Delhi District Court
Leayan Global Private Limited vs Avinash Kumar Chawla on 7 February, 2026
CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As
M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026
IN THE COURT OF VINOD YADAV: DISTRICT JUDGE:
(COMMERCIAL COURT)-02: NORTH-WEST DISTRICT: ROHINI
DISTRICT COURTS: DELHI
CNR No.DLNW01-011501-2023
CS (Comm.) No.897/2023
In the matter of:-
AMENDED MEMO OF PARTIES
M/s Leayan Global Pvt. Ltd.,
Through Its Authorized Signatory,
At: 119-121 (Part), Block P & T,
FazalGanj, Kanpur-208012, Uttar-Pradesh.
....Plaintiff
Versus
Avinash Kumar Chawla,
Trading as: M/s Chawla Plywood House,
At: Powayan Road, Near Chawla Dharmkanta, Dilazaq,
Shahjahanpur, Uttar Pradesh-242001.
.....Defendant
Date of Institution of Suit : 18.12.2023
Date of filing of Application U/o XIII-A CPC : 17.01.2025
Date of hearing arguments on said application : 07.02.2026
Date of judgment : 07.02.2026
SUIT UNDER SECTION 134 & 135 OF THE TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999
AND COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, SEEKING PERMANENT INJUNCTION
TO RESTRAIN INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE MARK, INFRINGEMENT
OF COPYRIGHT, PASSING OFF, RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS ETC.
07.02.2026
JUDGMENT IN TERMS OF ORDER XIII-A CPC
1. This is a suit filed by plaintiff, inter alia seeking a decree of
permanent injunction, restraining infringement of trademark, copyright,
passing off, damages and rendition of accounts etc.
Digitally signed
by VINOD
VINOD YADAV
YADAV Date:
2026.02.07
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2. (i) During the course of proceedings, plaintiff preferred an
application under Order XIII-A CPC, inter alia praying for summary
judgment in the matter.
(ii) Despite repeated opportunities, no reply to this application
has been filed by the defendant.
3. The relevant facts for the consideration on this application
are that plaintiff is a company incorporated under the provisions of the
Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacturing and
marketing of all kinds of shoes, boots, slippers, soles and other footwear
articles, cleaners, polish, bags, wallets, luggage items, belts, saddlery,
sports items and equipment, readymade garments, leather, leather
materials and articles, animal skins and hides and other allied and
cognate goods. It is claimed that plaintiff company is wholly owned
subsidiary of M/s RSPL Limited.
4. It has been averred that in the year 1998 plaintiff through its
predecessor conceived and adopted the trade mark RED CHIEF (word)
along with (RED CHIEF LABEL) consisting of a unique
geometric pattern, having the word "Red" transcribed in white on a red
background in the upper-third section and word "Chief" transcribed in
white on a blue background in the lower-third section, with Device of a
Red-Indian Chieftain being placed in the middle in relation to said goods
and business.
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5. (i) It has been further averred that plaintiff's trade mark RED
CHIEF and (RED CHIEF LABEL) are registered under
relevant Class 19 and 20 and also in other classes in India under various
registrations which are still valid and subsisting under the provisions of
the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the details whereof are given hereunder:
S. No. TRADEMARK CLASS APPLICA APPLICA STATUS CONDITIONS
TION TION
NO. DATE
1. RED CHIEF 19 920686 26/04/2000 Registered N/A
(LABEL)
SERIES MARK
(DEVICE
MARK)
2. RED CHIEF 19 1207650 19/06/2003 Registered Registration
SHOES of this Trade
(LABEL) Mark shall
give no right
to the
Exclusive
Use of
Disclaimer
of Word
"SHOES".
3. RED CHIEF, 20 920687 26/04/2000 Registered N/A
WOMEN
(LABEL)
(DEVICE
MARK)
4. RED CHIEF 20 1207651 19/06/2003 Registered Registration
SHOES of this Trade
(DEVICE Mark shall
MARK) give no right
to the
Exclusive
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Use of
Disclaimer
of Word
"SHOES".
(ii) The plaintiff has further filed various other applications for
registration of trademark RED CHIEF and RED CHIEF LABEL in
Classes 01 to 42 under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in
India, details whereof finds mention in paragraph No.7 of the plaint. It
has been further averred that some of the applications for registration of
artwork RED CHIEF with its variants are still pending registration,
details of which are mentioned in paragraph No.9 of the plaint.
6. It has been contended that the artistic work involved in the
plaintiff's trademark RED CHIEF, (RED CHIEF LABEL) ,
& is an original art
work, well protected and enforceable within the meaning of the
Copyright Act 1957.
7. It has been further stated that with the advent of e-
commerce, the internet and trade thereunder, plaintiff is also displaying
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its product(s) under the trademark RED CHIEF, (RED CHIEF
LABEL) , & on
the internet through its website namely www.redchief.in and
www.leayan.com, wherein the word RED CHIEF is the most essential
part of the plaintiff's said domain name. It has been contended that
plaintiff has been using the said domain name not only to display its said
products under the said trademark/label, but is also using it as a tool to
carry out its business thereunder. The said domain name of the plaintiff
is claimed to be interactive in nature.
8. (i) It has been further stated that since the year of adoption of
the trademark RED CHIEF, (RED CHIEF LABEL),
& , plaintiff has
been continuously, commercially, openly, exclusively and to the
exclusion of others, uninterruptedly and in the course of trade and as
proprietor thereof, using said Trade Mark/Label as Trade Mark in
relation to its said goods and business and carrying on its said goods and
business. The said mark is also stated to be available in the list of well-
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known trademarks on IP India Website URL/link
https://ipindiaonline.gov.in/tmrpublicsearch/well-known-trademaks-
updated.pdf.
(ii) It has been further averred that with the increase in its
popularity, plaintiff has already built up a handsome sales figures, details
of which are mentioned in paragraph No.23 of the plaint. It has been
contended that the public at large and trade associate, identify and
distinguish the said trade mark/label/trade name with the plaintiff and
plaintiff's goods/services and business alone and the same is entitled to
be registered, recognized and protected under the category of well-
known trademarks within the meaning of provisions of Section-2(1) (zg)
and Section-11 of Trade Marks Act, 1999.
9. Defendant is stated to be engaged in the business of
manufacturing, marketing, trading, soliciting and selling of plywood,
decorative plywood & laminated plywood, board, teak plywood, marine
plywood and related and cognate products by using impugned
trademarks/label RED CHIEF
, which is
identical/deceptively similar to plaintiff's said trademark/label RED
CHIEF, (RED CHIEF LABEL),
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& , in relation to
impugned goods and business.
10. It has been further averred that in the second week of
December' 2023, plaintiff came across the impugned goods under the
impugned trade mark/label. It has been alleged that the defendant has
been openly, continuously and extensively advertising and selling its
goods and products through various leading third party E-Commerce
cum interactive websites including the platform of Just Dial and Trade
India through its respective weblinks/URL's
https://www.justdial.com/Shahjahanpur/Chawla-Plywood-House-
Shahjahanpur-H-O/9999P5842-5842-180219103730-Y7M6_BZDET
and https://www.tradeindia.com/chawla-ply-wood-house-23623729/. A
true representation cum screenshot of the aforesaid e-commerce cum
interactive websites have been provided in paragraph No.32 of the plaint.
