Madras High Court
Valliammal vs Lakshiammal on 22 January, 2009
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS
DATED: 22..01..2009
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA
A.S.No.758 of 1999
Valliammal ... Appellant
vs.
1.Lakshiammal
2.Ramasamy Gounder
3.Kumaravel
4.Soundararajan
5.Sundararajan
6.Muthya ammal ... Respondents
Appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 24.9.99 passed in O.S.No.152 of 1986 by the Subordinate Judge, Namakkal.
For Appellant : Mr.D.Shivakumaran
For Respondents: Mr.K.Sukumaran for RR1 to 5
JUDGMENT
This appeal is focussed as against the judgement and decree dated 24.09.1999 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Namakkal in O.S.No.152 of 1986, which is one for partition of the suit property and for mesne profits.
2. Tersely and briefly, pithily and precisely, the case of the plaintiff as stood exposited from the averments in the plaint, the recitals in the documents and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, would run thus:-
(a) One Narayana Gounder and his wife Nanjammal (D1) gave birth to four children, namely, Lakshmi Ammal(D2), Muthaya Ammal(P1), Ramasamy Gounder(D3) and Valliammal(P2). D4, D5 and D6 are the sons of D3-Ramasamy Gounder.
(b) The suit properties are the self-acquired properties of the deceased Narayana Gounder. Consequent upon his death on 17.05.1984, his legal heirs, the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 were entitled to 1/5th share each. Accordingly they were enjoying the suit properties jointly.
(c) Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought amicable partition, which evoked no positive response. The legal notice failed to pave the way for amicable partition. But, on the other hand, it evoked untenable reply from the defendants as though D3 became the absolute owner of the suit properties by virtue of the 'Will' executed by the deceased Narayana Gounder. Upon the death of Narayana Gounder's wife, each of the plaintiffs is entitled to < th share.
3. Refuting and remonstrating, inveighing and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, the second defendant filed the written statement, the warp and woof of it would run thus:
Narayana Gounder obtained a small portion of the suit property in the partition, which emerged among Narayana Gounder and his co-parceners. From out of the income derived from the said joint family nucleus and also from the joint exertion of Narayanasamy Gounder and D3-Ramasamy, several other immovable suit properties were purchased. Since the second plaintiff got married the husband of the first plaintiff, quite against the wish and will of her parents, Narayana Gounder wanted to deprive the plaintiffs to have any claim over the suit properties and accordingly Narayana Gounder executed Ex.B2-the 'Will' in favour of D3, as per Ex.B1 the cancellation deed, after cancelling Ex.B12 the earlier 'Will' of the year 1973 executed by him in favour of his grand children.
Accordingly, she prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
4. The epitome and the long and short of the case of D3, as stood exposited from his written statement,which was adopted by D1, succinctly and concisely, be set out thus:
In the partition, which emerged among Narayana Gounder and his co-sharers, Narayana Gounder was allotted the land bearing Survey No.159/2 measuring an extent of 1 acre and 97 cents. The rest of the immovable properties were purchased from out of the independent income derived by D3 and he has been enjoying them separately. D3 constructed a Mill, in the said Narayana Gounder's ancestral land, which he obtained in the partition. D3's mother in law, who had no male issues contributed necessary funds for such construction of Mill by D3. Ex.B12 the 'Will' dated 14.06.1973 was executed earlier by Narayana Gounder in favour of D3's sons. Subsequently, the testator cancelled it as per Ex.B1-the 'Will' dated 15.03.1982, whereupon, Ex.B2-the 'Will' dated 17.03.1982 was executed by the same Narayana Gounder bequeathing all his properties in favour of D3. As per Ex.A1-the partition deed dated 05.12.1985, a partition was effected among Narayana Gounder's wife-D1, his son D3 and his paternal grand sons and they have been enjoying it peacefully. The plaintiffs are having no right over the suit property.
Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
5. D6 filed the written statement buttressing and fortifying the stand of D3.
6. In fact, D3 filed two additional written statements, detailing additional facts in support of his contention that the plaintiffs are having no right over the suit properties and also contending that the land bearing survey No.339/1, 4.55 acres was given in his favour by the Government under one "D" patta.
Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
7. The trial court framed the relevant issues. During the trial, the second plaintiff examined herself as PW1 and Exs.A1 to A8 were marked on the plaintiffs' side. On behalf of the defendants, one scribe by name Kandhasamy was examined as D.W.1, one Natesan was examined as D.W.2 and D3 examined himself as D.W.3 and Exs.B1 to B.12 were exhibited on the defendants' side.
8. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, the judgement and the dismissal decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs have filed this appeal on the various grounds inter alia thus:
(a) The judgement and decree of the trial court is against law, weight of evidence and all probabilities of the case.
(b) Ex.B2, the 'Will' is a fabricated and forged one, but the trial Court failed to take note of the same.
(c) The trial Court also fell into error in holding that the suit properties are not the joint family properties, despite the defendants having admitted that the land in Survey No.159/2 is the ancestral property. The trial Court was not justified in dismissing the suit in entirety.
(d) In the absence of any evidence adduced on the side of the defendants to prove their contention that from out of D3's mother-in-law's funds, D3 had source of income to acquire his own properties, the trial Court should not have dismissed the suit.
(e) Overlooking the defects in the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2, the trial Court simply believed the theory of the defendants and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs.
(f) In Ex.A1-the Partition Deed, there is no reference to Ex.B2-the 'Will', nonetheless, the trial Court believed the genuineness of Ex.B2 and that too, in the absence of any evidence to demonstrate and exemplify that it was Narayana Gounder, who signed it as executor of the 'Will'.
Accordingly, the second plaintiff/appellant prayed for setting aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court.
9. The parties are referred to here under, for convenience sake, according to their litigative status before the trial Court.
10. The points for determination are as to :
1. Whether Ex.B2-the 'Will' was proved in accordance with law by D3, the propounder of the 'Will'?
2. Whether the suit properties are co-parcenery properties?
3. Whether the suit properties are partly ancestral and partly self-acquired properties of D3?
4. What were the rights of the deceased Narayana Gounder over the suit properties as on the date of his death and what was the quantum of his share in those properties?
