Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Nara Chandrababu Naidu vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 10 January, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 7894 OF 2023
O R D E R:
1. This petitioner/A.1 has filed the present Criminal Petition invoking the provisions of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) seeking pre-arrest bail in the event of his arrest in connection with Crime No.16 of 2022, registered at the C.I.D., Police Station, Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati, Mangalagiri.
2. The Petitioner, along with others, stands accused in a case involving the offences punishable under Sections 120(B), 420, 34, 35, 36, 37, 166, 167 and 217 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (referred to as 'I.P.C.') and Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (referred to as 'P.C. Act').
3. The case against the Petitioner (A.1) and others is based on a report lodged by Alla Rama Krishna Reddy, Member of Legislative Assembly, Mangalagiri, dated 27.04.2022, and a subsequent preliminary enquiry report dated 06.05.2022, alleging corrupt and illegal activities between 2014 and 2019 by the Petitioner, the former Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh, and certain other government officials concerning the design of the master plan for the capital city area and the alignment of Inner Ring Road and its connected arterial roads. The alleged purpose is to cause wrongful gain to specific individuals and entities connected to decision-making authorities, leading to corresponding wrongful loss to the general public and T.M.R., J 2 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 the state exchequer. Specific allegations include awarding the initial work for the master plan's preparation to M/s. Surbana International Consultants Private Limited (later changed to M/s. Surbana Jurong Consultancy Private Limited) on a nomination basis, contrary to the prescribed procedures and guidelines of the Central Vigilance Commission. Additionally, there are claims of prescribing a mandate to the bidder to align the master plan with the draft perspective plan, ensuring an increase in the value of lands belonging to Mr Lingamaneni Ramesh and M/s. Heritage Foods. These actions are alleged to be part of a quid pro quo arrangement, including the provision of illegal gratification, such as having the house of Mr Lingamaneni Ramesh on Karakatta Road, Undavalli, at the disposal of the Petitioner.
4. The case of the petitioner/A.1, in brief, is that:
i. The Petitioner, having served as the Chief Minister for the unified State of Andhra Pradesh for over nine years, subsequently became the 1st Chief Minister for the Truncated State of Andhra Pradesh and presently holds the position of Leader of the Opposition in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The crime in question was registered on 09.05.2022, and for the past 16 months, the Petitioner has neither received any notice to appear before the Investigating Agency nor been subject to investigation. In this case, the co-accused sought anticipatory bail, granted by this Court's Order on 06.09.2022 in Crl.P.No(s) 3811 of 2022 and batch.
ii. The primary allegation against the Petitioner is that, based on discussions and inputs, three alignment options for the Inner Ring Road (IRR) were considered, and the Petitioner, as the then Chief Minister, directed the final alignment to derive maximum pecuniary benefit for their close associates. This allegedly led to a manifold escalation in the value of their lands, causing wrongful loss to ordinary individuals whose lands either came under IRR notification or faced developmental restrictions in the vicinity. The Prosecution does T.M.R., J 3 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 not assert that the accused's actions defrauded specific individuals, including the Complainant. The F.I.R. contents lack the elements necessary to invoke the mentioned sections.
iii. The Petitioner contends that the present case was registered against them for exposing the Government's anti-people policies and the current Chief Minister's alleged exploitation of the State's resources. It is asserted that the registration is part of a vindictive agenda to implicate political opponents in criminal cases, aiming to harass and incarcerate them, tarnish their image, reputation, and prestige, and deprive them of personal liberty. The Petitioner characterises it as nothing more than an act of regime revenge.
