State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Dr. Kirandeep Kaur vs Beant Kaur And Others on 9 March, 2017
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PUNJAB
DAKSHIN MARG, SECTOR 37-A, CHANDIGARH.
1. First Appeal No.259 of 2014
Date of institution : 18.03.2014
Date of Reserve : 23.02.2017
Date of decision : 09.03.2017
Dr. Kirandeep Kaur, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Dhanaula, now
posted as Medical Officer (Gynecologist), Civil Hospital, Sangrur.
....Appellant/Opposite Party No.3
Versus
1. Smt. Beant Kaur wife of Khusia Singh son of Chetan Singh,
resident of Village Pharwahi, Tehsil and District Barnala.
....Respondent/Complainant
2. State of Punjab, through Deputy Commissioner, Barnala.
3. Chief Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Barnala.
4. Ms. Chhinderpal Kaur, Staff Nurse, Civil Hospital, Dhanaula.
5. Dr. Jasbir Singh Aulakh, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital,
Barnala.
6. National Insurance Company Limited, through its Manager,
opposite Parbhat Theatre, Barnala, Punjab.
....Respondents/Opposite Parties No.1,2 & 4 to 6
2. First Appeal No.432 of 2014
Date of institution : 11.04.2014
Date of Reserve : 23.02.2017
Date of decision : 09.03.2017
State of Punjab, through Deputy Commissioner, Barnala.
....Appellant/Opposite Party No.1
Versus
1. Smt. Beant Kaur wife of Khusia Singh son of Chetan Singh,
resident of Village Pharwahi, Tehsil and District Barnala.
....Respondent/Complainant
First Appeal No.259 of 2014 2
2. Dr. Kirandeep Kaur, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Dhanaula
now posted as Medical Officer (Gynecologist), Civil Hospital,
Sangrur, District Sangrur.
3. Chief Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Barnala, District Barnala.
4. Ms. Chhinderpal Kaur, Staff Nurse, Civil Hospital, Dhanaula,
District Barnala.
5. Dr. Jasbir Singh Aulakh, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital,
Barnala.
6. National Insurance Company Limited, through its Manager,
opposite Parbhat Theatre, Barnala, District Barnala.
....Respondents/Opposite Parties No.2 to 6
First Appeals against the order dated
10.02.2014 of the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Forum, Barnala.
Quorum:-
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Paramjeet Singh Dhaliwal, President
Mr. Harcharan Singh Guram, Member
Present:-
For the appellant : Sh. Mukand Gupta, Advocate
For respondent No.1 : Sh. Sarwinder Goyal, Advocate
For respondent No.2 : None
For respondent No.3 : None
For respondent No.4 : Service dispensed with
For respondent No.5 : Sh. Nitin Gupta, Advocate.
JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH DHALIWAL, PRESIDENT :
This order shall dispose of the above noted two appeals, which are directed against the order dated 10.02.2014 passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Barnala (in short, "the District Forum"), whereby the complaint filed by Smt. Beant Kaur, complainant, under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, "the Act") was allowed and opposite parties No.1 & 3 were jointly and severally directed to pay a consolidated amount of compensation of ₹2,00,000/- to the complainant for causing death of her newly born child. The complainant was also granted liberty to First Appeal No.259 of 2014 3 file a criminal complaint against opposite party No.3, if she so desired. Opposite party No.3 was also given liberty to recover the amount from the Insurance Company by filing a recovery suit in Civil Court. It was also observed that opposite party No.1 can also recover the amount from opposite party No.3.
2. The first appeal (F.A. No.259 of 2014) has been filed by opposite parties No.3 for setting aside the impugned order. Opposite party No.1 has also filed separate appeal (F.A. No.432 of 2014) for setting aside the impugned order.
3. It would be apposite to mention at the outset that hereinafter the parties will be referred, as have been arrayed before the District Forum.
