Karnataka High Court
Ramesh S/O Shivappa Revadigar And Ors vs The Spl Land Acquisition Officer .And ... on 24 April, 2020
Bench: G.Narendar, M.Nagaprasanna
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF APRIL 2020
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.NARENDAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
M.F.A. No.200380 OF 2015 (LAC) C/W. M.F.A.No.200379
OF 2015, M.F.A.No.200381 OF 2015, M.F.A.No.33116 OF
2013, MFA CROB. No.200055 OF 2016, M.F.A.No.33115 OF
2013, MFA CROB. No.200054 OF 2016, M.F.A.No.33114 OF
2013, MFA CROB.NO.200053 OF 2016, M.F.A.No.33117 OF
2013 AND MFA CROB. No.200052 OF 2016(LAC)
IN M.F.A. NO.200380 OF 2015 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
1. RAMESH
S/O SHIVAPPA REVADIGAR
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. PARWATI
W/O GANGAPPA REVADIGAR,
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2
3. SHRIDEVI
W/O GURAPPA,
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI HARSHAVARDHAN R. MALI PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
AND A.C. BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. THE EX. ENGINEER, M.I.DN.
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ARCHANA P. TIWARI, AGA.)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION
ACT, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL WITH COSTS AND
MODIFY THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD PASSED BY II ADDL.
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR DATED 04.07.2013 IN
LAC NO.50/2010 AND FIX MARKET VALUE AT THE RATE OF
Rs.5,50,000/- PER ACRE AND AWARD ALL STATUTORY
BENEFITS, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY ETC.
IN M.F.A. NO.200379 OF 2015 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
1. RAMESH
S/O SHIVAPPA REVADIGAR
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
3
2. PARWATI
W/O GANGAPPA REVADIGAR,
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
3. SHRIDEVI
W/O GURAPPA REVADIGAR,
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI HARSHAVARDHAN R. MALI PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
AND A.C. BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. THE EX. ENGINEER, M.I.DN.
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ARCHANA P. TIWARI, AGA.)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION
ACT, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL WITH COSTS AND
MODIFY THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD PASSED BY II ADDL.
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR DATED 04.07.2013 IN
LAC NO.49/2010 AND FIX MARKET VALUE AT THE RATE OF
Rs.5,50,000/- PER ACRE AND AWARD ALL STATUTORY
BENEFITS, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
4
IN M.F.A. NO.200381 OF 2015 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
1. RAMESH
S/O SHIVAPPA REVADIGAR
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. PARWATI
W/O GANGAPPA REVADIGAR,
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
3. SHRIDEVI
W/O GURAPPA,
AGE: MAJOR, OCCU: AGRICULTURE,
R/O KAKHANDAKI TQ. AND DIST.
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI HARSHAVARDHAN R. MALI PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
AND A.C. BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. THE EX. ENGINEER, M.I.DN.
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ARCHANA P. TIWARI, AGA.)
5
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION
ACT, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL WITH COSTS AND
MODIFY THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD PASSED BY II ADDL.
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR DATED 04.07.2013 IN
LAC NO.51/2010 AND FIX MARKET VALUE AT THE RATE OF
Rs.5,50,000/- PER ACRE AND AWARD ALL STATUTORY
BENEFITS, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY ETC.
IN M.F.A. NO.33116 OF 2013 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER AND ASST. COMMISSIONER
BIJAPUR - 585 103. ... APPELLANT
(BY SMT.ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
AND:
1. BASAPPA
S/O MALLAPPA KORI
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O KAKHANDAKI, TQ. BIJAPUR - 585 103.
2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 585 103. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENT NO.1;
NOTICE TO R2 IS SERVED)
6
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAC ACT, AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED:13.02.2013 PASSED
IN LAC NO:40/2010 ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR, WHEREIN PARTLY ALLOWING
THE CLAIM REFERENCE PETITION AND ENHANCED
COMPENSATION @ RS.3,06,000/- PER ACRE FOR
IRRIGATED LANDS ETC.
IN M.F.A. CROB.NO.200055 OF 2016 (LA)
BETWEEN:
BASAPPA
S/O MALLAPPA KORI,
AGE: 72 YRS., OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
R/O KAKHANDAKI - 586 101
TQ. & DIST.: VIJAYAPUR. ... CROSS OBJECTOR
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER &
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
THIS MFA CROB. IS FILED U/O 41 R-22 OF CPC,
PRAYING TO MODIFY THE COMPENSATION AWARDED BY
7
IIND ADDL.SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BIJAPUR IN LAC
NO.40/10 PASSED ON 13.02.2013 BY FIXING THE MARKET
VALUE AT THE RATE OF RS.9,00,000/- PER ACRE ALONG
WITH ALL STATUTORY BENEFITS AS CLAIMED BY THE
APPELLANTS IN RESPECT AS CLAIMED BY THE APPELLANTS
IN RESPECT OF ACQUIRED LAND BEARING SY.NO.89/3/X
MEASURING 4, A-11 G OF KAKHANDAKI VILLAGE,
TQ.BIJAPUR, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE ETC.
IN M.F.A. NO.33115 OF 2013 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER AND ASST. COMMISSIONER
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... APPELLANT
(BY SMT.ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
AND:
1. SAMANT
S/O BANDU PATTANKAR
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O KAKHANDAKI, TQ. BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENT NO.1;
NOTICE TO R2 IS SERVED)
8
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAC ACT, AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED:13.02.2013 PASSED
IN LAC NO: 41/2010 ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR, WHEREIN PARTLY ALLOWING
THE CLAIM REFERENCE PETITION AND ENHANCED
COMPENSATION @ RS.3,06,000/- PER ACRE FOR
IRRIGATED LANDS ETC.
