Delhi District Court
Sh. Tej Singh vs M/S Lal Chand Bhika Mal (Through) on 7 December, 2020
IN THE COURT OF Ms. ADITI GARG
SCJ-CUM-RC(CENTRAL): TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
E. No. 919/2019
Sh. Tej Singh
S/o Late Sh. Rich Pal Singh
R/o C-150, Mahendru Enclave,
G.T.Karnal Road,
Delhi - 110033 ..... Petitioner
VERSUS
1. M/s Lal Chand Bhika Mal (Through)
2. Sh. Surender Kumar Jain
3. Sh. Mahender Kumar Jain
4. Sh. Sanjeev jain
(All S/o Late Sh. Bhika Mal Jain)
All to be served at :-
Shop No.73, First Floor, Moti Bazar,
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006
Also at : 1006, Gali Larewali Maliwara,
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006. ..... Respondents
ORDER
07.12.2020
1. Vide this order, I shall decide application for leave to defend, filed by respondents under section 14(1)(e) read with Sec.25B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short DRC Act) filed by petitioner. Before adverting to the application for leave to defend, facts of the present petition are enumerated hereinafter briefly.
2. That the petitioner is the owner/landlord of shop bearing No.73, First Floor, Moti Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 ((hereinafter referred as 'the tenanted shop) which is shown red in the site plan, having been purchased the same from its erstwhile owner by virtue of registered sale deed and the same is bonafidely required by the petitioner for his own use and the for the use of his other family members. That earlier Sh. Bhika Mal Jain, proprietor of the respondent no.1 was the tenant in respect of shop in question and the rent receipt was issued in the name of M/s Lal Chand Bhika Mal and after the death of Sh. Bhika Mal Jain somewhere in the year 1995-96, all the respondents become the tenant in respect of the shop in question. That the eldest daughter of the petitioner (supra) who is a widow not want to become burden on her parents and wants to stand on her own legs and hence wants to start the business of sale of readymade garments such as bridal saress, lehngas, kurtis, ladies suits, chunnis, gowns, casual wear, ladies undergarments etc. and as such the petitioner requires the shop in question for starting the said business for her daughter. Nonetheless, the elder son of the petitioner namely Ved Prakash is also unemployed and the petitioner has given him two shops on the first floor of property bearing bearing No. 73, Moti Bazar, Delhi-110006 to earn his livelihood. That the petitioner is the co-owner in the property bearing No.C- 150-, Mahendru Enclave, G.T.Karnal Road, Delhi-110033 alongwith other co- owner i.e. his sister-in-law (Bhabi) wife of his elder brother. The said property though is measuring 400 sq. yards but constructed only upto ground floor and the petitioner is in occupation of half portion of the said property which he is using as his residence to accommodate his other family members (supra).
3. In response to the said claim of petitioner, respondents filed application for leave to defend along with his affidavit within statutory period of 15 days of receiving summons in prescribed form from the court. In the said affidavit accompanying application for leave to defend, following defences have been taken :
(i) Rate of rent is disputed.
Respondent alleged that petitioner has falsely stated that the respondents are the tenant in the tenanted shop @ Rs.500/- per month but factually the respondents are the tenant in the tenanted shop @ Rs.50/- and the respondents have been depositing the rent through DR petitions. It is further mentioned that in the objection which was filed by the petitioner in a DR Petition No.276/2010, the petitioner alleged that the respondents are the tenant @ Rs.1500/-. Petitioner is not sure with regard to the rate of rent of the tenanted premises.
(ii) That the tenant is in the possession of the tenanted premises for past 80 years. Allegedly, petitioner purchased the suit premises in 2005 / 2008 only. That the petitioner has been imprisoned for murder and hence his need is not bonafide.
(iii) As per the petition, daughter of the petitioner, for whose bonafide need the tenanted premises are required, became widow in 2005, however, the petition has been filed only in 2019. Further, it is contended that petitioner has not shown on record anything to show when his daughter shifted from Meerut to Delhi and moreover nothing has come on record to show how two granddaughters of petitioner are going to pursue their studies from Delhi. Hence, need of the petitioner is not bonafide.
