consequence thereof, the same has been implemented. The decision of Basanta Kumar Sahoo (supra) was referred to by the High Court of Delhi in the case of Amrish Kumar Vrs. Indian Institute of Mass Communication, W.P.(C) No.5906 of 2018 & CM Appl No.23016 of 2018, disposed of on 14.02.2020 [2020 SCC OnLine Del 1915].
8. In Amrish Kumar (supra), the High Court of Delhi observed as follows:
„In the present case too, the workmen admittedly have been working for 23 years. It clearly tantamount to unfair labour practice by denying them the benefits of regular services for 23 years. The objective of the Act is to prevent unfair labour practice which is defined in detail in 5th Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with reference to Section 2A. The specific definition applicable to the present case is clause 10 which reads as under:
„10. To employ workmen as "badlis", casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for WA No.693 of 2025 Page 19 of 96 years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.‟ The facts of the instant case as discussed hereinabove clearly shows that keeping the workmen in uninterrupted service for 23 years as casual workmen and denying them the status and privilege of permanent workmen, constitutes unfair labour practice which is illegal and needs to be quashed. Furthermore, similarly situated workmen of the respondent who worked in its other administrative unit in Orissa (Dhenkanal), for roughly half a century on ad hoc basis, have been directed by the Orissa High Court in Basanta Kumar Sahoo Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No.24759 of 2012, decided on 31.07.2017 to be regularized. The said judgment has referred to and relied upon Umadevi (supra) and State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari (2010) 9 SCC 247. The SLP against the said judgment of the Orissa High Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 05.01.2018; therefore, it has attained finality. The case of the present petitioners is identical. That being the position i.e. they had worked for almost 23 years; the employer was same; they had been working against the sanctioned posts; they were not considered as regular employees, therefore, the treatment meted out to them constitutes unfair labour practice. In the circumstances, their services too shall be regularized from initial date of joining, with all consequential benefits.
9. It is pertinent to mention here that the decision rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Amrish WA No.693 of 2025 Page 20 of 96 Kumar (supra) was challenged before the apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 710 of 2021, which was dismissed vide order dated 10.12.2021 and, as a consequence thereof, the same has also been implemented. Therefore, the Central Administrative Tribunal, relying on the said judgment, having passed the order impugned, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. As such, the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 13.07.2023 in O.A. No. 260/00/163 of 2018 is hereby confirmed and the petitioners are directed to regularise the service of the opposite parties from initial date of their joining with all consequential benefits within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the order."
7.2. In view of State of Jammu and Kashmir Vrs. District Bar Association, Bandipora, MANU/SC/1566/2016 = (2017) 3 SCC 410; and Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra Vrs. State of Odisha, (2014) 4 SCC 583 = AIR 2014 SC 1716 wherein it has been clearly laid down that in order to ascertain whether an appointment is irregular or illegal, the Court would have to enquire as to whether the appointment process adopted was tainted by vice of non- adherence to an essential prerequisite or is liable to be faulted on account of the lack of a fair process of recruitment. It has already been noticed in Umadevi‟s case, (2006) 4 SCC 1, which was further explained in State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247, WA No.693 of 2025 Page 21 of 96 that the "regularisation" in service can be permissible if the following conditions are fulfilled:
i. The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any Court or Tribunal.
ii. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years.
7.3. The view of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India echoed in the case of Jaggo Vrs. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826=(2024) 12 SCR 1235, may be relevant for appreciating the present matter:
"20. It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long years of service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State or its instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries and illegal appointments that circumvent constitutional requirements. However, where appointments were not illegal but possibly "irregular," and where employees had served continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need for a fair and humane resolution becomes paramount.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 22 of 96
Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service performing tasks inherently required on a regular basis can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario demanding fair regularization. In a recent judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2024) 1 SCR 1230, it was held that held that procedural formalities cannot be used to deny regularization of service to an employee whose appointment was termed "temporary"
but has performed the same duties as performed by the regular employee over a considerable period in the capacity of the regular employee. The relevant paras of this judgment have been reproduced below:
„6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) by the High Court does not fit squarely with the facts at hand, given the specific circumstances under which the appellants were employed and have continued their service. The reliance on procedural formalities at the outset cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive rights that have accrued over a considerable period through continuous service. Their promotion was based on a specific notification for vacancies and a subsequent circular, followed by a selection process involving written tests and interviews, which distinguishes their case from the appointments through back door entry as discussed in the case of Uma Devi (supra).WA No.693 of 2025 Page 23 of 96
7. The judgment in the case Uma Devi (supra) also distinguished between "irregular" and "illegal" appointments underscoring the importance of considering certain appointments even if were not made strictly in accordance with the prescribed Rules and Procedure, cannot be said to have been made illegally if they had followed the procedures of regular appointments such as conduct of written examinations or interviews as in the present case. ***‟
21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the initial label of the appellants‟ engagements and the outsourcing decision taken after their dismissal. Courts must look beyond the surface labels and consider the realities of employment: continuous, long-term service, indispensable duties, and absence of any mala fide or illegalities in their appointments. In that light, refusing regularization simply because their original terms did not explicitly state so, or because an outsourcing policy was belatedly introduced, would be contrary to principles of fairness and equity.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 24 of 96Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations.
23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which India is a founding member, has consistently advocated for employment stability and the fair treatment of workers. The ILO‟s Multinational Enterprises Declaration [International Labour Organization-- Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy] encourages companies to provide stable employment and to observe obligations concerning employment stability and social security. It emphasizes that enterprises should assume a leading role in promoting employment security, particularly in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate long-term unemployment.
24. The landmark judgment of the United State in the case of Vizcaino Vrs. Microsoft Corporation, 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) serves as a pertinent example from the private sector, illustrating the consequences of misclassifying employees to circumvent providing benefits. In this case, WA No.693 of 2025 Page 25 of 96 Microsoft classified certain workers as independent contractors, thereby denying them employee benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact, common-law employees and were entitled to the same benefits as regular employees. The Court noted that large Corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees or independent contractors as a means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing their profits. This judgment underscores the principle that the nature of the work performed, rather than the label assigned to the worker, should determine employment status and the corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights the judiciary's role in rectifying such misclassifications and ensuring that workers receive fair treatment.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:
Misuse of "Temporary" Labels:
Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labeled as "temporary" or "contractual," even when their roles mirror those of WA No.693 of 2025 Page 26 of 96 regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.
Arbitrary Termination:
Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.
Lack of Career Progression:
Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.
Using Outsourcing as a Shield:
Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.
Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when WA No.693 of 2025 Page 27 of 96 their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long- serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between "illegal" and "irregular" appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is appropriate. This selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing it against employees who have rendered indispensable services over decades.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 28 of 9627. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for Government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods, especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning, not only contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair employment practices, Government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country."
7.4. In the case of Shripal Vrs. Nagar Nigam, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221=(2025) 1 SCR 1427 referring to observations rendered in Jaggo (supra), it has clarified as follows:
"16. The High Court did acknowledge the Employer‟s inability to justify these abrupt terminations. Consequently, it ordered re-engagement on daily wages with some measure of parity in minimum pay. Regrettably, this only perpetuated precariousness: the Appellant Workmen were left in a marginally improved yet still uncertain status. While the High Court recognized the importance of their work and hinted WA No.693 of 2025 Page 29 of 96 at eventual regularization, it failed to afford them continuity of service or meaningful back wages commensurate with the degree of statutory violation evident on record.
17. In light of these considerations, the Employer‟s discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen stands in violation of the most basic labour law principles. Once it is established that their services were terminated without adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that they were engaged in essential, perennial duties, these workers cannot be relegated to perpetual uncertainty. While concerns of municipal budget and compliance with recruitment rules merit consideration, such concerns do not absolve the Employer of statutory obligations or negate equitable entitlements. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the legitimate rights of workmen who have served continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended period.
18. The impugned order of the High Court, to the extent they confine the Appellant Workmen to future daily-wage engagement without continuity or meaningful back wages, is hereby set aside with the following directions:
I. The discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen‟s services, effected without compliance with Section 6E and Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is declared illegal. All orders or communications terminating their services WA No.693 of 2025 Page 30 of 96 are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant Workmen shall be treated as continuing in service from the date of their termination, for all purposes, including seniority and continuity in service.
II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the Appellant Workmen in their respective posts (or posts akin to the duties they previously performed) within four weeks from the date of this judgment. Their entire period of absence (from the date of termination until actual reinstatement) shall be counted for continuity of service and all consequential benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for promotions, if any.
III. Considering the length of service, the Appellant Workmen shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages from the date of their discontinuation until their actual reinstatement. The Respondent Employer shall clear the aforesaid dues within three months from the date of their reinstatement.
IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never WA No.693 of 2025 Page 31 of 96 applied to the Appellant Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure these long time employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable norms."
7.5. While considering issue relating to perennial nature of work vis-a-vis regularisation in service after long period of exploitation, in a batch of writ appeals being Odisha Water Supply and Sewarage Board Vrs. Bijay Kumar Samal, W.A. No.857 of 2024, etc., etc., vide Judgment dated 30.07.2025 it has been held by this Court as follows:
"All these Intra-Court appeals are by the Orissa Water Supply and Sewerage Board. They seek to call in question the subject orders rendered by learned Single Judges of this Court in the individual writ petitions. All these orders in substance direct the Appellant Board to absorb/regularize the services of Respondent-employees and that if need be and to facilitate the same, posts be created/sanctioned by the Government since they have been in continuous & spotless service for more than two decades, the perennial nature of work specifically being admitted by the Appellant-Board.