4. Brief facts, as set out in the complaint, are that the complainant was pregnant and during labour pains, she was taken to CHC Dhanaula by her father-in-law Sh. Chetan Singh on 12.08.2011 in the evening. She was received by Chhinderpal Kaur, Staff Nurse, opposite party No.4 in the hospital and on the advice of Dr. Kirandeep Kaur, opposite party No.3, she was admitted in the said hospital. After admission, she suffered loose motions and opposite party No.4 after consulting opposite party No.3 gave some medicines to the complainant and the loose motions stopped. The complainant apprehended that the medicines given for loose motions were not suitable for health of the child in the womb. Opposite party No.3 failed to reach the hospital, despite various requests made by opposite party No.4. Opposite party No.4, on checking the complainant, informed her that she was having some First Appeal No.259 of 2014 4 gastric problem. Opposite party No.4 called opposite party No.3 and on the advice of opposite party No.3, opposite party No.4 pressed the stomach of the complainant and also gave some medicines. At the same time, opposite parties No.3 & 4 prescribed for getting some laboratory tests of the complainant from outside, because the laboratory of the hospital was closed. The complainant got her medical tests conducted from Mehak Computerized Laboratory, Dhanaula by paying ₹1,000/-. After checking the tests reports, opposite parties No.3 & 4 advised that the child will take birth by 6 a.m. in the morning. However, after some time, after checking the complainant, opposite party No.4 disclosed that 'latrine' of the child has emerged and opposite party No.3 was informed about this fact, who advised that the complainant should be taken to CHC Barnala immediately. Opposite parties No.3 & 4 advised the complainant to go to the hospital in lying condition by moving the body on the left side. Father-in-law of the complainant arranged an ambulance No.108 and the complainant was admitted in Civil Hospital, Barnala at 6.30 a.m. on 13.08.2011; where opposite party No.5 after checking the complainant informed that no latrine of the child had emerged and that the condition of the child in the womb was stable/normal. Thereafter, opposite party No.5 left the hospital. The complainant again developed some problem and was attended by the hospital staff, but opposite party No.5 failed to visit the hospital to check her, despite repeated requested made to him. In the meantime, the condition of the complainant deteriorated. Opposite party No.5 visited the hospital and shifted the complainant to the First Appeal No.259 of 2014 5 operation theatre. Upon asking by opposite party No.5, complainant replied that her earlier delivery was normal. Accordingly, opposite party No.5 told the complainant that this time also the delivery would be normal and no operation was required. Thereafter, after conducting the operation, the child was taken out from the womb and the newly born child started crying which showed that child was hale and hearty at the time of birth. However, as a shock, the child died suddenly. It was averred that the child died, because opposite parties No.3 to 5 gave wrong treatment to the complainant. They failed to provide medical service/aid to the complainant at the appropriate time. The complainant was discharged from the hospital on 20.08.2011. The medicines and the material used during operation were purchased by the father-in-law of the complainant from the private medical stores. The death of the newly born child took place due to negligence of opposite parties No.3 to 5, as they failed to discharge their obligatory duty and even committed an offence. A complaint was filed against opposite parties No.3 to 5 by her father-in-law, but no action was taken thereon. Father-in-law of the complainant also sought information under RTI Act from opposite party No.2 and the District Family Welfare Officer-cum- Deputy Medical Commissioner, Office of Civil Surgeon, Barnala, vide letter dated 02.11.2011, informed that the inquiry is pending, but no action was taken against the erring doctors. Thus, there was deficiency in service and medical negligence on the part of the opposite parties. Accordingly, the complainant sought the following directions to the opposite parties:-
First Appeal No.259 of 2014 6
i) to pay ₹50,000/-, as pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant due to purchase of medicines and lab. expenses;
ii) to pay ₹1,00,000/-, on account of mental tension, agony and physical harassment due to operation;
iii) to pay ₹2,00,000/-, as damages on account of death of the minor; and
iv) to pay ₹10,000/-, as cost of proceedings.
5. Upon notice, opposite party No.1 did not appear before the District Forum and was proceeded against ex parte, vide order dated 20.01.2012.