(iv) That the petitioner is not sure about area of tenanted premises and has filed a false site plan. The correct site plan has been filed by the respondent.
(v) That the petitioner's need is not bonafide as one big shop (comprising of shop no. BCD as shown in the site plan) has been rented out to M/s. Fashion Bazar and its tenancy was extended by the petitioner recently. In application mentioning subsequent events, the respondent had stated that the said M/s. Fashion Bazar has vacated shop no. BCD in July / August and thereafter the same was leased to Frontier Fashion for two months and thereafter to Kalra Lehnga shop in October 2020 at monthly rent of Rs. 2.5 lacs. It is stated that the petitioner has encroached and raised unauthorized construction in the portions measuring 11' x 21' adjacent to shops B and C and same is in the occupation of a tenant who is occupying shop B, C and D.
(vi) That the petitioner has given two shops to his son Sh. Ved Prakash for doing business on the same floor. The petitioner filed a suit for possession with regard to two shops (shop no. E and F) and got vacant possession. On 22.11.2016 petitioner through his son, had let out those two shops for three years at 70000/- per month, and the tenancy was further extended in 2019. Therefore, the petitioner's need for his daughter is not bonafide.
(vii) Concealment of availability of Alternate Suitable Accommodation.
It is stated that shop, Mark 'A' is lying vacant since August 2019 and the same is adjacent to the tenanted premises. That the petitioner has pasted pamphlets on the shop Mark 'A' for letting out the same. The said shop is two side open.
That the petitioner is also an owner of commercial property no. 168, Katra Nawab, Chandni Chowk, Delhi- 110006, measuring 45 sq. yds. comprising of first, second and third floor and is in possession of the same. The said property is commercial and is lying vacant.
4. Petitioner, filed reply to the said application and affidavit denying the version of respondent and reiterated the facts as mentioned in the petition. Petitioner had denied that tenanted premises was let out at Rs. 50/- and that the petitioner is not sure about rate of rent. Petitioner had denied the site plan filed by the respondent. It is further stated that the petitioner is using shop Mark 'A' as his office from where he is running the business of property dealer. That there is no malafide intention of the petitioner and he has not intention of letting out shop Mark 'A'. That the photographs showing pamphlets filed by the respondent are manipulated and manufactured. It is denied that there is any concealment of reasonably suitable accommodation.
With regard shop no. B, C and D, it is stated that these are not three separate shops, however, one big shop and is under the tenancy of M/s. Fashion Bazar who is an old tenant of son of petitioner Sh. Ved Prakash. It is denied that petitioner has encroached and raised unauthorized construction measuring 11' x 21'.
With regard shop no. E and D it is stated that these are not two separate shops, however, one big shop and is under the tenancy of old tenant who was inducted as tenant by son of petitioner.
With regard property no. 168, Katra Nawab, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-6, it is stated that th petitioner only owns a small room on first floor which is the subject matter of another litigation bearing Ex No. 1237/2017 and the same is subjudice before the court of Sh. Puneet Pahwa, Ld. ARC, Central, Delhi. That the petitioner does not own any other part of the abovesaid property. That the petitioner has filed the present eviction petition for the bonafide need of his daughter as he has no other suitable alternate accommodation to accommodate her need.
5. I have heard the arguments and gone through the documents.
6. Before moving further, I must mention here the necessary law, which governs, applications of like nature. The principles requiring considerations for grant of leave to defend application in the eviction petition have been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court way-back in the year 1982 in the case of Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, 21 (1982) DLT 378 and which have been reiterated in various judicial pronouncements and can be noted thus:
"What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought for? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend is sought for, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action. At that stage of granting the leave parties rely in support of their rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and counter-assertions on affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way or the other. Conceding that when possession is sought for on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively."