5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any share in the suit properties?
6. Whether there is any infirmity in the judgement and decree of the trial Court?
Point No.1:
11. The epitome and the long and short of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant/second plaintiff is that Ex.B2- the 'Will' is ex facie and prima facie a dubious document, which smacks falsehood; it allegedly emerged on 17.03.1982 as an unregistered 'Will'; whereas Ex.B1-the registered cancellation deed dated 15.03.1982, cancelling the earlier registered 'Will'-Ex.B2 dated 17.3.1982 would reveal that Narayana Gounder intended not to divert the line of succession by his 'Will' and in such a case in all probabilities, he might have intended to execute Ex.B2, the 'Will' in favour of D3 immediately two days after his decision not to interfere with the line of succession to the property by his legal heirs after his death; there is no reference to Ex.B2-the' Will' in Ex.A1-the partition deed, dated 05.12.1985, which emerged a year and a half after the death of Narayana Gounder; the trial Court did not take into account the supine admission made by D3 quite against his own pleading; whereas it has simply accepted the case of D3 in toto; the trial Court ignored that the pleas of D3 were antithetical to his own pleadings, depositions and the recitals in Ex.A1 and other documents, which he relied on. Accordingly, she prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
12. The warp and woof, the gist and kernel of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents/ defendants could be portrayed to the effect that the patchy evidence adduced on the plaintiffs' side is quite antithetical to the pleadings, so to say, the plaintiffs' claimed their alleged shares in the suit property by trying to project as though the suit properties are the self-acquired properties of deceased Narayana Gounder; but, on the other hand, during trial, the plaintiffs tried to project their case as though those properties are the joint family properties; the plaintiffs cannot blow hot and cold, approbate and reprobate and accordingly, their appeal should be dismissed.
13. The learned counsel for the respondents/ defendants would also develop his argument that by virtue of Ex.B2, the "Will", Narayana Gounder after cancelling the earlier Will Ex.B12, as per the cancellation deed Ex.B1, bequeathed his half share in the ancestral properties, which are found set out in the "B" Schedule of the plaint leaving the self-acquired properties of DW3, Ramasamy Gounder; DW3, the propounder of the "Will" Ex.B2 by examining DW1 Kandhasamy, the scribe of the Will and DW2 Natesan, the only surviving witness proved the "Will" and as such, absolutely there is no merit in the case of the plaintiffs.
14. Indubitably and incontrovertibly, the plaintiffs approached the Court with the case that the suit properties are the self-acquired properties of their father deceased Narayana Gounder, hoping and believing that, by such a plea, consequent upon the death of Narayana Gounder on 17.05.1984, the plaintiffs would be entitled to their respective shares as Class-I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act. But the circumstances, established before the Court unerringly and unassailably pointed out to the effect that by no stretch of imagination, the suit properties could be termed as the exclusive self-acquired properties of the deceased Narayana Gounder, as admittedly Narayana Gounder got an extent of 1.97 acres of land in the partition Ex.B3 dated 05.05.1927, which emerged between Narayana Gounder and his co-parceners; and the income derived from out of the said ancestral property, he acquired various other items of suit properties in his own name as per sale deeds, Exs.B5, B6 and B10.
15. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants before this Court that the properties claimed to have been purchased by DW3 Ramasamy Gounder, the son of Narayana Gounder were not from out of the income derived from the said joint family properties.
16. At this juncture, my mind is reminiscent and redolent of the trite proposition of law that in a partition suit, the plaintiffs are defendants and the defendants are the plaintiffs and that de hors the contentions of the plaintiffs and their claim for specific shares, the Court could grant appropriate relief from what transpired from the admissible evidence, which were adduced before the trial Court. Accordingly, if viewed, it is crystal clear that simply because the plaintiffs wittingly or unwittingly, knowingly or unknowingly, had taken the plea that all the suit properties are the self-acquired properties of the deceased Narayana Gounder, nonetheless, relief could be granted in favour of the plaintiffs, depending upon the reliable piece of evidence which were placed before the trial Court.
17. Among the immovable suit properties, which are found set out in the "B" schedule of the plaint, three categories are involved:-
(i) the admitted ancestral properties in the name of deceased Narayana Gounder;
(ii) Ramasamy Gounder's alleged self-acquired properties, which he claims to have purchased from out of his own funds as per Ex.B7 and incorporated in the "B" Schedule of the plaint and
(iii) the property bearing survey No.339/1, which was given by the Government in the name of Ramasamy Gounder as per "D" memo-Ex.B9.
18. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the properties purchased under Ex.B7 and also the property acquired under Ex.B9 in the name of DW3 Ramasamy Gounder, should be taken as the co-parcenery properties of Narayana Gounder in view of the candid and supine admission made by DW3 Ramasamy Gounder in his deposition as under:
@ehd; jdpg;gl;l Kiwapy; mlkhdk; bgw;w brhj;jhf ,Ue;jhYk;. fpiuak; bgw;w brhj;jhf ,Ue;jhYk; bghJ FLk;g brhj;jhf mDgtpf;fg;gl;L te;jJ. vf;rpgpl; V1 gj;jpuj;jpy; brhj;Jf;fs; bghJ FLk;gj;jpw;Fk; ghj;jpag;gl;lJ vd;Wk;. gphpf;fg;gltpy;iy vd;Wk; Twp ,Ue;jhy; rhp jhd;/@ It is therefore crystal clear from the perusal of the above excerpts from the deposition of DW3, that DW3 without minching words admitted that all the properties referred to in the "B" Schedule of the plaint are the joint family properties of Narayana Gounder and himself.
19. The common or garden legal principle is that the propounder of the Will has to prove it. DW3 Ramasamy Gounder (D3), being the propounder of the alleged unregistered Will Ex.B2, was expected to prove it, strictly in accordance with law.