11. It has been averred that defendant has adopted the impugned
trademark/label only with a view to trade upon the tremendous goodwill
and reputation of the plaintiff's said trademark/label which amounts to
unfair advantage and is detrimental to the distinctive character and repute
of the said trademark/label of the plaintiff. It is alleged that defendant is
networking, soliciting, trading and selling displaying, advertising,
supplying, soliciting the impugned goods and business under the
impugned Trademark/label through various third-party e-commerce cum
interactive websites viz. Just Dial and Trade India through its respective
weblinks/URL's https://www.justdial.com/Shahjahanpur/Chawla-
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Plywood-House-Shahjahanpur-H-O/9999P5842-5842-180219103730-
Y7M6_BZDET and https://www.tradeindia.com/chawla-ply-wood-
house-23623729/ which are interactive in nature and can be accessed
across the globe including within the North-West, Rohini areas i.e.,
MangolPuri, Bharat Nagar, Mayure Enclave, Begampur, Vijay Vihar,
AmanVihar, Raja Park, Azadpur, Sultan Puri, Subhash Palace,
KeshavPuram, etc. It has been further averred that the defendant has been
committing the impugned acts of passing off in the markets of Delhi
including North-West Delhi.
12. Alongwith the plaint, plaintiff also preferred an application
under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC, inter alia praying for ad-interim ex-
parte injunction. Vide order dated 19.12.2023, the said application was
allowed and following order was passed:
xxxxx
21. For the forgoing reasons and till further
orders, the defendant by itself/themselves as also
through its/their proprietors, promoters, retailers,
C&F Agents, individual partners and directors (if
any), agents, servants, assignees, representatives,
successors, distributors and all others acting for and
on their behalf are hereby restrained from using,
manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising
or displaying (including in audio, print, visual media
or otherwise), directly or indirectly or dealing in any
other manner or mode in the impugned
trademark/label RED CHIEF,
"
which is/are identical/deceptively similar to
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plaintiff's said trademark/ label RED CHIEF,
(RED CHIEF LABEL) ,
&
, or any other trademark/label
identical with and/or deceptively similar thereto in
relation to their impugned goods and business of
plywood, decorative plywood & laminated
plywood, board, teak plywood, marine plywood and
related and cognate products, thereby infringing
plaintiff's registered trade marks and copyright; and
passing off its goods and business as that of the
goods and business of the plaintiff.
xxxxx
13. Further vide order dated 19.12.2023, the application moved
by plaintiff under Order XXVI Rule CPC inter alia seeking appointment
of Local Commissioner was allowed. Consequently, Ms.Varsha Goyal,
Advocate was appointed as "Local Commissioner" with the directions to
visit premises of defendant i.e, (i) M/s Chawla Plywood House, Principal
Place of Business at: Powayan Road, Near Chawla Dharmkanta, Dilazaq,
Shahjahanpur, Uttar Pradesh-242001; and (ii) Godown address at:
Mishra Bhawan, Ram Nagar, Opposite Krishna Mandir, Dilazak,
Shahjahanpur, Uttar Pradesh, 242001. The learned Local Commissioner
accordingly executed the commission on 28.12.2023 and filed her report,
which is already on record.
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14. (i) After getting served, defendant filed written statement, inter
alia contending that the defendant has not infringed the trademark of
plaintiff as both the parties have been dealing in different goods. The
plaintiff deals in shoes and other related leather goods; whereas, the
defendant is a trader in plywood. It has been further contended that the
trademark of the plaintiff is not a well known trademark; in the
alternative, it has been stated that even if it may be a well known
trademark, the same may be in Delhi and not in Uttar Pradesh.
(ii) On merits, it has been contended that the defendant has
been purchasing the plywood items and Boards from various
traders namely M/s Zamzam Enterprises and M/s Shiv Shakti
Enterprises etc. and as such, the defendant has not violated the
trademark of the plaintiff.
15. I have given thoughtful consideration to the averments
made in the plaint and have carefully gone through the material on
record. At the outset, learned counsel for the plaintiff has
confined his claim in the application for passing off.
16. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has taken me
through the list of trademarks having been declared as "well
known trademark(s)" by the Trade Mark Registry itself. The
name of the plaintiff figures at S.No.107 therein. For ready
reference, same is re-produced hereunder:
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S.No. Trademark Proprietor Determining Report Observation
Authority
107 Registrar of N/A The Registrar
Leayan Global Trade Marks observed that the
Private Mark is well-known
Limited, Plot with reference to
No.119, 120, shoes, boots,
121, Block P slippers, soles and
& T, other footwear
(Red Chief) Fazalganj, articles, cleaners,
Kalpi Road, polish, bags, wallets,
(with reference to Kanpur, luggage items, belts,
shoes, boots, slippers, Uttar Pradesh. saddlery, sports
soles and other items and
footwear articles, equipment,
cleaners, polish, bags, readymade garments
wallets, luggage items, leather, leather
belts, saddlery, sports materials and
items and equipment, articles, animal skins
readymade garments and hides and other
leather, leather allied.
materials and articles,
animal skins and hides
and other allied)
17. The learned counsel has also referred to the judgment
dated 01.07.2022, rendered by Ms.Nivedita Anil Sharma, learned
District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Shahdara District,
Karkardooma District Courts in CS (Comm.) No.01/2021, titled
as, "Leayan Global Private Limited V/s Pawan Rajput & Anr.",
whereby the said Court has been pleased to declare the trademark
of the plaintiff to be a "well known trademark" within the
meaning of Section 2(z)(g) of Trade Marks Act, 1999. For ready
reference, Section 2(z)(g) of Trade Marks Act, 1999 is re-
produced hereunder:
xxxxx
2. Definitions and interpretation- (1) In this
Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
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.........
(zg) "well known trade mark", in relation to any goods or services, means a mark which has become so to the substantial segment of the public which uses such goods or receives such services that the use of such mark in relation to other goods or services would be likely to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade or rendering of services between those goods or services and a person using the mark in relation to the first-mentioned goods or services.
xxxxx
18. Further, the relevant provisions in this regard are Section(s) 11(6) to 11(9) of The Trade Marks Act, 1999, which for ready reference are re-produced hereunder:
xxxxx (6) The Registrar shall, while determining whether a trade mark is a well-known trade mark, take into account any fact which he considers relevant for determining a trade mark as a well-known trade mark including--
(i) the knowledge or recognition of that trade mark in the relevant section of the public including knowledge in India obtained as a result of promotion of the trade mark;
(ii) the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of that trade mark;
(iii) the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the trade mark, including advertising or publicity and presentation, at fairs or exhibition of the goods or services to which the trade mark applies;
(iv) the duration and geographical area of Page 12 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 any registration of or any application for registration of that trade mark under this Act to the extent that they reflect the use or recognition of the trade mark;
(v) the record of successful enforcement of the rights in that trade mark, in particular the extent to which the trade mark has been recognised as a well-
known trade mark by any court or Registrar under that record.