It is also settled that at the stage of granting leave to defend, the test that is applied is whether in the facts disclosed in the affidavit, filed seeking leave to defend, prima facie shows that the landlord would be dis entitled to obtain an eviction order and not, where at the end, the defence taken by the tenant may fail. If the application filed under Section 25B disclosed some substantial triable issues, then it would be grave injustice to brush them outrightly, without testing the veracity of the claims made by the tenant/applicant. The law in this regard is well settled in various pronouncements and reference can also be made to Inderjeet Kaur V. Nirpal Singh, VII(2001) SLT 602=(2001) 1 SCC 706, wherein it was held as under:
"A landlord, who bonafidely requires a premises for his residence and occupation should not suffer for long waiting for eviction of a tenant. At the same time, a tenant cannot be thrown out from a premises summarily even though prima facie he is able to say that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide or untenable and as such not entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence the approach has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing leave to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition within the board scheme of Chapter IIIA and in particular having regard to the clear terms and language of section 25B(5).
In Aggarwal Papers Vs. Mukesh Kumar(deceased) through LR's 194 DLT 605, it was observed by Hon'ble Justice M.L. Mehta that ;
"Though, I am conscious of the fact and to which, there is no dispute that the landlord is the best judge of his affairs and also choices, and the tenant cannot dictate as to how the landlord has to live and utilize his premise; but, at the same time, it is also settled principles of law in such cases that the mere wish or desire of the landlord or his decision to get the tenanted premises vacated is not the decisive factor. It is not that whatever he would say, in every case, would be taken to be s gospel truth. If that was so, then, on the mere asking of every landlord that he needs the premises for setting up an office for his or his family member's business and he is the judge and master of his decisions and choices, the statutory protection afforded to the tenant, would become meaningless. That is not the intent of the legislation. The applicability of above proposition is only after the landlord is able to demonstrate that his assertion of requirement of the tenanted premises is authentic and genuine. If he is able to show and demonstrate so, then certainly neither the tenant nor this Court could dictate terms upon him as to how and in what manner he should utilize his premises. The projected requirement of the tenanted premises, based on his subjective decision, is required to be tested by the Court..............it is necessary to bear in mind that when leave to defend is refused the party seeking it is denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments of the opposite party by cross examination and rival affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the point one way or the other."
Therefore, in view of aforesaid observations of higher echelon of judiciary, it is clear that Controller shall give to tenant, leave to contest application, if the affidavit filed by tenant discloses such facts as would dis- entitle the landlord from recovering possession. If disputed question of facts are raised and their decision is necessary to grant relief to landlord, then those questions should not be decided on affidavits and leave to contest should be granted. At the same time bare denial of facts by tenant will not be sufficient. Tenant must give detailed facts substantiating the grounds taken by him. Essential ingredients of Section 14(1) are : -
a) That the petitioner is the owner / landlord of the tenanted premises
b) The said premises are bona-fide required by the landlord either for himself or for his family member.
c) The landlord or the family member has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.
These three thresholds are to be satisfied conjunctively in order to attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) and the absence of even one of the said ingredients clearly makes the said provision inapplicable.
7. The Delhi Rent Control Act is enacted to balance the rights of the landlord and the tenant. Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act entitles the landlord to file a suit for eviction showing his bona-fide requirement when he has no other alternate suitable accommodation so as to fit in his bona-fide requirement. This Section is controlled by procedure enumerated in Section 25-B DRC Act, which states that the summary procedure is to be followed and leave to defend is to be granted only when the tenant has been able to raise any defence, which if proved, would dis-entile the landlord of the eviction relief.
8. I shall discuss the defences raised by the respondent hereinunder :-
The first defence taken by the respondent is that petitioner is not aware of the correct rate of rent. That in the present petition, the petitioner had mentioned the rate of rent to be Rs 500, whereas in objection to previously filed DR petition, the petitioner had stated rent to be Rs 1500. In this regard, it is stated that for the purposes of eviction petition under section 14(1)(e) DRC, only those three conditions are to be fulfilled, as enumerated above. So long as the tenant-landlord relationship and the bonafide need is prima facie established, any other factor becomes inconsequential. The defence is thus rejected as baseless. That the tenant is in the possession of the tenanted premises for last 80 years. That the petitioner had purchased the property only in 2005/2008 and he has been imprisoned for murder.