20. The propounder should have examined himself first and thereafter, the scribe DW1 and the attesting witness DW2 Natesan, should have been examined, but surprisingly and curiously, in this case, those two witnesses have been witnessed as D.Ws.1 and 2 and the propounder of the Will examined himself as DW3. Apparently, I could see no material to indicate that DW3 obtained any permission from Court to examine himself after examining the witnesses.
21. Trite the proposition of law is that preponderance of probabilities would govern the adjudication in civil cases and it is therefore just and necessary to detail and delineate the circumstances involved in this case.
22. Indubitably and indisputably, Narayana Gounder executed Ex.B12 the registered Will dated 14.06.1973 in favour of his grand sons, viz., Kumaravel, Soundararajan and Sundararajan, all sons of DW3 Ramasamy, bequeathing his properties. However subsequently, by virtue of Ex.B1, the registered cancellation deed dated 15.03.1982, the same Narayana Gounder cancelled Ex.B12, the Will on the sole ground as revealed by the recitals contained therein that he did not want to enforce the earlier Will, Ex.B12.
23. Curiously and surprisingly, hardly two days after such cancellation deed Ex.B1 dated 15.03.1982, Ex.B2 the alleged unregistered Will dated 17.03.1982 is purported to have emerged, at the instance of Narayana Gounder in favour of DW3. But, Ex.B2 is not a registered one, even though after the alleged execution of Ex.B2 on 17.03.1982, the said Narayana Gounder lived for nearly 14 months and died only on 17.05.1984.
24. In this factual matrix, the evidence adduced on the side of the defendants has to be scrutinised and that too, in the light of the dicta as found enunciated in the various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court.
(i) 2005(1) SCC 40 [Daulat Ram and other vs. Sodha and others] (ii) 2005(1) SCC 280 [Meenakshiammal (Dead) through LRs. and others vs. Chandrasekaran and another] (iii) 2005(1) CTC 443 [Sridevi and others vs. Jayaraja Shetty and others] (iv) 2005(1) L.W.455 [Janaki Devi vs. R.Vasanthi and 6 others] (v) 1989 (1) L.W.396 [Nagarajan and 3 others vs. Annammal] (vi) AIR 1982 SC 133 [Smt.Indu Bala Bose and others vs. Manindra Chandra Bose and another] (vii) AIR 1985 SC 500 [Satya Pal Gopal Das vs. Smt.Panchubala Dasi and others] (viii) AIR 1991 Bom. 148 [Asber Reuben Samson and others v. Eillah Solomon and others] (ix) 2008(2) MLJ 119 [M.Anandan and others vs. A.Dakshinamoorthy] (x) 2006(4) L.W.942 [Gurdev Kaur & others vs. Kaki & others] (xi) 2008(1) MLJ 1337 SC [Savithri and others vs.Karthyayani Amma and others]
(xii) 2007(3) L.W.916 [1. J.Mathew (died) 2.J.Damien and 3 others vs. Leela Joseph] A few excerpts from some precedents would run thus:
(i) 2001(3)CTC 283 [Corra Vedachalam Chetty and another vs. G.Jankiraman].
The aforesaid decision is on the point that the Court while analysing the Will is acting as a Court of conscience. An excerpt from the above said decision would run thus:
"26. This need for caution, cannot be exploited by unscrupulous caveators who choose to cull out imaginary suspisions with a view to prevent the legatees under the Will from claiming the benefit thereunder and to render the last Will of the deceased wholly ineffective. In this context, the conduct of the persons who raise the alleged ground for suspision is also to be looked at, to know as to how credible are the grounds for suspisions sought to be raised by such persons. In this case, the suspicion is sought to be raised by a person who is keenly interested in making the Will ineffective and whose conduct is far from one which would inspire confidence in truthfulness of his statements."
(ii) 2003(1)CTC 308 [ Janki Narayan Bhoir vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam]. An excerpt from it would run thus:
"8. To say will has been duly executed the requirements mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act are to be complied with i.e., (a) the testator has to sign or affix his mark to the will, or it has got to be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction; (b) that the signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing at his direction, has to appear at a place from which it could appear that by that mark or signature the document is intended to have effect as a will; (c) the most important point with which we are presently concerned in this appeal, is that the will has to be attested by two or more witnesses and each of these witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will, or must have seen some other person sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or must have received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person, and each of the witness has to sign the Will in the presence of the testator.
9. It is thus clear that one of the requirements of due execution of Will is its attestation by two or more witnesses which is mandatory.
10. Section 68 of the Evidence Act speaks as to how a document required by law to be attested can be proved. According to the said Section, a document required by law to be attested shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving an evidence. It flows from this Section that if there be an attesting witness alive capable of giving evidence and subject to the process of the Court, has to be necessarily examined before the document required by law to be attested can be used in an evidence. On a combined reading of Section 63 of the Succession Act with Section 68 of the Evidence Act, it appears that a person propounding the Will has got to prove that the will was duly and validly executed. That cannot be done by simply proving that the signature on the Will was that of the testator but must also prove that attestations were also made properly as required by clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act. It is true that Section 68 of the Evidence Act does not say that both or all the attesting witnesses must be examined. But at least one attesting witness has to be called for proving due execution of the Will as envisaged in Section 63. Although Section 63 of the Succession Act requires that a Will has to be attested at least by two witnesses, Section 68 of the Evidence Act provides that a document, which is required by law to be attested, shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been examined for the purpose of the proving its due execution if such witness is alive and capable of giving evidence and subject to the process of the Court. In a way, Section 68 gives a concession to those who want to prove and establish a will in a Court of law by examining at least one attesting witness even though will has to be attested at least by two witnesses mandatorily under Section 63 of the Succession Act. But what is significant and to be noted is that that one attesting witness examined should be in a position to prove the execution of a will. To put in other words, if one attesting witness can prove execution of the will in terms of the clause (c) of Section 63, viz., attestation by two attesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, the examination of other attesting witness can be dispensed with. The one attesting witness examined, in this evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of the Will. If the attesting witness examined besides his attestation does not, in his evidence, satisfy the requirements of attestation of the Will by other witness also it falls short of attestation of will at least by two witnesses for the simple reason that the execution of the will does not merely mean the signing of it by the testator but it means fulfilling and proof of all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will under Section 68 of the Evidence Act fails to prove the due execution of the Will then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence to make it complete in all respects. Where one attesting witness is examined and he fails to prove the attestation of the Will by other witness there will be deficiency in meeting the mandatory requirements of Section 68 of the Evidence Act."