(7) The Registrar shall, while determining as to whether a trade mark is known or recognised in a relevant section of the public for the purposes of sub-section (6), take into account--
(i) the number of actual or potential consumers of the goods or services;
(ii) the number of persons involved in the channels of distribution of the goods or services;
(iii) the business circles dealing with the goods or services, to which that trade mark applies.
(8) Where a trade mark has been determined to be well known in at least one relevant section of the public in India by any court or Registrar, the Registrar shall consider that trade mark as a well-known trade mark for registration under this Act.
(9) The Registrar shall not require as a condition, for determining whether a trade mark is a well-known trade mark, any of the following, namely:--
(i) that the trade mark has been used in India;
(ii) that the trade mark has been registered;Page 13 of 56
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(iii) that the application for registration of the trade mark has been filed in India;
(iv) that the trade mark--
(a) is well-known in; or
(b) has been registered in; or
(c) in respect of which an application for registration has been filed in, any jurisdiction other than India, or
(v) that the trade mark is well-known to the public at large in India.
xxxxx
19. Therefore, the trademark of the plaintiff can safely be termed as "well known". I do not find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the defendant that if a trademark is well known then the same is just area specific, i.e trademark of the plaintiff may be well known in Delhi, but it may not be so in Uttar Pradesh.
20. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has further taken me through the documents showing that defendant has been advertising the infringed product(s) on e-commerce site like Just Dial to trade in India (page 145 and 146 of the documents), which for ready reference are re-produced herein.
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21. Now, let us have a comparative analysis of the marks used by plaintiff and defendant (page 147 of the documents filed by the plaintiff):
Comparison Chart of plaintiff registered Trademark/label alongwith the original product of the bearing registered trademark/ label vis-a-vis impugned product bearing impugned trademark/label of the defendant:
Plaintiff's Trademark / label Defendant's Impugned Trademark/label
22. Therefore, it is apparent that the mark being used by the defendant is similar to that of plaintiff even in minuscule details.
23. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has further taken me through the report of learned Local Commissioner, wherein the learned Local Commissioner has placed on record photographs of the time of execution of commission, where the defendant was categorically found using the trademark of the plaintiff.
24. The learned counsel for the defendant has very vehemently argued that since the goods in which both the parties have been dealing are different goods, therefore, the defendant cannot be held to have passed off the goods of plaintiff.
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25. (i) Let us see the legal position in this regard. In case reported as, "F.A.F.O No.275 of 1984", titled as, "Bata India Limited V/s Pyare Lal & Co., Meerut City & Ors." (DOD:
23.01.1985), the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
31. In Reddaway v. Banham, 1896 AC 199, one of the questions was whether it was necessary for the plaintiff to manufacture the same product which the defendants were producing in order to ask for an injunction in a passing off action. Answering the question in the negative his Lordship observed :
"Now it is not always necessary that there must be in existence goods of that other man with which the defendant seeks to confuse his own. As Lord Greene M.R. said :
--
"Passing off may occur in cases where the plaintiffs do not in fact deal in the offending goods."
32. The law on the subject has been very succinctly considered by the learned Single Judge in the Ellora Industries case (AIR 1980 Delhi 254) (supra) in the following words :
"A word appeals to the ear more than the eye. There is a real and tangible risk of damage, the field of activity being common. The wrongful appropriation of trade reputation is an injury to the plaintiffs. That injury and the acknowledged intention to continue to inflict it, is ample justification for the injunction which was granted."
I entirely agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge.
33. It is also well settled that proof of actual Page 18 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 damage or fraud is unnecessary in a passing off action. The question is whether the offending goods is likely to cause injury or damage to the interest of the plaintiff. A question arises as to who are the people who are likely to be deceived or in whose mind confusion may be created by the user of a mark which is familiar and well established in the market. The Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Dhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (AIR 1963 SC
449) observed (at p. 453 of the AIR) :--
"A critical comparison of the two names may disclose some points of difference but an unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection would be deceived by the overall similarity of the two names......"
34. 1 am of the opinion that the user of the name 'Bata' to any product may give rise in the mind of "unwary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection" that it is a product by the plaintiff. It is this impression which may ultimately cause damage to the reputation of the plaintiff. It amounts to an invasion of his right vis a vis the name 'Bata'. The moot point to be considered in an action for passing off where goods marketed by the defendants are likely to cause an impression in the mind of the purchaser that he is buying the goods of 'Bata'. If it creates this impression, it would be a case for the grant of a temporary injunction for the duration of the suit. If this is not done, the plaintiff may suffer an irreparable injury.
35. The question whether the plaintiff has established that the respondents are passing off goods of their own as that of the plaintiff will be a matter to be established on the basis of the evidence. I am not concerned at the present about the evidence, for it has still to be led. I am not concerned whether the plaintiff I has Page 19 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 suffered any damages or not or whether the plaintiff has been injured by the action of the defendants. At this stage, I have only to consider whether there is a cause of action and whether there is a prima facie case for issue of a restrictive order. As seen above, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has a cause of action for instituting a proceeding for passing off. I am further of the view that the plaintiff has been able to make out a case for issue of an injunction in respect of the user of the name 'Bata' to any of their products by the defendants. The name' Bata' is neither a fancy name nor paternal name nor in any way connected with the defendants. It is not the name of a flower or fauna. It is a fancy name of a foreigner who has established his business in making shoes and the like products in this country. The name is well known in the market and the user of such a name is likely to cause not only deception in the mind of an ordinary customer but may also cause injury to the plaintiff-Company. I will re-emphasise that these observations of mine are prima facie in purport and are not to be taken as the final expression of opinion on the merits.
36. In view of the above, it will be necessary to restrain the respondents from using the name 'Bata' on any of their product. It will also be necessary to direct the respondents not to use the name 'Bata' in any of their packages, advertisements and the like until further orders in the suit. The defendants may use another name for their product but are restrained from using the name 'Bata' in conjunction with any other words for their product. The restraint order would continue until the disposal of the suit. I order accordingly. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.
xxxxx Page 20 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026
(ii) In case reported as, "CS (OS) No.1164/2001", titled as, "Beiersdorf A.G V/s Ajay Sukhwani & Anr." (DOD:
14.11.2008), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
31. Counsel for the defendants had submitted that the field of activity of the plaintiff and defendants are different. While the plaintiffs are marketing cosmetic products, the defendants are providing educational services to students, who want to study abroad. It was, thus submitted that there was no misrepresentation. In view of the nature and extent of goodwill, the said argument has to be rejected. As stated above, the present case is one of fraudulent adoption of the mark NIVEA by the defendants and not of unintentional infringement, therefore, the fact that the activities of the plaintiff and defendants, is not that important. Fraudulent adoption is frowned upon and may not be accepted even when there is difference between the fields of activities of the parties. To succeed in a suit for passing off, it is not necessary that both parties should be in the same line of business. Absence of common business is not fatal but one of the relevant facts which should be taken into consideration.