IN M.F.A. CROB.NO.200054 OF 2016 (LA)
BETWEEN:
SAMANT
S/O BANDU PAATANKAR,
AGE: 60 YRS., OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
R/O KAKHANDAKI - 586 101
TQ. & DIST.: VIJAYAPUR. ... CROSS OBJECTOR
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER &
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
2. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
THIS MFA CROB. IS FILED U/O 41 R-22 OF CPC,
PRAYING TO MODIFY THE COMPENSATION AWARDED BY
IIND ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BIJAPUR IN LAC
9
NO.41/10 PASSED ON 13.02.2013 BY FIXING THE MARKET
VALUE AT THE RATE OF RS.9,00,000/- PER ACRE ALONG
WITH ALL STATUTORY BENEFITS AS CLAIMED BY THE
APPELLANTS IN RESPECT AS CLAIMED BY THE APPELLANTS
IN RESPECT OF ACQUIRED LAND BEARING SY.NO.122/1K
MEASURING 5 ACRE G OF KAKHANDAKI VILLAGE,
TQ.BIJAPUR, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
IN M.F.A. NO.33114 OF 2013(LAC)
BETWEEN:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER AND ASST. COMMISSIONER ... APPELLANT
(BY SMT.ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
AND:
1. KAMALABAI BALAPPA
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O KAKHANDAKI, TQ.BIJAPUR.
2. SHIVALINGAPPA BALAPPA,
KOLKAR, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O KAKHANDAKI, TQ.BIJAPUR.
SINCE DEAD BY LRs,
2(I) KAMALABAI
(II) RAMAPPA BOTH R/O KAKHANDAKI,
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPURA.
3. RAMAPPA
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
10
R/O KAKHANDAKI, TQ.BIJAPUR.
4. RENUKA
D/O BALAPPA KOLKAR
(RS NO.88/1B)
SINCE DEAD BY LRs
4(I) KAMALABAI W/O BALAPPA
(II) RAMAPPA S/O BALAPPA
5. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION, BIJAPUR. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENT NOS.1
TO 4;)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAC ACT, AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED:13.02.2013 PASSED
IN LAC NO:36/2010 ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR, WHEREIN PARTLY ALLOWING
THE CLAIM REFERENCE PETITION AND ENHANCED
COMPENSATION @ RS.2,04,000/- PER ACRE FOR DRY
LANDS ETC.
IN M.F.A. CROB.NO.200053 OF 2016 (LA)
BETWEEN:
1. KAMALABAI BALAPPA,
AGE: 72 YRS., OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
2. SHIVALIGAPPA BALAPPA KOLAKAR,
SINCE DECEASED REPRESENTED BY, LRs
11
i) CROSS-OBJECTOR NO.1 I.E.,KAMALABAI, AND
ii) CROSS-OBJECTOR NO.3 I.E., RAMAPPA.
3. RAMAPPA
AGE: 45 YRS., OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
4. RENUKA
D/O BALAPPA KOLAKAR,
SINCE DECEASED REPRESENTED BY LRs
i) KAMALABAI W/O BALAPPA KOLAKAR,
AGE: 72 YRS., OCC: AGRICULURIST,
ii) RAMAPPA
S/O BALAPPA KOLAKAR,
AGE: 45 YRS., OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
iii) SHIVALINGAPPA
S/O BALAPPA KOLAKAR,
SINCE DECEASED REPRESENTED BY
i) CROSS-OBJECTOR NO.1 I.E.,KAMALABAI
AND
ii) CROSS-OBJECTOR NO.3 I.E., RAMAPPA.
ALL ARE R/O
KAKHANDAKI - 586 101
TQ. & DIST.: VIJAYAPUR. ... CROSS-OBJECTORS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER &
ASST. COMMISSIONER, BIJAPUR - 586 101.
12
2. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
THIS MFA CROB. FILED UNDER ORDER 41 R-22 OF
CPC, PRAYING TO MODIFY THE COMPENSATION AWARDED
BY IIND ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BIJAPUR IN LAC
NO.36/10 PASSED ON 13 .02.2013 BY FIXING THE MARKET
VALUE AT THE RATE OF RS.9,00,000/- PER ACRE ALONG
WITH ALL STATUTORY BENEFITS AS CLAIMED BY THE
APPELLANTS IN RESPECT OF ACQUIRED LAND BEARING
SY.NO.88/3 & 88/1 B MEASURING 5 ACRES AND 24
GUNTAS OF KAKHANDAKI VILLAGE, TQ.BIJAPUR, IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND ETC.
IN M.F.A. NO.33117 OF 2013 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER AND ASST. COMMISSIONER
BIJAPUR - 585 103. ... APPELLANT
(BY SMT. ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
AND:
1. GURUPADAPPA
S/O MALLAPPA KORI
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O KAKHANDAKI, TQ. BIJAPUR - 585 103.
13
2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 585 103. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES FOR RESPONDENT
NO.1;
NOTICE TO R2 IS SERVED)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAC ACT, AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED:13.02.2013 PASSED
IN LAC NO:38/2010 ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AT BIJAPUR, WHEREIN PARTLY ALLOWING
THE REFERENCE PETITION AND ENHANCED
COMPENSATION @ RS.3,06,000/- PER ACRE FOR
IRRIGATED LANDS AND ETC.
IN M.F.A. CROB.NO.200052 OF 2016 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
GURUPADAPPA,
S/O MALLAPPA KORI,
AGE: 75 YRS., OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O KAKHANDAKI - 586 101
TQ. & DIST. VIJAYAPUR. ... CROSS-OBJECTOR
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ KAREDDY AND SRI BIRADAR
VIRANAGOUDA, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER &
ASST. COMMISSIONER.
BIJAPUR - 586 101.
14
2. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MINOR IRRIGATION,
BIJAPUR - 586 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ARCHANA P.TIWARI, AGA.)
THIS MFA CROB. FILED UNDER SECTION 41 RULE 22
OF CPC, PRAYING TO MODIFY THE COMPENSATION
AWARDED BY IIND ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BIJAPUR
IN LAC NO.38/10 PASSED ON 13 .02.2013 BY FIXING THE
MARKET VALUE AT THE RATE OF RS.9,00,000/- PER ACRE
ALONG WITH ALL STATUTORY BENEFITS AS CLAIMED BY
THE APPELLANTS IN RESPECT OF ACQUIRED LAND
BEARING SY.NO.89/2X MEASURING 4 ACRE OF
KAKHANDAKI VILLAGE, TQ. BIJAPUR.