*** WA No.693 of 2025 Page 32 of 96 6.1. Appellant-Board is constituted under the provisions of the Orissa Water Supply & Sewerage Board Act, 1991; the Board discharges public functions with service rendered by Respondent-employees since a quarter century or so, is not in dispute. It is obvious that the work in question is perennial in nature and that these poor employees have been accomplishing the same with no complaint whatsoever. It is also not in dispute that the Board, being the employer in terms of Section 9 of the Act, has engaged the services of these respondents, there being no regular recruits, despite its recommendation to the State Government on several occasions. This being the position, the Appellant-Board, being an instrumentality of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, has to conduct itself as a Model Employer, vide Bhupendra Nath Hazarika Vrs. State of Assam, AIR 2013 SC 234. It hardly needs to be stated that there is Preambular Socialistic Pattern prescribed by the Constitution itself and therefore such an instrumentality cannot take up a stand that runs contrary to the same, apart from being bereft of elements of justice & fair play. After all, a Statutory Body like the Appellant- Board cannot run its ordained functions as East India Company of bygone era.
*** 6.3. Illegality is one thing and irregularity is another, even if arguably they are not polls asunder. At times, the difference between these two, sages of law like Fedric Pollock say, more often than not, is in degrees and not in kind. In a constitutionally WA No.693 of 2025 Page 33 of 96 ordained Welfare State its instrumentality like the Board cannot be permitted to contend that although it made the appointments in question, the same are marred by illegality, especially when they are not, for the reasons already discussed above. Here are employees who have been shading their sweat, if not blood, to the soil in the discharge of their functions for more than twenty five years. Firstly, a perpetrator of illegality, if at all these appointments are of the kind, cannot be permitted to take the advantage of its own illegal act. Secondly, whatever arguable illegality at the entry level of employment would diminish year by year and become nil at least after a quarter century, as a concession to the shortness of human life. One cannot dig the grave profitably, the dead having gone with the winds long ago once for all. Therefore, the entry of these respondents is at the most can be termed as irregular and therefore Umadevi cannot be chanted like mantra to defeat their legitimate expectation, if not right.
*** 6.7. We notice that the Appellant-Board in the subject Resolutions dated 23.12.2013, 03.01.2014, etc. has specifically stated the circumstances warranting creation and sanctioning of posts explicit recommending to regularize the services of all employees of the kind. It is admitted by the learned panel counsel before us that quite a few employees having secured orders of regularization in WP(C) WA No.693 of 2025 Page 34 of 96 Nos.3921, 3922, 3924 of 2006, WP(C) No. 10046 of 2008 & WP(C) No. 3395 of 2020, the Board had laid challenge in Writ Appeals that came to be negatived and further that even the SLPs filed before the Apex Court met the same fate. If one set of employees are granted regularization, another set similarly circumstanced cannot be unfavourably discriminated vide Apex Court decision in Raman Kumar & Ors. Vrs. UOI, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 520. This decision specifically refers to Umadevi supra. Again we need not say that an Article 12 entity cannot practise "pick & choose", when it comes to employing the work force. What applies to goose, applies to gander, subject to all just exceptions into which argued case of the appellants does not fit."
7.6. It is apt to refer to the anxious consideration shown by the Madras High Court in N. Karunanidhi Vrs. Union of India, W.P. No. 12887 of 2016, vide Judgment dated 22.04.2022 rendered with respect to exploitation of service. The following benevolent observation has been made by said Court in favour of the employees, whose services have been utilized by the Government for a substantial length of time:
"18. If the Courts cannot give direction for their regularisation of service, in the constrained legal scenario what other remedies that are available to these unfortunate employees, who have been engaged in service for public purpose, without having any definite future to hold on? These WA No.693 of 2025 Page 35 of 96 petitioners cannot be kept on the tenterhooks of their employment for years together, by brushing aside and discarding their concerned yearning for a definite future, with unresponsive indifference.
19. A welfare State grounded on constitutional values, cannot come up with apathetic and callous stand that despite continued employment of these petitioners for years together, no semblance of right is available to them. Such stand by the State is opposed to constitutional values as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Courts of course have held that equal opportunity must be provided in public employment and entry through back door should be discountenanced. When Article 21, being violated by the State, action towards its servants, the consideration of the Government must primarily be focussed on alleviating legitimate grievances of its employees. Even assuming that the recruitment of these writ petitioners had not been fully in consonance with the procedure for appointment in Government services, the fact remained that these persons have been consciously appointed by the Government for implementing public projects and the work has been extracted from them continuously for several years. It is therefore, not open to the Government after a period of time to turn around and contend that these writ petitioners have no right at all to seek any kind of guarantee for their future.
20. In the opinion of this Court, continued employment for several years, even on a WA No.693 of 2025 Page 36 of 96 projects meant to serve the State as a whole, certain rights would definitely accrue to them, atleast to the extent of making a claim for formulation of a scheme/towards their absorption. This Court is quite conscious of the fact that the Government has been benevolent and had come up with several schemes in the past and directed regularisation of services of thousands of employees over a period of time. Such benevolence ought to permeate to the lowest levels to take within its sweep the desperate cry of the petitioners as well. As in the sublime words of the father of nation, Mahatma Gandhi, „A nation‟s greatness is measured by how it treats its weakest members‟. Merely because these writ petitioners have been employed in the projects, the policy makers may not shut their mind and close their eyes to their precarious plight having to serve public purpose but left in the lurch and unprotected, at the end of the day."
7.7. In Sheo Narain Nagar Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017) 11 SCR 138, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized such employment on temporary status as on exploitative terms. The pertinent observation made in the said case is quoted hereunder:
"8. When we consider the prevailing scenario, it is painful to note that the decision in Uma Devi (Supra) has not been properly understood and rather wrongly applied by various State Governments. We have called for the data in the instant case to ensure as to how many employees were working on contract basis or ad-hoc basis or WA No.693 of 2025 Page 37 of 96 daily-wage basis in different State departments. We can take judicial notice that widely aforesaid practice is being continued. Though this Court has emphasised that incumbents should be appointed on regular basis as per rules but new devise of making appointment on contract basis has been adopted, employment is offered on daily wage basis etc. in exploitative forms. This situation was not envisaged by Uma Devi (supra). The prime intendment of the decision was that the employment process should be by fair means and not by back door entry and in the available pay scale. That spirit of the Uma Devi (supra) has been ignored and conveniently over looked by various State Governments/ authorities. We regretfully make the observation that Uma Devi (supra) has not be implemented in its true spirit and has not been followed in its pith and substance. It is being used only as a tool for not regularizing the services of incumbents. They are being continued in service without payment of due salary for which they are entitled on the basis of Article 14, l6 read with Article 34(1)(d) of the Constitution of India as if they have no constitutional protection as envisaged in D.S. Nakara Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 from cradle to grave. In heydays of life they are serving on exploitative terms with no guarantee of livelihood to be continued and in old age they are going to be destituted, there being no provision for pension, retiral benefits etc. There is clear contravention of constitutional provisions and aspiration of down trodden class. They do have equal rights and to make them equals they WA No.693 of 2025 Page 38 of 96 require protection and cannot be dealt with arbitrarily. The kind of treatment meted out is not only bad but equally unconstitutional and is denial of rights. We have to strike a balance to really implement the ideology of Uma Devi (supra). Thus, the time has come to stop the situation where Uma Devi (supra) can be permitted to be flouted, whereas, this Court has interdicted such employment way back in the year 2006. The employment cannot be on exploitative terms, whereas Uma Devi (supra) laid down that there should not be back door entry and every post should be filled by regular employment, but a new device has been adopted for making appointment on payment of paltry system on contract/ad hoc basis or otherwise. This kind of action is not permissible, when we consider the pith and substance of true spirit in Umadevi (supra).
9. Coming to the facts of the instant case, there was a direction issued way back in the year 1999, to consider the regularization of the appellants.
However, regularization was not done. The respondents chose to give minimum of the pay scale, which was available to the regular employees, way back in the year 2000 and by passing an order, the appellants were also conferred temporary status in the year 2006, with retrospective effect on 2.10.2002. As the respondents have themselves chosen to confer a temporary status to the employees, as such there was requirement at work and posts were also available at the particular point of time when order was passed. Thus, the submission raised by learned WA No.693 of 2025 Page 39 of 96 counsel for the respondent that posts were not available, is belied by their own action. Obviously, the order was passed considering the long period of services rendered by the appellants, which were taken on exploitative terms.
10. The High Court dismissed the writ application relying on the decision in Umadevi (supra). But the appellants were employed basically in the year 1993; they had rendered service for three years, when they were offered the service on contract basis; it was not the case of back door entry; and there were no Rules in place for offering such kind of appointment. Thus, the appointment could not be said to be illegal and in contravention of Rules, as there were no such Rules available at the relevant point of time, when their temporary status was conferred with effect from 02.10.2002. The appellants were required to be appointed on regular basis as a one-time measure, as laid down in paragraph 53 of Umadevi (supra). Since the appellants had completed 10 years of service and temporary status had been given by the respondents with retrospective effect in the 02.10.2002, we direct that the services of the appellants be regularized from the said date i.e. 02.10.2002, consequential benefits and the arrears of pay also to be paid to the appellants within a period of three months from today."