The test is not whether the parties are in the same line of business or in connected line of business but whether there is likelihood of confusion or the defendants has tried to mislead. In cases of coined words, a plaintiff with passage of time and goodwill can get exclusively identified by the said mark. The mark/word NIVEA is associated with the plaintiff. Defendants are trying to take advantage and benefit of the said goodwill by adopting the mark NIVEA for educational services provided by them. Looking at the similarity of the two marks, fraudulent Page 21 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 adoption of the said mark by the defendants, the nature and extent of the goodwill of the plaintiff, nature and difference of trade by itself is not sufficient to defeat the suit for passing off. The consumers or customers of the defendants may be educated and belong to middle class, both lower and upper, but use of the mark "NIVEA International" by the defendants will cause or is likely to cause confusion and belief that the defendants are connected or associated with the plaintiff. A person belonging to the middle class, who has been using or has heard of NIVEA cream/cosmetics, will normally assume some connection between the plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants are trying to say something about themselves which is not correct i.e. defendants are associated or connected with the plaintiff. Defendants are trying to take advantage of the attraction in the mark Nivea. Defendants are trying to project a connection between themselves and the plaintiff.
xxxxx
26. If the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments is applied to the facts of the present case, then it would be apparent that the type of goods being dealt with by the parties may be different, but the fact of using the trademark of the plaintiff would tantamount to passing off the goods of plaintiff to encash upon its reputation and goodwill.
27. The other argument raised by learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff is manufacturer; whereas, the defendant is a trader is again of no help to him because violation of the common law right of the plaintiff given under Trade Mark Page 22 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 Act cannot be permitted to be violative even by traders. Reference in this regard could be had to the law laid down in case reported as, "RFA (OS) No.29/2002", titled as, "Lalli Enterprises V/s Dharam Chand & Sons" (DOD: 11.02.2000), whereby the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down as under:
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2. After hearing the learned Counsel, we are of the view that all the reasons given by the learned Single Judge in support of the impugned judgment are not sustainable. It is not correct to say that an action of the present type lies only against the manufacturer of the goods. It can lie against any party involved in the infringement chain. So far as the production of cash memos is concerned, it is not necessary. One thing which has to be kept in view is that such clandestine sales are often without cash memo. .......
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28. It is worthwhile to note that the learned Local Commissioner has categorically stated in her report that the infringing material was being sold by the defendant without actually issuing the cash memo.
29. In the end, learned counsel for the defendant very bleakly argued that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. It appears that this argument has been made by the defendant in total ignorance of an authoritative pronouncement by the Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case reported as, "FAO (OS) (Comm.) No.66/2025", titled as, "Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. V/s Veda Sees Page 23 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 Sciences Pvt. Ltd." (DOD: 03.12.2025), whereby the Hon'ble High Court has been pleased to lay down as under:
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17. Whether the impugned judgment is correct in holding that the registration of the asserted trade marks of the appellant in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction on this Court.
17.1 The learned Single Judge has ruled against the appellant, on this issue, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhodha House.
17.2 We are unable to sustain this finding.
17.3 The Supreme Court, in Dhodha House, decided two appeals, i.e., Civil Appeal No.6248/1997 (Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi) and Civil Appeal No.16/1999 (Patel Field Marshal Industries and Ors. v. P.M. Diesel Ltd.). Of these, the decision in Civil Appeal No.6248/1997 is not of relevance for our purpose.
17.4 In paras 17 and 18 of the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the exposition of law, in Dhodha House, to the effect that the cause of action, to institute an infringement suit, arises only where when a registered trademark is used and not "when the application is filed for registration of a trademark." In thus paraphrasing the ratio decidendi of Dhodha House, the learned Single Judge is correct.
17.5 Where the learned Single Judge has erred, in our opinion, is in his failing to note that the appellant was not invoking the jurisdiction of this Court because its application for registration of the asserted marks, was filed within the jurisdiction of this Court, but Page 24 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 because the asserted marks were registered within such jurisdiction.
17.6 Dhodha House holds, unexceptionably, that a mere filing of an application for registration does not give rise to a cause of action for infringement. The registration of a trademark, on the other hand, unquestionably does. This is apparent from Section 28(1)18 of the Trade Marks Act which confers, on the proprietor of a validly registered trademark, both the right to exclusively use the said trademark as well as for remedies against infringement of the mark. Infringement, throughout Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, presupposes registration of the infringed trade mark, as each sub-section of Section 29 commences with the words "A registered trade mark is infringed ..."
17.7 There can, therefore, be no infringement of an unregistered trade mark. The very first criterion to be satisfied for a case of infringement to sustain is that the infringed mark is registered. The expression "cause of action" is defined, classically, as the bundle of facts which the plaintiff would have to prove to succeed in the action. Alternatively, it is defined as "every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgement of the court". Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd v. Union of India comprehensively defined the expression "cause of action", thus:
"6.Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would Page 25 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily."
Viewed thus, it is obvious that the registration of the asserted mark is an indispensable part of the right to sue for infringement, and to succeed in the suit. If the defendant traverses the assertion of the plaintiff that the mark is registered, the plaintiff would have to prove the fact. The registration of the asserted mark is, therefore, in a way the sine qua non for maintaining an infringement action.
17.8 Among the remedies available against infringement, of a registered trademark is, moreover, the remedy of injunction, as per Section 135(1)22 of the Trade Marks Act. The mere registration of a trademark, therefore, confers, on the proprietor of the registered trademark, the right to obtain an injunction, where the trademark is infringed. The registration of the trademark, therefore, unquestionably constitutes not just a part, but an indispensable part of the cause of action for an infringement suit.
17.9 The learned Single Judge, in holding that the registration of the asserted trademarks of the appellant in Delhi did not constitute part of the cause of action to institute the suit has, therefore, ruled contrary to Section 28(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
Page 26 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 17.10 Dhodha House does not exposit any such proposition. What it holds is that territorial jurisdiction cannot be vested in a Court merely because the advertisement of the application filed by the plaintiff seeking registration of the asserted marks was within such jurisdiction. In this context, it is relevant to extract paras 30 and 31 of the decision in Dhodha House, thus:
"30. The said decision has no application in the instant case for more than one reason. For the purpose of registration of a trade mark, an application must be filed in the branch office of the Registrar of Trade Marks. It is not in dispute that under Section 5(3) of the 1958 Act, the Central Government has issued a notification in the Official Gazette defining the territorial limits within which an office of the Trade Marks Registry may exercise its functions. The office of the Trade Marks Registry at New Delhi exercises jurisdiction over the States of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh and the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Whereas in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi no such application has been filed, admittedly in Patel Field Marshal Industries v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. the Delhi office has no jurisdiction as parties are residents of Rajkot and an application was filed by the appellant for registration of its trade mark at Bombay. If an objection is to be filed, the same has to be filed at Bombay. An advertisement by itself in a journal or a paper would not confer jurisdiction upon a court, as would be evident from the following observations of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v.Page 27 of 56
CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 Utpal Kumar Basu:
"Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi;
that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action."
31. A cause of action will arise only when a registered trade mark is used and not when an application is filed for registration of the trade mark. In a given case, an application for grant of registration certificate may or may not be allowed. The person in whose favour a Page 28 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 registration certificate has already been granted (sic) indisputably will have an opportunity to oppose the same by filing an application before the Registrar, who has the requisite jurisdiction to determine the said question. In other words, a suit may lie where an infringement of trade mark or copyright takes place but a cause of action for filing the suit would not arise within the jurisdiction of the court only because an advertisement has been issued in the Trade Marks Journal or any other journal, notifying the factum of filing of such an application."