THESE MFAs'. AND MFA CROSS OBJECTIONS HAVING
BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 22.1.2020,
COMING ON THIS DAY, M.NAGAPRASANNA J., PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:-
JUDGMENT
This conglomeration of appeals filed under Section 54(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, raise a challenge to the common judgment passed by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bijapur (hereinafter stated as 'Reference Court' for short) in LAC.Nos.38, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of 2010 disposed on 13.02.2013 and common judgment in LAC.Nos.49, 50 and 51 of 2010 dated 04.07.2013 respectively. 15 MFA.Nos.33114 of 2013, 33115 of 2013, 33116 of 2013, 33117 of 2013 are filed by the State Government against the order of the Reference Court dated 13.02.2013 insofar as it determines the amount of compensation to them as being grossly excessive. Cross Appeals in MFA-CROB.Nos.200052 of 2016, 200053 of 2016, 200054 of 2016 and 200055 of 2016 are filed by the land losers challenging the award of the Reference Court insofar as it determines the amount of compensation to them as being grossly inadequate. MFA 200379 of 2015, MFA 200380 of 2015, MFA 200381 of 2015 are filed by the land losers against the order of the Reference Court dated 04.07.2013 insofar as it determines the amount of compensation to them as being grossly inadequate .
2. Facts material for the adjudication of the appeals are as follows:
MFA.Nos.33114 of 2013, 33115 of 2013, 33116 of 2013 and 33117 of 2013 and MFA-CROB.Nos.200052 of 2016, 200053 of 2016, 200054 of 2016 and 200055 of 2016:16
The subject matter of acquisition in the aforestated appeals are concerning the lands situated in Kakhandaki Village, Bijapur Taluk and District. The preliminary notification was issued on 29.09.2006 under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short), proposing to acquire the said lands for construction of a Minor Irrigation Tank. The Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as 'the LAO' for short) determined the market value of the land at Rs.57,500/- per acre for irrigated lands and Rs.44,000/-
per acre for dry lands. The claimants on protest sought reference under Section 18 (1) of the Act. The survey number, extent of land in the respective LACs. filed by the land losers (hereinafter referred to as 'the claimants') are in terms of the chart depicted below:
MFA No.200379 of 2015, MFA No.200380 of 2015 and MFA No.200381 of 2015 :
Sl. LAC No. Name of the Kakhandaki Extent A-
No. claimants Sy.No. Gs 1 49/10 1. Ramesh S. 4 acres Kakhandaki Revadigar 2. Parwati G. 17 Revadigar 3. Shridevi G., Revadigar 2 50/10 1. Ramesh S. 1-36 " Revadigar 2. Parwati G. Revadigar 3. Shridevi G., Revadigar 3 51/10 1. Ramesh S. 1-20 " Revadigar 2. Parwati G. Revadigar 3. Shridevi G., Revadigar
MFA Nos.33114 of 2013, 33115 of 2013, 33116 of 2013 and 33117 of 2013 and MFA-CROB.Nos.200052 of 2016, 200053 of 2016, 200054 of 2016 and 200055 of 2016:
Sl. No. LAC Sy.No. Measuring Village acres - Gs 01 38/10 89/2X 4 acres Kakhandaki 02 30/10 121/2/K 1 - 36 "
03 31/10 602/K 1 - 20 "
04 32/10 121/2A/1 1 - 18 "18
05 33/10 121/1P 7Gs "
06 34/10 122/1B 1 - 31 "
07 35/10 602/1/B/K 2 - 28 "
08 36/10 88/3, 5 - 24 "
88/1B 09 37/10 121/2A/2 2 acres "
10 39/10 121/2B 2 acres "
11 40/10 89/3/x 4 - 11 out "
of 1-2
Karab 3-09
12 41/10 122/1k 5 acres "
13 42/11 628/2x, 1-5 "
628/2x1,
628/2x2
3. The Reference Court has awarded a sum of Rs.3,06,000/- per acre for wet land and Rs.2,07,000/- per acre for dry lands in terms of its common judgment dated 13.02.2013 in LAC. Nos.38, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41 of 2010 and 42 of 2011. The State has challenged the award of the Reference Court dated 13.02.2013 in MFA.Nos.33114 of 2013, 33115 of 2013, 33116 of 2013 and 33117 of 2013. MFA No.33114 of 2013 was before the learned Division Bench and the 19 other MFAs'. filed by the State Government were listed before the learned Single Judge, who, on 01.12.2015 granted stay of the order of the Reference Court in the aforementioned cases subject to the State Government depositing 50% of the amount along with proportionate interest within a period of four weeks from that date. Subsequently, by an order dated 01.04.2016, all the aforementioned MFAs. were directed to be tagged along with MFA.No.33114 of 2013 filed by the State Government which was pending before the learned Division Bench. After issuance of notice in the above stated MFAs. the claimants filed cross-
appeals in MFA-CROB.Nos.200052 of 2016, 200053 of 2016, 200054 of 2016 and 200055 of 2016. Thus, against the judgment of the Reference Court dated 13.02.2013, MFAs'. filed by the State Government and the cross appeals filed by the claimants arose.
4. There was one more set of acquisition proceedings under the same notification, in the same village and for the same purpose. Subject matter of acquisition proceedings in the lands bearing Survey Nos.91/1, 91/2 and 92 to the extent of 4 20 acres and 20 guntas, 2 acres and 37 guntas and 2 acres and 36 guntas respectively. The LAO determined the market value of the land at Rs.57,500/- per acre for irrigated lands and Rs.2,07,000/- per acre for dry lands, as was done in the case of other land losers of the same acquisition. The claimants on protest sought reference under Section 18 (1) of the Act and on the reference filed by them, the Reference Court awarded a sum of Rs.3,06,000/- per acre for wet land in terms of its judgment dated 04.07.2013 in LAC Nos.49, 50 and 51 of 2010 following the judgment passed in LAC No.38 of 2010. Aggrieved by the award passed by the Reference Court, the claimants have preferred MFA.No.200379/2015 against the award in LAC.No.49/2010 and MFA.No.200380/2015 against LAC.No.50/2010 and MFA.No.200381/2015 against LAC.No.51 of 2010. The State Government has not chosen to file any appeal against the award of the Reference Court in LAC.Nos.49, 50 and 51 of 2010.
5. Contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate for the appellant - State Government in all the appeals :
21
The State contends that the Reference Court has grossly erred in placing reliance upon Exhibits P.11 and P.12 for determining the market value, taking into consideration the maximum yield of sugarcane of 51 tons of sugarcane crop and the maximum price of Rs.1,200/- per ton, which is completely contrary to the records and the evidence produced before the Court. The Reference Court has not at all taken into consideration the crops grown, the yield and the price that the claimants got for the crops that they had grown. It is the further contention of the State that the Reference Court ought to have taken note of the actual crops grown in the respective lands, the actual yield at the price that the respective crops fetched to arrive at a just compensation to be awarded to the claimants.
6. The State would contend that the Reference Court could have arrived at the market value on the available independent evidence on the basis of capitalization method as in identical circumstances the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of HEERABAI AND OTHERS Vs. THE LAND 22 ACQUISITION OFFICER reported in (2010) 10 SCC 492 wherein, the Apex Court has determined the market value at Rs.75,600/- per acre for irrigated lands acquired for Bheema Lift Irrigation Project in terms of notification dated 08.06.1995. On the strength of the judgment, the State contends that there is a gap of 11 years between the notification concerning Bheema Lift Irrigation Project which was on 08.06.1995 and the notification in the instant case. If the escalation at the rate of 10% is considered, the market value of the subject lands would be Rs.1,58,760/- per acre, the market value of Rs.3,06,000/- now awarded for the subject lands is on the higher side and against the well-established principles of law.
7. The State further contends that the Reference Court has committed a grave error in relying upon the evidence of PW.1 to PW.3 who have deposed on behalf of all the claimants which is blatantly contrary to law. The price and the yield in the absence of examining the author of the documents i.e. exhibits P8 to P13 could not have been taken as evidence as mere 23 marking of a document will not amount its proof. The Reference Court has not taken judicial notice of the pattern of crops grown in the area. On the aforementioned contentions, the State submits that the appeals filed by the claimants should be dismissed and the appeals filed by the State should be allowed and the matter should be remitted back to the Reference Court for re-determination of the compensation in accordance with law after giving adequate opportunity to all the concerned.
8. Contention of the learned counsel for claimants in all the appeals:
The claimants contend that the Reference Court has grossly erred in restricting its consideration only to Exhibit P.15 for the purpose of determination of compensation, the Reference Court ought to have considered other modes of determination and the documents placed before it. The determination of compensation in Exhibit P.15 is on the basis of capitalization method taking Sugarcane as the crop grown and the Reference Court in that judgment - Ex.P.15 has erred in considering a 24 conservative price and yield and does not reflect the true market value.
9. It is the contention that the Reference Court ought to have placed reliance on Exhibit P.10, which is a better piece of evidence reflecting true market value of the land in the area as Exhibit P.10 pertains to acquisition of lands for NTPC Thermal Project acquired in terms of preliminary notification under the KIADB Act on 07.01.2010. If that is taken into consideration, the difference between the notifications is only about 3½ years and therefore the Reference Court ought to have adopted the market value granted for the land that is acquired for the NTPC Thermal Project by applying appropriate de-escalation. It is the claim that Exhibit P.10 the value of land acquired for the Thermal Project was settled at Rs.7 lakhs per acre for irrigated lands and subsequently on re-negotiation, an additional sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid to the land losers/claimants as ex-gratia apart from other benefits. It is submitted that the lands of the claimants should also be determined under the same parameters 25 as is determined for the acquisition for the NTPC Thermal Project as they are similarly situated lands.
10. It is further contended that the learned Division Bench of this Court in MFA.No.30132 of 2012 and connected cases pertaining to the acquisition of similarly placed lands during the same period pertaining to the same taluk has determined market value at the rate of Rs.8,03,690/- per acre. The claimants contend that they are also entitled for the same compensation. It is the contention that at the time of preliminary notification concerning the lands for acquisition, the market value of the subject land was more than Rs.7 lakhs per acre and due to inability of the claimants to pay the court fee, the claim was restricted to Rs.2,85,000/-per acre.
11. The claimants also place reliance on the decision of this Court in MFA No.32005/2012 and connected cases wherein, the market value for similarly placed lands acquired during the same period i.e. 2005 is determined at Rs.7,20,000/- per acre 26 and would also submit that the award in LAC.No.22/2010 which was acquired for Upper Krishna Project in terms of notification dated 24.07.2006, the market value was determined at Rs.6,02,000/- per acre and the said award has been satisfied by the Government by paying the compensation to the land losers concerning acquisition for Upper Krishna Project dated 24.07.2006. The contention of the claimants is that, there is hardly any difference between the Lands acquired for Upper Krishna Project at the subject lands for construction of Minor Irrigation Tank and the dates of notification of acquisition is also around the same time. The cumulative contention is that, the market value for the acquisition in the year 2006 on an average for the kind of lands that are acquired in the subject appeals are to be determined at Rs.6.00 lakh per acre for wetlands, which would be just and fair compensation and the same be awarded to them. The claimants contended that the determination of the compensation by the Reference Court runs contrary to the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is germane to notice that all the claimants before this Court have filed an application seeking to bring in additional evidence on 14.03.2019. The 27 additional evidence that the claimants are wanting to bring in record are the proceedings of the KIADB in respect of acquisition of lands in the surrounding area for NTPC Thermal Project. It is the claimants' contention that the settlement amount which was earlier made is modified and an additional sum of Rs.2.00 lakhs is paid as ex-gracia for the benefit of the land losers and seeks this Court to permit to led the additional evidence to be placed on record which was not placed before the Reference Court.
12. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
13. The kernel of this conglomeration of appeals is about the determination of the compensation, the State Government in its appeals inter alia contends that the Reference Court has grossly erred in awarding a compensation of Rs.3,06,000/- per acre for irrigated land and Rs.2,07,000/- for dry lands. The sum arrived at is without any basis. The claimants contend that the determination of the amount of compensation for the lands that 28 they have lost is grossly inadequate and the Reference Court has not considered any evidence placed before the Court for determination of a higher compensation. Since the issue is with regard to the method of determination of compensation it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which has laid down postulates for determination of market value of lands acquired to be followed by the Reference Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CHIMANLAL HARGOVINDDAS Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER reported in (1988) 3 SCC 751, was pleased to hold as follows:
"3. Before tackling the problem of valuation of the land under acquisition, it is necessary to make some general observations. The compulsion to do so has arisen as the trial Court has virtually treated the award rendered by the Land Acquisition Officer as a judgment under appeal and has evinced unawareness of the methodology for valuation to same extent. The true position therefore requires to be capsulized.29
15. The following factors must be etched on the mental screen:
"(1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award unless the same material is produced and proved before the court.
