Karnataka High Court
Muniraju @ Ravi vs State Of Karnataka By on 25 June, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2018 KAR 222, 2018 (4) AKR 602, (2018) 5 KANT LJ 359 (2019) 2 ALLCRILR 432, (2019) 2 ALLCRILR 432
Author: R.B Budihal
Bench: R.B Budihal
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JUNE, 2018
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE BUDIHAL R.B.
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.A. PATIL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.39/2017
BETWEEN:
Muniraju @ Ravi
S/o late Hanumaiah
Aged about 38 years
Working in Jayanagar East End
Dinesh Electrical Shop, R/at.No.87,
Koracharu Beedi, Vinayaka Nagar,
Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk
Bangalore Rural District-562 123.
... Appellant
(By Sri Manjunath G., Advocate)
AND:
State of Karnataka
by Anekal Police Station
Bangalore Rural District-562 123
Represented by learned State Public Prosecutor.
... Respondent
(By Sri Vijayakumar Majage, Addl. SPP)
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This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374(2) of
the Cr.P.C praying to set aside the judgment and order of
conviction dated 12.11.2008 and sentence dated
13.11.2008, passed by the District and Sessions Judge
and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-V, Bangalore
Rural District, in S.C.No.26/2007 - Convicting the
appellant/accused for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of Indian Penal Code.
This Criminal Appeal having been heard and
reserved on 13.06.2018 coming on for pronouncement of
judgment this day, B.A.Patil, J. delivered the following:-
JUDGMENT
The present appeal is preferred by the accused, assailing the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, dated 12.11.2008 in SC.No.26/2007, passed by the District and Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, FTC-V, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore.
2. The genesis of the case of the prosecution is that one P. Shashi, maternal uncle of the deceased filed the complaint at Ex.P1 alleging that he along with his niece deceased Geetha @ Hemavathi, daughter of Lakshmamma, Akshitha, daughter of his another sister -3- Chennarajamma and Nagaraj, brother-in-law of Chennarajamma were staying together. On 18.8.2006 as usual they all went to attend their work including Lakshmamma, the mother of the deceased. Complainant's niece Akshitha, aged about 10 years used to go to school and deceased Geetha who failed in SSLC used to attend tailoring classes at Haragaddhe. She used to go everyday at about 9.15 a.m., while so going she used to leave Akshitha to her school. As on the date of the incident, deceased Geetha was not keeping well, she stayed back in the house. Hence, the complainant by leaving Akhitha to School, went to attend his work. It is further case of the prosecution that as usual, the mother of the deceased came to the house at about 2.30 p.m. As the door was closed, she tapped the door and as the door was not opened, by suspecting she enquired. Thereafter with the help of the persons who were working by the side of the house in a site the door was opened by breaking open the lock with crowbar. When they entered -4- the house, they saw the deceased Geetha lying on the floor in a pool of blood. Immediately she informed her brother Lokesh alleging that some unknown miscreant has committed her murder. Thereafter the complainant filed the complaint as per Ex.P1. On the basis of the said complaint at Ex.P1, a case was registered in Crime No.114/2006 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
3. After committal of the case, the trial Court took cognizance and after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties on being confronted with the charges, accused denied the same for which he was made to stand trial. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses and got marked 17 Exhibits and also MO.Nos.1 to 11. Accused abided by his denial in the course of cross-examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., but did not adduce any evidence in defence. The trial Court on an appraisal of the evidence -5- on record by believing the case of the prosecution recorded the finding of conviction of the appellant quo all the charges. Being aggrieved by such order, the appellant-accused is before this Court.
