Kerala High Court
S Haja Najeemudeen vs Union Of India on 27 July, 2022
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar, Shaji P.Chaly
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF JULY 2022 / 5TH SRAVANA, 1944
WP(C) NO. 24346 OF 2022
PETITIONER:
S HAJA NAJEEMUDEEN
AGED 68 YEARS,
S/O.A.I. SHEIK JAMAL MOHAMED IBRAHIM,
AL-ZAMAAL, 60/1659,
UDAYA NAGAR, KATHRIKADAVU, COCHIN-682017.
BY ADVS.
P.K.MADHUSOODANAN
P.M.BINOY KRISHNA
RESPONDENTS:
1 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXPENDITURE,
GOVT. OF INDIA, NORTH BLOCK,
NEW DELHI - 110001.
2 INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH (ICAR)
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, ICAR, KRISHI
BHAVAN, NEW DELHI-110001
3 DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL MARINE FISHERIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE
(CMFRI), (ICAR), P.B. NO.1603,
ERNAKULAM NORTH P.O., KOCHI-682018.
4 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FARMERS' WELFARE,
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT, ICAR SOCIETY,
KRISHI BHAVAN, NEW DELHI-110001
5 DR. A. GOPLAKRISHNAN.
DIRECTOR, CMFRI, P.B. NO. 1603,
ERNAKULAM NORTH P.O., KOCHI-682018
W.P(C)24346/2022
2
6 CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION (CVC)
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, CVC, SATARKTA
BHAWAN, GPO COMPLEX, BLOCK - A, INA,
NEW DELHI-110 023
7 DEPUTY DIRECTOR (DT) II,
INDIAN AUDIT AND ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT,
0/0 THE PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR OF AUDIT (CENTRAL)
CHENNAI, BRANCH OFFICE - KOCHI,
GOLDEN JUBILEE ROAD,
KALOOR, KOCHI-682017
8 DR. TRILOCHAN MOHAPATRA,
DIRECTOR GENERAL,
INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH (ICAR),
KRISHI BHAVAN, NEW DELHI 110 001.
BY SRI.S.MANU, ASST. SOLICITOR GENERAL
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI. P SANTHOSH KUMAR, SC, ICAR
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 27.07.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.P(C)24346/2022
3
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 27th day of July, 2022 S. Manikumar, CJ.
An employee of Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Kochi (CMFRI), who retired on 30.4.2014 as Chief Technical Officer (T-9) with effect from 1.1.2006, has filed the instant writ petition for the following reliefs :
"a) A Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction directing the 6th respondent to conduct detailed investigation proper enquiry in to the matter in issue raised by the audit authorities and the corruption committed by the officials, including the 5th respondent and his colleagues, in the 124 SSS selection scam conducted without any sanction/permission, authority and power, and purchase made specifically pointed out in Exhibit P5 and P6, within a time limit to be fixed by this Hon'ble Court in the interest of justice.
b) A Writ of Mandamus any other appropriate Writ, order or or direction declaring that the conduct of the 6th respondent in not Conducting proper investigation, examination and enquiry in to the subject matter in issue in Exhibit P5 in spite of receipt of Exhibit P6 and repeated requests made thereunder, are per se illegal, opposed to law and the relevant provisions of the Central vigilance Commission Act, 2003 and the rules made there under, which amounts to W.P(C)24346/2022 4 fraud on the public, challenge against rule of law and therefore illegal."