(Emphasis supplied) 17.11 Thus, even in Dhodha House, the application for registration of the trademark was filed at Bombay. The advertisement, advertising the filing of the application, was, inter alia, issued in Delhi. It was on the ground that the advertisement of the application was also issued in Delhi that the jurisdiction of this Court was sought to be invoked. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the advertisement of the filing of the application for registration of the mark, was also issued in Delhi, when the application itself was filed in Bombay, could not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the suit.
17.12 The appellant, in the present case, never sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that the application for registration of the asserted trade marks was advertised within the jurisdiction of this Court, but that the registrations were granted by the Trade Mark Office at Delhi.
17.13 The Supreme Court has clearly held, in para 31 of Dhodha House, that the suit would lie where infringement of the trademark Page 29 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 takes place. Infringement of trademark, per definition, is dependent on the registration of the mark. Thus, in para 31, the decision in Dhodha House in fact emphasizes the jurisdiction of the Court where the asserted mark is registered to entertain an infringement action. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the fact that the marks asserted by the appellant in the present case were registered within the jurisdiction of this Court was by itself a factor which entitled the appellants to institute the suit before this Court. The learned Single Judge, in our considered opinion, is not correct in having held otherwise.
18. Whether the Marketing Agreement formed part of the cause of action for instituting the suit and, therefore, whether the suit was amenable to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court 18.1 The finding, of the learned Single Judge, that the Marketing Agreement dated 1 January 2022 executed between the appellant and the respondent did not form part of cause of action in the suit is, to our mind, clearly fallacious. The learned Single Judge has extensively relied, in arriving at this finding, on the fact that the appellant had moved IA 20138/2022 under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, seeking leave to separately sue the respondent for breach of the Marketing Agreement and that leave, as sought, had been granted by a learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 12 July 2023. The learned Single Judge has also relied on the fact that, in paras 49 and 50 of the plaint, which dealt with cause of action and jurisdiction, there is no reference to the Marketing Agreement.
18.2 We are not able to concur with the learned Single Judge on any of these findings.
Page 30 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 18.3 Firstly, a bare reading of the plaint makes it clear that the plaintiff had asserted, at more points than one, that the manner of use, by the respondent, of the infringing marks, was in breach of the Marketing Agreement executed between the appellant and the respondent. Inter alia, these assertions are to be found in paras 28 to 30 of the plaint, which already stand reproduced in para 3.2(viii) supra.
18.4 Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, in its various sub-sections, defines "infringement". Each sub-section commences with the words, "A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use ..." Ergo, infringement has necessarily to be by a person who has no authority to use the allegedly infringing mark either as its registered proprietor or by way of permitted user. A person who uses the mark as a permitted user cannot, therefore, be an infringer of the mark.
18.5 It is for this reason that the appellant has specifically asserted, in the plaint, that the user of the infringing mark by the respondent was in breach of the Marketing Agreement and the extent to which the respondent had been permitted to use the appellant's mark thereunder. User of the appellant's mark in breach of the Marketing Agreement was, therefore, specifically alleged in the plaint, to buttress the assertion that the respondent was not using the infringing mark as a permitted user within the meaning of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act.
18.6 The learned Single Judge has failed to take stock of these assertions in the plaint, which more than amply demonstrate that the Page 31 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 Marketing Agreement, and its covenants, constitute an essential part of the cause of action on which the plaint is based.
18.7 Once the Marketing Agreement and its covenants constitute a part of the cause of action on which the plaint is based, courts having jurisdiction over the place of execution of the Marketing Agreement would ipso facto have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit. On the aspect of cause of action founded on breach of a contract, the Supreme Court has held, in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd v. A.P. Agencies, thus:
"15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract."
(Emphasis supplied) In a similar vein, Prakash Kaur v. K.G. Ringshia holds that "in cases where cause of action consist of breach of contract, a suit can be filed at the place where contract is made or to be performed and also where breach occurs."
18.8 As the plaint of the appellant was premised on the ground that the use, by the respondent, of the allegedly infringing marks breached the Marketing Agreement between them, the Marketing Agreement constituted Page 32 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 part of the cause of action on which the suit was based and, therefore, this Court, being the Court within whose jurisdiction the Marketing Agreement was admittedly executed, would be possessed of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and adjudicate on the lis.
19. Re. availability of the respondent's products on e-commerce websites 19.1 One of the grounds on which the appellant asserted that this Court has territorial jurisdiction in the matter, was that the respondent's products are available on e- commerce websites, which can be accessed in Delhi. The learned Single Judge has observed that there are only two e-commerce websites to which specific allusion is to be found in the plaint, which are IndiaMart and Kalgudi.
19.2 The impugned judgment holds that availability of the respondent's marks on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites could not confer jurisdiction on this Court, as the listings of the products on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of the respondent, but at the instance of some third parties.
19.3 The learned Single Judge has also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding to hold that as there was no evidence of any orders having been placed on IndiaMart or Kalgudi for purchasing the allegedly infringing products of the respondent, the listing of the said products on the said platforms could not constitute a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction.
19.4 The decision in Banyan Tree Holding 19.4.1 Banyan Tree Holding25 , the plaintiff before the Division Bench of this Court in the Page 33 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 said case, sued the defendants for having used the mark "BANYAN TREE RETREAT" with a device of a Banyan Tree which, according to BTH, infringed its registered trademark. The Division Bench notes, in para 5 of its judgment, the recital, in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, as pleaded by BTH, thus:
"5. The learned single Judge has, in the referral order dated 11.8.2008, noticed that the plaintiff has in para 30 of the plaint claimed that this Court has the territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to entertain the suit. According to the Plaintiff the Defendants solicit business through use of the impugned mark "BANYAN TREE RETREAT" and the Banyan device in Delhi. It is stated that "the Defendants have presence in Delhi through their website http://www.makprojects.com/banyantree. htm which is accessible in Delhi." It is further contended that "the said website is not a passive website. It not only provides contact information but also seeks feedback and inputs from its customers through an interactive web-page."
Further, the Plaintiff submits that the services of the Defendants are being offered to the customers in Delhi "also because of the ubiquity, universality and utility of the features of the Internet and the World Wide Web and hence the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court."
19.4.2 The Division Bench formulated three questions as arising before it for consideration, Page 34 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 of which the first two are relevant, and may be reproduced thus:
"(i) For the purposes of a passing off action, or an infringement action where the Plaintiff is not carrying on business within the jurisdiction of a court, in what circumstances can it be said that the hosting of a universally accessible website by the Defendants lends jurisdiction to such Court where such suit is filed ("the forum court")?
(ii) In a passing off or infringement action, where the defendant is sought to be sued on the basis that its website is accessible in the forum state, what is the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to prima facie establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit?"
19.4.3 The Division Bench observed, at the outset of its discussion, that the suit before it was not one for infringement, but for passing off. It observed that, if the suit was one for infringement, this Court would in any event have territorial jurisdiction in the matter, in view of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, as BTH was carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. In a case of passing off, however, Section 134 would not be applicable and jurisdiction would have to vest in the Court in terms of Section 20 of the CPC.