(iii) An excerpt from one other decision reported in 1995 (II) CTC 476 [Kashibai and another vs. Parwatibai and others] would run thus:
"10. This brings us to the question of the will alleged to have been executed by deceased Lachiram in favour of his grand-son Purshottam, the defendant No.3. Section 68 of Evidence Act related to the proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. Admittedly, a Deed of Will is one of such documents which necessarily required by law to be attested. Section 68 of the Evidence Act contemplates that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until the attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. A reading of Section 68 will show that "attestation" and "execution" are two different acts one following the other. There can be valid execution of a document which under the law is required to be attested without the proof of its due attestation and if due attestation is also not proved, the fact of execution is of no avail. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 also lays down certain rules with (C) of Section 63 provides that the Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses each one of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature of mark of the such other person; and each of the witnesses should sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.
(iv) AIR 2007 SC 2219 (Apoline D'Souza v. John D' Souza. An excerpt from it would run thus:
"20. The ratio of the said decision does not assist the appellant, as the mode and manner of proof of due execution of a Will indisputably will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is for the propounder of the Will to remove the suspicious circumstances, which has not been done in this case."
25. A bare perusal of the aforesaid decisions would unambiguously and unequivocally, pellucidly and palpably, highlight and spotlight that the propounder of the Will has to prove the Will strictly by way of dispelling the suspicious circumstances and it would be all the more important, when the Will concerned is having the effect of favouring one of the legal heirs to the exclusion of the other legal heirs of the testators.
26. Obvious and axiomatic, as it is that Narayana Gounder died leaving behind his son Ramasamy Gounder DW2 (D3) and his three daughters, viz., Muthaiyammal and Velaiammal, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and D2 Lakshmiammal. If Ex.B2 is a true one, it would have the effect of depriving all the female heirs from claiming share in the suit properties. Hence, as per the dicta found exemplified in the various decisions referred to supra, the propounder of the Will DW3 was bound to prove the Will strictly. Over and above that, there is also one other suspicious circumstance, which could glaringly be noticeable.
27. Ex.B2, the alleged unregistered Will emerged hardly two days after Ex.B1, the registered cancellation deed. The pertinent question arises as to why, Narayana Gounder did not make Ex.B2 itself a deed of cancellation cum fresh Will. It is not uncommon on the part of a testator to cancel the earlier Will and execute a fresh Will by virtue of one document. It is also to be noticed that Ex.B2 emerged hardly two days after Ex.B1 as an unregistered Will. Hence, in these circumstances, the evidence of D.Ws.1, 2 and 3 should be scrutinised in depth. DW3 (D2) would try to expound and explain that Narayana Gounder cancelled the earlier Will Ex.B12 by executing Ex.B1 as the testator felt that DW3's sons who were the beneficiaries under Ex.B12 did not behave with the testator properly. The relevant excerpt from the deposition of DW3 would run thus:
@gpujpthjpfs; jfg;gdhhplk; rhptu ele;J bfhs;shjjhy; vd;Dila bgaUf;F jpUj;jp capiy vGjpdhh;/ ,e;j brhj;Jf;fs; vy;yhtw;iwa[k; vdJ jfg;gdhh; ,we;j gpd;dpl;L fwhh; bra;J vdJ kfd;fsplk; bfhLj;J tpl;nld;/@ Whereas, DW1, Kanthaswamy, the scribe of Ex.B2 in his deposition would project the intention of Narayana Gounder as though he did not want to bequeath his properties to anyone. An excerpt from his deposition is extracted here under:
@jd;Dila brhj;Jf;fis capy; K:yk; ahUf;Fk; ghj;jpag;gLj;j tpUk;gtpy;iy vd;W Kd;dpl;l capiy uj;J bra;jhh;/@
28. At this juncture, the core question arises as to what actuated and accentuated, propelled and impelled Narayana Gounder allegedly to execute Ex.B12 the Will, hardly two days after the cancellation deed Ex.B1. It could be an educated guess of any man having head over shoulder that a person who intended his son to be the beneficiary of his property and that his grand sons should not be the beneficiaries under the earlier Will, while executing a fresh Will would narrate those facts and execute the Will in favour of his son. But, in this case, it was not done so. Absolutely, there is no iota or morsel, shard or shred, speck or dot of evidence as to what transpired between the execution of Ex.B1 and Ex.B2, so to say, within that short span of two days. As such, the suspicious circumstances have not been dispelled by the propounder of the Will DW3.