(2) So also the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial court open or exposed to challenge before the court hearing the reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the court to sit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate court.30
(3) The court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it.
(4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose.
(5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of notifications under Sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant).
(6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that 31 day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
(7) In doing so by the instances method, the court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value.
(8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land.) (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
(10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations:
(i) proximity from time angle,
(ii) proximity from situation angle.
(11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price 32 reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-
à-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition.
(12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do.
(13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors.
(14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors: 33
Plus factors Minus factors
1. smallness of size 1. largeness of area
2. proximity to a road 2. situation in the interior at a
distance from the road
3. frontage on a road 3. narrow strip of land with
very small frontage
compared to depth
4. nearness to developed area 4. lower level requiring the
depressed portion to be
filled up
5. regular shape 5. remoteness from developed
locality
6. level vis-à-vis land under 6. some special
acquisition disadvantageous factor
which would deter a
purchaser
7. special value for an owner of
an adjoining property to
whom it may have some
very special advantage
(15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There 34 cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds. cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10,000 sq. yds. or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approximately between 20 per cent to 50 per cent to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. 35
(16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the judge must place himself.
(17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.
14. The afore-extracted judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is again reiterated in the year 2018 in the case of UNION OF INDIA Vs. DYAGALA DEVAMMA reported in (2018) 8 SCC 485 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
15. Before we examine the facts of this case, it is necessary to take note of the general principles of law on the subject in question which are laid down by this Court in several cases and some of which were also cited at the Bar by the learned counsel for the parties. Indeed, if we may say so, the law on the several issues urged herein by the learned counsel for the parties is already 36 settled by this Court and what has varied in its application depends on the facts of each case.
16. In Chimanla Hargovinddas v. LAO [Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs. LAO, (1988) 3 SCC 751] , this Court dealt with the question as to how the Court should determine the valuation of the lands under acquisition and what broad principle of law relating to acquisition of land under the Act should be kept in consideration to determine the proper market value of the acquired land.
17. In para 4 of the judgment, this Court laid down as many as 17 principles, which are reproduced below for perusal: (Chimanlal Hargovinddas case [Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. LAO, (1988) 3 SCC 751] , SCC pp. 754-56, para 4) "(1)-(4)*** (5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the 37 Land Acquisition Act (dates of notifications under Sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant).
(6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
(7) In doing so by the instances method, the court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value.
(8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land.) 38 (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
(10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations:
(i) proximity from time angle,
(ii) proximity from situation angle.
(11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-à-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition.39
(12) A balance sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do.
(13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors.
(14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may
illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors:40
Plus factors Minus factors
1. smallness of size 1. largeness of area
2. proximity to a road 2. situation in the interior at a
distance from the road
3. Frontage on a road 3. narrow strip of land with very
small frontage compared to depth
4. nearness to developed 4. lower level requiring the
area depressed portion to be filled up
5. regular shape 5. remoteness from developed
locality
6. level vis-à-vis land 6. some special disadvantageous
under acquisition factor which would deter a
purchaser
7. special value for an
owner of an adjoining
property to whom it
may have some very
special advantage
(15) The evaluation of these
factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard-and-fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor 41 regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq yd cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10,000 sq yd or more.
Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a layout, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approximately between 20 per cent to 50 per cent to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur 42 would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards.
(16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself.
(17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense."
18. These principles are invariably kept in mind by the courts while determining the market value of the acquired lands (also see Union of India v. Raj Kumar Baghal Singh [Union of India v. Raj Kumar Baghal Singh, (2014) 10 SCC 422 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 17] ).
19. In addition to these principles, this Court in several cases have laid down that while determining the true market value of the acquired land especially when the acquired land is a large chunk of undeveloped land, it is just and reasonable to make appropriate 43 deduction towards expenses for development of acquired land. It has also been consistently held that at what percentage the deduction should be made varies from 10% to 86% and, therefore, the deduction should be made keeping in mind the nature of the land, area under acquisition, whether the land is developed or not and, if so, to what extent, the purpose of acquisition, etc. It has also been held that while determining the market value of the large chunk of land, the value of smaller pieces of land can be taken into consideration after making proper deduction in the value of lands especially when sale deeds of larger parcel of land are not available. This Court has also laid down that the court should also take into consideration the potentiality of the acquired land apart from other relevant considerations. This Court has also recognised that the courts can always apply reasonable amount of guesswork to balance the equities in order to fix a just and fair market value in terms of parameters specified under Section 23 of the Act. (See Trishala Jain v. State of Uttaranchal [Trishala Jain v. State of Uttaranchal, (2011) 6 SCC 47 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 178] and Vithal Rao v. LAO [Vithal 44 Rao v. LAO, (2017) 8 SCC 558 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 155] .) The law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the afore extracted judgments are the guiding principles as to how the market value has to be determined for the lands acquired when reference is sought under Section 18(1) of the Act.
15. In terms of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as extracted hereinabove if the order of the Reference Court impugned in these appeals are considered, it would become unmistakably clear that the Reference Court has failed to adopt any of the methods stipulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Reference Court adopts Expert Opinion Method, Sales Statistics Method and Capitalisation of Income Method. To consider the issue with regard to whether the claimants prove that the market value of the lands determined by the LAO was meager, improper and requires to be enhanced, the Reference Court narrates the entire evidence that is let in and concludes as follows:
45
"13. So as on publication of 4(1) dated 21-9-06 price per ton is 1200/- and as per Ex.P13 yield per acre during th eyar 05-06 is 50- 52 tons. Hence I am of the opinion that in LAC cases some guess work is necessary and as per sec.23 of the act MV is to be determine on the basis of the capitalization method. So in the instance case looking to evidence of PW.1 and 2 though they have deposed that they are growing 80 tons per acre per year but for that no documents are produced. So best piece of evidence to determine and to fix MV on the basis of capitalization method is ex.P8 i.e. price list during the year 05-06 the price per ton is 1200/- and as per Ex.P13 average crop of sugarcane per acre 50-52 tons and when lands are irrigated naturally in these days agriculturist are using good seeds and also fertilizer for growing sugar cane crop. Hence during the year 05-06 as per Ex.P.13 agriculture officer stated 50-52 per ton but author of this document is not examined. ex.P13 is sufficient to come to conclusion that average crop in Kakhandaki village is 50-52 tons. Hence average crop per acre is taken at 51 per acre as Kakhandaki is also situated on the river of Krishna and growing 46 sugarcane crop and during the year 06 per ton 1200/- average crop is 51 ton per acre then it comes to Rs.61,200/- and as per principle laid down in AIR 1997 SC 1845. State of Gujarat and others Vs. Rama rana and others. LA act. S.31-compensation- valued of land-determination - on the basis of yield-50% of net value should be deducted for cultivation expenses-after deduction balance would be net value of land-compensation to be determined by applying multiplier of 10.
