Allahabad High Court
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs Smt. Ram Beti And Ors. on 6 May, 2004
Equivalent citations: III(2004)ACC636, 2004(4)AWC3006, 2004 ALL. L. J. 2738, 2004 A I H C 4380, (2004) 4 ALL WC 3006, (2004) 3 TAC 5, (2004) 56 ALL LR 32, (2004) 3 ACC 636
Author: Umeshwar Pandey
Bench: Umeshwar Pandey
JUDGMENT Umeshwar Pandey, J.
1. A child namely Ram Bharosey met with an accident on account of having collided with Bus No. U.M.A. 9657 belonging to the appellant U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (in short "U.P.S.R.T.C.'). The bus dashed against his cycle from behind on the road and the deceased child aged 12 years died on the spot. The respondents, who happened to be parents of the deceased, filed a claim petition before the Tribunal below claiming compensation of Rs. 3,30,000. The claim was contested by the appellant-U.P.S.R.T.C. and written statement was filed with the pleadings that the accident had not taken place with the aforesaid bus belonging to it. It also disputes the income of the child and stated that he was not employed as a labour at any place. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal considering the pleadings of the parties framed two issues and recorded its findings that accident had taken place with the aforesaid bus belonging to the appellant and gave an award of compensation amounting to Rs. 1,00,000 in favour of the claimants-parents of the deceased and passed the impugned Judgment.
2. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment of award given by the Tribunal below, the appellant has come up in this appeal.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the materials available on the record.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant, while placing his submissions has strenuously urged that the Tribunal, in passing the award in favour of the respondents, has not adopted any rationale for fixation of the quantum of compensation in the case. No multiplier has been applied by the Tribunal for fixation of such compensation. The learned counsel has further urged that the deceased child was only 12 years of age and there was hardly any occasion for him to be of any pecuniary help to the claimants-parents, even though the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act') in such cases of child death in accidents, has chalked out a formula in the second schedule. But that provision also cannot be applied because this accident is said to have taken place as back as 1989 whereas the payment of compensation on structured formula basis was provided by the Amending Act 54 of 1994, which came into effect from 14.11.1994, much after the date of giving the impugned award dated 4.3.1991. The learned counsel has relied upon the case law of Maitri Koley and Anr. v. New India Assurance Co. and Ors. 2004 (1) TAC 1 (SC) and has thus, submitted that the procedure as provided in Section 163A of the Act read with Second Schedule will not be applicable for the payment of award. The learned counsel has also submitted that the award of a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 as given in the present case, appears to be wholly unjustified.
5. From the record, it is clear that the deceased child was 12 years of age on the date of accident and the claimants-parents were 35 and 40 years of age at that point of time. From the evidence. It had also stood fully proved that the child was working as a labour in brick-kiln and was earning Rs. 25 per day as his wages. In the case of Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3218 and M. S. Grewal and Anr. v. Deep Chand Sood and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3660, while dealing with the issue in relation to the death of children, the Apex Court has placed reliance upon the decision of Lord Atkinson in Taff Vale Railway Company v. Jenkins, 1913 AC 1 and has ruled that : "In cases of death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents claim and prospective loss will found a valid claim provided that the parents established that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived."
6. In the present case, there was sufficient evidence to the effect that even though the deceased child was only 12 years of age but he had some earning of his own as a labour in the brick-kiln. There was definite future prospects for the child to have further pecuniary gains in his life and thus could be of financial assistance to his parents who were 35 and 40 years of age at the time of his death. The Tribunal, obviously, has not discussed the rationale or the principles on which it fixed the compensation and has also not tried to reach the final opinion as to availability of a multiplier but that would not amount to a legal ground for the appellant before this Court to negate the entire claim of compensation and to dismiss the claim petition. While dealing as first appellate court in a matter of First Appeal From Order, this Court has to find out on the basis of materials available on the record if some compensation is to be awarded and what would be its extent? In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Shri Laxman Iyer and Anr. 2004 (1) AWC 176 (SC) ; 2004 (1) TAC 3 (SC), the Apex Court while dealing with a matter of accident claim relating to the death of teenager boy-student having no earning of himself, found that the compensation to the claimants-parents was payable. Thus, in the aforesaid matter at hand if the child of 12 years having his own earning has died and his parents being 35 and 40 years of age only will definitely have some claim for compensation as they were having substantial pecuniary loss in the death of their child.
7. Now the question arises as to what should be the actual compensation payable in the present case? Section 163A of the Act provides payment of compensation on structured formula basis and such formula is detailed in Second Schedule of the Act. A multiplier available in the case of children upto the age of 15 years is that of 15. As already discussed above, this amendment in the Act came into effect in the year 1994 and the accident took place in the year 1989. In view of the case law of Maitri Koley (supra), the multiplier provided in the Second Schedule may not be strictly applicable in such case where accident had taken place prior to the Act coming into force but the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.) and Ors. v New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., 2001 (1) AWC 617 (SC); (2001) 2 SCC 9, has permitted the structured formula to be taken assistance as a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation than any other method so far. In paras 22 and 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as below :
"22. The appellants claimed a sum of Rs. 2,36,000. But P.W. 1 widow of the deceased said that her husband's income was Rs. 1,500 per month. P.W. 4 brother of the deceased also supported the same version. No contra-evidence has been adduced in regard to that aspect. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 1,500. In calculating the amount of compensation in this case we lean ourselves to adopt the structured formula provided in the Second Schedule to the M.V. Act. Though it was formulated for the purpose of Section 163A of the M.V. Act, we find it a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation than any other method so far as the present case is concerned.
23. The age of the deceased at the time of accident was said to be 35 years plus. But when that is taken along with the annual income of Rs. 18,000 figure indicated in the structured formula is Rs. 2,70,000. When 1/3rd therefore, is deducted the balance would be Rs. 1,80,000. We, therefore, deem it just and proper to fix the said amount as total compensation payable to the appellants as on the date of their claim."
8. Thus, in the case at hand I propose to take assistance as a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation payable to the respondents-parents of the child. I have no hesitation in adopting multiplier of 15 in making such award. The deceased Ram Bharosey used to earn Rs. 25 per day and with this income his annual income will come at Rs. 9,000. If it is multiplied with 15 then the figure comes to Rs. 1,35,000. There were definite prospects of the child after having grown up in the age to have further earnings but that apart if his total annual income is counted at Rs. 9,000 only, the multiplier of 15 would be a safer figure for fixation of compensation. Out of the aforesaid amount, the pecuniary assistance rendered to the parents would be to the extent of 2/3rd and l/3rd would be his personal expenditure out of the aforesaid total figure. In this manner, if the personal expenditure of the deceased is deducted from the said figure of Rs. 1,35,000, the pecuniary loss, which can be safely said to have been incurred by the respondents-parents comes to Rs. 90,000. Even though, the Tribunal below has awarded a sum of Rs. 1,00,000, remaining sum of Rs. 10,000 for awarding compensation can be treated to be the amount covering the compensation for expenditure of funeral etc. and the mental shock that the respondents have suffered in the death of their minor son. The award does not appear to be exorbitant or unreasonable and requires no interference in the present appeal.
9. The appeal, thus, having no force is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.