7.8. This Court in Satrughana Mishra Vrs. Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI), vide Judgment dated WA No.693 of 2025 Page 40 of 96 19.01.2001 in O.J.C. No.18115 of 1997 reported at 2001 (3) LLN 699 held that:
"5. The petitioners who appeared in-person disputed the fact that they have been appointed to work as irrigators. ON the other hand, their contention is that they were forced to work as irrigators and their names were deleted from the list of NMRs. Their sole grievance is that they have not been regularized in service and are being paid consolidated pay for last several years. There is no dispute that the petitioners have been working as irrigators for quite some time and total length of service on casual basis rendered by the petitioners is more than 10 years. Therefore, the opposite parties cannot say that there is no requirement for absorption of the petitioners on regular basis against the said posts. Non-
regularisation of the petitioners in the said posts even though work is available for continuance of the posts amounts to exploitation.
6. Considering the submission of Sri Patra on behalf of opposite parties that the scale of pay shall be fixed for the irrigators in the next meeting of the governing body of WALMI, I direct that in the next meeting of the governing body which may be held within three months from the date of communication of this order, the scale of pay of the petitioners be fixed and they may be paid salary as regular employees of WALMI. Since juniors were regularized, namely Govind Chandra Sahoo and Snakarsana Jena, Sri Patra submitted that it may not be possible on WA No.693 of 2025 Page 41 of 96 the part of the WALMI to pay the arrears if a stipulated time is granted, as it depends on grant of State Government. Therefore, I do not fix any time-limit for payment of arrears, but direct that the arrears dues should be paid preferably within a period of one year and accordingly budget provision should be made."
7.9. In Ramesh Chandra Mohapatra Vrs. State of Odisha, 2022 SCC OnLine Ori 2587 it has been observed as follows:
"13. The orders appointing each of the above persons, the corresponding order of the OAT and that of the High Court and the Supreme Court of India have all been enclosed with the rejoinder affidavit. Specifically, in SLP(C) No.32178 of 2014 (State of Orissa Vrs. Prahallad Sahoo), the observation of the Supreme Court in its order dated reads as under:
„*** Though the appointments of the respondents were irregular as they were not sponsored by the Employment Exchange, we do not intend to interfere with the judgment of the High Court in view of the long period of service rendered by the respondents. The question of law raised in these petitions is left open.
The special leave petitions are dismissed accordingly.‟
14. In the case of Harihar Prusty, this Court while dismissing the State‟s W.P. (C) 9475 of 2016 by the WA No.693 of 2025 Page 42 of 96 order dated 30th January, 2018 declined to interfere with the order dated 15th September 2015 passed by the OAT in O.A. No. 2137(C) of 2001 whereby the OAT had directed his regularization. Likewise, in the case of Manoj Kumar Parida, the order of the OAT was affirmed by this Court by an order dated 3rd December 2019 in W.P.(C) No. 1366 of 2014.
***
17. The Court has compared the appointed orders issued to Prahallad Sahoo, Harihar Prusty and the present petitioners and it finds that they are no different. The appointment orders of Prahallad Sahoo and Harihar Prusty also refer to them as „outsiders‟ and they were appointed as Field Man Demonstrator in a scale of pay. The wording of their appointment letters is no different from that of the present Petitioners. As far as the cadres are concerned, the Petitioners belong to the Soil Conservation Technical Cadre to which Prahallad Sahoo and Harihar Prusty belong. Therefore, there can be no justification for treating the present Petitioners differently. Meanwhile, as already pointed out even by the Government, another employee Subasish Sarangi who was also earlier Field Man Demonstrator has been reinstated in service pursuant to the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 31174 of 2020.
18. With all these cases being identical and that the aforementioned three persons who have been reinstated being junior to the present Petitioners, there can be no justification for treating the present Petitioners differently."
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 43 of 967.10. Noteworthy to refer to the Order dated 06.12.2021 passed in W.A. No.231 of 2016 [Vice Chairman, State Council for Technical Education & Vocational Training, Odisha Vrs. Braja K. Mohanty] and batch, wherein it has been observed as follows:
"In each of these appeals, the respondent has worked as contractual watchman for over ten years. It is also stated in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition in paragraph 13 by the present appellants that there were in fact five vacancies in sanctioned posts of watchman. The only distinction sought to be made is that for benefiting by the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, their appointments had to be merely „irregular‟ and not „illegal‟. The fact remains that the respondents have been working continuously as watchmen. It is not the case of the appellant that they are not qualified to be employed as watchman. Given the fact that the respondents have worked as watchmen on contract basis for over ten years, it is obvious that the appellant requires their services. In the circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of the learned Single Judge requiring the appellants to consider the cases of the respondents for regularization. The appeals are dismissed."
7.11. Noticing the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vrs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, in Niranjan Nayak Vrs. State of Odisha & Others, 2023 (I) OLR 407 the observation of this Court runs as follows:
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 44 of 96"12. Similarly, in the case of Amarendra Kumar Mahapatra and Others Vrs. State of Odisha and Others, (2014) 4 SCC 583 = AIR 2014 SC 1716, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the appellants were entitled to regularization in service having regard to the fact that they have rendered long years of service on ad hoc basis.
13. In the case at hand, it can be ascertained that the petitioner was appointed against a substantive vacant post and he had been discharging his duties in the said post since 1993. The appointment was made on an ad hoc basis and was extended from time to time. Since the petitioner was appointed against substantive vacancy and the post was sanctioned by higher authorities, the petitioner should have been extended the benefit of regulatisation like other similarly situated persons."
Analysis and discussions:
8. Given the above delineated perspective by the Courts, it is perceived that fallacious argument has been advanced by the learned Additional Government Advocate referring to stance taken by way of counter affidavit that erroneous decision of the Administration cannot be ground to clothe a citizen with right in the garb of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This Court hastens to observe that the reason for denial of claim of the respondent by the Housing and Urban Development Department notwithstanding recommendation of the WA No.693 of 2025 Page 45 of 96 Cuttack Municipal Corporation vide Letter dated 07.02.2018 (Annexure-20) read with resolution dated 14.11.2017 of said Corporation (Annexure-19) is liable to be held as without any rational foundation. Thus, the argument of the Additional Government Advocate cannot be countenanced in law as well as on facts.
8.1. It is reminded of that, every holder of a public office is a trustee whose highest duty is to the people of the country and, therefore, every act of the holder of a public office, irrespective of the label classifying that act, is in discharge of public duty meant ultimately for public good. [See, Shrilekha Vidyarthi (Kumari) Vrs. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212].
8.2. In Kalinga Mining Corporation Vrs. Union of India, (2013) 5 SCC 252 the principle of res judicata vis-à-vis scope to reopen already decided issue in another litigation inter se parties has been discussed as follows:
"42. Considering the principle of res judicata, this Court in Mohanlal Goenka Vrs. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, (1952) 2 SCC 648 = AIR 1953 SC 65 = 1953 SCR 377 held as under:
„23. There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as „res judicata‟ between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the WA No.693 of 2025 Page 46 of 96 question whether or not it operates as „res judicata‟.‟ This Court also held that:
„14. *** A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides.‟ [See State of W.B. Vrs. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee, AIR 1966 SC 1061]
43. In view of the aforesaid clear enunciation of the law by this Court, it would appear that even if the judgment dated 02.07.2001 [Kalinga Mining Corpn.
Vrs. Union of India, AIR 2002 Ori 83] rendered by the High Court in OJC No. 11537 of 1999 and the dismissal [Kalinga Mining Corpn. Vrs. Union of India, SLP (C) No. 13556 of 2001, Order dated 24.08.2001, wherein it was directed: „The special leave petition is dismissed.‟] in limine of SLP (C) No. 13556 of 2001 arising from the aforesaid judgment is considered to be erroneous in view of the judgment in Saligram Khirwal Vrs. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 689, the matter regarding the locus standi of the LRs of Respondent 10 to proceed with a mining lease application cannot be permitted to be reopened at this stage since it has become final inter partes."
8.3. At the same breath, it may not be inept to have reference to the Order dated 06.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 filed by the respondent on an earlier WA No.693 of 2025 Page 47 of 96 round of litigation, wherein it has been observed that the case of the petitioner is identical to that of decided matters in cases of Ashok Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of Odisha, 2013 (II) OLR 451; Gajendra Prasad Behera Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, vide Order dated 27.03.2014; Kailash Chandra Maharana Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.20298 of 2013, vide Order dated 08.05.2015 and the authority competent was directed to regularise the service of such employees treating at par with the juniors, who have been absorbed in service from the date of their initial engagement. In the said Order dated 06.07.2015 this Court directed the authority to reconsider the case of the petitioner "on the basis of recommendation" of the Cuttack Municipal Corporation and "in the light of judgments referred to supra". Said order of this Court passed in the case of the present respondent having not been challenged by the authority concerned attained finality. However, perusal of Office Order dated 14.08.2015 issued by the Government of Odisha in Housing and Urban Development Department depicts that the respondent is absorbed in regular post of Junior Assistant under the Local Fund Service Cadre, but the date of absorption has been considered "from the date of issue of this order", which is contrary to what has been done in the cases of Gajendra Prasad Behera and other junior employees.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 48 of 968.4. This Court is of considered view that such fixation of date of regularisation is contrary to the observation and direction contained in Order dated 06.07.2015 inasmuch as nothing is placed on record to suggest that the authority concerned has ever considered effect and impact of Ashok Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of Odisha, 2013 (II) OLR 451; Gajendra Prasad Behera Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, vide Order dated 27.03.2014; Kailash Chandra Maharana Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.20298 of 2013, vide Order dated 08.05.2015.