14. So as per principle laid down by the apex court in above decision 50% of the total income is to be deducted towards cost of expenses for growing sugarcane crop and net income from sugarcane per acre comes to Rs.61,200/- and 50% is deducted then exact income from sugarcane crop comes to Rs.30600/- and by applying multiplier 10 the exact MV comes to Rs.3,06,000/- per acre. So when lands are irrigated and growing sugarcane the claimants are entitled to determine MV at 47 Rs.3,06,000/- per acre for sugarcane crop irrigated lands."
16. The Reference Court after having noticed the principles laid down in the decision with regard to the several aspects of determination of compensation ought to have considered the acquisition of the lands in question in terms of the judgments in the case of HARGOVINDDAS (supra). At paragraph No.14, the Reference Court places heavy reliance upon Ex.P.15 which is the order passed in the LAC.Nos.38, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41 of 2010 and 42 of 2011 concerning the same acquisition. The Reference Court has not reasoned out the similarity of the lands which led to award similar compensation. For the purpose of deciding compensation of land in case of acquisition, Section 23 of the LA Act, 1894 is the fundamental section which speaks about some vital factors to be considered while determining compensation. It is necessary to reproduce the said section, which reads as follows:
" 23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.-(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, this court shall take into consideration-First, 48 the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub- section(1); Secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof;
Thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land;
Fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings;
Fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and Sixthly, the damage (if any) Bonafide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land."49
17. Interpreting Section 23 of the LA Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manoj Kumar and Others V. State of Haryana and Others reported in (2018) 13 SCC 96, at paragraphs 11 to 16 has held has follows:
"11. In our opinion, the High Court could not have placed an outright reliance on Swaran Singh case [Swaran Singh v. State of Haryana, 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 19044] , without considering the nature of transaction relied upon in the said decision. The decision could not have been applied ipso facto to the facts of the instant case. In such cases, where such judgments/awards are relied on as evidence, though they are relevant, but cannot be said to be binding with respect to the determination of the price, that has to depend on the evidence adduced in the case. However, in the instant case, it appears that the land in Swaran Singh case [Swaran Singh v. State of Haryana, 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 19044] was situated just across the road as observed by the High Court as such it is relevant evidence but not binding.
As such it could have been taken into consideration due to the nearness of the area, 50 but at the same time what was the nature of the transaction relied upon in the said case was also required to be looked into in an objective manner. Such decisions in other cases cannot be adopted without examining the basis for determining compensation whether sale transaction referred to therein can be relied upon or not and what was the distance, size and also bona fide nature of transaction before such judgments/awards are relied on for deciding the subsequent cases. It is not open to accepting determination in a mechanical manner without considering the merit. Such determination cannot be said to be binding.
12. We have come across several decisions where the High Court is adopting the previous decisions as binding. The determination of compensation in each case depends upon the nature of land and what is the evidence adduced in each case, may be that better evidence has been adduced in later case regarding the actual value of property and subsequent sale deeds after the award and before preliminary notification under Section 4 are also to be considered, if filed. It is not proper to ignore the 51 evidence adduced in the case at hand. The compensation cannot be determined by blindly following the previous award/judgment. It has to be considered only a piece of evidence, not beyond that. The court has to apply the judicial mind and is supposed not to follow the previous awards without due consideration of the facts and circumstances and evidence adduced in the case in question. The current value reflected by comparable sale deeds is more reliable and binding for determination of compensation in such cases award/judgment relating to an acquisition made before 5 to 10 years cannot form the safe basis for determining compensation.
13. The awards and judgment in the cases of others not being inter parties are not binding as precedents. Recently, we have seen the trend of the courts to follow them blindly probably under the misconception of the concept of equality and fair treatment. The courts are being swayed away and this approach in the absence of and similar nature and situation of land is causing more injustice and tantamount to giving equal treatment in the case of unequals. As per 52 situation of a village, nature of land, its value differ from distance to distance, even two to three kilometre distance may also make the material difference in value. Land abutting highway may fetch higher value but not land situated in interior villages.
14. The previous awards/judgments are the only piece of evidence on a par with comparative sale transactions. The similarity of the land covered by previous judgment/award is required to be proved like any other comparative exemplar. In case previous award/judgment is based on exemplar, which is not similar or acceptable, previous award/judgment of court cannot be said to be binding. Such determination has to be outrightly rejected. In case some mistake has been done in awarding compensation, it cannot be followed; on the ground of parity an illegality cannot be perpetuated. Such award/judgment would be wholly irrelevant.
15. There is yet another serious infirmity seen in following the judgment or award passed in acquisition made before 10 to 12 years and 53 price is being determined on that basis by giving either flat increase or cumulative increase as per the choice of individual Judge without going into the factual scenario. The said method of determining compensation is available only when there is absence of sale transaction before issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act and for giving annual increase, evidence should reflect that price of land had appreciated regularly and did not remain static. The recent trend for last several years indicates that price of land is more or less static if it has not gone down. At present, there is no appreciation of value. Thus, in our opinion, it is not a very safe method of determining compensation.
16. To base determination of compensation on a previous award/judgment, the evidence considered in the previous judgment/award and its acceptability on judicial parameters has to be necessarily gone into, otherwise, gross injustice may be caused to any of the parties. In case some gross mistake or illegality has been committed in previous award/judgment of not making deduction, etc. and/or sufficient evidence had not been adduced 54 and better evidence is adduced in case at hand, previous award/judgment being not inter partes cannot be followed and if land is not similar in nature in all aspects it has to be outrightly rejected as done in the case of comparative exemplars. Sale deeds are on a par for evidentiary value with such awards of the court as court bases its conclusions on such transaction only, to ultimately determine the value of the property."