5. The Respondent-State has submitted a counter, refuting all the allegations presented in the petition. The contentions outlined in the Counter need not be reiterated, as they essentially mirror the report's content dated 27.04.2022. Additionally, the Counter asserts that:
i. The former Chief Minister, along with the former Minister for Municipal Administration and Urban Development and others responsible for selecting agencies for the design of the Master Plan of Amaravati Capital City, Inner Ring Road (IRR) alignment, and the Seed Capital, is accused of conspiring to favour Narayana Group Institutions, Lingamaneni Group of Companies, M/s. Rama Krishna Housing Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Heritage Foods, etc. They allegedly abused their official position by entrusting the work to companies following their directives, resulting in manipulations in the IRR alignment at the expense of the public exchequer.
ii. The Petitioner is accused of residing in a house owned by the Lingamanenis near Undavalli without paying rent, and M/s. Heritage Foods Pvt. Ltd., owned by the Petitioner's family, purchased land adjacent to the Lingamanenis' before the Capital City was notified. This is alleged to be an explicit quid pro quo arrangement related to the IRR design, causing wrongful loss to farmers whose land was affected by the manipulated IRR alignment. Irregularities in work allotment to the Master Planner on a nomination basis were flagged by the office of the Accountant General (Audit), A.P., Vijayawada.
T.M.R., J 4 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 iii. The Petitioner is alleged to have intentionally framed the Inner Ring Road (IRR) alignment in proximity to the lands of close associates, resulting in an abnormal escalation of land values and subsequent pecuniary benefits for other accused individuals. The Petitioner (A.1) and A.2 purportedly orchestrated the IRR alignment adjacent to the lands of their close associates, with approximately Rs.4.46 Crores paid to the consultant from public funds. Sri Ponguru Narayana (A.2), then the Minister of Municipal Administration and Urban Development (M.A. & U.D. Department), played a pivotal role in determining the location of the start-up area. Leveraging his position as the Vice- Chairman of the APCRDA, he allegedly utilised privileged information about the start-up area's location to purchase 58.00 cents of agricultural lands during June, July, and August 2015, at Rs.3,69,45,500/-. These lands, owned by A.2, were collectively offered to the APCRDA for land pooling.
iv. During the investigation, it came to light that Smt. Nara Bhuvaneswari, the wife of A.1, transferred Rs.27,00,000/- on 10.06.2019 through RTGS to the account (Ac. No.106701000013999) of Sri Lingamaneni Ramesh (A.3), who is the owner of the Karakatta House. The bank account does not specify the specific purpose of this transfer. In response to a letter from the Investigating Officer, the Auditor of A.3, Sri C.T. Chowdary, submitted a page from the Ledger Account Book, claiming that the transferred amount was designated as "Rent Deposit for River Site." These circumstances suggest that the entry in the Ledger Account was created as an afterthought, aiming to conceal the offence and mislead the investigation process.
v. It is a settled proposition of law that the courts consider the prima facie case against the accused, the gravity of the alleged offence and the need for custodial interrogation while granting anticipatory bail. Examining relevant material and connected records reveals a prima facie violation of statutory regulations in entrusting the State's property to intended beneficiaries. The Petitioner and co-accused, in abetment and conspiracy with private individuals, are implicated under section 409 IPC for the alleged breach of trust.
6. Heard Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, representing the petitioner/A.1, and Sri S. Sriram, learned Advocate General, representing the T.M.R., J 5 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 Respondent-State. Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition and Counter. Consequently, the contentions raised by learned counsel need not be reproduced.
7. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre V. State of Maharashtra1, the Hon‟ble Apex Court laid down certain factors and parameters that must be considered while dealing with anticipatory bail. It further held as follows:
(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;
(ii) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognisable offence;
(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;
(iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences;
(v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;
(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people;
(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, I860, the Court should consider with even greater care and caution because over-implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern;
(viii) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;
(ix) The Court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the Complainant;
(x) Frivolity in Prosecution should always be considered. It is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the Prosecution, in the normal course of events, the 1 (2011) 1 SCC 694 T.M.R., J 6 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 accused is entitled to an order of bail. Reference may be made to another part of this judgment.
8. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision reported in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. V. State of Punjab2, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"18. According to the sixth proposition framed by the High Court, the discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised in regard to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the Court, at the stage of granting anticipatory bail, is satisfied that such a charge appears to be false or groundless. Now, Section 438 confers on the High Court and the Court of Session the power to grant anticipatory bail if the applicant has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed "a non-bailable offence". We see no warrant for reading into this provision the conditions subject to which bail can be granted under Section 437(1) of the Code. That section, while conferring the power to grant bail in cases of non-bailable offences, provides by way of an exception that a person accused or suspected of the commission of a non-bailable offence "shall not be so released" if there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If it were intended that the exception contained in Section 437(1) should govern the grant of relief under Section 438(1), nothing would have been easier for the legislature than to introduce a similar provision into the latter section. We have already pointed out the basic distinction between these two sections.
