Madhya Pradesh High Court
Annapurnabai @ Bhoori vs State Of M.P. on 11 February, 1999
Equivalent citations: I(2000)DMC699
JUDGMENT S.P. Khare, J.
1. Appellant Smt. Annapurnabai has been convicted under Sections 498A and 306, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and five years respectively. She has also been convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months.
2. Deceased Sunita aged about 18 years married to the appellant's son Ramesh (D.W. 3) in April, 1987 committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her and setting her ablaze on 27.11.1987. She died on 19.12.1987 that is, within eight months of her marriage in the hospital. Phulchand Mishra (P.W. 1) and Rohinibai (P.W. 3) are her parents.
3. The prosecution case was that the appellant was demanding Jhumka, Kardhan and money for T.V. connection from the parents of Sunita. The appellant used to taunt her that she was not beautiful and used to beat her. She treated her with cruelty. Her dying declaration Ex. P-12 was recorded by Shri S.R. Dewangan, Additional Tehsildar and Executive Magistrate on 27.11.1987 at 3.25 p.m. in the Government Hospital, Raigarh. She had written letter Ex. P-1 to her father regarding the demand of dowry.
4. The accused pleaded not guilty. The Trial Court after appreciation of the evidence on record convicted and sentenced her as stated at the outset. In this appeal it is argued that the charges against the appellant are not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
5. The evidence on record has been closely scrutinised by this Court. Shri S.R. Dewangan (P.W. 7) has deposed that on receipt of instructions from the S.D.M. he went to K.G. Hospital, Raigarh and found Sunita lying on the bed. He obtained certificate from the doctor on duty that she was in a fit physical and mental condition to make her dying declaration. That certificate is written on Ex. P-13. Then he recorded her statement in question-answer form in Ex. P-12. He read it over to her and she admitted it to be correct. She could not sign this statement because of severe burn injuries. Dr. B. Swarnakar (P.W. 10) has deposed that he had examined Sunita on 27.11.1987 before her statement was recorded by the Magistrate. He found her fully conscious and fit to give her statement. He recorded this certificate on Ex. P-12 and signed it. The relevant portion of the dying declaration of the deceased is as under:
"Q : Aapko Kisee Ne Jalne Ke Liye Kya Prerit Kiya ?
Ans. Meree Saas Mujhe Sundar Nahin Hai Kahkar Maartee Thee, Dukh Detee The. Mujhse Sahan Nahin Hua, Main Apne Upar Mitee Ka Tel Daal Kar Jali Hoon."
6. In the dying declaration Ex. P-12 the deceased did not mention anything about the demand of any dowry. She does not say that she took the extreme step because of insistence by anyone for payment of the articles of dowry. The demand of dowry was hot the driving force to commit suicide. It is true that shortly after the marriage the deceased wrote in the letter Ex. P-1 addressed to her father that her mother-in-law is asking for Kardhan, Jhumka (of silver) and charges for connection of T.V. But several months had passed thereafter. It is not known whether these articles were given or not but there is no specific evidence that the mother-in-law repeated the demand of these items. The letter shows that these ornaments of traditional nature were asked for Sunita herself and not for the use of the appellant. It is also found that the father of the girl had expressed to give these items in the marriage. Therefore, simply reminding for these small things did not amount to demand of dowry nor this thing weighed or loomed large with the deceased in bringing an end to her life. If that had been the causative factor that would have found place in the dying declaration. Clause (b) to Explanation to Section 498A, I.P.C. is not attracted as she was not harassed on account of dowry.
7. The next question is whether the appellant exhibited "wilful conduct" of such a nature which was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. According to the dying declaration the appellant used to say that Sunita was not beautiful and on that account she used to harass and beat her. In the letter Ex. P-1 written by Sunita , there is no indication of any physical assault or torture by the appellant. There is no precise evidence to that effect. It is in evidence of the parents of the deceased that Sunita had no complaint against her husband. They have also no complaint against him. If the husband was not dissatisfied because of her dark complexion and he never expressed his unhappiness on that ground it is difficult to believe that the appellant would beat or harass her on that count.
8. The only thing which appears to be true is that the appellant expressed that Sunita was not beautiful. The dying declaration again does not show that the appellant said that she was ugly (badsurat) as stated by the parents of the deceased in evidence. That would have been a stronger word to disturb the mental equilibrium of the deceased. The remark of the mother-in-law that Sunita was not beautiful cannot be approved as it was expected of her to treat her with greater love and affection when it was known that she was pregnant. But the remark that the daughter-in-law was not beautiful was not of such a nature which could drive her to commit suicide. It was not of sufficient gravity. It is a question of fact in each case whether the woman was subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A, I.P.C. The letter Ex. P-1 shows that Sunita was very much emotional, of low tolerance and unstable mind. There was no grave and serious provocation by the appellant. Even after the introduction of Section 498A, I.P.C. and Section 113A, Evidence Act proof must be beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 209=1 (1990) DMC 1 (SC). On a dispassionate consideration of the material on record it is found that the charges against the appellant are not established.
9. The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside and she is acquitted of all the charges.