2. Short Facts leading to filing of the writ petition are as under:
2.1. The petitioner is a tax payer and a senior citizen of India. He has come across a series of corruption, illegalities, irregularities and fraud on the public, cheating, violation of Government orders etc., conducted by the officials of the Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (CMFRI) and Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) for the undue benefits of some top officials. He has come across the Audit Report at Exhibit P5 which culled out shocking illegalities committed in respect of filling up of 124 SSS post through direct recruitment done without any permission/approval which is mandatory, from the competent authorities. This was done at the instance of the 5th respondent and his colleagues for undue monetary benefits to them by illegal conducts, corruption, favouritism, nepotism, undue bias towards certain candidates to have them selected by direct recruitment, resorted to in clear violation of the mandates in Exhibits P1 to P3, besides atrocious, overt acts without any W.P(C)24346/2022 5 authority or power. Though the Petitioner sought vigilance enquiry in to the 'recruitment scam' and other corruption charges pointed out in the Audit Report at Exhibit P5, the 6 th respondent (CVC) is unmoved abdicating its duties cast upon him and as envisaged under section 17(2) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 and want of approval/sanction from the competent authorities for conducting the direct recruitment. The public money of the exchequer has been wasted for ulterior motives with the malicious intention to amass wealth otherwise than in accordance with law. Left with no other remedy, the Petitioner approaches this Hon'ble Court by filing this Public Interest litigation for issuance of necessary directions to the 6th respondent to conduct proper and effective vigilance enquiry in to the matters in issue raised in Exhibit P5 audit report and render justice to the public upholding rule of law, with a view to eradicate corruption. The Petitioner bonafide believe that the efforts made by him in good faith will pave the way for eradicating corruption, illegalities and and irregularities at the intervention of this Hon'ble Court. Hence, this Writ Petition (Civil) is filed.
W.P(C)24346/2022 6
3. In support of his contentions, petitioner has raised the following grounds:
A. It is most respectfully submitted that the inaction on the part of the the 6th respondent in not investigating the matter in issue raised in Exhibit P6 and not eliciting the true facts and the undue considerations involved in it, amounts to negation of statutory duty cast upon him as enjoined by law, particularly in view of the relevant provisions in the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, and the rules made thereunder. The duties of the 6th respondent is not that of a post office between the complainant and the accused. The petitioner along with audit report at Exhibit P5 pointed out the overt high handed, illegal, erroneous and undue conduct of the 5th respondent and his colleagues for amassing undue monetary benefits by corrupt practices, contrary to the stipulations in Exhibits P1 to P3, P13 and P14, without obtaining the necessary permission from the Ministry of Finance, causing huge loss to the exchequer and the tax payers money is being wasted. In spite of the specific report of the audit, the 6h respondent did not move even a finger to investigate and enquire in to the motive of the corruption behind it. What else for which the 6th respondent is being in existence? By sleeping over his rights and duties, the 6 th respondent form a part and parcel of inducing corruption among the officials of the department and the same cannot be allowed at the cost of the tax payers, it most humbly prayed. Therefore, it is only just and proper, in the interest of justice to issue necessary directions to conduct a thorough and fact finding investigation and enquiry into the matters in issues raised by the audit report, and the complaint filed by W.P(C)24346/2022 7 the petitioner and bring about the truth of the subject matter and the Corruption committed by the officials of the CMFRI and ICAR in this matter in issue and proceed against the culprits in accordance with law upholding rule of law.
B. The petitioner submitted Exhibit P6 before the 6th respondent praying to conduct an independent enquiry in to the matter in issue raised therein and in Exhibit P5 and find out the corruption, illegalities and irregularities committed by the officials of the CMFRI, Kochi and ICAR, New Delhi. As the officials involved in the 124 SSS Scam and others pointed out in Exhibit P5 by the audit, the 6th respondent did not act, investigation or enquiry has not been conducted by their own abdicating his duty. Miscarriage of justice has therefore been occasioned, causing great loss to the exchequer and tax payers money is being wasted. This cannot be allowed. Therefore, indulgence and interference by this Hon'ble Court is most essential and warranted to elicit the truth and eradicate corruption among the top officials who are misusing and misappropriating Government money, paid by the tax payers.