6. Opposite party No.2 appeared and filed reply, raising preliminary objections that the complaint is not maintainable. The complaint is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and mis- joinder of parties. The Punjab Health Systems Corporation, who is running Civil Hospital, Barnala is a necessary party. The designation of opposite party No.2 is not correctly mentioned in the complaint. The complainant has concealed material facts and she has not approached the District Forum with clean hands. The entire treatment was given to the complainant free of costs on behalf of Punjab Health Systems Corporation and, as such, the complainant does not fall within the definition of the "Consumer", as per the Act. The District Forum has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. On merits, it was admitted that father-in-law of the complainant filed a complaint to opposite party No.2 on 23.08.2011. On receipt of said complaint, Dr. Bhalinder Singh, The District Family Welfare Officer, office of Civil Surgeon, Barnala was First Appeal No.259 of 2014 7 appointed as Inquiry Officer, who conducted the inquiry and submitted his report, vide No.Steno/2011/2213 dated 29.12.2011 to opposite party No.2; whereby opposite parties No.3 to 5 were found innocent. As such, the complaint filed by the father-in-law of the complainant was filed, on the basis of the report dated 29.11.2011. The complainant is not entitled to any relief. Denying other allegations of the complaint, dismissal thereof was prayed with costs.
7. Opposite party No.3 in her reply taken similar preliminary objections as taken by opposite party No.2. On merits, it was pleaded that on 13.08.2011 at 12.05 A.M., the complainant was with the history of nausea and vomiting and was examined by opposite party No.3. Opposite party No.3 gave treatment in the shape of I V fluids, injection aciloc, injection perinorm and injection pantokem at about 12.30 A.M. and the patient was feeling well. The patient complained of mild labour pains at around 3.00 A.M., but by that time there was no chance of delivery of baby and normal delivery was waited. The complainant was not admitted in the hospital due to labour pains, as wrongly alleged by the complainant, but she was admitted due to acute gastritis (nausea+vomiting). After informing the attendant of patient and after taking his consent about need of caesarean, she was referred to Civil Hospital, Barnala at 6.00 A.M. in an ambulance, because O.T. staff of CHC Dhanaula was on strike. The patient was admitted by opposite party No.4, who was having a degree of GNM. The condition of the mother and fetus was stable from 3.00 A.M. onwards and the patient was First Appeal No.259 of 2014 8 continuously monitored. From 3.00 A.M. onwards, the patient was continuously monitored. At 5.40 A.M., the concerned nurse informed opposite party No.3 about decrease in fetal heart rate and about the passage of meconium by the fetus. Actually, the abdomen of the patient was palpated as per routine for monitoring the labour pains. The patient was advised to get the tests conducted, as were earlier advised on 19.07.2011, but the complainant was herself negligent in not getting the tests conducted from the Govt. Lab., which works only upto 2.00 P.M. It was further pleaded that the patient was not having any antenatal check-up or medical history prior to 19.07.2011 nor she got any tests from any other laboratory. It was denied that she was advised to get the medical tests from Mehak Computerized Lab., Dhanaula. The complainant herself admitted that the new born baby was delivered alive. It was denied that the new born baby died due to wrong treatment given by opposite parties No.3 & 4. There was no delay or negligence on their part in treating the complainant. While denying the other allegations of the complaint, opposite party No.3 prayed for the dismissal thereof with costs.
8. Opposite party No.4, in her reply, raised similar preliminary objections as raised by opposite party No.2. On merits, opposite party No.4 took similar defence as taken by opposite party No.3 and prayed for dismissal of the complaint.
9. Opposite party No.5, in his reply, raised similar preliminary objections as raised by opposite party No.2. On merits also, opposite party No.5 also raised similar defence as taken by First Appeal No.259 of 2014 9 opposite party No.2. In addition to that, opposite party No.5 pleaded that after delivery, the newly born child baby was received by Dr. Bharti Garg, Child Specialist of Civil Hospital, Barnala, who after examining the baby and giving necessary treatment to the baby, referred the baby to Rajendra Hospital, Patiala, because the baby was thickly meconium stained. Denying other allegations, the dismissal of the complaint was prayed.
10. Opposite party no.6 also adopted reply filed on behalf of opposite party No.2 and prayed for dismissal of the complaint.