4. The main grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused Sri Manjunath G, are that the prosecution is intending to rely upon the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 who said to have seen the accused going inside the house and 15 minutes thereafter going out of the house to substantiate the fact they have last seen the accused going inside the house, but their evidence is inconsistent and does not probablize the said fact. Though the said evidence is not trustworthy and not reliable, the trial Court has wrongly convicted the accused. It is his further contention that the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence and in order to prove its case, the prosecution has to prove the chain of all the events, but it has failed to prove all the links and even -6- then the trial Court has erroneously passed the impugned judgment and order. Learned counsel for the appellant- accused further submitted that the prosecution has relied upon one more circumstance to show that the key of the door was with the accused and the same was opened by him. But before that the said lock has not been seized by the prosecution and even the key has not been seized while drawing the spot mahazar. He further contended that the conduct of the witnesses PWs.2 and 3 is very unnatural and inconsistent. Though they were present at the time when the mother of the deceased came to the house and they helped her to open the door with crowbar by breaking open and after entering the house, they noticed the dead body of the deceased Geetha with injuries, they have not at all whispered a single word about they seeing the accused at about 8.45 a.m. coming to the house and going out 15 minutes thereafter. If really they saw the accused, immediately they would have informed the said fact to the mother of the -7- deceased and to the complainant. In this behalf, the presence of these witnesses by the side of the house of the mother of the deceased and they witnessing the accused going inside the house and going out, is doubtful. He further submitted that though these witnesses were very much present, their statements have been recorded after 15 days of the incident. The said delay has not been properly explained by the prosecution to substantiate and accept their statements. He further submitted that the panch witness PW.12 has turned hostile. Even the Investigating Officer has not followed the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act ('Act' for short) and recovery is hit by Section 27 of the Act so also the recovery has not been proved. Under such circumstances, the trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused. He further submitted that the recovery of gold chain and its description is also having difference. In that light, the recovery has not been proved properly. He further submitted that -8- serology report has also not been produced in order to prove the grouping of blood group on the articles seized, though the FSL report at Ex.P17 contains that some of the articles were stained with blood. On these grounds, he prayed to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and order passed by the trial Court.
5. Per contra, the learned Additional SPP Sri Vijayakumar Majage, vehemently argued by contending that the prosecution has proved all the circumstances to bring home the guilt of the accused. PWs.2 and 3 have last seen the accused going and coming back from the place of the alleged incident. Even the key, knife and gold chain have been recovered at the instance of the accused based on his voluntary statement at Ex.P16 by drawing a mahazar at Ex.P12. He further submitted that the alleged incident took place on 18.8.2006, but the accused was apprehended only on 1.9.2006, which clearly goes to show that the accused was absconding -9- without just cause. The said circumstance also clearly points out towards the guilt of the accused. He further submitted that all the circumstances together if they are analyzed in its right perspective, they point out the guilt of the accused alone and accused has committed the heinous offence of murder for gain. The trial Court after considering the entire material on record, has rightly convicted the accused and there are no good grounds made out by the appellant-accused to interfere with the judgment and order of the trial Court and deserves to be confirmed by dismissing the appeal. On these grounds, he prayed to dismiss the appeal.
6. Before going to discuss the point in controversy, we want to bring it on record some of the facts which are not in dispute. It is not in dispute that the death of the deceased Geetha is homicidal death. It is also not in dispute that the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence as there are no eye witnesses to the incident in
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question. It is also not in dispute that the serology report has not been produced. Keeping in view the aforesaid admitted facts, it is well established principle of law that if a case rests on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances are to be linked with one another and the Court will be in a position to see the chain of events and if the chain of events and important links have been established by the prosecution, then it is said to have been proved. Keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the aforesaid line, let us consider whether the prosecution has proved all the important chain of events.
7. The first circumstance on which the prosecution has mainly relied upon is that of the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 who said to have seen the accused going inside the house where the incident has taken place and coming out 15 minutes thereafter. As could be seen from the evidence of these witnesses, they have deposed that
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they were working in a site situated by the side of the house of PW.1, the complainant. All the residents of the house went for their work and at that time deceased Geetha was alone at home. At about 8.45 a.m., accused Muniraju went to the said house and at that time, he was picking the plants and at about 9.15 a.m. he went out of the house. They further deposed that at about 11.30 a.m. as they were thirsty, they went to the house to drink water and when they tapped the door, nobody opened it. Hence, under the impression that there was nobody in the house, they came back. At about 2.30 or 3.00 p.m., PW.5, mother of the deceased came to the house and tapped the door. As the door was not opened, they told that at about 8.45 a.m. accused Muniraju had come to the house. They have further deposed that thereafter they called PW.1 over phone, who came at about 3.50 or 4.00 p.m. and he also tapped the door. As the door was not opened, with the help of crowbar by breaking open the lock, they went inside the house and
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saw the dead body of the deceased. Neck of the deceased was found slit. During the course of cross- examination, they have deposed that they would not notice who are there in the houses when they were working. They have also admitted that whenever they go to work, they would carry the food as well as water which is required for the day. They have further admitted that they were working on their own in the said site. They have also deposed that they do not know when their statements have been recorded. Other suggestions have been denied.