29. The one other suspicious circumstance is that DW1, Kandhasamy, the scribe would depose, as though Narayana Gounder himself stated that for want of funds, he could not get Ex.B2 the Will registered immediately and that four days thereafter, the same could be got registered. Had really, what Kandhasamy stated was true, absolutely, there could have been no rhyme or reason on the part of the testator not to get Ex.B2 registered, despite the testator lived for 14 long months after the alleged execution of Ex.B2. It is therefore a serious suspicious circumstance, relating to the very emergence of Ex.B2 on 17.03.1982 and that too when specifically, the case of the plaintiffs is to the effect that only as an after thought and that too, at the time of exchange of notices, DW3 managed to concoct Ex.B2. An excerpt from the deposition of DW3 in this regard would run thus:
@ .....jfg;gdhh; fhhpaj;jd;W vd; mk;kh xU fhapjk; bfhz;L te;J bfhLj;jhh;fs;/ mg;nghJ jhd; gp/2 Ig; gw;wp vdf;F bjhpa[k;/@ @vd; nghpy; ,uz;L Vf;fuh jdpahf epyk; th';fpa[s;nshk;/ g{h;tPf brhj;J 1 Vf;fh; 97 brz;l; epyk; nghf ghf;fp epy';fs; vd; jfg;gdhh; Rahh;$pjkhf rk;ghjpj;j brhj;J/@ ///// vd; jfg;gdhh; ,we;j gpd;dpl;L 3 k; ehs; fhhpak; nghJ gpujpthjpfSk; vd; cwtpdh;fs; te;J ,Ue;jhh;fs;/ me;j rkaj;jpy; vd; jhahh; gPnuhtpy; ,Ue;J xU fhfpjk; Mtzk; cs;sJ mJ vd;d btd;W ghh; vd;W vd;dplk; fhz;gpj;jdh;/ mij ehd; th';fp goj;Jg; ghh;j;njhk;/ 3k; ehs; fhhpak; nghJ jhd; gp/2 capy; gw;wp bjhpa te;jJ/ gp/1 gj;jpuj;ij uj;J bra;J 2 ehl;fs; fHpj;J gp/2 gj;jpuk; vGjp ,Ue;jhh;/ gp/2 gj;jpuk; vd; bgaUf;F vGjg;gl;L ,Ue;jJ/ gp/2 capypy; vd; jhahUf;Fk; rhg;ghl;ow;F ve;j tHp tifa[k; bra;atpy;iy/ v';fSf;F thof;ifahf gj;jpuk; vGJk; fe;jrhkp gps;is jhd; gp/2 capy; vGjpdhh;/ ehd; gp/2 gj;jpuj;ij vLj;Jf; bfhz;L ngha; fe;jrhkp gps;is ,lk; nfl;nld;/ gp/2 capy; ghh;g;gjw;F Kd;ng gyKiw ehd; fe;jrhkp gps;is re;jpj;J cs;nsd;/ me;j rka';fspy; vd; jfg;gdhh; capy; vGjp itj;Js;s tpguk; gw;wp vd;dplk; fe;jrhkp gps;is brhy;ytpy;iy/@ ////// @capy; vGjpa njjpa Kjy; vd; jfg;gdhh; ,wf;Fk; njjp tiu ehd;. vd; jhahh;. jfg;gdhh; Mfpnahh; xd;whfj; jhd; trpj;J te;njhk;/ vd; jfg;gdhh; ,wf;Fk; tiu vd; kfd; nghpy; ,Ue;j capiy uj;J bra;J tpl;L vd; bgahpy; capy; vGjp itj;j tpguj;ij vd;dplk; brhy;ytpy;iy/ vd; jfg;gdhh; ,wf;Fk; njjp tiu vdf;Fk;. vd; jfg;gdhUf;Fk; tUj;jk; vJt[k; fpilahJ/@ From the above excerpts, what this Court could understand is that according to DW3, the propounder of the Will, was not at all aware of the Will, at the time of its emergence; only after the death of Narayana Gounder when his mother produced Ex.B2 on the third day obsequies ceremony of his father Narayana Gounder, he came to know about it. Whereas, DW2 Natesan, during cross examination would state thus:
//////// @ehd; ehuhaz ft[z;lh; ,we;j mLj;j ehs; ,st[f;F ngha; ,Ue;njd;/ ehd; jpUk;gp tUk; nghJ. 3 k; gpujpthjp vd; gpd;dhy; te;J v';f mg;gh capy; vGjp itj;jpUe;jhuhnk mjpy; eP rhl;rp ifbaGj;J nghl;oUf;fpwPh;fsh vd;W nfl;lhh;/ Vd; te;J vd;dplk; 3 k; gpujpthjp capiyg; gw;wp nfl;lhh; vd;W vdf;F bjhpahJ/ 3 k; gpujpthjpf;F mth; jfg;gdhh; capy; vGjp itj;j tpguk; bjhpa[k;/@
30. A bare comparison of the deposition of DW3 with DW2 would indicate that DW2 has not come forward with truth relating to the time at which, DW3 came to know about Ex.B2, the Will. DW2, is none but the close relative of DW3. Even though DW2 would claim that as on the date of attesting, he was not so close to the family of DW3; nonetheless, he would admit that subsequently, DW2's sister's daughter was given marriage to D6, who is the son of D3. But one fact is clear that as on the date of deposing before the Court, DW2 happened to be the close relative of DW3 and that fact should not be lost sight of and consequently he could be labelled as an interested witness. DW3 also would candidly state that as of now, his sons including D6 are only enjoying the property and not himself.
31. The fact also remains that there is no reference to Ex.B2 in Ex.A1, which is a partition deed, emerged on 05.12.1985 among Narayana Gounder's wife deceased Nanjammal (D1) and D2 to D6 relating to the suit properties. Had really Ex.B2 emerged in the form of a Will, which was presented before the Court, certainly, it would have found a place in Ex.A1. Even though in Ex.A1, there is reference to Ex.B12, the earlier Will and the cancellation deed Ex.B1, nonetheless, there is no reference to Ex.B2; for which DW3 unconvincingly and incoherently would dish out a plea as though if Ex.B2 was referred to in Ex.B1 that would have lead to confusion and obfuscation. An excerpt from DW3's deposition would run thus:
@bghJ brhj;J vd;W fwhhpy; vGjpf; bfhLf;f ntz;Lk; vd;W rhh;gjpthsh; brhd;dhh;/ capiy fhl;odhh; rpf;fy; tUfpwJ/ fpiuak; khjphp vGj ntz;o tUk; mjw;fhf capiy fhl;odhy; epiwa !;lhk;g; xl;o tUk; vd;W brhd;dhh;/ bghJ brhj;jhf vGjpdhy; ey;yJ vd;W brhd;djpdhy; capiy fhl;ltpy;iy/@
32. I am at a loss to understand as to how, if Ex.B2 was referred to Ex.A1, that would have lead to perplexity.
33. The explanation offered by DW3 for non-specification of D2 in Ex.A1 as found above is obviously and axiomatically unconvincing and it is not a supposable explanation.
34. Hence, there is considerable force in the plea of the plaintiffs that Ex.B2 emerged as an after thought.
35. The marshalling of relevant facts and the available evidence would glaringly demonstrate and exemplify that instead of DW3 dispelling the suspicious circumstances, contributed more suspicion relating to emergence of Ex.B1 and no more elaboration in this regard is required.