11. The parties produced evidence in support of their respective averments before the District Forum, which after going through the same and hearing learned counsel on their behalf, allowed the complaint, vide impugned order. Hence, these appeals.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, respondent No.1 and respondent No.6 and have carefully gone through the record.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant/opposite party No.3 vehemently contended that the District Forum passed the impugned order, without properly appreciating the evidence produced on the record. The complainant took treatment from the Govt. hospital without any consideration and the complainant does not fall under the definition of "consumer". While admission of the complainant, she was thoroughly examined and properly treated, as per standard protocol and there was no medical negligence in treating her on the part of opposite party No.3. As the staff of Civil Hospital, Dhanaula was on strike at the relevant time, so the complainant was referred First Appeal No.259 of 2014 10 to Civil Hospital Barnala at 6.22 a.m. through ambulance; where she was operated by the doctors on 13.08.2011 and she delivered a child, who died after taking birth. After the patient was referred to Civil Hospital, Barnala in a stable condition, there was no occasion for opposite party No.3 to give wrong treatment to the patient thereafter. In support of his arguments, he relied upon Indian Medical Association Vs. V.P. Shantha & Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 651. The appeal is liable to be allowed and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
14. Per contra, learned counsel respondent No.1/complainant contended that the order passed by the District Forum is legal and valid and there is no ground for interfering with the same. Opposite party No.3 visited the hospital after repeated requests of opposite party No.4. Opposite party No.3, instead of conducting caesarean delivery, referred the complainant to Civil Hospital, Barnala without any reasonable cause. The opposite parties caused delay in giving treatment and even wrong treatment was given. Necessary tests were not prescribed. Had the opposite parties been vigilant, the life of the newly born child could have been saved. The medical negligence has been clearly proved on the part of the opposite parties and the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
15. We have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments raised on behalf of parties and have thoroughly examined the entire record.
First Appeal No.259 of 2014 11
16. First of all, we intend to decide the preliminary objection raised by the opposite parties that the complainant is not their consumer and does not falls under the definition of the "consumer", as per the Act, as the entire treatment was provided to her free of costs in a Govt. Hospital.
17. The "consumer" is defined, under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act, as under:
"Consumer" means any person who, --
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who 'hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a First Appeal No.259 of 2014 12 person who avails of such services for any commercial purposes.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this clause, "commercial purpose" does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self- employment.
18. A bare perusal of the above said definition of "consumer", shows that a consumer means any person, who buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. When such service, as referred to above, is availed, then the complainant certainly falls under the definition of "consumer". The definition of "consumer" is wide enough to include a patient, who merely promised to pay the treatment charges to the hospital.
19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Savita Garg Vs. The Director, National Heart Institute 2004 (10) CPSC 1031 while dealing with the issue of free of charge as well as paid treatment, held in Para No.14 as under:-
First Appeal No.259 of 2014 13
14. Therefore, as per the English decisions also the distinction of 'contract of service' and 'contract for service', in both the contingencies the courts have taken the view that the hospital is responsible for the acts of their permanent staff as well as staff whose services are temporarily requisitioned for the treatment of the patients. Therefore, the distinction which is sought to be pressed into service so ably by learned counsel cannot absolve the hospital or the institute as it is responsible for the acts of its treating doctors who are on the panel and whose services are requisitioned from time to time by the hospital looking to the nature of the diseases. The hospital or the institute is responsible and no distinction could be made between the two classes of persons i.e. the treating doctor who was on the staff of the hospital and the nursing staff and the doctors whose services were temporarily taken for treatment of the patients. On both, the hospital as the controlling authority is responsible and it cannot take the shelter under the plea that treating physician is not impleaded as a party, the claim petition should be dismissed. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & ors. There the question had come up before this Court with regard to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 vis-a`-vis the medical profession. This Court has dealt with all aspects of medical profession from every angle and has come to the conclusion that the doctors or the institutes owe a duty to the patients and they cannot get away in case of lack of care to the patients. Their Lordships have gone to the extent that even if the doctors are rendering services free of charge to the patients in the Government hospitals, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act will apply since the expenses of running the said hospitals are met by appropriation from the Consolidated Fund which is raised from the taxes paid by the tax payers. Their Lordships have First Appeal No.259 of 2014 14 dealt with regard to the definition of "service" given in Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and have observed as follows:
" The service rendered free of charge to patients by doctors/ hospitals whether non-Govt. or Govt. who render free service to poor patients but charge fee for services rendered to other patients would, even though it is free, not be excluded from definition of service in Section 2(1)(o). The Act seeks to protect the interests of consumers as a class. To hold otherwise would mean that the protection of the Act would be available to only those who can afford to pay and such protection would be denied to those who cannot so afford, though they are the people who need the protection more. It is difficult to conceive that the legislature intended to achieve such a result. Another consequence of adopting a construction, which would restrict the protection of the Act to persons who can afford to pay for the services availed by them and deny such protection to those who are not in a position to pay for such services, would be that the standard and quality of services rendered at an establishment would cease to be uniform. It would be of a higher standard and of better quality for persons who are in a position to pay for such service while the standard and quality of such service would be inferior for person who cannot afford to pay for such service and who avail the service without payment. Such a consequence would defeat the object of the Act. All persons who avail the services by doctors and hospitals who give free service to poor patients but charge fee for others, are required to be treated on the same footing irrespective of the fact that some of them pay for the service and others avail the same free of charge. Most of the doctors and hospitals work on commercial lines and the expenses incurred for providing services free of charge to patients who are not in a position to bear the charges are met out of the income earned by such First Appeal No.259 of 2014 15 doctors and hospitals from services rendered to paying patients. The Government hospitals may not be commercial in that sense but on the overall consideration of the objectives and the scheme of the Act it would not be possible to treat the Government hospitals differently. In such a situation the persons belonging to "Poor class" who are provided services free of charge are the beneficiaries of the service which is hired or availed of by the "paying class". Service rendered by the doctors and hospitals who render free service to poor patients and charge fees for others irrespective of the fact that part of the service is rendered free of charge, would nevertheless fall within the ambit of the expression "service"
as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act."
20. Identical issue arose in the case of Pravat Kumar Mukherjee Vs. Ruby General Hospital & Ors. II (2005) CPJ 35 (NC); wherein, after discussing the entire law on the subject, the Hon'ble National Commission held that even if no payment is made, still the complainant falls under the definition of the "consumer". The authority relied upon by learned counsel for opposite party No.3 is distinguishable, as per the observations and law discussed above.
21. In view of the above law, even the persons availing treatment from Government Hospitals free of charge are to be held to be beneficiaries-consumers. As such, the complainant certainly falls within the definition of the "consumer", as defined in the Act, as the treatment undertaken by opposite parties squarely falls within the definition of "service" as per the definition given in Section 2 (1)
(o) of the Act.
22. Now coming to the merits of the case, the complainant was admitted in Civil Hospital, Dhanaula on 12.08.2011 vide Ex.R-1 First Appeal No.259 of 2014 16 and as per version of opposite party No.3, at that time the patient was not in labour pains. She was admitted with the history of nausea and vomiting and opposite party No.3 gave treatment i.e. I V fluids, injection aciloc, injection perinorm etc. as per document which is part of Ex.R-1. The case of the complainant is that opposite party No.3 was not present in the hospital at the relevant time and she was called after making repeated calls by opposite party No.4. Delivery by way of caesarean operation was the urgent need at that time, but opposite party No.3 referred the complainant to Civil Hospital, Barnala after a considerable delay and even without any sufficient cause. Opposite party No.3 was cross-examined in this case. She deposed in cross-examination that the complainant was nine months pregnant at the time of her admission in the hospital and complained of vomiting, pain in abdomen. She further deposed that she was capable of conducting caesarean operation in such a situation. During the cross-examination, opposite party No.3 showed here ignorance about the rules regarding referring any patient to some higher hospital. She further admitted it correct that it is mentioned in Ex.C-5 that she advised the treatment on telephone. She further deposed that the complainant was referred to higher hospital due to strike of OT staff in the hospital. However, there is no documentary evidence to prove that the OT staff of Civil Hospital Dhanaula was on strike on that day. Opposite party No.3 was also cross-examined by opposite party No.5 and she stated that Dr. Rohit Ram Pal had admitted the patient. She also admitted that she did not advise the patient for any test at the time of admission. She First Appeal No.259 of 2014 17 further admitted that Dr. Rohit Ram Pal had not given his opinion before referring the patient in that condition to Civil Hospital, Barnala. She conveyed Dr. Rohit Ram Pal on telephone to refer the patient. She also admitted that she was busy in conducting another delivery. She also admitted that she did not contact the SMO for arranging the nurse and it was an emergency. Opposite party No.3 also admitted that opposite party No.4 was capable of providing services in emergency situation. She specifically admitted that she was not present in the hospital at the time of referring the patient.