C. Admittedly there is no permission/ sanction obtained from the Department of Expenditure (Ministry of Finance) to conduct selection and appointment from open market of 124 Skilled Support Staff (SSS). As is evident from Exhibit P5, notification was issued for selection and appointment of 109 SSS from open market. But at the instance of the 5 th respondent, 124 SSS were selected and appointed by direct recruitment. The selection conducted was farce as the same is actuated by favoritism, bias and nepotism as evident from W.P(C)24346/2022 8 Exhibit P5. Exhibit P5 itself states that these vacancies which are filled up by direct recruitment, was in clear violations of the statutory rules in existence, were remained vacant for more than 5 years and there is a clear ban of filling up those posts in Exhibit P1 to P3.As evident from Exhibit P1, posts that have remained vacant for more than 5 years are not to be revived except under very rare and unavoidable circumstances and only after seeking clearance of the Department of Expenditure. To the knowledge of the petitioner, no clearance of the Department of Expenditure was obtained before conducting selection and appointment to the said posts of SSS which remained unfilled for more than five years and there did not exist "very rare and unavoidable circumstances" as stipulated so as to resort to revival of the 124 posts remained vacant for more than a year. The obtaining of higher ranks to 13 candidates the who are dependents of certain employees in CMFRI evidences the favoritism, nepotism, corruption and bias practiced in the selection conducted hastily by the 5th respondent. Therefore the reasons behind the selection and direct appointment of the 124 SSS made in haste, in clear violation of Exhibits P1 to P3,would have been gone in to by the 6th respondent, it would have to be investigated and conducted enquiry to find out the real motive behind it lifting the veil. The petitioner submits that the conduct of the 5th respondent in notifying 109 vacancies of SSS remained vacant for more than five years, the erroneous and farce selection conducted in violation of the relevant recruitment Rule, in clear violations of the mandates in Exhibits P1 to P3, P13 and P14 are with ulterior motives and for undue material benefits known to him and his Colleagues only. Therefore it amounts to fraud on the public, which W.P(C)24346/2022 9 cannot be allowed. Therefore, interference by this Hon'ble Court is most warranted and essential to uphold rule of law.
D. The 6th respondent has a statutory obligation to conduct detailed enquiry and investigation in to the matter in issue specifically referred to in Exhibit P5 on receipt of Exhibit P6. But the 6th respondent left everything in respect of the audit objections to be proved by the petitioner, without conducting proper investigation, not examined the relevant records and not considered the matters in issue with relevant records as envisaged in 17(2) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, and not even raised a finger to find out the corruption behind the scam and other atrocious acts committed by the officials, including 5th respondent and his colleagues. Surprisingly, the 6th respondent dealt with the "improvement of tender process' and not the 'recruitment process' and wrongly advised the 2nd respondent to close the complaint against the recruitment scam. The Public money of the Exchequer has been wasted for ulterior motives with the malicious intention to amass wealth for them, it is learned and the 6th respondent acted as a passive spectator even after specifically pointing out the irregularities and the illegalities done by the officials for ulterior motives and unlawful gains, without any authority and power. This cannot be allowed. Therefore interference by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court is highly warranted and essential to uphold the rule of law, justice and prevention of loss of money of the public exchequer and thus protect the tax payers hard earned money procured for the protection of the public." W.P(C)24346/2022 10
4. Documents, supporting the averments, Exhibits P1 to P15 have been filed.
5. On the basis of the above, by inviting attention of this Court to Exhibit P4 dated 24.11.2016, an order passed by the Deputy Secretary (Administration) & First Appellate Authority, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi and the representation dated 23.5.2017 addressed to the Secretary, Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi, with a prayer to conduct an independent enquiry, Exhibit P7 information furnished to the petitioner in response to the RTI application dated13.4.2017 and 7.7.2017, Mr.P.K. Madhusoodhanan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was informed earlier that no regular enquiry was conducted as regards selection/appointment of 124 Skilled Support Staff (SSS).
6. Attention of this Court was also invited to Exhibit P11 by which the OSD/CPIO, Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi has informed the petitioner about the details of the information sought for.
7. For brevity, Exhibit P11 dated 11.12.2020 is reproduced:
W.P(C)24346/2022 11 "CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION Satarkta Bhawan, GPO Complex, Block A, INA, New Delhi - 110023 CVCOM/R/E/20/00696/468695 Dated:11.12.2020 To Shri S. Haja Najeemudeen.
Al Zamaal Udaya Nagar Kathrikadavu, Cochin-682017.