8. On going through the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, though they have stated in their examination-in-chief that they have seen the accused going to the house of PW.5, the mother of the deceased, the conduct of these witnesses is unnatural and unbelievable. If really they have seen the accused going and coming out of the house where the alleged incident has taken place,
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immediately when PW.5 came and tapped the door and when she called PW.1, the complainant and they opened the door by breaking the lock with the help of crowbar, and if they suspected the accused, they could have disclosed the name of the accused to these two witnesses. Be that as it may, even when the police officers came to the place of incident, at that time also they have not disclosed the name of the accused. They have also deposed that if they go to work, usually they would carry the food and water and they would not observe any other things while they were working at their own. Under the said facts and circumstances, on re-appreciation of the evidence of these two witnesses, the credibility of these witnesses appears to be doubtful especially their presence at the site by the side of the house where the incident has taken place is doubtful. When they have seen the accused going inside and coming out of the house and they were knowing the fact that the deceased alone was there in the house and
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accused was going inside the house, at that time, they never enquired about the accused as normally, in the village people make enquiry if an unknown person enters the house of other person. Even as per the evidence of these two witnesses, they have gone at about 11.30 a.m. to fetch water as they were thirsty and when they tapped the door, it was not opened. At that time also, they have not behaved naturally. In that light, the presence of these witnesses at the place of the incident and they seeing the accused going inside and coming out of the house appears to be doubtful.
9. It is well established principle of law that in case if any doubt arises, then the benefit of doubt should go to the accused. Leave apart this, even as could be seen from the evidence of these two witnesses, at paragraph No.4, they have deposed that after 15 days, they were working in a site and at that time, police jeep came wherein the accused was also there. At that time also,
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they never disclosed the said fact of accused going inside and coming out of the house. Evidence produced clearly indicates the fact that the statement of the accused came to be recorded after fifteen days of the incident. It is well established principle of law that if the statement of the witnesses is recorded belatedly, the same is not considered to be true and it will be considered to be a serious lacuna on the part of the investigation. The conduct of the witnesses also creates a doubt. In that light, the said evidence is not trustworthy and reliable so as to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. In that light, the first limb of the prosecution that PWs.2 and 3 have seen the accused going inside and coming out of the house is failed.
10. The second circumstance on which the prosecution is intending to rely upon is that the recovery of knife and key at the instance of the accused as per Ex.P12. As could be seen from the evidence of PW.15,
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the Investigating Officer, he has deposed that on 29.08.2006 after completing the inquest proceedings, he apprehended the accused on 1.9.2006 and recorded his voluntary statement as per Ex.P16. PW.15 has not specifically stated as to what the accused volunteered before him as per Ex.P16. It is well established principle of law that in order to rely upon the evidence under Section 27 of the Act apart from marking, he has to specifically say as to what exactly the words used by the accused to lead the recovery. Though the prosecution also got examined PW.12, the panch witness to recovery mahazars at Exs.P11 and P12, he has not supported the case of the prosecution and he has been treated as hostile and no other witness has been examined to prove the said fact. Even as could be seen from the evidence, the accused was taken to the house of PW.5 and he was made to open the key, but if really the door was locked and the same was opened with the help of crowbar definitely the same should have been mentioned in the
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spot mahazar at Ex.P2, which is silent in this behalf. In so far as recovery of mobile and knife is concerned, the same is not proved in accordance with the procedure established by law and in that light the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the same.