23. Further Dr. Jasbir Singh Aulakh, opposite party No.5 was also cross-examined in this case. He specifically admitted that the case of the patient was serious in nature. The meconium had already passed by the fetus, so at the time of admission, the decision to conduct caesarean section was taken. Since the patient was anaemic, so her relatives were advised to arrange for the blood. He further stated that in such type of cases it is very important to deliver the child as soon as possible. He admitted that the delay may cause death of the child. He further stated that the complainant was operated upon and no other patient was available for surgery on that day.
24. The allegations of the complainant have been proved by her by way of her affidavit Ex.CW-1/A. It stands proved from document Ex.R-1/A that the complainant was admitted in the hospital at 12.05 a.m. and remained there till 6.00 a.m., when opposite party No.3 referred the complainant to Civil Hospital at Barnala. From the deposition of opposite party No.3, it is proved First Appeal No.259 of 2014 18 that she was capable of performing caesarean operation. It is pertinent to note that as per the affidavit of Dr. Kirandeep Kaur, opposite party No.3, there was thick meconium and it was an emergency situation and immediate caesarean operation was required to save the life of the complainant as well as the child. When she was capable of performing caesarean operation, then why she did not conduct the caesarean operation on the complainant immediately in such a critical situation. She did not come to the hospital rather chose to prescribe medicines on phone. As already mentioned above, there is no evidence on the record to prove that OT staff was on strike on the relevant day. From 12.05 a.m. to 6.00 a.m. i.e. for about 6 hours the complainant remained at Civil Hospital, Dhanaula in such a critical situation, but opposite party No.3 had not done the needful at the appropriate point of time. Opposite parties No.1 & 3 failed to rebut the evidence of the complainant that opposite party No.3 was responsible for the loss of child suffered by the complainant.
25. Establishing medical negligence against the treating doctor is often very difficult. The medical expert witness can only draw inferences from the findings recorded in the medical record by the concerned doctors. It is the concerned doctor, who remains present at the time of conducting the surgery, along with his supporting staff. He only knows, what really occurred, when the alleged medical negligence happened. Even the well trained and knowledgeable expert in the field will not be in a position to ascertain the medical negligence. They are to opine only on the First Appeal No.259 of 2014 19 basis of medical record made available. Sometimes, things speak of itself. It is a legal concept, which is known as 'res-ipsa-loquitur'. In the present case, it needs to be examined, whether it will be of any help.
26. In view of above discussion, opposite party No.1 & 3 failed to prove that there was no medical negligence on the part of opposite party No.3. Instead of personally examining the patient, opposite party No.3-Dr. Kirandeep Kaur only instructed the concerned nurse, opposite party No.4, to give the treatment to the patient, without any justification, including the pressing of her stomach (belly). Furthermore, she should have looked into the urgency in the present case. The lack on the part of opposite party No.3 resulted in deterioration of the health of the patient and consequently the complainant lost the precious life of her newly born child, which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Such an act and conduct of opposite party No.3 clearly amounts to medical negligence and deficiency in service on her part. The District Forum, after discussing the entire evidence and case law, has passed a well reasoned and speaking order and there is no ground to interfere with the same.
27. Accordingly, both the appeals i.e. F.A. No.259 of 2014 and F.A. No.432 of 2014 are dismissed and the impugned order is upheld.
28. In F.A. No.259 of 2014, the appellant/opposite party No.3 had deposited a sum of ₹25,000/- at the time of filing of the appeal. This amount, along with interest which has accrued thereon, First Appeal No.259 of 2014 20 if any, be remitted by the registry to the respondent No.1/complainant, by way of a crossed cheque/demand draft after the expiry of 45 days of the sending of certified copy of the order to them.
29. In F.A. No.432 of 2014, the appellant/opposite party No.1 had deposited a sum of ₹25,000/- at the time of filing of the appeal. This amount, along with interest which has accrued thereon, if any, be remitted by the registry to the respondent No.1/complainant, by way of a crossed cheque/demand draft after the expiry of 45 days of the sending of certified copy of the order to them.
30. The appeals could not be decided within the statutory period due to heavy pendency of court cases.
(JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH DHALIWAL) PRESIDENT (HARCHARAN SINGH GURAM) MEMBER March 09, 2017.
(Gurmeet S)