26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail...."2
(1980) 2 SCC 565 T.M.R., J 7 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
9. In Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI3, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"Economic offences (Category D)
90. What is left for us now to discuss are the economic offences. The question for consideration is whether it should be treated as a class of its own or otherwise. This issue has already been dealt with by this Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2020) 13 SCC 791 : (2020) 4 S.C.C. (Cri) 646], after taking note of the earlier decisions governing the field. The gravity of the offence, the object of the Special Act, and the attending circumstances are a few of the factors to be taken note of, along with the period of sentence. After all, an economic offence cannot be classified as such, as it may involve various activities and may differ from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of the Court to categorise all the offences into one group and deny bail on that basis. Suffice it to state that law, as laid down in the following judgments, will govern the field:
Precedents
91.P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791 : (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 646] : (SCC pp. 804-805, para 23) "23. Thus, from cumulative perusal of the judgments cited on either side including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565: 1980 S.C.C. (Cri) 465] of this Court, it could be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of "grave offence" and in such circumstance, while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused.
One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the 3 (2022) 10 S.C.C. 51 T.M.R., J 8 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 triple test or the tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard, what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provide so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately, the consideration will have to be on a case-to-case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand trial."
10. In Mahipal V. Rajesh4, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that it is necessary for the Court while considering a bail application, to assess whether, based on the evidentiary record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed the crime. It is settled law that when granting bail, a detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the case's merits has not to be undertaken. That did not mean that whilst granting bail, some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.
11. A Court doesn't need to give elaborate reasons while granting bail, particularly when the case is at the initial stage, and the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystallised as such.
12. It is settled law that while considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to a free, fair and complete investigation, and 4 (2020) 2 SCC 118 T.M.R., J 9 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused. It is the duty of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in the proper way to protect the personal liberty of the citizen. According to law, everyone charged with a penal offence has a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The presumption of innocence is a human right. There cannot be a presumption of guilt to deprive a person of his liberty without an opportunity before the Court. The Court must thoroughly scrutinize the entire available record, particularly the allegations directly attributed to the accused, and assess whether these allegations are corroborated by other material and circumstances on record.
13. In light of the above settled legal principles, the rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides will be appreciated to decide the entitlement of the Petitioner to get the relief of anticipatory bail.
14. To facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the rival contentions, it is essential to briefly highlight certain admitted or uncontested facts as follows:
(a) The Respondent/State contends that Surbana Jurong International Pvt. Ltd. ("Surbana") was "nominated" as the Master Planner by the APCRDA without following competitive bidding or auction.
(b) The A.P. Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA) was enacted and formulated by the State Government through the APCRDA Act, which came into force on 30.12.2014, as per G.O.Ms.No.254 MA & U.D. (M2) Department. Section 4(2) of the APCRDA Act designates the Chief Minister of the State as the T.M.R., J 10 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 Chairman of APCRDA, with the Minister in charge of the Department of Municipal Administration and Urban Affairs serving as the Vice-Chairman.
(c) Initially, the Capital area was notified as covering 122 square kilometres, as per G.O.Ms.No.254 MA & U.D. (M2) Department, dated 30.12.2014. Subsequently, the area for the Capital City was modified to 217 square kilometres through G.O.Ms.No.141 MA & U.D. (M2) Department, dated 09.06.2015. Further, a perspective plan for the Capital Region, covering an area of 7420 sq. km, was prepared, along with a detailed Master Plan for the Capital city, spanning 391 sq. km.
(d) In the First Authority Meeting of APCRDA held on August 28 2015, a Resolution (Annexure-I) was passed, entrusting the work to M/s.