8.5. Furthermore, it is the firm stand of the appellants vide paragraph 7 of the writ appeal that "the name of the petitioner (the respondent herein) had not been sponsored by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation in the year 1997 to the State Government for consideration of the case of the petitioner for regularisation along with other candidates those have been engaged in different Urban Local Bodies of the State between the period from 14.06.1982 to 15.09.1992". The facts adumbrated herein above clearly manifest that it is the Cuttack Municipal Corporation which has failed to sponsor the name of the respondent for such purpose. Rather it emanates from the resolution and recommendation of the Cuttack Municipal Corporation that the respondent WA No.693 of 2025 Page 49 of 96 has been working since 1990 and his engagement would fall between 10.09.1982 and 30.06.1992. The respondent has within reasonable period brought to the notice of the authority concerned regarding such omission. It is not denied that his counterparts and juniors have been absorbed in service from the date of their initial engagement.
8.6. To fortify his claim the respondent enclosed to the writ petition a Letter bearing No.15272-- 13-HUD-37-MUN- 18-HR-1/2014/HUD, dated 31.07.2014 issued from the Housing and Urban Development Department which unequivocally speaks of placing the list of 57 DLR/NMR employees working against existing vacancies in the post of Junior Assistant (LFS Cadre) along with detailed bio- data before the Selection Board for "ratification for regularisation of their services". It is pointed out by Dr. Jitendra Kumar Lenka, learned Advocate that in the said list the name of Gajendra Prasad Behera finds place at serial No.4 whereas the petitioner was placed at serial No.27.
8.7. Perusal of Judgment dated 27.03.2014 rendered in the case of Gajendra Prasad Behera Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, it is revealed that:
"8. Considering the Judgment of the Apex Court in Umadevi (supra) & taking into consideration the WA No.693 of 2025 Page 50 of 96 guidelines formulated thereunder, the petitioner having served for more than 10 years continuously as DLR Octroi Tax Collector, his service is to be regularized from the date his juniors were regularized. This Court in Shri Ashok Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of Orissa, 2013 (II) OLR 451 has also taken the similar view & stated that since the services of some of the juniors to the petitioner have been regularized, the claim of the petitioner in that case should be accepted & direction should be given for his regularization in service.
Taking into account the ratio decided in Umadevi (supra) & Ashok Kumar Prusty (supra) & applying the same to the present facts & circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the claim of the Petitioner is acceptable & therefore, issues the following directions:
(i) The petitioner be treated at par with his juniors like opposite parties 6 and 7, whose services have been regularized with effect from 18.1.1990 and his services be regularized from that date.
(ii) After regularization of services, the petitioner be granted all the financial benefits admissible to the post with all arrears as due & admissible, which should be paid to him within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order;
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 51 of 969. With the aforesaid observation & direction, the writ petition is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to cost."
8.8. Accordingly, an Office Order No.18299-HUD-MUN-OP-
59/14/HUD, dated 21.07.2015 was issued by the Housing and Urban Development Department absorbing Gajendra Prasad Behera in service reckoning his date of initial engagement as the date of regularisation in service. Said decision of the Government of Odisha vide Office Order dated 21.07.2015 runs as follows:
"In supersession of this Department Order No.l0652 dated 16.04.2015 and pursuant to Order dated 27.03.2014 passed by the Hon‟ble High Court, Orissa in W.P(C) No.5727 of 2005, the services of Sri Gajendra Prasad Behera, DLR, Basudevpur Municipality is hereby regularized in the post of Tax Collector/Octroi Tax Collector with effect from 18.01.1990 i.e. the date of- regularisation of his junior Sri Siba Mallick, Tax Collector & Sri Gaurang Sahoo, Tax Collector of the then Basudevpur, NAC."
8.9. Scrutiny of material placed on record by the respondent demonstrates that Rashmi Ranjan Singh, Junior Asssitant, initially engaged on 26.02.1992 as NMR much later to the respondent has been granted pensionary benefit under the old pension scheme, i.e., prior to amendment of the Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1992 vide Finance Department Notification No.44451/F., dated 17.09.2005 and Finance WA No.693 of 2025 Page 52 of 96 Department Circular No.Pen-40/2005-16950(255)/F., dated 02.04.2007.
8.10. It is admitted by the appellants in their counter affidavit filed in connection with the writ petition that because the Cuttack Municipal Corporation did not sponsor the name of the respondent in the year 1997, his case for regularisation could not be considered by the Selection Board. Drawing vague distinction that Gajendra Prasad Behera was regularised in the post which is non-Local Fund Service Cadre, the appellants feigned that the respondent could not be regularised in a post belonging to Local Fund Service Cadre. Nonetheless, the record particularly Office Order dated 21.07.2015 referred to above does not reveal such distinction is the reason for denial of benefit to the respondent. Such a stand is rejected being contradictory to what is laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill Vrs. The Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 3 SCR 272. Pertinent observations as is relevant for the present context are extracted hereunder:
"We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Commissioner of Police Vrs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16, „Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he WA No.693 of 2025 Page 53 of 96 intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.‟ Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older:"
8.11. Having not challenged the Order dated 06.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 (Radha Krisna Dash Vrs. State of Odisha) the appellants allowed the same to attain finality, and at this belated stage they cannot take "U" turn. Reading of counter affidavit filed by the appellants in W.P.(C) No.16335 of 2018 (Radha Krisna Dash Vrs. State of Odisha) would project that the contentions and grounds justifying rejection of claim of the respondent appears to be contrary to what is reflected in the recommendation of Cuttack Municipal Corporation vide Letter No.1348, dated 07.02.2018 and observation and direction of this Court in Order dated 06.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009. The text of recommendation of Cuttack Municipal Corporation in the Letter dated 07.02.2018 runs as follows:
"With reference to the letter above on the aforementioned subject [Letter No.16012/HUD, Bhubaneswar, dated 18.07.2017], the contention of the representation of Shri Radha Krushna Dash, Junior Assistant, Administration, WA No.693 of 2025 Page 54 of 96 on being verified with the Cuttack Municipal Corporation Office records and the revelation of the facts thereunder are submitted below for consideration at the Government level.
That, at the outset, the claim of Shri R.K. Dash,.with regard to date of his initial entry into erstwhile Cuttack Municipality now Cuttack Municipal Corporation, being 01.11.1990 and assignment of duties thereby, i.e., for preparation of pay acquittance roll of the old age pension beneficiaries etc. it is conclusive to say that his initial entry into erstwhile Cuttack Municipality is 01.11.1990 and the duties assigned to him is clerical in nature.
As regards the claim of Shri Dash for regularization of his service from the date of his initial entry, i.e., 01.11.1990 and his nature of duties being clerical as ascertained from the source of official records, the case of Shri Dash may be considered on the same standing as his junior counterparts Dhirendra Kumar Lenka and other Udayabhanu Mishra (both Junior Asistants) have been allowed by the Government to get their services regularised from their initial entry with pensionary benefits as recruitees to the post during 15.09.1982 to 30.06.1992 period as per Government in Housing and Urban Development Department Order No. LFS 16998/HUD, dated 17.05.1999 (Sl. No.136 & 137) and accordingly the seniority of Shri Dash may be counted above the place of his junior counterpart Shri Lenka and Sri Mishra as per facts above.
From the verification of records, the Cuttack Municipal Corporation is of views that the claim of Shri Dash for regularization of his service like that of his counterparts whose cases are referred to above, may be considered as WA No.693 of 2025 Page 55 of 96 he has been rendering his continuous service in the Cuttack Municipal Corporation from the date of his initial entry, i.e., from date 01.11.1990 with dischargement of duties as clerical in nature."
8.12. It does not emanate neither from the counter affidavit nor does it from Order dated 17.05.2018 of the Housing and Urban Development Department (Annexure-21 to the writ petition) as to why aforesaid recommendation was discarded or overturned.
8.13. It remained unanswered with regard to not sponsoring the name of the respondent for regularisation in service by the Selection Board purported to have been constituted under Rule 7 of the Odisha Local Fund Service Rules way back in 1997 and even after the same is pointed out by the respondent within a reasonable period to the competent authority. It is also not disputed or denied by the learned Additional Government Advocate representing the appellants that counterparts and juniors have been regularised with effect from the date of initial engagement discriminating the case of the respondent. No explanation of the appellants is available on record to the material found placed in the rejoinder affidavit of the respondent. Furthermore, significant it is to reiterate that even though the Order dated 06.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 filed by the respondent transpired that the case of the petitioner WA No.693 of 2025 Page 56 of 96 is identical to that were decided by this Court in the matters of Ashok Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of Odisha, 2013 (II) OLR 451; Gajendra Prasad Behera Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, vide Order dated 27.03.2014; Kailash Chandra Maharana Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.20298 of 2013, vide Order dated 08.05.2015, as if the direction is issued for reconsideration independently without having due regard to such referred cases, the Housing and Urban Development Department refused to ante-date the date of absorption. At this distance of time the appellants ought not to have approached this Court with a specious plea that because the name of the respondent was not sponsored by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation for consideration by the Selection Board his service in 1997, he is to be regularised from the date of order, i.e., 14.08.2015.