36. DW1, the scribe would depose that serendipitously, the testator Narayana Gounder picked him up while the former was going to Vinayagar temple and he was taken by Narayana Gounder to his thatched shed and he expressed his desire to execute a Will and that too, after two days from the emergence of Ex.B1, the said cancellation deed and these versions would project as to how DW1 has not come forward with truth. It is just and necessary to extract here under the relevant portion during cross examination of DW1.
@ehuhaz ft[z;lUf;F mg;nghJ 80 taJ ,Uf;Fk;/ Kjph;e;j taJ/ jw;brayhf mtiu re;jpj;j nghJ mtUila bfhl;lha;f;F brd;W m';F vGjpndd;/ bfhl;lha;f;Fk; mtiu re;jpj;j ,lj;jpw;F 4 gh;yh'; J}uk; ,Uf;Fk;/ jdpahf te;jnghJ vd;id re;jpj;jhh;/ bfhl;lhapy; mg;nghJ ehd; m';F brd;w nghJ mtiuj; jtpu ntW ahUk; ,y;iy/ ehd; fhiyapy; nfhapy; nghFk; nghJk; ngdh bfhz;L brd;nwd;/ nfhtpy; brd;w nghJ fhiy 8/30 kzp ,Uf;Fk;/ ngg;gh; mtnu itj;jpUe;jhh;/ capiy jahh; bra;a[k; nghJ brhj;J gj;jpunkh ntW gj;jpunkh vd;dplk; mth; jutpy;iy/@ The above excerpt coupled with the earlier discussion would leave no doubt in the mind of the Court that the narration of DW1, the scribe relating to execution of Ex.B2, is stranger than fiction. The testator at the relevant time was an octagenarian and had he really intended to execute the Will, it is doubtful, as to how, he could have by chance picked the scribe four furlongs away from his shed and brought him to his shed and provided him with paper for writing the Will. In fact, as per the evidence available on the defendants' side, the testator wanted the Will also to be registered within four days but in reality, it was not registered. Relating to securing the presence of witnesses, once again the circumstances delineated by DW1, the scribe and DW2 one of the attesting witnesses, who is apparently an interested witness, is far from convincing. DW1 would state that from the shed itself, he showed signs to attesting witnesses and secured their presence and that they attested the Will.
37. At this juncture, I would like to highlight that there is not even a supposable or believable case not to talk of a strong case. Hence, it is just and necessary to refer to Ex.B2, which is niggardly worded and found written in one page. No one would ever venture to write such a solemn document and that too in the circumstances cited supra, in that cryptic manner. Relating to description of property, the following words alone are found written there:
@vd; FLk;g brhj;jpy; nkw;go vd; kfdpd; ghj;jpak; nghf vdf;Fs;s ghjp ghj;jpaj;ij ,jd; K:yk; capy; gpwg;gpj;J ,Uf;fpnwd;@.
@nryk; o ehkfphpg;ngl;il rg;o mhpah ft[z;lk;gl;o fpuhkj;jpy; vdf;F ghj;jpag;gl;l ghjp brhj;J g{uht[k; vdf;Fs;s nythnjtp g{uht[k; ,e;j capYf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ/@
38. D.W.1, the scribe himself would depose as under:
/////////////// @rhl;rpfs; ve;j Ch; vd;gJ vdf;F bjhpahJ/ mth;fSila jfg;gdhh; bgah;. Ch; ehd; vGjtpy;iy/ rhl;rpfs; ve;j ngdhtpy; ifbaGj;J nghl;lhh;fs; vd;W vdf;F bjhpahJ/@ It is apparently clear that DW1 without minching words deposed that it was not he who put the respective fathers' names of the witnesses in Ex.B2, but in it, the respective fathers' names of the witnesses are found mentioned; and DW1 could not say as to who wrote like that. It is not the case of DW1 that the witnesses themselves had put their respective fathers' names besides their signatures. He would also answer that he didn't know with which, pen the witnesses signed. As such, all these discrepancies in the evidence of DW1 lend support to the case of the plaintiffs that witnesses have not signed in the presence of the scribe, even though the scribe would claim that the testator and the witnesses had all signed after each one of them seeing the other signing. DW2, Natesan, would state that he did not see the scribe putting his signature in Ex.B2. It is also pertinent to note that in the entire deposition of DW1 Kanthasamy, there is no assertion by DW1 that he signed Ex.B2 even though in Ex.B2 one signature is found as one that of the scribe. In fact, during cross examination, DW1 stated thus:
@gj;jpuj;jpy; vGjpaJk; rhl;rpa[k; vd;W nghltpy;iy@ As such DW1 does not speak about his signature at all.
39. The basic requirement in a scribe's deposition is that he should identify his signature in the document scribed by him. But, his deposition is conspicuous of its missing and adding fuel to the fire, DW2 would narrate that he didn't see the scribe signing. As has been already pointed out supra, there is no evidence much less, clinching evidence to demonstrate as to who put the respective fathers' names of the witnesses. In one breath, DW1 would claim that only with his pen, the witnesses put their signature and in another breath he would say that he didn't know with which pen, they put their signatures.
40. DW2 also in his deposition would not state as to who put the father's name of the first attesting witness Kakkaverry Ramasamy. These are all serious lacuna in proving the Will. D2 in her written statement would contend as though the plaintiffs got married one and the same person and that made Narayana Gounder to develop crochety and itchy as against his daughters, the plaintiffs; whereupon he executed the Will Ex.B12; thereafter he cancelled it by Ex.B1 Will and thereat he executed Ex.B2 Will in favour of D3. According to D2, the factum of Narayana Gounder having executed Ex.B2 was known to her and that she also informed the plaintiffs about it. If that be the case, it is not known as to how D3- Ramasamy could plead total ignorance about the execution of the Will by Narayana Gounder in his favour, till his mother handed over the same to him on the third day of his father's death. As such, the versions as found set out in the written statement of D2 do not go hand in hand with the versions found in the written statement of D3 also.