19.4.4 The defendants before this Court were situated at Hyderabad. As such, Section 20(a) would not apply. BTH sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of Section 20(c) of the CPC, contending that, as the defendants had an interactive website which could be accessed within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court had jurisdiction in the matter.
Page 35 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 19.4.5 The Division Bench of this Court embarked on an exhaustive analysis of the entire law relating to territorial jurisdiction in the case of e-commerce, in this country as well as across the globe. Following the said analysis, questions (i) and (ii) as framed by it were answered thus, by the Division Bench:
"42. This Court holds that jurisdiction of the forum court does not get attracted merely on the basis of interactivity of the website which is accessible in the forum state. The degree of the interactivity apart, the nature of the activity permissible and whether it results in a commercial transaction has to be examined. For the 'effects' test to apply, the Plaintiff must necessarily plead and show prima facie that the specific targeting of the forum state by the Defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state. For the purposes of a passing off or an infringement action (where the plaintiff is not located within the jurisdiction of the court), the injurious effect on the Plaintiff's business, goodwill or reputation within the forum state as a result of the Defendant's website being accessed in the forum state would have to be shown. Naturally therefore, this would require the presence of the Plaintiff in the forum state and not merely the possibility of such presence in the future. Secondly, to show that an injurious effect has been felt by the Plaintiff it would have to be shown that viewers in the forum state were specifically targeted. Therefore the 'effects' test would have to be applied in conjunction with the "sliding scale" test to determine if the forum court has Page 36 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 jurisdiction to try a suit concerning internet based disputes.
43. The question no. (i) is accordingly answered.
Question (ii) : In a passing off or infringement action, where the defendant is sought to be sued on the basis that its website is accessible in the forum state, what is the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to prima facie establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit?
44. This brings us to the question as to the extent of burden of proof on the Plaintiff to prima facie show that the Defendant has purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court. In the present case, it is argued that by enabling customers to go on the website and get a copy of its brochure and make enquiries, the Defendant must be held to have purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court. The question that arises is for the purposes of Section 20 (c) CPC, in such circumstances, is what is the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to show prima facie that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the forum court.
45. This court holds that in order to prima facie establish that the Defendant purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court, the Plaintiff would have to show that the Defendant engaged in some commercial activity in the forum State by targeting its website specifically at customers within that State. This is Page 37 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 consistent with the law laid down in Cybersell and reiterated later in Toys R Us. It is also consistent with the application of the 'tighter' version of the 'effects' test which is 'targeting'. In any action for passing off or infringement, it would have to be shown that the Defendant by using its mark intended to pass off its goods as that of the Plaintiff's. A mere hosting of a website which can be accessible from anyone from within the jurisdiction of the court is not sufficient for this purpose. Also a mere posting of an advertisement by the Defendant depicting its mark on a passive website which does not enable the Defendant to enter into any commercial transaction with the viewer in the forum state cannot satisfy the requirement of giving rise to a cause of action in the forum state. Even an interactive website, which is not shown to be specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for commercial transactions, will not result in the court of the forum state having jurisdiction. In sum, for the purposes of Section 20 (c) CPC, in order to show that some part of the cause of action has arisen in the forum state by the use of the internet by the Defendant, the Plaintiff will have to show prima facie that the said website, whether euphemistically termed as "passive plus" or "interactive" was specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for commercial transactions. The Plaintiff would have to plead this and produce material to prima facie show that some commercial transaction using the website was entered into by the Defendant with a user of its website within the forum state and that the specific targeting of the forum state by Page 38 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 the Defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state. Question no. (ii) is answered accordingly."
(Emphasis supplied) 19.4.6 The learned Single Judge is, therefore, correct in his view that, as per the law declared in Banyan Tree Holding, the mere existence of an interactive website of the defendant, accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would not be sufficient for the suit to be maintainable here. It would additionally have to be shown that some commercial transaction was concluded within the jurisdiction of this Court.
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30. It is clear in the facts and circumstances of the present case that presence of defendant is admittedly there on e-commerce cum interactive websites like Just Dial and Trade India which can be accessed even from Delhi. Therefore, this argument has no force.
31. On 17.01.2026, separately statement of Shri Mohit Sharma, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff was recorded in Court, whereby he has relinquished prayer clause 46 (B), (C)) and (D) and pressed only for prayers (A), (E) and (F).
32. I have heard learned counsel for the plaintiff on the aforesaid application and gone through the entire material on record. It has been very vehemently argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff that there is no need to record evidence in the matter. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the following judgments:
Page 39 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026
(a) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.1203/2018", titled as, "AKTIEBOLAGET VOLVO & Ors. V/s Gyan Singh & Anr."
(DOD: 25.04.2023);
(b) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.478/2019", titled as, "Sandisk LLC V/s Amit & Ors." (DOD: 01.03.2023);
(c) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.564/2020", titled as, "Imagine Marketing Private Ltd. V/s M/s Green Accessories Through Its Proprietor & Anr." (DOD: 21.03.2022);
(d) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.675/2019", titled as, "Dhani Loans And Services Limited & Anr. V/s WWW.Dhanifinance.Com & Ors." (DOD: 12.10.2022);
(e) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.929/2018", titled as, "Sanofi & Anr. V/s Faisal Mushtaq & Ors." (DOD: 16.11.2018);
(f) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.413/2021", titled as, "LT Foods Limited V/s Saraswati Trading Company" (DOD:
11.11.2022);
(g) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.1219/2018", titled as, "Shri Ved Prakash Garg Trading As M/s Parul Food Products V/s M/s Gurudev Industries" (DOD: 20.12.2018);
(h) Case reported as, "CS (OS) No.3466/2012", titled as, "Disney Enterprises Inc. & Anr. V/s Balraj Muttneja & Ors." (DOD: 20.02.2014); and
(i) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.564/2020" titled as, "Imagine Marketing Private Limited V/s M/s Green Accessories Through: Its Proprietor & Anr." (DOD: 21.03.2022).
33. The judgment in case of LT Foods (supra) and Shri Ved Prakash Garg (supra) has been referred to establish the point that the report of Local Commissioner in itself can be treated as evidence.
Page 40 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026
34. The learned counsel has further very vehemently argued that in the teeth of material available on record in the form of plaint, documents and the report of leaned Local Commissioner, no useful purpose would be served asking the plaintiff to lead evidence with regard to the grant of prayer qua damages and cost.
35. In case reported as, "AKTIEBOLAGET VOLVO" (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to observe as under:
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10. At the hearing on 19thApril, 2023, the counsels for the defendants on instructions submitted that the defendants were agreeable to a decree of permanent injunction being passed against the defendants. Counsel for the plaintiffs also pressed for costs and damages of Rs.10,00,000/- to be apportioned between the defendants.
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17. I am of the opinion that no purpose would be served by directing the plaintiffs to lead evidence by filing examination-in-chief by way of affidavit. The defendants have no reasonable prospect of succeeding in the present suit. Therefore, in my opinion, this is a fit case where a Summary Judgment in terms of Order XIII-A of the CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes of a specified value, read with Rule 27 of the IPD Rules, deserves to be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
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36. The Hon' ble High Court, thereafter in paragraphs No.22 and 23 of the aforesaid judgment has been pleased to lay down as under:
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22. Clearly, the customers are being misled by the Page 41 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 defendants and the entire effort is deliberate and dishonest. This amounts to dilution of the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiffs' marks and causing loss to the plaintiffs in business and reputation. The members of the public are bound to confuse bicycles manufactured and sold by the defendants under the mark VOLVO as emanating from the plaintiffs. The defendants have been making unlawful gains at the expense of the plaintiffs. I am convinced that this is nota case of innocent adoption by the defendants.