11. The next circumstance on which the prosecution is intending to rely upon is the recovery of the gold chain which is said to have been taken by the accused immediately after the incident in question. As could be seen from the evidence of PW.15, he has only deposed that accused took PW.14 and the police officials to his shop and accused told to give MO.No.1 and the same was seized by drawing a mahazar as per Ex.P11. PW.14 with whom MO.No.1 was pledged, has not supported the case of the prosecution and even no other witness who was present at the time of recovery of MO.No.1 was examined to substantiate the said fact. Even as could be seen from the recovery mahazar at Ex.P11, the article
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which was seized is a gold chain. As per the evidence of PW.5, it was a box type chain and hence there is inconsistency with regard to description of the said chain. The evidence produced in this behalf is not worth believable material so as to accept the same.
12. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused slit the neck and took away the gold chain from her neck. The clothes of the accused were seized to ascertain whether the blood has been spilled over the clothes of the accused. If really the incident has taken place as alleged, definitely there could have been some stains of blood on the clothes of the accused. Even as could be seen from the photographs produced which were available in the lower Court records, the body was in the pool of blood. In that light, the prosecution has not come up with any explanation. Even as could be seen from the evidence of PW.7, she has deposed that about one year back, accused came and gave a gold chain and
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told that the same belongs to his wife and as he was having a financial problem he requested to get it pledged and get the money. She has further deposed that the said gold chain was a mangalya chain which was like box type. Thereafter she and accused went to Mathaji Jewelers at Harinagar, where she introduced the accused and pledged the gold article and received an amount of Rs.25,750/-. During the course of cross-examination, she has deposed that the gold chain was pledged in the said shop in her name and usually the name of the person who pledges will be written on the receipt. If really the accused has gone along with PW.7 and pledged the said gold chain definitely his name should have been mentioned in the receipt. Even as could be seen from the cross-examination, PW.7 has deposed that beneath her name, the name of Ravi has been written and it has not been properly explained as to why the said name has been written. In that light, there are lot of inconsistencies with regard to description of the seized
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article and pledging the same with PW.14. Hence, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the recovery at the instance of the accused.
13. Though the prosecution got examined PW.6, the daughter of PW.5, who has seen the accused going inside the house, as could be seen from the time of giving evidence, she was minor. In order to rely upon the evidence of child witness, Court has to keep in mind the requirements of Sections 118 of the Act. Section 118 of the Act specifies that all persons are competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them. Court as a rule of prudence to consider such evidence on close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability of such evidence. If the said witness is tutored, under such circumstance, Court can reject the testimony of such witness partially or fully. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon'ble
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Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramesh and another, reported in (2011)4 SCC 786, wherein at paragraphs-7 to 14, it has been observed as under:-
7. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan this Court examined the provisions of Section 5 of the Oaths Act, 1873 and Section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that (AIR p.55, para 7) every witness is competent to depose unless the court considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of the same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the court considers otherwise. The Court further held as under:
(AIR p.56, para 11) "11. ... it is desirable that Judges and Magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why they think that, otherwise the credibility of the witness
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may be seriously affected, so much so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But whether the magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate."
8. In Mangoo v. State of M.P. this Court while dealing with the evidence of a child witness observed that there was always scope to tutor the child, however, it cannot alone be a ground to come to the conclusion that the child witness must have been tutored. The Court must determine as to whether the child has been tutored or not. It can be ascertained by examining the evidence and from the contents thereof as to whether there are any traces of tutoring.
9. In Panchhi v. State of U.P. this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied on.
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However, it is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law. It cannot be held that "the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring." (SCC p.181, para 11).
10. In Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v.
State of Maharashtra, this Court dealing with the child witness has observed as under:
(SCC pp.567-68, para 10) "10. '... 7. ... The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his
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understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.'* "
11. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern between right and wrong and the court may find out from the cross-examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong. The court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting questions
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to him and even if no such questions had been put, it may be gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to understand the sanctity of giving evidence on a oath and the import of the questions that were being put to him. (Vide:
Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh v. State of Maharashtra.)
12. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire
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confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of a serious nature.
13. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from untutored part, in case such remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such an eventuality the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness. (Vide: Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab.)
14. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that
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the deposition of a child witness may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.
14. Keeping in view the observations made in the above case, if we peruse at paragraph No.4 of the cross- examination of PW.6, a question was put to the said witness that the police have tutored her to depose like that, but the witness has answered that the lawyer has tutored her and when a question has been asked who has tutored, she has pointed out towards the learned
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Government Advocate and has deposed that he has instructed how to depose and she does not know anything about the case in question. In the light of the above said evidence and the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the evidence of this witness to the effect that she has seen the accused while going to the school inside the house is not trustworthy, reliable and safe and as such the same is liable to be rejected and accordingly, it is rejected.
15. It is well established principle of law that if a case rests on the circumstantial evidence the prosecution has to prove all the circumstances and proved circumstances must lead to one and only conclusion towards the guilt of the accused and the chain of events must be complete. It is also well established Principle of law that if any one of the links which is said to be an important link is not established beyond reasonable doubt then the said evidence cannot be made a basis to
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convict the accused. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sunil, reported in (2017) 14 SCC 516, wherein at paragraphs 13 to 15, it has been observed as under:-
13. In a case where there is no direct witness to prove the prosecution case, conviction of the accused can be made on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided the chain of the circumstances is complete beyond all reasonable doubt. It was observed by this Court in the case of Prakash vs. State of Karnataka as follows: (SCC p. 153, para
51) "51. It is true that the relevant circumstances should not be looked at in a disaggregated manner but collectively. Still, this does not absolve the prosecution from proving each relevant fact.
'6. In a case of circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by independent evidence and the circumstances so proved, must form a
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complete chain without giving room to any other hypotheses and should be consistent with only the guilt of the accused.' (Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, SCC p.176 para 6)"
14. It has also been the observation of this Court in Musheer Khan Vs. State of M.P. apropos the admissibility of evidence in a case solely based upon circumstantial evidence that: (SCC p.762, paras 55-58) "55. Section 27 starts with the word `provided'. Therefore, it is a proviso by way of an exception to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. If the facts deposed under Section 27 are not voluntary, then it will not be admissible, and will be hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. (See State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad.)
56. The Privy Council in Pulukori Kottaya vs. King Emperor held that Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not artistically worded but it provides an exception to the prohibition imposed under the preceding sections. However, the extent of discovery admissible pursuant to the facts deposed by accused
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depends only to the nature of the facts discovered to which the information precisely relates.
57. The limited nature of the admissibility of the facts discovered pursuant to the statement of the accused under Section 27 can be illustrated by the following example:
Suppose a person accused of murder deposes to the police officer the fact as a result of which the weapon with which the crime is committed is discovered, but as a result of such discovery no inference can be drawn against the accused, if there is no evidence connecting the knife with the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused.
58. So the objection of the defense counsel to the discovery made by the prosecution in this case cannot be sustained.
But the discovery by itself does not help the prosecution to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed on A-4 and A-5 by the High Court."
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15. From a perusal of the evidence on record, it could without any hesitation be said that the basic foundation of the prosecution had crumbled down in this case by not connecting the respondent with the incident in question. And when basic foundation in criminal cases is so collapsed, the circumstantial evidence becomes inconsequential. In such circumstances, it is difficult for the Court to hold that a judgment of conviction could be founded on the sole circumstance that recovery of weapon and other articles have been made.
16. Keeping in view the above said facts and circumstances, we have carefully and cautiously gone through the records and the evidence as well as the impugned judgment and the order. The trial Court has not considered the above said circumstances in its right perspective and has wrongly convicted the accused- appellant. We find no rational justification for the conclusion reached by the trial Court. The trial Court has
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misread the evidence on record and has completely ignored the relevant evidence on record and has come to a wrong conclusion. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the trial Court is not sustainable in law and the same requires to be set aside.
Accordingly, appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 12.11.2008 passed in SC.No.26/2007, by the District and Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, FTC-V, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore is set aside. The accused- appellant herein is acquitted of the charges levelled against him under Section 302 of IPC. He is ordered to be released forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE *ck/-