Sub: information under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Sir ,
1. Please refer to your RTI online application dated 26/11/2020 on the aforementioned subject.
2. Reply w.r.t item no.9 of your RTI application under reference is as under:-
The matter regarding irregularities of recruiting124 SSS was referred for investigation and report to the CVO, Indian Council of Agriculture Research (ICAR). On receipt of the report from CVO. ICAR, the matter was examined in the Commission and Commission after examining the same. in agreement with CV0. ICAR and DA. ICAR. had advised closure of the compliant.
Further, the information regarding decision of the CVC and the ground on which CVC has taken the decision to close the matter i.e file noting in which the matter was examined, is exempted from disclosure as per Section 11(1) r/w section 2(n) of the RTI Act as upheld by the CIC in case no. CIC/AT/A/2009/0617 dated 16/09/2009 in case of K.L.Bablani Vs DG Vigilance, Customs & Central Excise in which CIC held that file-notings in vigilance files cannot authorized to be disclosed as these amount to information confidentially held by the public authority and thereby came within the scope of Section 11(1) read with section 2(n) of the RIT Act. The CIC order had also been relied upon by the CIC while delivering decision in Case No.CIC/AT/A/2010/000757 dated 12/11/2010 and in Case No.CIC/SB/A/2015/000649 dated 08/02/2017. The decisions in above cases essential proves that the file noting in vigilance files cannot be authorized to be disclosed W.P(C)24346/2022 12 as these amounts to information confidentially held by the public authority and thereby come within the scope of Section 11(1) r/w section 2(n) of RTI Act, 2005.
If you are not satisfied with the reply, you may prefer an appeal to Dr. Praveen Kumari Singh, Additional Secretary. Central Vigilance Commission. Satarkta Bhawan. G.P.O Complex. Block-A, INA. New Delhi-110023 within 30 days from the date of receipt of this letter.
Yours faithfully (P.K.. Mohanty) OSD/CPIO"
8. Material on record discloses that acting on the complaints of Mr. S. Haja Najeemudeen and the remainders of the petitioner, a reply dated 20.4.2021 has been sent by the Deputy Director (DT) II, Indian Audit and Accounts Department, Kochi, respondent No.7 (Exhibit P12), which reads thus:
"INDIAN AUDIT AND ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT Office of the Principal Director of Audit (Central), Chennai, Branch Office Kochi, Golden jubilee Road, Kaloor, Kochi-682 017 No. CE/IV/2-20/Compl-CMFRI/20-21/8 Date:20.4.2021 To Shri. S. Haja Najeemudeen, Al Zamal, 60/1659, Udaya Nagar, Kathrikadavu, Cochin-682017.
Sir, Sub: Representation against CMFRI, Kochi Ref: i. This office letter No. CE/IV/2-20/ Compl. CMFR/20-21/34 dated 22.02.2021.
ii. Your e-mail reminders dated 25.03.2021, 02.04.2021 & 12.04.2021.
W.P(C)24346/2022 13 A reference is invited to the emails cited (ii) requesting to furnish the present position of audit para relating to irregularities in the recruitment of Skilled Supporting Staff in the Inspection Report of CMFRI, Kochi which was discussed in the Audit Committee Meeting held in March 2021.
In this connection it is informed that the Para regarding 'Irregularities in the recruitment of SSS had been discussed in detail with the concerned officials of CMFRI, in the presence of Director (Finance) from ICAR HQ and dropped the para based on the discussions and further document produced to audit.
ICAR was aware of the recruitment of Skilled Supporting Staff as it had sought several details from CMFRI in connection with above exam. Further ICAR had also appointed two officers as ICAR HQ representatives in the Recruitment Committee.
The allegations on the irregularities were investigated by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) which is a premier/ Apex agency to investigate corruption cases in Central Govt. organisations. Subsequently CVC closed the case for want of merit.
Other sub-paras like conducting written examinations without a mention in advertisement, nature of questions included in the examination etc. have been dropped based on the discussions conducted.