Baseless allegations have been made by the respondent /tenant, without any proof as such. Even if the petitioner had purchased the property only 15 years back, that doesn't preclude the landlord/petitioner from bringing eviction petition.
The defence is thus rejected as baseless.
That the daughter of the petitioner, for whose bonafide need the petition has been filed, became widow in 2005 and the petition has been filed only in 2015. Further the petitioner had not placed record as to when his daughter shifted from Merut to Delhi, hence the need of the petitioner is not bonafide.
In order to ascertain the defence of the respondent. It is essential to evaluate the meaning of word bonafide as used in the provision. In the landmark case, Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus : -
"The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in sub-section (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is duty- bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind that statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective then the finding regarding bonafide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment."
Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in good faith and genuine i.e. without fraud or deceit". Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own.
The meaning of "bona-fide" in the context appears to be in two folds. (a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one.
(b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant at a higher rent.
In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 100", whereby it was held that : -
".....The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself....".
In the present case the petitioner had filed the petition for her son. It is stated that the petitioner doesn't have any other alternative suitable accommodation available to meet the need of her son. Hence, it can be inferred that in the present case, petitioner has raised bonafide need for eviction.
In the present case, the petitioner has stated that he want to settle his widow daughter. The defence that daughter had become widow in 2005 and petition has been filed in 2019 is not only baseless but also insensitive. The intent of the legislature had been well explained y the Apex court in the judgment enumerated above. The need to settle the daughter cannot be said to be fake or misconceived in the absence of some cogent proof which the respondent had miserably failed to put forth. Further the petitioner need not prove when his daughter had shifted . The need is for a member who is dependent upon the petitioner. The defence is thus rejected as baseless.
The respondent had disputed the site plan filed by the petitioner, however, on bare comparison of the site plans, there is not much difference. Otherwise also the respondent had had not stated when his grandsons had completed graduation. That the petitioner had sold out one shop in 2016 and therefore the need of the petitioner is not bonafide. That the sons of the petitioner are well settled and therefore the grandsons cannot be said to be dependant upon the petitioner. That the petitioner has alternate suitable accommodation available, i.e. shop no BCD and EF, and the lease of the said shops has been recently renewed by the petitioner. The petitioner had replied that the said he had given the shops to his son and he is only taking rent from the shops. The petitioner had placed on record the rent agreements wrt to said shops, entered into between his son and the tenants. The petitioner had not extended the tenancy. Otherwise also, the petitioner had mentioned in the petition itself that he had given two shops to his son. The petitioner had stated that he had considered shop no BCD as one unit and shop EF as one unit. Even the counsel for the respondent had stated that these are different units, however, there is nothing on the record to substantiate the same , except the sale deeds. The respondent himself had averred that the shops are big size units. The respondent has nowhere bene able to show that shop BCD are three different units. The respondent himself had stated that the petitioner had been renewing the lease deeds , hence it can be inferred that that the shops are being used as collective units since long. It is not expected out of the petitioner to take one shop from his son and give to his daughter. The respondent had not shown physically where are the 5 shops .On the other hand, the size of the shops reflect that they have been joined. As regards shop no A, the petitioner had placed on record the visiting card. The respondent had stated that the said shop is lying vacant, and had placed certain photographs and cd to show that the shop has been painted after filing of the petition and that the petitioner is trying to manufacture evidence. However, there is no cogent proof of the same. The respondent had placed certain photographs showing that shop no A was available for rent in August 2020, however, the same appear to have been taken at night time. No cogent proof has been brought forth by the respondent to show that the shop no A is available to the petitioner. Even with respect to property no 168, the respondent had not been able to substantiate his defence. On the othet hand, the petitioner had stated that he has only one shop and he hasn't got the possession of the same as litigation is pending with the occupant. The law is very clear on the point that the respondent has to show that the petitioner has suitable alternate available accommodation, merely by stating that plaintiff has properties would not entitle the respondent for leave to defend.