41. Hence, in these circumstances, it cannot be held that Ex.B2, the " Will" was proved as per law. The perusal of the judgment of the trial Court, to say the least, is far from satisfactory as without adverting to the aforesaid serious lacuna in the evidence relating to proving of the Will, it held as though the Will was proved. The trial Court was expected to apply its mind on the suspicious circumstances as highlighted supra, thereat the learned Judge should have looked for evidence, which are capable of dispelling such suspicions. However, the trial Court resorted to the dubious approach of blindly believing the version of D.Ws.1 and 2 coupled with the version of DW3 and simply recorded the finding in favour of DW3. As such, the findings of the trial Court relating to the validity of Ex.B2 is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same is set aside.
42. Accordingly, Point No.1 is decided in favour of the plaintiffs that DW3 the propounder of the Will has not proved Ex.B2.
Point Nos.2,3 and 4:
43. These points are inter-linked and interwoven, interconnected and inter-twined with one another and hence taken together for discussion.
44. The contention of D3 that as per Ex.B9, the "D" form patta, the Government allotted the land bearing Survey No.339/1, measuring 4 acres and 55 cents as his exclusive property, runs counter to his own admission made in his deposition that all the suit properties were treated as joint family properties.
45. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would cite a decision of this Court reported in 2006 (4) L.W.798 (Mrs.Bagirathi and 5 others vs. S.Manivanna and another) and an excerpt from it would run thus:
"11. This submission ignores the basic principle that the superstructure was a joint family property so far as Sundaraja Naicker and his two sons are concerned. Even though Sundaraja Naicker was sued as the ostensible tenant it must be taken that he was being sued on behalf of the joint family consisting of himself and two male members as well as other male members of the family and, therefore, the purchase of land under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act by the father, who was obviously representing the family must be treated as purchase on behalf of the entire joint family and not in his individual capacity. Therefore, the purchase of such land under City Tenants Protection Act enured to the benefit of the entire joint family and it cannot be said that Sundaraja Naicker had become the separate owner of the land and the members of the joint family continued to be joint owners in respect of the superstructure standing on the land. This submission is therefore destined to be rejected."
46. It is therefore crystal clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgment that simply because one member of the joint family acquired right over the immovable property by invoking the Statutory provision, automatically he cannot be termed as the absolute owner of it when the evidence on record speaks to the contrary.
47. The decision reported in 2000 (2) MLJ 538 (Sankaranarayanan vs. Dhandapani and others) as cited by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would run thus:
"20. In Mt.Bahu Rani v.Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 P.C 72, a grant was made to two brothers and the question that arose for consideration before the Privy Council was, whether the grant is taken by the two brothers as joint tenants or an tenants in common. At page 75 of the reports, it was held thus:
"Prima facie a gift to a member of a joint Hindu family is his separate property and will only become joint family property when it descends to his sons, unless he himself has made it joint family property by throwing it into the common stock. There is nothing in the terms of these maintenance grants to these two brothers to suggest that the Government intended to make a grant to a joint family" (Italics supplied).
21. In Dattatraya Sitaram v. Shankar Mahadji, AIR 1938 Bom.250 and 251, their Lordships relied on Katama Natchiar's case, 9 M.I.A. 539 and held thus:
"It is well established that there is nothing to prevent a member of a joint family from obtaining a grant form Government for his own benefit: Katama Natchiar's case, 9 M.I.A.539. Whether such a grant ensures for the benefit of the family of which he is a member must, as their Lordships of the Privy Council have held, depend upon the terms of the grant; 25 I.A. 195. It is also open to such a person to treat, what initially was his separate property, as joint family property; and it is equally possible for the family to prove that the consideration paid to Government for the grant originally proceeded from the family funds. In either of these case though initially the grant was the separate property of the grantee, the property would acquire the character of joint family property in which according Hindu Law, the other coparceners would be equally interested". (Italics supplied).
22. From the above decisions, it is clear that prima facie, plaintiff is the absolute owner of the property and the document does not disclose that it is intended for the benefit of the joint family. As stated earlier, plaintiff is the youngest son of late Ramaswamy Pillai. The only reason that is mentioned in the written statement to get patta in the name of the plaintiff is that their father asked the Government to assign the land in favour of the plaintiff to avoid the land being taken over by the Government under the provisions of Land Ceiling Act. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the family had any property in excess of the ceiling area and how the assignment in favour of the plaintiff will help the family to get away from the clutches of Land Ceiling Act it they had excess land. While DW1 was examined he said thus:
@mJ g[wk;nghf;F jhpR epyk;/ ic& g[wk;nghf;F epyj;jpy; gl;lh bfhLg;gth;fSf;F ntW epyk; ,Uf;ff;TlhJ/ vd; mg;gh. Rnfhjuh; nghpy; epyk; ,Ue;jjhy; vd; jk;gp ngUf;F gl;lh th';fg;gl;lJ@/ So the version of DW1 is entirely different from what he has stated in the written statement."
It is clear from the above precedent that even though in the normal circumstances, the grant given by the Government would enure to the benefit of the person in whose favour it is granted, nonetheless, if the grantee treats it as the joint family property, then the other co-parceners also would be having equal right in it.
48. In view of the supine and categorical admission made by DW3 himself that all the suit properties are the self-acquired properties including the one granted under Ex.B9, the "D" patta, this Court could have no hesitation in holding that all the properties are the co-parcenery properties of Narayana Gounder and Ramasamy.
49. The learned counsel for DW3 would argue that the suit properties situated in Survey Nos.189/3, 167/4 and 159/4 are all the self-acquired properties of D3. He would also develop his argument to the effect that the mill situated in the ancestral property, which Narayana Gounder obtained in the partition from his original co-parcenery, happened to be the exclusive property of D3 for the reason that he after getting funds from his mother-in-law made such construction.
50. In the written statement filed by D3 at para No.3, he candidly and categorically, without minching words made a supine submission to the effect that in the admitted ancestral property bearing Survey No.159/2, the mill was constructed and from out of the income derived from the said Mill, some of the suit properties were purchased in the name of Narayana Gounder. However, he would unsuccessfully contend that the said Mill was put up only from out of the funds, which he got from his mother-in-law, but to buttress and fortify the same, there is no morsel or modicum of evidence adduced by the defendants.