Yours faithfully Dy. Director (DT) II"
9. Thereafter, vide letter dated 27.8.2021 (Exhibit P13), Under Secretary (Admn) & CPIO, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New Delhi, respondent No.2 has also observed that the W.P(C)24346/2022 14 first appeal filed under Right to Information Act, 2005 has been disposed of.
10. For brevity, Exhibit P13 letter dated 27.8.2021 is reproduced:
"INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH Krishi Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, NewDelhi-110001 No. (Admn.) 1-3/2021-CR(A)&RTI August 27, 2021 To Shri S. Haja Najeemudeen, Al Zamaal, Udaya Nagar, Kathrikadavu, Cochin-682017, Kerala [Email id: [email protected]] Subject: Seeking information under RTI Act, 2005 -regarding.
Sir, This is with reference to your first appeal dated 02.07.2021 addressed to the First Appellate Authority (Admn.). The said appeal has been received in the Council on 28.07.2021.
The information sought by you under point 4(1) of your RTI application dated 11.05.2021 has already been provided to you vide CPIO (Admn.)'s letter of even number dated 09.06.2021 . however, vide your aforesaid first appeal dated 2.7.2021, you have requested the First Appellate Authority (Admn.) or CPIO (Admn.) to supply information whether 'Annexure-I' i.e. FAA's order dated 18/24.11.2016 is correct based on facts available in the concerned file and actually W.P(C)24346/2022 15 issued by then FAA (Admn.), ICAR. You are, hereby, informed that the said order of FAA (Admn. ) was based on the available records in the file and was actually issued by the then FAA (Admn.).
Since the FAA (Admn.) is on ex-India leave, the requisite information is being provided by the undersigned being the custodian of the documents. This disposes off your first appeal under RTI, Act. 2005.
Yours faithfully (Sandeep Singh Dudi) Under Secretary (Admn.)& CPIO"
11. Giving due consideration to the averments and the documents enclosed, it could be deduced that the allegations on the irregularities, said to have been made against 8th respondent/Dr.Trilochan Mohapatra, the then Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi, in the matter of recruitment of SSS, has been examined, details have been collected from CMFRI with respect to the exams conducted and for the reasons mentioned in the letter dated 20.4.2021 (Exhibit P12), issued by the Deputy Director (DT) II, petitioner has already been informed that the Central Vigilance Commission has already closed the case for want of merit. Such information has been furnished on W.P(C)24346/2022 16 20.4.2021. Appeal filed under RTI Act, 2005 has been disposed of by Under Secretary (Amn.) & CPIO, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New Delhi, as stated supra.
12. From the above, it could be further deduced that competent authorities, which includes Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) which is a premier/Apex agency to investigate into the alleged cases of corruption in Central Government Institutions, has already closed the case for want of merit.
13. After the closure of the complaint and even after receiving the above said information as early as on 20.4.2021, instant writ petition is filed after nearly one year and two months.
14. Though there is no specific time limit for instituting of a writ petition, being aggrieved against the orders of any authority or for enforcement of fundamental or statutory rights, courts have consistently held that such a writ petition, has to be filed within a reasonable time.
15. We deem it fit to consider few decisions on the aspect of 'reasonable time', delay and laches:
"(i) Though reasonable time is not prescribed in the rules framed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the W.P(C)24346/2022 17 words "reasonable time", as explained in Veerayee Ammal v.
Seeni Ammal (AIR 2001 SC 2920), at Paragraph 13, are extracted hereunder:
"13. The word "reasonable" has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the "reasonable time" is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean:
"A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly"; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea."
There is an inordinate delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner. What is laches is as under:
"Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. "Laches" or "Lashes" is an old french word for slackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it means neglect to do what in the law should have been done for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time. What could be the laches in one case might not constitute in another. The laches to non-suit, an aggrieved person from challenging the acquisition proceedings should be inferred from the conduct of the land owner or an W.P(C)24346/2022 18 interested person and that there should be a passive inaction for a reasonable length of time. What is reasonable time has not been explained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case."
In addition to the above, this Court deems it fit to consider few decisions, on the aspect of delay, laches and reasonable time, in approaching the Writ Court.