Surbana Jurong International Pvt. Ltd. on a nomination basis. This work included the preparation of a detailed Master Plan covering 217 sq. km, incorporating the Layout infrastructure plan and cadastral framework for the land pooling scheme of Amaravati city, with a cost of Rs.11.92 Crores. Subsequently, APCRDA decided to enter into a revised M.O.U. with M/s Surbana Jurong International Pvt. Ltd. under a new caption of "Revision of Capital City Master Plan and Preparation of Land Pooling Schemes for Amaravati Capital City" for a payment of Rs.16,64,62,800/-.
(e) The work of 'Revision of Capital City Master Plan and Preparation of Land Pooling Schemes for Amaravati Capital City' was further ratified, and the contract was awarded to M/s Surbana Jurong International Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Singapore, for an amount of Rs.14,79,66,934/-. This decision was made during the 2nd Authority Meeting of the APCRDA held on 26.04.2016.
T.M.R., J 11 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
15. The Respondent/State contends that awarding the contract and entrusting high-value work on a nomination basis to the Singapore consultancy, along with the subsequent extension of the work, goes against the guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) through Circular No.005/C.R.D./19 dated 05.07.2007 (Annexure-6).
16. As per the Respondent/State's acknowledgement, two bidders, namely Stantec Consulting Pvt. Ltd. and Aarvee Associates Pvt. Ltd., participated in the tender process but were disqualified based on the eligibility criteria.
17. The additional Counter filed on behalf of the Respondent-State shows that Surbana was appointed as the Master Planner by showing the following reasons:
(a) There will be saving time in view of the 2018 deadline for delivering the land back to the land owners.
(b) The same planner who did the concept will take the single thought process to a detailed level without distortion.
18. The meeting where the decision to appoint Surbana was made had approximately 30 participants, including the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Ministers, I.A.S. officers, and Industrialists. No objections were raised to Surbana's appointment, as indicated by the document. The statement of LW.33, who served as Commissioner of APCRDA, was presented by the learned Advocate General. According to LW.33, the proposal to go for fresh tenders was rejected by the Authority. The decision to nominate Surbana T.M.R., J 12 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 was justified based on the shortage of time to notify the Land Pooling Scheme, the need for continuity, and Surbana's proven competency in preparing the Draft Master Plan. The option of going for tenders was rejected in favour of continuing with Surbana. The Authority resolved to hire Surbana on nomination for Rs.11.92 crore, considering the tight timelines stipulated under L.P.S. Rules 2015 and in the best interest of the Capital City Project.
19. In Natural Resources Allocation, in Re, Special Reference No.1 of 2012 5, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"119. The norm of "common good" has to be understood and appreciated in a holistic manner. It is obvious that the manner in which the common good is best subserved is not a matter that can be measured by any constitutional yardstick--it would depend on the economic and political philosophy of the Government. Revenue maximisation is not the only way in which the common good can be subserved. Where revenue maximisation is the object of a policy, being considered qua that resource at that point of time to be the best way to subserve the common good, auction would be one of the preferable methods, though not the only method. Where revenue maximisation is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental considerations.
120. Therefore, in conclusion, the submission that the mandate of Article 14 is that any disposal of a natural resource for commercial use must be for revenue maximisation, and thus by auction, is based neither on law nor on logic. There is no constitutional imperative in the matter of economic policies--Article 14 does not predefine any economic policy as a constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of Article 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve the public good and uses the broad term "distribution", suggesting that the methodology of distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/allocation of natural resources to the highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to subserve the common good and, at times, may run counter to the public good. Hence, it needs little emphasis that the disposal of all natural resources through auctions is clearly not a constitutional mandate.5
(2012) 10 S.C.C. 1 T.M.R., J 13 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
112. Equality, therefore, cannot be limited to mean only auction without testing it in every scenario. In State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952) 1 S.C.C. 1: A.I.R. 1952 SC 75: 1952 Cri LJ 510: 1952 SCR 284 at p.