The Court cannot ignore such flagrant misuse of the plaintiffs' marks by the defendants. Even though the claim of the plaintiffs for damages, based on the recoveries made at the premises of the defendant no.2 and the invoices placed on record, is close to Rs.20,00,000/-, I deem it appropriate to award a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-towards damages and costs to the plaintiffs.
23. Taking into account that the defendants no. 3 and 4 are the manufacturers and suppliers of the aforesaid goods and the defendants no.1and 2 were selling the goods supplied by the defendants no.3 and 4, out of the aforesaid amount, the defendants no.3 and 4 shall be liable to pay Rs.6,50,000/- in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 shall be liable to pay Rs.3,50,000/- in favour of the plaintiffs.
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37. The other judgment(s) sought to be relied upon by learned counsel for the plaintiff also lays down the same law.
38. Amended Order XIII-A of CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, enables the Court to decide a claim or part thereof without recording oral evidence. Order XIII-A of CPC seeks to avoid the long drawn process of leading oral evidence in certain eventualities. Consequently, the said provision enables disposal of commercial Page 42 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 disputes in a time bound manner and promotes the object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
39. Rule 3 of Order XIII-A of CPC empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against a defendant where on an application filed in that regard, the Court considers that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending a claim and there is no other compelling reason as to why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence. Order XIIIA (3) of CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, is reproduced herein below:-
xxxxx "3. Grounds for summary judgment.--The Court may give a summary judgment against a plaintiff or defendant on a claim if it considers that-
(a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, as the case may be; and
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence."
xxxxx
40. (i) Now, coming back to the facts of instant case. A perusal of the registered trademark of the plaintiff and the impugned trademark used by the defendant, as placed on record, shows that impugned trademark/label RED CHIEF, " is identical to the Page 43 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 registered trademark(s) of the plaintiff in all material particulars including the style, design, dress code and colour combination and an unwary customer can be easily misled and deceived by the said infringed trademark and can be trapped in buying the infringed goods as that of the plaintiff. The photograph of the impugned goods bearing impugned mark of the defendant is provided hereunder:
Page 44 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 (Impugned Goods bearing impugned mark of the defendant)
(ii) Therefore, it is clearly seen that defendant has adopted the impugned trademark/label/trade name RED CHIEF, Page 45 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 , which is/are visually, structurally, deceptively and confusingly similar to plaintiff's Trademark/label/trade name RED CHIEF, (RED CHIEF LABEL) , & in relation to impugned goods/services which creates the same commercial impression.
41. The defendant cannot be allowed to piggy bag upon the reputation of plaintiff. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a case involving somewhat similar facts, i.e in case reported as, "1992 SCC Online Del 122", titled as, "The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. V/s Mahavir Steels & Ors." (DOD: 25.02.1992), has been pleased to hold as under:
xxxxx
14. .........An imitation remains an imitation whether it is done by one or by many. It acquires no legitimacy. A wrong is not righted by the following it musters. Infringement of trade mark by a trader cannot be justified on the ground that there are others like him who are doing the same. There is a Page 46 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 growing tendency to copy the trade marks to cash upon some one else's business reputation . The pirates of trade marks are like parasites clinging to others for their growth. Imitators of trade marks have the sole object of diverting the business of others. This tendency must be curbed in the interest of the trade and the consumers.
xxxxx
42. Further in case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.126/2022", titled as, "M.L Brother LLP V/s Mahesh Kumar Bhuralal Tanna" (DOD:
12.05.2022), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down that Local Commissioner's report can be read in evidence in terms of Order XXVI Rule 10(2) CPC. For ready reference, the said observations are re-produced as under:
xxxxx
10. Order 26 Rule 10 (2) CPC stipulates that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. The said provision reads as under:
10. Procedure of Commissioner.-- (1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him, to the Court.
(2) Report and depositions to be evidence in suit. Commissioner may be examined in person.--The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record; but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the Commissioner Page 47 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation."
11. In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Rajesh Agarwal 2018 IAD (Delhi) 622, this Court examined the said provision and held that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report, it becomes evidence in the suit itself. Under Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC it is not mandatory to examine the Commissioner to admit the report of the Commissioner as evidence in the suit. The relevant observations are as under:
8. The Local Commissioner is in fact a representative of the Court itself and it is for this reason that Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC clearly provides that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report the same shall be treated as evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record.
xxx xxx xxxx
10. The rationale behind Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC is clear i.e. the Commissioner is appointed as a representative of the Court and evidence collected by the Commissioner along with the report of the Commissioner would be evidence in the suit, subject to any objection raised by any party. If any party has any objection to Commissioner's report or to the evidence, such party has an option to examine the Commissioner personally in open Court.
Such examination is however, neither compulsory nor required especially in cases where the party does not challenge the report. In the present case, a perusal of the written statement filed by the Defendant Page 48 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 clearly reveals that the Defendant does not challenge the Commissioner's report. Para of the written statement is set out below..."
12. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Vinod Goel v. Mahesh Yadav [RFA 598/2016 decided on 23rd May, 2018] wherein the Court observed as under:
"7. It is the settled proposition in law that when a Commissioner is appointed, he acts as the officer of the Court and it is not necessary for the Commissioner to be examined. This is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Misrilal Ramratan & Ors. Mansukhlal & Ors. v. A.S. Shaik Fathimal & Ors., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 600, wherein the Court held as under:
"It is now settled law that the report of the Commissioner is part of the record and that therefore the report cannot be overlooked or rejected on spacious plea of non-
examination of the Commissioner as a witness since it is part of the record of the case."
8. Even this Court, recently in Levis Strauss v. Rajesh Agarwal [RFA 127/2007 decision dated 3rd January, 2018], held as under
"11. The rationale behind Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC is clear i.e. the Commissioner is appointed as a representative of the Court and evidence collected by the Commissioner alongwith the report of the Commissioner would be evidence in the suit, subject to any objection raised by any party. If any party has any objection to Commissioner's report or to the evidence, such party has an option to examine the Commissioner personally in open Court.Page 49 of 56
CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 Such examination is however, neither compulsory nor required especially in cases where the party does not challenge the report."
9. Mr. Prag Chawla clearly concedes that there may be no requirement to examine the Local Commissioner once the Commissioner is appointed by a Court.
10. Under these circumstances, since the Commissioner had visited the suit property and had submitted the report, it is deemed appropriate that the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after taking into consideration the report of the Local Commissioner, Mr. Y.D. Nagar dated 5th January, 2000 in Suit No.2198/1999.