(i) In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or other relief.
(ii) In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India [AIR 1974 SC 130 : (1974) 3 SCC 554], the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of condoning delay of an application filed beyond the statutory period of limitation and on the aspect of delay, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"..........the Authority is competent to devise, consistently with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, its own procedure based on general principles of justice, equity and good conscience. One of such principles is that delay defeats equity. The Authority found that the applicant was guilty of gross negligence. He took no steps whatever to carry out the amendment for several months after the order permitting the amendment, and thereafter, when the case was at the final stage, he suddenly woke up, as it were, from slumber, and sought to amend his application. In the circumstances, the Authority rightly refused to put a premium on this delay and laxity on the part of the appellant."
(iii) In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 1974 SC 2271:(1975) 1 SCC 152], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 2, held as under:
"2... A person aggrieved by an order or promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year order of suspension such promotion; it is not that there is any period of limitation of the Courts to exercise their W.P(C)24346/2022 19 powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal."
(iv) In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 24, held as under:
"24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do W.P(C)24346/2022 20 not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. .........Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it."
(v) In G.C. Gupta v. N.K. Pandey [AIR 1988 SC 654 : (1988)1 SCC 316], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 16, held as under:
"16. Inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the Court to refuse appropriate relief but also a relevant consideration it be so minded not to unsettle settled things."
(vi) In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly, and, at paragraphs 12, 18 and 21, held as under:
"12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under W.P(C)24346/2022 21 Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame- worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State.
xx xxx xxxx
18. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grant of such W.P(C)24346/2022 22 relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong (1874) 5 PC 221) thus:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
xx xxx xxxx
21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his dis-entitlement of such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily."
(vii) In State of Rajasthan v. D. R. Laxmi reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court, within a reasonable time, which is always W.P(C)24346/2022 23 a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner.
(viii) In Board of Secondary Education of Assam v. Mohd. Sarifuz Zaman [(2003) 12 SCC 408], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys the remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit of discretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss of limitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is a principle based on public policy and utility and not equity alone......."
(ix) In Karnataka Power Corporation Limited v. K. Thangappan and Another [AIR 2006 SC 1581: (2006) 4 SCC 322], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 6, held as under:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party."
(x) In Chairman, U. P. Jal Nigam and Another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions, on the aspect of delay, at paragraph 13, held as under:
"13........Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted."
(xi) In Virender Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation reported in (2009) 1 SCC 297, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
W.P(C)24346/2022 24 "The court exercises its jurisdiction only upon satisfying itself that it would be equitable to do so. Delay and/or laches, indisputably, are the relevant factors.
"15. The Superior Courts, times without number, applied the equitable principles for not granting a relief and/or a limited relief in favour of the applicant in a case of this nature. While doing so, the court although not oblivious of the fact that no period of limitation is provided for filing a writ petition but emphasize is laid that it should be filed within a reasonable time. A discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches."
Some of the decisions considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Virender Chaudhary's case (cited supra), are reiterated as follows:
"16. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Anr. v. Jabar Singh and Ors. [(2007) 2 SCC 112], this Court held:
"It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly field in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches."
17. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. [(2007) 9 SCC 278], this Court held:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the W.P(C)24346/2022 25 earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347], U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [(2006) 11 SCC 464] and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd., v. K.Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 332])
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 524] and M.R.Gupta v. Union of India [(1995) 5 SCC 628])"
(xii) In S.S.Balu v. State of Kerala reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479, following the judgment in NDMC v. Pan Singh (AIR 2007 SC 1365), at paragraph 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15- 1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage."
W.P(C)24346/2022 26
(xiii) In Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India [AIR 2012 SC 2274 : (2012) 7 SCC 610], following the earlier judgment relating to delay and laches, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that belated approach in filing writ petition is impermissible and at paragraphs 26 and 27, it is held as under:
"26. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is manifest that a litigant who invokes the jurisdiction of a Court for claiming seniority, it is obligatory on his part to come to the Court at the earliest or at least within a reasonable span of time. The belated approach is impermissible as in the meantime interest of third parties gets ripened and further interference after enormous delay is likely to usher in a state of anarchy.