8.14. In such view of the matter, this Court finds the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge cogent, reasonable and justiceable; and the grounds taken by the appellants found to be devoid of merit and unsupportable.
9. The respondent could not have been by-passed in considering for regularisation along with his counterparts and picking up his juniors in preference to WA No.693 of 2025 Page 57 of 96 him indicates discriminatory treatment. The learned Additional Government Advocate sought to agitate that no parity of treatment could be claimed as a matter of right and Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot aid the cause of the respondent for considering him to absorb from the date of initial engagement.
9.1. As has already been observed, the respondent could not be faltered; but the omission to sponsor the name of the respondent along with others for consideration of his claim for regularisation by the Selection Board is attributable to the Cuttack Municipal Corporation. Such fact can be couched in the language of resolution of said Corporation and its letter of recommendation.
9.2. In Om Prakash Banerjee Vrs. State of West Bengal, (2023) 10 SCR 427 it has been held as under:
"22. At the outset, we would like to state that this a case of gross violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Appellant, who has been working in Respondent No.3-Municipality since 1991, and was, subsequently, appointed as a clerk in 1996; has not been regularised in his service. Moreover, his several of his co-employees (including juniors) have been regularised in service. The High Court‟s Order dated 20.06.2000 in Writ Petition No. 19555 of 1999 clearly shows that absorption has been given effect to vide Order dated 26.09.1996. The said writ petition was dismissed to the extent of WA No.693 of 2025 Page 58 of 96 entitlement of back dated appointment and arrears. However, the Respondents never paid any heed to such order and inordinately delayed the Appellant‟s appointment, while simultaneously absorbing other casual employees. Even the Appellant‟s service book records that Respondent No. 3-Municipality has absorbed the Appellant in view of the High Court‟s Order dated 20.06.2000 in Writ Petition No. 19555 (W) of 1999.
***
24. However, in the present case, as we have observed, the Appellant was appointed as a casual worker in 1991. While the services of other co-employees were regularised, that of the Appellant and some others was left out. The High Court in its Order dated 03.09.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 17892 of 2010 has also recorded the Respondents‟ submissions that resolutions pertaining to the Appellant‟s absorption are already in place and the same have been sent for necessary approval. Therefore, the judgment rendered in Umadevi (supra) will not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
25. Now, coming to the Reasoned Order dated 07.03.2012 passed by Respondent No. 2 herein, which states that in pursuance of the High Court‟s order dated 24.08.2009 to not to give effect to the instruction of the Labour Department (pertaining to regularisation of casual employees) as communicated in the circulars dated 13.08.1979, 28.08.1980 and 13.03.1996; the Appellant‟s services cannot be regularised. However, what is to WA No.693 of 2025 Page 59 of 96 be seen here is that, as early as 2002, i.e., the High Court‟s Order dated 20.06.2000 in Writ Petition No. 19555 of 1999 clearly shows that absorption has been given effect to vide Order dated 26.09.1996. Moreover, as has been observed above, the Respondents had also submitted before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 17892 of 2010 that resolutions pertaining to the Appellant's absorption are already in place and the same have been sent for necessary approval. Apart from this, as is evident from the facts and circumstances mentioned above, the non- regularisation of the services of the Appellant in the present case, is, in our view, a violation of the fundamental rights of equality before law and equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment under the State, as enshrined under Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution, respectively. It is to be noted that the Appellant has retired in 2021."
9.3. Significant observation has been made in the case of Union of India Vrs. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2019) 2 SCR 317 with respect to pick and choose juniors for regularisation in preference to seniors, relevant excerpts of which runs as follows:
"17. From the record before this Court, it has emerged that as a matter of fact, four persons were regularized after the judgment of the High Court in the earlier round of proceedings. The Tribunal has entered a finding of fact that the persons who were regularized were junior to those who ranked above WA No.693 of 2025 Page 60 of 96 them in the seniority list. The applicability of Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 to a situation such as present, has been dealt with in several judgments of this Court, including the decisions in Malathi Das Vrs. Suresh, (2014) 13 SCC 249 and Prem Ram Vrs. Managing Director Uttarakhand Pey Jal and Nirman Nigam Dehradun, (2015) 11 SCC 255, referred to earlier.
18. In Malathi Das, this Court noted that, as a matter of fact, the authorities had granted regularization to various other individuals who were similarly placed. Among them were persons who were regularized even after the decision in Uma Devi. Similarly, in Prem Ram, this Court observed that persons who were appointed on a date subsequent to the appellant were regularized. A distinction was sought to be made in the case of the appellant on the specious plea that they were brought on to a work- charge establishment. This Court observed that what was important was that the appellant had been appointed as early as in the year 1988 and, by the time the decision in Uma Devi was rendered, he had completed more than ten years of service. The Government had formulated Rules for regularization. This Court noted that neither the State Government nor the Jal Nigam had resented the idea of regularizing those who had served for over a decade. In this background, the Court came to the conclusion that there was no impediment in directing regularization of the services of the appellant and for the release of retiral dues on that basis.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 61 of 96
19. In the present case, the original order passed by the Tribunal did not contain a mandamus for regularization. The order mandated that a seniority list should be maintained by the Union of India and that the possibility of regularizing the casual workmen at the Regional Training Institute should be considered against existing and future vacancies in Group „D‟ posts. Acting on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court, the Union of India proceeded to formulate a seniority list and, in fact, regularized at least four individuals. The judgment of the High Court attained finality. Even before the decision in Uma Devi, as the Tribunal noted, the workmen had put in over twelve years of service. The Tribunal, in our view, justifiably held that the action of selecting juniors for regularization, by-passing in the process, persons who had put in longer years of service was manifestly unfair and arbitrary. This direction of the Tribunal has been affirmed by the High Court in its impugned decision. The arbitrariness in the conduct of the authorities at the Institute is writ large in the facts of this case. Picking up individuals for regularization, while ignoring seniors shows that a favoured few have been rewarded. This is arbitrary."
9.4. In State of Odisha Vrs. Arun Kumar Nath, 2025 SCC OnLine Ori 2696 in the context of adherence to the equality principles as the concept of rule of law envisioned by the framers of the law and bringing the same in reality while occupying a space in the Constitution, it has been observed as follows:
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 62 of 96"2. The adherence of the equality principles not only helps the citizens to reach to a highest potential but also inculcates the sense of justice at par with the equally circumstanced persons. It is not an and principle finding a space in the Constitution but erodes the differential treatment amongst the equals. It is, thus, a necessary corollary to the concept of rule of law envisioned by the framers of the law and bringing the same in reality while occupying a space in the Constitution.
3. Although the equality is the faith and the aspiration of a citizenry in a democratic republic, yet its applicability has to be ensured with great caution and care, and not in an abstract manner. The equality amongst the equals is the hallmark of the doctrine of equality as unequals cannot be treated equally in the garb of the equality principles.
4. The enlightening observation of Justice P. N. Bhagwati in Pradeep Jain Vrs. Union of India reported in (1984) 3 SCC 654 can be aptly applied that "equality must not remain mere idle incantation but it must become a living reality for the large masses of people." We are conscious that the equality principles should not be applied with the mathematical precision but on practical inequalities permeating the sense of an equal treatment vis-à-vis the rule of law, which is paramount.
***
36. We cannot overlook the fact that one of the Gardeners, namely, Kabindranath Sahoo who was appointed along with the writ petitioners/ WA No.693 of 2025 Page 63 of 96 respondents approached this Court by filing a writ petition, which was allowed by the Court and, therefore, on the ground of parity or equality principles, the writ petitioners/respondents come within the ambit of the homogeneous class cannot be discriminated with different treatments."
9.5. Referring to Ground Nos. B, C and D which are basis to attack the decision of the learned Single Judge, learned Additional Government Advocate would rely on Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Chiggan Lal, (2022) 19 SCC 662; Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Nanu Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 494 = (2006) Supp.9 SCR 544; and Chaman Lal Vrs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCR 311 to contend that a wrong benefit granted to certain persons/ employees in the earlier years would not entail parity of treatment and entitle such employees to claim similar relief inasmuch as "negative equality" is not ingrained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He further argued that fixing date of regularisation in service is the domain of the employer and relief granted in a particular year cannot be percolated to grant of identical relief to other employees in subsequent years.
9.6. There is no dichotomy with such proposition of law.
Conceding to the ratio laid down in aforesaid reported cases, this Court in State of Odisha Vrs. Arun Kumar Nath, 2025 SCC OnLine Ori 2696 following principle WA No.693 of 2025 Page 64 of 96 enunciated in Union of India Vrs. Arulmozhi Iniarasu, (2011) 9 SCR 1 (Pr.12), stated as follows:
"30. The aforesaid decisions relied upon by the appellants do not come to the aid of the appellants on disparity of the facts or the special facts involved therein. It is no longer res integra that a difference in fact or an additional fact may invite a different decision and it is an ardent duty of the Court while applying the ratio to see the factual parity."