13. In view of Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC and the judgments discussed above, the settled legal position that emerges is that the report of the Local Commissioner can be treated as evidence in the suit where it is not challenged by any party. Accordingly, in the present case the report of the Local Commissioner and the contents therein can be relied upon by the Court as evidence as the same is unchallenged.
xxxxx (underlining which is mine emphasized)
43. There is no opposition on the part of defendant to the report of learned Local Commissioner filed in the matter.
44. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case in totality, I am of the considered opinion that there is no real prospect of defendant succeeding in proving its defence. Thus, no useful purpose would be served by allowing the proceedings to meander mindlessly in Page 50 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 Court and to clog the justice delivery system. Therefore, in my opinion, present is a fit case where the Summary Judgment in terms of Order XIII-A of the CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, deserves to be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in case reported as, "2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764", titled as, "Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. V/s Kunwer Sachdev", wherein the Hon' ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to observe as under:
xxxxx "90. To reiterate, the intent behind incorporating the summary judgment procedure in the Commercial Court Act, 2015 is to ensure disposal of commercial disputes in a time-bound manner.
In fact, the applicability of Order XIIIA, CPC to commercial disputes, demonstrates that the trial is no longer the default procedure/norm.
91. Rule 3 of Order XIIIA, CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against the defendant where the Court considers that the defendant has no real prospects of successfully defending the claim and there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence. The expression "real" directs the Court to examine whether there is a "realistic" as opposed to "fanciful" prospects of success. This Court is of the view that the expression "no genuine issue requiring a trial" in Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure and "no other compelling reason.....for trial" in Commercial Courts Act can be read mutatis mutandis. Consequently, Order XIIIA, CPC would be attracted if the Court, while hearing such an application, can make the necessary finding of fact, apply the law to the facts and the same is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means of achieving a fair and just result.
Page 51 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026
92. Accordingly, unlike ordinary suits, Courts need not hold trial in commercial suits, even if there are disputed questions of fact as held by the Canadian Supreme Court in Robert Hryniak (supra), in the event, the Court comes to the conclusion that the defendant lacks a real prospect of successfully defending the claim."
xxxxx
45. (i) Considering the present case on the touchstone of the law laid down in the above referred judgments, I find that no useful purpose would be served, firstly by framing the issue with regard to grant of damages & cost and then asking the plaintiff to lead evidence in the matter. I am further of the considered opinion that there is no defence available on record on part of defendant which debars the plaintiff from claiming decree in the matter, as there is no real prospect of defendant successfully contesting their claim.
(ii) Further, while going through the report of learned Local Commissioner, it is evident that 64 pieces of impugned goods of plywood bearing impugned mark (RED CHIEF) and impugned label (RED CHIEF) of size 6 ft x 4 ft were recovered from the premises of defendant. It is further apparent from the report of learned Local Commissioner that the defendant had not been maintaining any proper bills/account books of the shop, as it had been selling the same on kachha bills/handwritten bills.
(iii) Be that as it may, taking into account the documents relied upon by the plaintiff, it is observed that plaintiff has a good case and no useful purpose would be served by going to trial in the matter. I order accordingly.
Page 52 of 56CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026
46. As regards the damages claimed for by the plaintiff, it is noted that The Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 provide guidance on the manner in which the damages could be calculated in such cases. Rule 20 of the IPD Rules, 2022 is set out below:
xxxxx "20. Damages/Account of profits:A party seeking damages/account of profits, shall give a reasonable estimate of the amounts claimed and the foundational facts/account statements in respect thereof along with any evidence, documentary and/or oral led by the parties to support such a claim. In addition, the Court shall consider the following factors while determining the quantum of damages:
(i) Lost profits suffered by the injured party;
(ii) Profits earned by the infringing party;
(iii) Quantum of income which the injured party may have earned through royalties/license fees, had the use of the subject IPR been duly authorized;
(iv) The duration of the infringement;
(v) Degree of intention/neglect underlying the infringement;
(vi) Conduct of the infringing party to mitigate the damages being incurred by the injured party; In the computation of damages, the Court may take the assistance of an expert as provided for under Rule 31 of these Rules.
xxxxx
47. Further, on the aspect of damages, in case reported as, "2019:DHC:2185", tilted as, "Koninlijke Philips and Ors. V/s Amazestore & Ors.", the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down certain standards for grant of damages in following terms:
xxxxx "41. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the rule of thumb that should be followed while granting damages can be summarized Page 53 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 in a chart as under:--
# Degree of malafide conduct Proportionate award
(i) First time innocent infringer Injunction
(ii) First-time knowing infringer Injunction + partial costs
(iii) Repeated knowing infringer which Injunction + costs + partial causes minor impact to the plaintiff damages
(iv) Repeated knowing infringer which Injunction + costs+ causes major impact to the plaintiff compensatory damages
(v) Infringement which was deliberate Injunction + Costs + and calculated Aggravated damages (gangster/scam/mafia) + wilfful (compensatory + additional contempt of Court damages)
42. It is clarified that the above chart is illustrative and is not to be read as a statutory provision. The Courts are free to deviate from the same for good reason."
xxxxx
48. Taking a holistic view of the matter vis-a-vis provisions as laid down under Rule 20 of the IPD Rules, 2022 and applying the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of "Koninlijke Philips" (supra), I am of the considered opinion that grant of damages @ Rs.3,00,000/- to the plaintiff would meet the ends of justice. I order accordingly.
49. Accordingly, suit of the plaintiff is decreed as under:
(i) A decree of permanent injunction is hereby passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant and the defendant by itself/themselves as also through its/their proprietors, promoters, retailers, C&F Agents, individual partners and directors (if any), agents, servants, assignees, representatives, successors, distributors and all others acting for and on their behalf are hereby restrained Page 54 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 from using, manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or displaying (including in audio, print, visual media or otherwise), directly or indirectly or dealing in any other manner or mode in the impugned trademark/label RED CHIEF, " with identical/deceptively similar placement and lettering style as those of plaintiff's said trademark/ label RED CHIEF, (RED CHIEF LABEL) , & , or any other trademark/label identical with and/or deceptively similar thereto in relation to their impugned goods and business of plywood, decorative plywood & laminated plywood, board, teak plywood, marine plywood and related and cognate products, thereby infringing plaintiff's registered trade marks and copyright; and passing off its goods and business as that of the goods and business of the plaintiff;
(ii) A decree in the sum of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Only) on account of damages sustained by the plaintiff due to loss of sale, reputation and goodwill as well as dilution of plaintiff's Page 55 of 56 CS (Comm.) No. 897/2023:Leyan Global Pvt.Ltd.Vs Avinash Kumar Chawla, Trading As M/s Chawla Plywood House: DOD: 07.02.2026 trademark is passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant;
(iii) Plaintiff is also entitled to cost of the proceedings, which will include actual cost incurred by the plaintiff, cost incurred towards execution of Local Commission as also the counsel's fee which is quantified as Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only);
(iv) The defendant is directed to dispose off/destroy the infringing material at his shop within two weeks from today, under due acknowledgement to the plaintiff.
50. Decree Sheet be prepared accordingly.
51. File be consigned to Record Room after completion of necessary formalities.
Digitally signed by VINODVINOD YADAV Date: YADAV 2026.02.07 18:04:07 +0530 Dictated & Announced in the (Vinod Yadav) open Court on 07.02.2026 District Judge (Commercial Court)-02 North-West/Rohini Courts Page 56 of 56