27. The acts done during the interregnum are to be kept in mind and should not be lightly brushed aside. It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time."
(xiv) In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation [AIR 2013 SC 565 : (2013) 1 SCC 353], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 12 and 14, held as under:
"12. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is W.P(C)24346/2022 27 involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience.
..........
14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non- deliberate delay. The Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners."
(xv) In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari reported in (2013) 12 SCC 179, following the judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, [(1975) 1 SCC 152], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in case a junior is promoted over his head, the senior must challenge it, at least within six months or at the most a year of such seniority and that anyone who sleeps over his right is bound to suffer. At Paragraph 24, it is held as under:
"24. There can be no cavil over the fact that the claim of promotion is based on the concept of equality and equitability, but the said relief has to be claimed within a reasonable time. The said principle has been stated in Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [(2009)15 SCC 321]. W.P(C)24346/2022 28 ............
27. We are absolutely conscious that in the case at hand the seniority has not been disturbed in the promotional cadre and no promotions may be unsettled.... the respondents chose to sleep like Rip Van Winkle and got up from their slumber at their own leisure, for some reason which is fathomable to them only. But such fathoming of reasons by oneself is not countenanced in law. Anyone who sleeps over his right is bound to suffer.
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court."
(xvi) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T.Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, at paragraphs 16 and 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant
- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time"
and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise W.P(C)24346/2022 29 like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent- employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."
16. Giving due consideration to the material on record, more so, the information as regards the closure of the case into the alleged irregularities/corruption against 8th respondent/ Dr.Trilochan Mohapatra, then Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), by the Central Vigilance W.P(C)24346/2022 30 Commission, New Delhi, we are not inclined to direct the respondents to resurrect the matter which has already been closed in the year 2021. We are also of the view that the writ petition is filed not within the reasonable time, there is delay and laches as discussed above in the foregoing paragraphs.
15. In the light of the above discussions and decisions considered, we are not inclined to grant the reliefs sought for in the writ petition. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
S. Manikumar, Chief Justice Sd/-
Shaji P. Chaly, Judge sou.
W.P(C)24346/2022 31 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 24346/2022 PETITIONER EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE O.M. NO. 7(2)/E.COORD/ 2013 DATED 18-09-2013 OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE O.M. NO. 7(2)/E.COORD/ 2014 DATED 29-10-2014 OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ICAR LETTER F.NO.
12(4)/2007-CDN(A&A) DATED 20-09-2013
ISSUED BY THE ICAR
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ICAR ORDER F.NO.
(ADMN)1-2/2016 CR(A) & RTI DATED 24-11-
2016 OF DEPUTY SECRETARY (ADMN), ICAR,
NEW DELHI.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE INSPECTION REPORT DATED
22-03-2017 OF THE LOCAL AUDIT OF
ACCOUNTS & REGISTERS OF CMFRI, KOCHI,
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
23-05-2017 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE 6TH RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE ICAR LETTER DATED 08-
05-2017 SUPPLIED TO THE PETITIONER UNDER RTI ACT, BY THE CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER (CPIO), ICAR, NEW DELHI EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE ICAR RTI LETTER 07-07- 2021 TO THE PETITIONER BY THE CPIO & UNDER SECRETARY (VIGILANCE II), ICAR, NEW DELHI EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE LAWYER NOTICE FOR THE 5TH RESPONDENT DATED 13-10-2020 W.P(C)24346/2022 32 EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE O.M. DATED 28-09-2020 ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR, CVC, TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF THE CVC'S LETTER DATED 11- 12-2020 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE CPIO, CVC, UNDER RTI ACT EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE 7TH RESPONDENT'S LETTER DATED 20-04-2021 EXHIBIT P13 TRUE COPY OF THE ICAR RTI LETTER DATED 27-08-2021.
EXHIBIT P14 TRUE COPY OF THE ICAR RTI COMMUNICATION DATED 30-09-2021.