In terms of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above extracted judgments placing reliance on the earlier judgments without considering the facts of the cases on hand would be committing an error in law and the reference court has placed blind reliance on the earlier orders passed by the reference Court without considering the facts and evidence in the cases before it.
18. Insofar as the issue with regard to the State Government not preferring an appeal against LAC No.49, 50 and 51/2010 and MFA Nos.200380, 200379 and 200381/2015 all 55 being filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation is concerned. The justification of the State is that the base reference order in LAC No.38/2010 is questioned and they need not question the orders passed in other orders of the reference Court following the order passed in LAC No.38/2010. In the first blush, the submission may seem unacceptable as the State Government has failed to challenge the orders passed in LAC Nos.49, 50 and 51/2010, but what is to be noticed is that those orders of the reference court were only following LAC No.38/2010 which is challenged by the State. In the circumstances, we would consider this issue in terms of Order XLI Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the CPC'), which reads as follows:
"Order XLI Appeals from Original Decrees 33. Power of Court of Appeal.-The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the 56 respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross- suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees."
19. In terms of the afore-extracted provisions of law, though the State Government has not filed an appeal against LAC Nos.49 to 51/2010, that will not take away the right of the appellate Court to consider and decide the issue more so in the light of the fact that the enhanced amount of compensation is yet to be disbursed to the claimants in the said appeals. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. MUTHUSWAMI GOUNDER Vs. N. PALANIAPPA GOUNDER reported in (1998) 7 SCC 327 has observed thus:
"12. Order 41 Rule 33 enables the appellate court to pass any decree or order which ought to have been made and to make such further order or decree as the case may be in favour of all or any of the parties even though (i) the appeal is as to part only of the decree; and (ii) such party or parties may not 57 have filed an appeal. The necessary condition for exercising the power under the Rule is that the parties to the proceeding are before the court and the question raised properly arises (sic out of) one of the judgments of the lower court and in that event, the appellate court could consider any objection to any part of the order or decree of the court and set it right. We are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court in Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan [1987 Supp SCC 528 : AIR 1988 SC 54] . No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and each case must depend upon its own facts. The Rule enables the appellate court to pass any order/decree which ought to have been passed. The general principle is that a decree is binding on the parties to it until it is set aside in appropriate proceedings. Ordinarily the appellate court must not vary or reverse a decree/order in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal and this Rule holds good notwithstanding Order 41 Rule 33 CPC. However, in exceptional cases, the Rule enables the appellate court to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed even if such decree would be in favour of parties who have not filed any appeal. The power though discretionary 58 should not be declined to be exercised merely on the ground that the party has not filed any appeals."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in case of Banarsi Vs. Ram Phal reported in (2003) 9 SCC 606 interprets Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC :
" 15 [Ed.: Para 15 corrected as per Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./65/2003] . Rule 4 seeks to achieve one of the several objects sought to be achieved by Rule 33, that is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. The above said provisions confer power of the widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties and such power is unfettered by consideration of facts like what is the subject-matter of the appeal, who has filed the appeal and whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of by modifying the judgment appealed against. While dismissing an appeal and though confirming the impugned decree, the appellate court may still direct passing of such decree or making of such order which ought to have been passed or made by the court below in accordance with the findings of fact and law arrived at by the court below and which it would have done 59 had it been conscious of the error committed by it and noticed by the appellate court. While allowing the appeal or otherwise interfering with the decree or order appealed against, the appellate court may pass or make such further or other, decree or order, as the case would require being done, consistently with the findings arrived at by the appellate court. The object sought to be achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid inconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed parties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power, higher the need for caution and care while exercising the power. Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow. The power is subject to at least three limitations: firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the court; secondly, a claim given up or lost 60 cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 of Order 41.
16. Panna Lal v. State of Bombay [AIR 1963 SC 1516 : (1964) 1 SCR 980] so sets out the scope of Order 41 Rule 33 in the widest terms:
The wide wording of Order 41 Rule 33 was intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as 'the case may require'. If there was no impediment in law the High Court in appeal could, 61 therefore, though allowing the appeal of the defendant-appellant by dismissing the plaintiff's suits against it, give the plaintiff-respondent a decree against any or all the other defendants who were parties to the appeal as respondents. While the very words of the rule make this position abundantly clear the Illustration puts the position beyond argument. The suit was filed by the plaintiff impleading the State Government and the Deputy Commissioner seeking recovery of compensation for the work done under a contract and the price of the goods supplied. The trial court held that the State was liable as it had beyond doubt benefited by the performance of the plaintiff. The suit was decreed against the State. The State preferred an appeal in the High Court. The plaintiff and other defendants including the Deputy Commissioner were impleaded as respondents. Disagreeing with the trial court, the High Court held that the contract entered into by the Deputy Commissioner was not binding on the State Government; that the Deputy Commissioner signed the contract at his own discretion; and further, that the contract not having been entered into in the form as required under Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was not enforceable against the State Government. The High Court also held that the 62 Government could not be held to have ratified the action of the contract entered into by the Deputy Commissioner. The State was held also not to have benefited by the performance of the plaintiff. On this finding, the High Court set aside the trial court's decree passed against the State Government. In an appeal to this Court, the Constitution Bench held that it was a fit case for the exercise of jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC. On the findings arrived at by the High Court, while setting aside the decree against the State, the High Court should have passed a decree against the Deputy Commissioner. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to have filed any cross-objection and the Illustration appended to Order 41 Rule 33 was enough to find solution.
17. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath [AIR 1963 SC 1901 : (1964) 3 SCR 549] the three-Judge Bench speaking through Raghubar Dayal, J. observed that:
"Rule 33 really provides as to what the appellate court can find the appellant entitled to. It empowers the appellate court to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made in the proceedings before it and thus could have reference only to the nature of the decree or 63 order insofar as it affects the rights of the appellant. It further empowers the appellate court to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. The court is thus given a wide discretion to pass such decrees and orders as the interests of justice demand. Such a power is to be exercised in exceptional cases when its non-exercise will lead to difficulties in the adjustment of rights of the various parties."