9.7. The factual matrix culled out from the documents enclosed to the writ petition transpires that, this Court by Order dated 06.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 filed at the instance of the respondent herein, issued writ of mandamus to the authority concerned with the following observation:
"At the same time, similar question came up for consideration before this Court referred to supra wherein this Court directed to regularise the services of the petitioner at par with his juniors. In that view of the matter, the impugned Order dated 14.09.2009 vide Annexure-13 is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the authority to reconsider the case of the petitioner on the basis of the recommendation made vide Annexure-8 and 11 in the light of the judgments referred to supra3"
3 Ashok Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of Odisha, 2013 (II) OLR 451; Gajendra Prasad Behera, W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, disposed of on 27.03.2014; Kailash Chandra Maharana Vrs. State Odisha, W.P.(C) No.20298 of 2013, disposed of on 08.05.2015.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 65 of 969.8. The learned Additional Government Advocate has not put forth any material to plead that such direction has been overturned by the higher Court. Even before the learned Single Judge in the counter affidavit filed by the appellants it does not emanate that wrong reliefs granted to Gajendra Prasad Behera and other juniors have been reversed or steps in this regard have been taken by the competent authority. Thus, this Court reasonably believes that the argument advanced by the Additional Government Advocate has no sanctity. The fallacy in such claim by the appellants based on the principle laid down Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Chiggan Lal, (2022) 19 SCC 662; Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Nanu Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 494 = (2006) Supp.9 SCR 544; and Chaman Lal Vrs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCR 311 can be perceived from the following analysis of facts4:
i. Evidence fell short to suggest that Gajendra Prasad Behera was not regularised in service from the date of initial engagement. The Office Order dated 21.07.2015 issued by the Housing and Urban Development Department clearly envisioned that "in supersession of this Department Order No.10652, dated 16.04.2015 and pursuant to 4 This Court discussed distinctive feature in State of Odisha Vrs. Arun Kumar Nath, 2025 SCC OnLine 2696.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 66 of 96
Order dated 27.03.2014 passed by the Hon'ble High Court, Orissa in W.P.(C) No.5727 of 2005, the services of Sri Gajendra Prasad Behera, DLR, Basudevpur Municipality is hereby regularised in the post of Tax Collector/Octroi Tax Collector with effect from 18.01.1990, i.e., the date of regularisation of his junior Sri Siba Mallick, Tax Collector and Sri Gaurang Sahoo, Tax Collector of the then Basudevpur NAC"; whereas in the instant case this Court directed the authority concerned in Order dated 06.07.2015 in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 to consider the case of the respondent in the light of said judgment rendered in the case of Gajendra Prasad Behera (supra).
ii. The fact that the juniors to the present respondent have been regularised with their date of initial engagement to accord pensionary benefit to them has been acknowledged vide Resolution dated 24.11.2017 of the Cuttack Municipal Corporation. It is also admitted in said resolution that by virtue of Order in Letter No.17662/HUD, dated 19.06.1992 of the Housing and Urban Development Department, the regularisation in service of juniors to the respondent was taken with effect from the initial date of engagement and, therefore, it was WA No.693 of 2025 Page 67 of 96 recommended to the said Department to reckon date of initial engagement of respondent, i.e., 01.11.1990, as the date from which he is to be regularised in service. Nothing is demonstrated on record to suggest that the Housing and Urban Development Department had sufficient reason to discard such recommendation.
iii. As it appears from the Order dated 17.05.2018 of the Housing and Urban Development Department (impugned in the writ petition) to deny relief to the respondent only reason ascribed by the Director of Municipal Administration is non-appearance of the respondent before the Selection Board in the year 1997. Evidence on record elicit that it is the Cuttack Municipal Corporation which was at fault by not sponsoring the name of the respondent at right point of time. The respondent had brought the fact of not sponsoring his name to the Housing and Urban Development Department before the concerned authority. In this respect the recommendation of the Cuttack Municipal Corporation in Letter dated 07.02.2018 (Annexure- 20 to the writ petition) is candid and admits of no ambiguity. There is no explanation proffered by the authority with regard to omission to sponsor the WA No.693 of 2025 Page 68 of 96 name of the respondent to the Selection Board constituted under Rule 7 of the Odisha Local Fund Service Rules. For the fault of the authority concerned, an employee should not be put to jeopardy and he should not have been denied his claim of parity of treatment with his counterparts.
iv. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has been serving in the Cuttack Municipality (nor Cuttack Municipal Corporation) since 01.11.1990 and his service record remained unblemished.
9.9. The respondent has placed on record by way of rejoinder affidavit dated 20.09.2022 that one Rashmi Ranjan Singh, initially engaged on 26.02.1992 as NMR much junior to the respondent, has been included in the list of pensioners making him entitled as per pre-amended Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Rules. This fact remained uncontroverted by the appellants. The text of Letter No.24850-- HUD-LFS-ESTT-46/11/HUD, dated 22.10.2016 reads as under:
"I am directed to invite to your Letter No.10175, dated 09.09.2016 on the subject cited above and to say that the service of Sri Rashmi Ranjan Singh, Junior Assistant shall be taken into account from the date of his initial engagement as NMR in Cuttack Municipal Corporation, Cuttack, i.e., from 26.02.1992 for pensionary benefit only and accordingly he should be included under Government WA No.693 of 2025 Page 69 of 96 Pension Scheme instead of National Pension Scheme which came into effect from 01.01.2025."
Said Rashmi Ranjan Singh was not only absorbed as Junior Assistant with effect from his initial date of engagement, but also he was accorded promotion to the higher post, i.e., Senior Assistant, by virtue of Office Order No.12244-- HUD-LFS-HR-0022-2020/HUD, dated 09.07.2020 (Annexure-26 forming part of rejoinder affidavit filed in connection with the writ petition).
9.10. It may, at this juncture, be pertinent to have reference to State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Shyam Kumar Yadav, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5538, wherein it has been held as follows:
"2. The issue that arose for consideration before the High Court in the second round of litigation was whether respondent No.1 was entitled to be absorbed as a regular employee, keeping in view the Government policy/Circular and the long period of service rendered by him as a daily wager. The High Court held that respondent No. 1 was entitled to regularisation of his services as several persons junior to him had already been absorbed. The intra- court appeal preferred by the State has also been turned down by a Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned Order dated 16.03.2018.
*** WA No.693 of 2025 Page 70 of 96
5. It is true that an employee engaged on daily wages has no legally vested right to seek regularisation of his services. However, if the competent authority takes a policy decision within the permissible framework, its benefit must be extended to all those who fall within the parameters of such a policy. Authorities cannot be permitted to pick and choose in such circumstances.
6. The fact that respondent No. 1 has worked as a daily wager from 2005 to 2009 is not in dispute. The eligibility for the post he holds has also not been controverted. The fact that he initially entered through the process in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is also not a serious issue. That being so, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court directing the petitioners to confer the status of a regular employee on respondent No. 1.
7. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed."
9.11. In State of Odisha Vrs. Satyashri Mohapatra, 2025 SCC OnLine Ori 2849 it has been observed as follows:
"8. This Court at the outset examines the contention of the respondent No. 1 and appellant and also the judgment dated 28.10.2024 passed in WP(C) No. 14996 of 2024 diligently. As is apparent from the grounds of the writ appeal, the State seeks to re- argue what has long since been settled by the learned Odisha Administrative Trbunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in Original Application No. 2415(C) of 2015 vide Order dated 03.03.2017. Careful reading WA No.693 of 2025 Page 71 of 96 of pargraph-6 of the said order, it is found categorically observed that the respondent No. 1 "cannot be discriminated from other nine Engineer, who have been brought over to work charge establishment" and directed for grant of all the benefits as was extended to such similarly situated employees.
8.1. The learned Single Bench having taken note of factual spectrum of the instant case, referred to State of Karnataka Vrs. C. Lalitha, (2006) 1 SCR 971, Punendu Mukhopadhyay Vrs. V.K. Kappor, (2007) 7 SCC 679 and State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs.
Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, to hold that since eight other employees were regularized with effect from 08.02.2013 in the post of Assistant Engineer but after such regularization they were allowed to take benefit of DoWR Notification No. 9660, dated 21.03.2013 and upgraded as Assistant Executive Engineer. Denial of the benefit granted to them to the respondent No. 1 is unfair and unjustified. It is held that the Appellant should have been more rational and could have treated the respondent No. 1 as similarly situated with these counterpart employees and the respondent No. 1 deserves same treatment.
8.2. It is noticed by the learned Single Judge that apart from the fact that such regularization is one-time relaxation as per the rules and that such grant of service and financial benefits to him with effect from 8th February, 2013 at par with the eight other Work Charged Assistant Executive Engineers (Civil) would cause injustice to the existing senior regular WA No.693 of 2025 Page 72 of 96 Assistant Executive Engineers of Mechanical Wing of Odisha Engineering Service Cadre, who have been upgraded and received such service benefits prospectively on and from 26th February, 2014. To deny the respondent No. 1 regularization is unfair and unjustified when all along he stood at par with his counterparts. It can, therefore, be said that the respondent No. 1 should not have been treated differently with the stand taken by the opposite parties.
