Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi
Collector Of Central Excise vs Black Diamond Beverage Ltd. on 13 November, 1985
Equivalent citations: 1986(7)ECC4, 1986(6)ECR347(TRI.-DELHI), 1986(23)ELT177(TRI-DEL)
ORDER D.N. Lal, Member (T)
1. Before the appeal was called, we observed that the appeal having been filed beyond the period of limitation, the appellant Collector had also moved an application for condonation of delay. This application has been given No. ED(SB)/COD/398/84A. The record of the Registry shows that the appeal as well as the application for condonation of delay were received in the Registry on 27-12-1984. Since it was observed that a considerable delay beyond the period of limitation was involved, we considered it expedient and in the interests of justice to first dispose of the application for condonation before taking up the appeal itself. In fact, we are surprised as to why the Registry did not first list the condonation application and instead listed the main appeal itself. The material date for the purpose of the application is that the order appealed against was passed by the Collector (Appeals) Central Excise, Calcutta on 12-7-1984. Shri Bhattacharya, the learned advocate for' the respondents, submits that his clients got the order on 30-7-1984.
2. The reasons for delay, as set out in the application, are to the effect that on 20-10-1984, the Office of the Collector came to know from the office of one of its Assistant Collectors that an order-in-appeal (the impugned order) had been issued on 12-7-1984. Working on this information, it is submitted.in the application that the Office of the Collector 'took an initiative to examine the law points involved in the order-in-appeal but as the order-in-appea! appeared to have been received in this office the same could not be examined' (presumably the word 'not' has not been placed in the sentence through inadvertence as pleaded by the learned SDR). This sentence itself is selfcontradictory. On the one side, the plea is that an initiative was taken to examine the law points involved and on the other side it is also submitted that the impugned order was not in possession of the examining authority. In other words, how could the examining authority prima facie take the view that the impugned order involved substantial points of law and facts which were worthy of being taken up to the Tribunal. Since the application does not throw any light on it, we leave the self-contradiction emerging from the sentence as it is.
3. It is further stated in the application that the Collector referred the matter to the Office of the Collector (Appeals) for furnishing to him a copy of the order-in-appeal. It would further appear from paragraph 4 of the application that on getting no response from the Collector (Appeals), the Collector deputed an officer on 6-12-1984 (about three and half months after the impugned order was passed) to the Office of the Collector (Appeals) and a copy of the order was obtained in the following manner :-
"The officer deputed for the purpose, however, managed to get a copy from the other level".
When the Collector as well as the Collector (Appeals) are functionaries of a responsible status working under the same Board, it is not understood as to why the Collector was so handicapped in obtaining a copy of the appellate order and had to resort to the manner as set out in paragraph 4 of the application.
4. The learned Counsel for the respondent submits that in spite of being unwell, he has undertaken this journey to plead the case of the respondent. He has forcefully opposed the application on the ground that it is vague, frivolous, without substance and certain material facts have been purposefully kept out of it. According to him, the application gives the impression as if the entire mechanics of filing appeals or applications before the highest forum are purely of an ad hoc character. Appeals are filed on getting information and getting access to orders through unusual methods. He submits that the appeal is badly barred by limitation by about two months and much as he would like to show accommodation to the other side, this is not a fit case where the Bench should show any leniency to the appellant Collector. In support of his submissions, he has also invited our attention to two orders of the Tribunal, reported at 1985 E.L.T. (21) 709 in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta v. East Coast Paper Products (P) Ltd., Calcutta and 1985 E.L.T. (20) 362 in the case of Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd., Bombay. He further submits that the latter order in turn follows the Supreme Court judgment reported at AIR 1972 (SC) 749. Jt is the prayer of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the aforesaid judgments have squarely dealt with matters pertaining to condonation of delay and applying the ratio of the said orders and judgments, the present application deserves to be rejected outright.
5. Shri P.K. Ajwani, the learned SDR, has no cogent ground to advance except to plead for more time to move another application or to substantiate the present application with the help of further material.
6. We have heard both sides with great attention. The application is undisputedly barred by limitation by a period of about two months. Under the accepted legal norms, in a case of this type, the appellant has to account for the delay in filing of the appeal for each day. On the other hand, we see lot of force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the application is worded in a very vague manner and does not bring into sharp focus as to the circumstances of a compelling nature which led to the delay in filing of the present appeal. We are afraid the present application does not disclose any material at all which would warrant a grant of the prayer made in the application.
7. We have given anxious consideration to the prayer of the learned SDR for further time being granted but we think it would not be in order. The Appellant Collector hid sufficient time and the very purpose of moving a condonation application is to collect all the relevant material and set it out in the application. We are, therefore, constrained not to accede to the request of the learned SDR for granting further time to amend the application.
8. In the result, we do not find any ground for condonation of delay and therefore reject the application.
9. As the application for condonation of delay has been rejected, the appeal itself is dismissed as barred by time. Ordered accordingly.