(emphasis supplied)
18. In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Balmiki Prasad Singh [(1975) 1 SCC 212] the following statement of law made by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. (as His Lordship then was) in the Division Bench decision in Venukuri Krishna Reddi v. Kota Ramireddi [AIR 1954 Mad 848 : (1954) 2 MLJ 559] was cited with approval which clearly brings out the wide scope of power contained in Rule 33 and the Illustration appended thereto, as also the limitations on such power: (SCC p. 236, para 36) "Though Order 41 Rule 33 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on courts to pass a decree in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal, there are, however, certain well-defined principles in accordance with which that jurisdiction should be exercised. Normally, a party who is aggrieved by a 64 decree should, if he seeks to escape from its operation, appeal against it within the time allowed after complying with the requirements of law. Where he fails to do so, no relief should ordinarily be given to him under Order 41 Rule 33.
But there are well-recognised exceptions to this rule. One is where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant it becomes necessary to readjust the rights of other parties. A second class of cases based on the same principle is where the question is one of settling mutual rights and obligations between the same parties. A third class of cases is when the relief prayed for is single and indivisible but is claimed against a number of defendants. In such cases, if the suit is decreed and there is an appeal only by some of the defendants and if the relief is granted only to the appellants there is the possibility that there might come into operation at the same time and with reference to the same subject-matter two decrees which are inconsistent and contradictory. This, however, is not an exhaustive enumeration of the class of cases in which courts could interfere under Order 41 Rule 33. Such an enumeration would neither be possible nor even desirable."
65
19. In the words of J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose [AIR 1965 SC 1874 :
(1965) 3 SCR 550] the limitation on discretion operating as bounds of the width of power conferred by Rule 33 can be so formulated: (AIR p. 1884, para
22) "The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the court appealed from and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by Order 41 Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final merely because the appellate court does not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from."66
20. A Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jadunath Basak v. Mritunjoy Sett [AIR 1986 Cal 416 : (1986) 2 CHN 44] may be cited as an illustration. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the defendant had no right or authority to run the workshop with machines in the suit premises and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from running the workshop. The trial court granted a decree consisting of two reliefs: (i) the declaration as prayed for, and (ii) an injunction permanently restraining the defendant from running the workshop except with the terms of a valid permission and licence under Sections 436 and 437 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 from the Municipal Corporation. The defendant filed an appeal. The Division Bench held that in an appeal filed by the defendant, the plaintiff cannot challenge that part of the decree which granted conditional injunction without filing the cross-objection. The Division Bench drew a distinction between the respondent's right to challenge an adverse finding without filing any appeal or cross-objection and the respondent seeking to challenge a part of the decree itself without filing the cross-objection. The Division Bench held that the latter was not permissible. We 67 find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Calcutta."
In a latest judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of PRALHAD Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in (2010) 10 SCC 458 has held as follows:
"18. The provision of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the appellate court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provision, the crucial words are that the appellate court is empowered to pass any order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression "order ought to have been made" would obviously mean an order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying "the court may pass such further or other order as the case may require". This expression "case" would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised 68 ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law."
20. In terms of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above quoted judgments interpreting Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC, it becomes unmistakably clear that the power of the appellate court cannot be taken away even in the circumstances where an appeal is not filed in a particular case which follows the earlier judgment in which appeals are filed. It is to be noticed that LAC.Nos.49, 50 and 51 of 2010 were partly allowed following this judgment of the Reference Court in LAC.No.38 of 2010 disposed on 13.02.2013, since we are of the view that the base LAC i.e. 38 of 2010 is rendered completely contrary to law and is required to be set aside the result of setting aside the award passed in LAC.No.38 of 2010 takes away the basis of determination of compensation in all the other cases.
21. Thus, in terms of Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC and the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the afore extracted cases, we have no hesitation to hold that the order in 69 LAC Nos.49 to 51/2010 is also erroneous and unsustainable. The State Government having not challenged the said orders will not preclude this Court to exercise its appellate powers and correct the infirmity.
22. Perusal of the impugned orders in this conglomeration of the appeals, clearly shows that the compensation has been determined without complying with principles laid down in Section 23 of the LA Act and the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of Hargovinddas (Supra), Dyagala Devamma (Supra) and Manoj Kumar (Supra).
23. In fact it is the submission of all the parties to the lis is that the Reference Court has failed to consider their cases in accordance with law. In the circumstances, without going into the merits of the claim of the State Government or the claimants, we deem it appropriate to set aside the award of the Reference Court and remit the matter back to the Reference Court for a fresh determination strictly in consonance with the law declared in the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 70 cases of HARGOVINDDAS Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER reported in (1988) 3 SCC 751, UNION OF INDIA Vs. DYAGALA DEVAMMA reported in (2018) 8 SCC 485 and MANOJ KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS reported in (2018) 13 SCC 96.
24. For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following:
ORDER (1) MFA Nos.33114 of 2013, 33115 of 2013, 33116 of 2013 and 33117 of 2013 are allowed and the order of the Reference Court in LAC Nos.38, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of 2010 dated 13.02.2013 is set aside.
(2) MFA-CROB.200052 of 2016, MFA-CROB.
No.200053 of 2016, MFA-CROB. No.200054 of 2016, MFA-CROB. No.200055 of 2016 are dismissed.
71(3) MFA No.200379 of 2015, MFA No.200380 of 2015 and MFA No.200381 of 2015 all being the devoid of merit are dismissed.
(4) The Cases are remitted back to the Reference Court for a decision afresh strictly in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of HARGOVINDDAS Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, reported in (1988) 3 SCC 751, UNION OF INDIA Vs. DYAGALA DEVAMMA reported in (2018) 8 SCC 485 and MANOJ KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS reported in (2018) 13 SCC 96 within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order.
(5) The Registry is directed to circulate this order to all the Presiding Officers of the Reference Courts for its strict adherence.
(6) The records shall be retransmitted forthwith to the Reference Court.
72(7) There shall be no order as to costs.
In view of the disposal of all the appeals and MFA.Crobs., pending I.As. in respective appeals and MFA.Crobs. are also disposed off as they do not survive for consideration.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE Cs/-