8.3. It is noticeable to have reference to Raman Kumar Vrs. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1018 wherein it has been held that if certain persons have been regularised and others are left out, dissimilar treatment is not warranted. In the said case it was observed as:
„5. 16 persons out of the remaining 30 employees filed contempt petition(s) alleging that the respondent(s)/department(s) are not regularizing the services of the appellants, thereby committing contempt of Court.
6. It appears that, before the High Court, an affidavit was filed stating therein that the services of the appellants could not be regularized since the posts were not available.
On this statement the contempt petition has been filed.
7. In the Constitution Bench judgment of this court passed in Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1, though the Court has held that backdoor entries should not be permitted, it has permitted a one WA No.693 of 2025 Page 73 of 96 time measure to be conducted for regularization of the services of these employees who had completed the service of more than ten years.
8. Indisputably, the appellants herein have completed service of more than ten years. Even this Court in the case of Ravi Verma Vrs. Union of India (Civil Appeal No(s).2795-2796 of 2018) decided on 13.03.2018 found that the act of regularizing the services of some employees and not regularizing the services of the others is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
9. Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the respondents, has vehemently opposed the petition. She submits that since posts were not available, and, thereafter, Group „D‟ posts have been abolished, the appellants could not have been regularized.
10. We are not inclined to accept the submission on behalf of the respondents. When the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax has himself found that 65 persons were entitled to be regularized, the act of regularizing the services of only 35 employees and not regularizing the services of other employees, including the appellants, is patently discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.‟ 8.4. Reference to paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Ravi Verma Vrs. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC WA No.693 of 2025 Page 74 of 96 3860 may be had to, wherein the following are the observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India:
„4. The appellants were appointed as casual employees in the Income Tax Department in the year 1993-1994 since then they were working continuously. On 30th January 2004 with respect to other similarly situated employees, temporary status was granted. The respondent No. 4 on 30th December 2004 recommended the case of the appellants for temporary status/regularization. Again it was recommended for regularization on 14.06.2005. In the meantime, the decision in the State of Karnataka Vrs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 was pronounced by this Court, the same provided that the employees who had rendered services continuously for ten years without the cover of the court‟s order be regularized as the one-time measure.
8. Again on 07.11.2007/19.11.2007 information was forwarded along with a recommendation for the regularization of services of the appellant and again on 01.01.2008 and 31.01.2008 also, recommendations were made. However services were not regularized, through Chief Commissioner, Income Tax, U.P. West, Ghaziabad regularized similarly placed 88 casual employees on 30.01.2009. The Chief Commissioner, Income Tax Orissa, Bhubaneshwar also regularized similarly situated eight employees on 12.03.2009;
orders of regularization have been placed on WA No.693 of 2025 Page 75 of 96 record respectively as Annexures P1 and P2. However, similar treatment was not accorded to the appellants.
9. On 01.06.2009 appellants 1, 2 and 3 were sanctioned minimum of regular pay scale of Group D employees with Dearness Allowance in accordance with DoPT Circular dated 31.05.2004 and in terms of the orders of CCIT dated 07.11.2007 and 06.12.2007 on conferral temporary of status on the employees. On 22.09.2009, Chief Commissioner, Income Tax, Kolkata also regularized 111 similarly situated casual employees and 17 employees on 15.10.1990 and Chief Commissioner, Income Tax, Lucknow regularized 59 similarly situated casual employees on 22.01.2010. There was further regularization of 35 employees of the office of Chief Commissioner, Income Tax, Patna on 20.08.2010. However, the claim of the appellants was rejected by respondent No. 3 though they had served continuously for more than ten years and fulfil the requisite criteria for the purpose of regularization in terms of the circulars of DoPT and the decision rendered by this Court in Uma Devi (supra). The appellants have also given the vacancy position.
12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, we are of the considered opinion that appointments were only irregular one, this Court observed in para 53 Uma Devi (supra) thus:
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 76 of 96„53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 = AIR 1967 SC 1071, R.N. Nanjundappa, (1972) 1 SCC 409 = (1972) 2 SCR 799 and B.N. Nagarajan, (1979) 4 SCC 507 = (1979) 3 SCR 937 and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above-referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 77 of 96
We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.‟
13. In view of the aforesaid decision, the circulars and regularization of the similarly situated employees at other places and various recommendation that were made the services of the appellants ought to have been regularized in the year 2006; discriminatory treatment has been meted out to them. As per the decision of Uma Devi (supra), they were entitled to regularization of services; they did not serve under the cover of court's order. Illegality has been committed by not directing regularization of services.‟ *** 8.7. Nevertheless, this Court perceives that when the respondent No. 1 cannot be given discriminatory treatment as against the eight Assistant Executive Engineers, this Court appreciating the factual position clarifies that the respondent No. 1 is required to be extended same benefit as that was given to the similarly situated employees. On 07.11.2022 the counterparts being regularised in the post of Assistant Engineer with effect from 08.02.2013 are allowed to take benefit of DoWR WA No.693 of 2025 Page 78 of 96 Notification No. 9660, dated 21.03.2013 and got upgraded as "Assistant Executive Engineers". Furthermore, subsequently, the eight counterparts upon such regularisation have already been given promotional benefit on 02.08.2023. Therefore, the respondent No. 1 cannot be left out."
9.12. The following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Dharam Singh Vrs. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735 deserve to be quoted:
"When public institutions depend, day after day, on the same hands to perform permanent tasks, equity demands that those tasks are placed on sanctioned posts, and those workers are treated with fairness and dignity. The controversy before us is not about rewarding irregular employment. It is about whether years of ad hoc engagement, defended by shifting excuses and pleas of financial strain, can be used to deny the rights of those who have kept public institutions running. We resolve it by insisting that public employment should be organised with fairness, reasoned decision making, and respect for the dignity of work.
***
6. The question before us is whether the High Court erred in failing to adjudicate the appellants' principal challenge to the State‟s refusals to sanction posts and treating the matter as a mere plea for regularization, and, if so, given the appellants' long and undisputed service, what appropriate relief ought to follow from this Court.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 79 of 96
***
9. Moreover, it is undisputed that the nature of work performed by the appellants, i.e., sorting and scrutiny of applications, dispatch and office support, and driving, has been continuous and integral to the Commission‟s functioning since their engagement between 1989 and 1992. The Commission itself moved for sanction of fourteen posts and furnished a list of fourteen daily wagers including the appellants. That consistent internal demand, coupled with uninterrupted utilisation of the appellants' labour on regular office hours, fortifies the conclusion that the duties are perennial. To continue extracting such work for decades while pleading want of sanctioned strength is a position that cannot be sustained.
***
11. Furthermore, it must be clarified that the reliance placed by the High Court on Umadevi (Supra) to non- suit the appellants is misplaced. Unlike Umadevi (Supra), the challenge before us is not an invitation to bypass the constitutional scheme of public employment. It is a challenge to the State‟s arbitrary refusals to sanction posts despite the employer‟s own acknowledgement of need and decades of continuous reliance on the very workforce. On the other hand, Umadevi (Supra) draws a distinction between illegal appointments and irregular engagements and does not endorse the perpetuation of precarious employment where the work itself is permanent and the State has failed, for years, to put WA No.693 of 2025 Page 80 of 96 its house in order. Recent decisions of this Court in Jaggo Vrs. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 and in Shripal Vrs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 have emphatically cautioned that Umadevi (Supra) cannot be deployed as a shield to justify exploitation through long-term "ad hocism", the use of outsourcing as a proxy, or the denial of basic parity where identical duties are exacted over extended periods. The principles articulated therein apply with full force to the present case. The relevant paras from Shripal (supra) have been reproduced hereunder:
„14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are "illegal" and those that are "irregular," the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 81 of 96
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years, sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer‟s failure to furnish such records-despite directions to do so-allows an adverse inference under well-
established labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavours perpetual daily wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature.
Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement. ***‟ ***
15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The State‟s refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003, in so far as they concern the Commission‟s proposals for sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed.
16. The appeal must, accordingly, be allowed.
17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and the State Governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform WA No.693 of 2025 Page 82 of 96 the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.
18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that "ad-
hocism" thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If "constraint" is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.
19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties, and the material indicating vacancies and comparator regularisations, we issue the following directions:
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 83 of 96i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts:
All appellants shall stand regularized with effect from 24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last- drawn wages if higher and the appellants shall be entitled to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the pay grade. For seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above.
ii. Financial consequences and arrears:
Each appellant shall be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular pay- level for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of regularization/ retirement/death, as the case may be.
Amounts already paid under previous interim directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears WA No.693 of 2025 Page 84 of 96 shall be released within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the date of default until payment.
iii. Retired appellants:
Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgment.
iv. Deceased appellants:
In the case of Appellant No. 5 and any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause (i), within three months of this Judgment.
v. Compliance affidavit:
The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P. Education Services Selection Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four months of this Judgment.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 85 of 96
20. We have framed these directions comprehensively because, case after case, orders of this Court in such matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling "reconsiderations," and administrative drift which further prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions, but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines, and verifiable compliance. As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India."