It is pertinent to mention the landmark judgments on the aspect of availability of suitable alternate accommodation.
In "Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta" reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 2507, it was held:
"...The landlord may convince the Court that the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come...".
In Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 405, it has been clearly held that "A tenant who alleges that landlord has at his disposal other accommodation has to place before the Ld. ARC some material to show that the landlord has a specific alternative accommodation at his disposal". Mere bald allegation with respect to availability of additional accommodation with the petitioner does not hold any basis and cannot be a basis to deny the petitioner of his right to vacate the tenanted premises for his bonafide requirement".
With respect to concealment, it has been held that it is not each and every concealment which would be fatal to the case of the petitioner. A person might have 10 properties , and may not disclose them all. It is the prerogative of the landlord to use the property as per his choice and the tenant has to show how any of the undisclosed properties would have been suitably met the requirement of the petitioner. In Shri Sukhbir Singh vs Dr. I.P. Singh RC Rev.261/2010, Delhi High Court, it was held that "the contention of the respondent tenant that the petitioner did not disclose the fact of being in possession of other properties, it would suffice to say that non-disclosure of properties which were not suitable to meet the petitioner requirement is not fatal to his case".
In view of the above judgments it can be easily inferred that the initial onus to prove is on the respondent, who at the time of filing of leave to defend, have to prima facie establish that the petitioner has alternate accommodation, by way of some document/proof. Mere allegation in itself is not enough. Similarly, mere allegation that the petitioner had hidden properties is not enough. In the present case also, even if it is presumed that petitioner has properties, then also, none are available to the petitioner . The fact that the daughter of the petitioner got widow in 2005 and the petition has been filed now . And that in 2016 petitioner had got vacant shops which were let out to does become relevant as the respondent himself had stated that the daughter of the petitioner is settled in Merut. Otherwise also its not incumbent upon the petitioner to explain why he is filing the petition now. Otherwise also, if the petitioner does not utilize the tenanted premises for the bonafide requirement, it is open to the respondent to approach the court u/s 19 DRC. The defence is accordingly rejected .
9. It has been held in Baldev Singh v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778, that the legislative intent of expeditious disposal of application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation. A special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created. If there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession. The landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own use only. These restrictions and conditions inculcate in strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine, the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant. Unless his need is bonafide, no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under the Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of a tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. This inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenant implies that whenever the landlord would approach the Court, his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bonafide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine.
From the above, it is held that all the defences raised by the respondent are meritless, vague and are not of the nature, which would dis-entitle the petitioner of the relief u/s 14 (1)(e) of the DRC Act. Leave to defend is thus, dismissed.
10. In Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta, 173 (2010) DLT 318, it was held that "Before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which dis-entitled the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time, entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima-facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows."
11. In view of the discussion made above, the respondent herein has been unable to raise any defence which is substantial or which if proved, would dis- entitle the petitioner of the relief of eviction. Merely vague pleas have been taken by the respondent which are not substantiated prima facie. Since no such defence has been raised by the tenant, leave to defend is denied to him.
12. Hence, the application for leave to defend filed by respondent is ordered to be dismissed. Consequently, eviction order is liable to be passed against the respondent u/s Section 25 B (4) of the Act. In view of above, petitioner is held entitled for recovery of the tenanted premises. However, the petitioner would not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted, i.e. shop bearing No.73, First Floor, Moti Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 as shown in red colour in the site plan, after expiration of six months from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act. Keeping in view the facts & circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.
Digitally signedADITI by ADITI GARG Date: 2020.12.07 GARG 15:33:43 +0530 Announced through videoconferencing (Aditi Garg) Dated 7th December, 2020 SCJcumRC (Central) Tis Hazari Courts : Delhi