51. It is a trite proposition of law that even if the self-acquired income/ property of a co-parcenery is put into a common hotch-pot of the co-parcenery, then, it would also be treated as co-parcenery property. I could see no rhyme or reason in the contention of D3 as to why from such alleged income of the Mill, certain suit properties should be purchased in the name of the father and certain other properties should be purchased in the name of Ramaswamy (D3). If really only from out of the Mill income, the suit properties except the land in Survey No.159/2 were purchased then, D3-Ramaswamy could have purchased all the properties in his own name.
52. It is therefore crystal clear that the plea of D3 does not carry conviction with the Court. But on the other hand, the very facts that some of the properties were purchased in the name of Narayana Gounder and some other properties were purchased in the name of Ramasamy and that too, when admittedly, till the death of Narayana Gounder, both Narayana Gounder and Ramaswamy lived together in one and the same house as co-parceners are indicative of the fact that all the properties are co-parcenery properties.
53. In Ex.A1 the partition deed dated 05.12.1985, there is no reference to Ex.B2 Will, but only in Ex.A3, the reply notice by the defendants, there is reference to Ex.B2 and for which also there is no supposable and believable, acceptable and legally agreeable explanation.
54. The learned counsel for the appellant/second plaintiff would appositely and appropriately, correctly and convincingly would argue that even assuming that as per the contention of D3 that with the alleged separate funds he purchased and developed properties and treated them as the joint property, then it should be taken that the entire property including the one claimed to be the exclusive property, should be made available for the benefit of all the co-parceners. There is also no piece of evidence much less reliable evidence to evince and indicate that D3 purchased the properties in his name from out of his own income.
55. It is the admitted case on the defendant's side that Narayana Gounder himself from out of the income derived from the admitted ancestral properties purchased various other properties found set out in the description of the suit properties. In such a case, it is not known as to how, it could be visualised that the admitted ancestral property as well as the subsequent properties acquired by Narayana Gounder were not yielding sufficient income so as to enable the co-parcenery to acquire the lands in other survey numbers, over which D3 is claiming exclusively right. It is not the case of either of the parties that over and above the agricultural income and the income derived from the said mill, the family had any other income.
56. There is also one other plausible argument available on the side of the appellant/second plaintiff that D3 himself admitted even at the time of emergence of Ex.B12, the registered Will that the properties were all co-parcenery properties, whereupon the concept of self-acquisition of properties by one of the members had no place in this case.
57. In Ex.B12, the Will dated 14.06.1973, the properties contemplated under Ex.B7 the sale deed dated 04.03.1974, which emerged in the name of DW3, did not find a place in view of the obvious reason that those properties were acquired subsequent to the emergence of Ex.B12. In Ex.A1 also, D3 and others clearly spelt out that all the properties are co-parcenery properties by the following words:
@brhj;Jf;fs; KGtJk; ek;k FLk;gj;Jf;F gpJuhh;$pjkhft[k;. Rahh;$pjkhft[k;. ghj;jpag;gl;l FLk;g bghJ brhj;Jf;fs; MfpwJ/@ The fact also remains that first plaintiff Muthayammal executed the sale deed Ex.B6 dated 22.10.1970 in favour of her father Narayana Gounder selling the land bearing Survey No.363/3B1 of the suit properties and as per the sale deed Ex.B8 dated 10.07.1972 the second plaintiff Valliyammal effected the sale in favour of her father Narayana Gounder, a portion of the suit properties bearing survey No.336/5 and those properties sold under Exs.B6 and B8 were originally belonged to Muthaiyammal and Valliyammal and after such sales, those properties also became the co-parcenery property of Narayana Gounder and after the death of Narayana Gounder, the plaintiffs being the daughters are entitled to their shares in the share of Narayana Gounder.
58. Accordingly, Point Nos.2, 3 and 4 are decided in favour of the plaintiffs as above.
Point Nos.5 & 6:
59. The ratiocination adhered to in deciding the aforesaid points would indicate that all the suit properties under the "B" scheduled properties are the co-parcenery properties of the co-parcenery comprised of Narayana Gounder and Ramasamy Gounder; since Narayana Gounder is held to have died intestate, his half share in the co-parcenery is deemed to have devolved of his son Ramasamy D3 and his three daughters, viz., the first plaintiff, the second plaintiff and D2 equally. Accordingly, the half share of Narayana Gounder should be divided into < th share each in favour of his said four children and consequently, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 would get 1/8 th share each in the entire suit properties.
60. The logic and reason adopted in adjudging the "B" Scheduled immovable properties shall also be applicable to the "C" scheduled movable properties. It appears there is scanty and meagre evidence available regarding "C" scheduled properties and during final decree proceedings evidence are permitted to be adduced by the parties concerned and accordingly, the final decree shall follow.
61. The trial Court in the judgment at para No.20 gave its finding about the valuation of the suit properties. In my opinion, only during final decree proceedings, the actual value of the properties should be gone into after entertaining evidence from both sides and as such, the findings of the trial Court in para No.20 under Issue No.5 also is liable to be set aside.
62. In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside and the preliminary decree is passed in respect of the suit properties allotting 1/8 th share each in favour of the first and second plaintiffs and D2 is entitled to another 1/8 th share and the remaining share belongs to D3. The plaintiffs are at liberty to apply for final decree praying for the routine and usual reliefs as permissible in a partition decree, in addition to their right to apply under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for getting assessed the mesne profits and for awarding the same as per law. Regarding the valuation of properties, the parties are at liberty to adduce evidence during final decree proceedings and accordingly obtain verdict before the trial Court.
63. Point Nos.5 and 6 are answered accordingly.
64. In the result, the appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
22..01..2009
vj2
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
To
The subordinate Judge, Namakkal
G.RAJASURIA,J.,
vj2
Judgment in
A.S.No.758 of 1999
22.01.2009