9.13. In State of Gujarat Vrs. Talsibhai Dhanjibhai Patel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2004 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"It is unfortunate that the State continued to take the services of the respondent as an ad-hoc for 30 years and thereafter now to contend that as the services WA No.693 of 2025 Page 86 of 96 rendered by the respondent are ad-hoc, he is not entitled to pension/pensionary benefit. The State cannot be permitted to take the benefit of its own wrong. To take the Services continuously for 30 years and thereafter to contend that an employee who has rendered 30 years continues service shall not be eligible for pension is nothing but unreasonable. As a welfare State, the State as such ought not to have taken such a stand.
2. In the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in directing the State to pay pensionary benefits to the respondent who has retired after rendering more than 30 years service."
Conclusion:
10. Having thus the view with respect to irregular engagement and the need for regularisation in service and parity of treatment in regularisation vis-a-vis Articles 14, 16 and 21, this Court finds that:
i. the respondent was engaged as Junior Assistant in Cuttack Municipality (now, Cuttack Municipal Corporation) since 01.11.1990;
ii. his name was not sponsored by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation for which no reason has been assigned. Though the respondent at the relevant point of time drew the attention of the authority, no step appears to have been taken.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 87 of 96
Such fact of non-sponsoring the name is acknowledged in the resolution of the Cuttack Municipal Corporation;
iii. by Order dated 06.07.2015 in W.P.(C) No.15134 of 2009 though it was directed to consider the case of the respondent for regularisation in service in the light of the co-employee's cases (Gajendra Prasad Behera, who was regularised in service was accorded with effect from his initial date of engagement and Rashmi Ranjan Singh, junior to the respondent, not only was considered for regularisation in service in the post of Junior Assistant from the date of his initial engagement, but also later on he was given promotion to the post of Senior Assistant), the case of the respondent was not considered pragmatically.
10.1. In the case of Vinod Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2024) 1 SCR 1230 = 2024 INSC 332 it has been indicated as follows:
"4. The appellants have approached this Court arguing that the High Court erred in its judgment by failing to recognize the substantive nature of their duties, which align with regular employment rather than the temporary or scheme-based roles they were originally appointed for. Furthermore, their promotion by a regularly constituted Departmental WA No.693 of 2025 Page 88 of 96 Promotional Committee, the selection process they underwent, and the continuous nature of their service for over a quarter of a century underscored their argument for regularization and that the High Court has incorrectly applied the principles from the case of Uma Devi (supra) to their situation.
***
8. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court finds merit in the appellants‟ arguments and holds that their service conditions, as evolved over time, warrant a reclassification from temporary to regular status. The failure to recognize the substantive nature of their roles and their continuous service akin to permanent employees runs counter to the principles of equity, fairness, and the intent behind employment regulations."
10.2. After taking note of judgments rendered in Secretary, State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247, &c. the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neelima Srivastava Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 8 SCR 167 = 2021 SCC OnLine SC 610 observed:
"32. The Division Bench of the High Court proceeded as if it was hearing an appeal against the judgment dated 23.01.2006 of the learned Single Judge which had already attained finality. Appeal filed under the Rules of the Court was filed against the judgment dated 15.05.2014 rendered in Writ Petition No. 8597 WA No.693 of 2025 Page 89 of 96 of 2010. It is a well settled principle of law that a Letters Patent Appeal which is in continuation of a Writ Petition cannot be filed collaterally to set aside the judgment of the same High Court rendered in an earlier round of litigation ignoring the principles of res- judicata and doctrine of finality.
33. By a majority decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vrs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 has laid down the law in this regard as under:
„When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions, of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate Court.
34. In Rupa Ashok Hurra Vrss. Ashok Hurra & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 103, while dealing with an identical issue this Court held that reconsideration of the judgment of this Court which has attained finality is not normally permissible. The decision upon a question of law rendered by this Court was conclusive and would bind the Court in subsequent cases. The Court cannot sit in appeal against its own judgment.WA No.693 of 2025 Page 90 of 96
35. In Union of India & Ors. Vrs. Major S.P. Sharma & Ors., (2014) 6 SCC 351, a three-judge bench of this Court has held as under:
„A decision rendered by a competent court cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings for the reason that if it is permitted to do so there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning.‟
36. Thus, it is very well settled that it is not permissible for the parties to re-open the concluded judgments of the Court as the same may not only tantamount to an abuse of the process of the Court but would have far reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice."
10.3. In N. Ramachandra Reddy Vrs. State of Telangana, (2019) 11 SCR 792 it has been restated as follows:
"43. Further, in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Workmen of Narendra & Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340, while considering the scope of the intra-Court appeal, this Court has held that, unless Appellate Bench concludes that findings of the learned Single Judge are perverse, it shall not disturb the same."
10.4. In Management of Narendra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vrs.
Workmen of Narendra & Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340 it has been observed as follows:
"Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion WA No.693 of 2025 Page 91 of 96 that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief."
10.5. In Wander Ltd. Vrs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp. SCC 727 following is the observation:
"14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to WA No.693 of 2025 Page 92 of 96 these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. Vrs. Pothan Joseph, (1960) 3 SCR 713 = AIR 1960 SC 1156: (SCR 721) „*** These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. Vrs. Jhanaton,1942 AC 130:
„*** the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case.‟ ***'***"
10.6. In Anindita Mohanty Vrs. The Senior Regional Manager, H.P. Co. Ltd., Bhubaneswar, 2020 (II) ILR-CUT 398 this Court had the occasion to examine the scope of intra- Court appeal and observed as follows:
"*** Let us first examine the power of the Division Bench while entertaining a Letters Patent appeal against the judgment/order of the Single Judge. This writ appeal has been nomenclature as an application under Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with clause 10 of the Letters Patent Act, 1992. Letters Patent of the Patna High Court has been made applicable to this Court by virtue of Orissa High Court Order, 1948. Letters Patent Appeal is an intra-Court appeal where under the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as vested in the Single Bench. (Ref: (1996) 3 SCC 52, Baddula Lakshmaiah Vrs. Shri Anjaneya Swami Temple). The Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal should not disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge WA No.693 of 2025 Page 93 of 96 of the Court unless it is shown to be based on no evidence, perverse, palpably unreasonable or inconsistent with any particular position in law. This scope of interference is within a narrow compass. Appellate jurisdiction under Letters Patent is really a corrective jurisdiction and it is used rarely only to correct errors, if any made.
In the case of B. Venkatamuni Vrs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh reported in (2006) 13 SCC 449, it is held that in an intra-Court appeal, the Division Bench undoubtedly may be entitled to reappraise both questions of fact and law, but entertainment of a letters patent appeal is discretionary and normally the Division Bench would not, unless there exist cogent reasons, differ from a finding of fact arrived at by the Single Judge. Even a Court of first appeal which is the final Court of appeal on fact may have to exercise some amount of restraint. Similar view was taken in the case of Umabai Vrs. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan reported in (2005) 6 SCC 243. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs. Karnataka Planters Coffee Curing Work Private Limited reported in (2016) 9 SCC 538, it is held that the jurisdiction of the Division Bench in a writ appeal is primarily one of adjudication of questions of law. Findings of fact recorded concurrently by the authorities under the Act concerned (Income Tax Act) and also in the first round of the writ proceedings by the learned Single Judge are not to be lightly disturbed.
Thus a writ appeal is an appeal on principle where the legality and validity of the judgment and/or order of the Single Judge is tested and it can be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against established or settled principle of law. If two views are possible and a view, which is WA No.693 of 2025 Page 94 of 96 reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a Single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing may be to the Division Bench; it is the view adopted by the Single Judge, which would, normally be allowed to prevail. If the discretion has been exercised by the Single Judge in good faith and after giving due weight to relevant matters and without being swayed away by irrelevant matters and if two views are possible on the question, then also the Division Bench in writ appeal should not interfere, even though it would have exercised its discretion in a different manner, were the case come initially before it. The exercise of discretion by the Single Judge should manifestly be wrong which would then give scope of interference to the Division Bench."
10.7. With such delineated scope laid down with respect to consideration of writ appeal, no factual perversity nor does legal flaw apparent on the face of Judgment dated 29.10.2024 of the learned Single Bench in W.P.(C) No.16335 of 2018 could be demonstrated by Sri Saswat Das, learned Additional Government Advocate. Therefore, the impugned Judgment of learned Single Judge does not warrant indulgence.
11. For the reasons ascribed supra and in the light of discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs and bearing in mind the scope for interference in intra-Court appeal, the writ appeal directed against Judgment dated 29.10.2024 rendered in W.P.(C) No.16335 of 2018 fails.
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 95 of 9612. As a consequence of dismissal of writ appeal, the authorities are directed to carry out the terms of Judgment dated 29.10.2024 and it is directed that entire exercise shall be concluded within a period of one month from date.
12.1. Failure to carry out the above direction within the aforesaid period would entail cost of Rs.5,000/- for each day of default, which shall be recovered from the salary of the authority concerned.
12.2. In the result, this writ appeal is dismissed with the above terms and pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
I agree.
(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY
Designation: Personal Assistant
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
(Secretary in-charge)
Reason: Authentication The 20th November, 2025//Aswini/Bichi/Laxmikant
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 20-Nov-2025 14:26:33
WA No.693 of 2025 Page 96 of 96