297], this Court, quoting from Kotch v. River Port Pilot Commissioners [91 L Ed 1093: 330 US 552 (1947)], had held that: (Anwar Ali Sarkar case [(1952) 1 S.C.C. 1: A.I.R. 1952 SC 75: 1952 Cri LJ 510: 1952 SCR 284 at p. 297], A.I.R. p. 80, para 10) "10. ... „The constitutional command for a State to afford equal protection of the laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. This Court has never attempted that impossible task.‟"
One cannot test the validity of a law with reference to the essential elements of ideal democracy, actually incorporated in the Constitution. (See Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1975 Supp S.C.C. 1] .) The courts are not at liberty to declare a statute void because, in their opinion, it is opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. The courts cannot declare a limitation or constitutional requirement under the notion of having discovered some ideal norm. Further, a constitutional principle must not be limited to a precise formula but ought to be an abstract principle applied to precise situations. The repercussion of holding an auction as a constitutional mandate would be the voiding of every action that deviates from it, including social endeavours, welfare schemes and promotional policies, even though CPIL itself has argued against the same and asked for making auctions mandatory only in the alienation of scarce natural resources meant for private and commercial business ventures. It would be odd to derive auction as a constitutional principle only for a limited set of situations from the wide and generic declaration of Article 14. The strength of constitutional adjudication lies in case-to- case adjudication, and therefore, an auction cannot be elevated to a constitutional mandate."
20. Additionally, during the investigation, L.W.33, the former Commissioner of APCRDA, justified the appointment of Surbana on a nomination basis by citing Section 22(1)(c)(iv) of the APCRDA Act, 2014, empowering the CRDA Authority to engage external consultants, advisors, and experts as deemed necessary, with rates and works to be determined by the Authority. In the exercise of its powers under the CRDA Act, 2014, T.M.R., J 14 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 the Authority, in its first meeting, resolved to entrust the work to Surbana on a nomination basis.
21. The material on record provides reasons for nominating Surbana without inviting fresh tenders. No material has been presented to indicate that the Petitioner gained any financial benefit from Surbana's appointment or STUP consultants.
22. According to the submissions of the learned Advocate General, APCRDA issued a tender notification for appointing a consultant through competitive bidding to prepare a pre-feasibility, feasibility, and detailed project report (D.P.R.) for IRR. M/s. STUP Consultants Pvt. Ltd., Chennai, was selected for the work. Notably, a specific condition was imposed on the successful consultant in the R.F.P., stating that "as far as possible, the IRR alignment should follow the proposed alignment as per the Draft Master Plan of the Capital city".
23. The learned Advocate General further contends that M/s. STUP Consultants recommended the alignment of Option 1 from three options, and APCRDA officials, on 14.12.2016, gave a detailed PowerPoint presentation to the Petitioner, explaining the merits and demerits of the three IRR alignment options. The PowerPoint presentation's comparison matrix specified that Option 2 of IRR alignment was unsuitable, not fulfilling the I.R.'s objective, and having a significantly higher total cost than Options 1 and 3.
T.M.R., J 15 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
24. The learned Advocate General placed the statement of L.W.6, who stated that, as per instructions from the then Minister of Municipal Administration and Urban Development and Vice-Chairman, APCRDA, and the Commissioner, APCRDA, the options for the Inner Ring Road were worked out, and the A.2 misused the official position.
25. The learned Advocate General contends that the Petitioner arbitrarily directed the final alignment to be Option 2, despite its failure to fulfill the IRR objective and the associated extra cost implications. It is further argued that the Petitioner directed APCRDA officials to present IRR alignment options before the Heads of Departments and the Cabinet on 15.12.2016. The presentation underwent multiple changes based on APCRDA officials' suggestions to cater to the Petitioner's needs, resulting in the deletion of the statement indicating that the IRR objective was not fulfilled and, subsequently, acquiring the status of being fulfilled.
26. Learned Advocate General placed LW.36's statement to contend that Option 2 IRR was finalized at the instance of A.1. But the statement indicates that during the Chief Minister's Review meeting on project Amaravati on 14.12.2016, a detailed presentation was made, highlighting various alignment options for IRR and their advantages and disadvantages. The comparison matrix mentioned that the land acquisition and road development costs were high for Option 2, and the IRR objective was not fulfilled, as it extended outside Vijayawada City. The Minister for MAUD T.M.R., J 16 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 intervened, suggesting Option 2 based on lower land acquisition costs and ease of implementation.
27. The statement of LW.36 clarifies that it was the Minister for MAUD, not the Petitioner, who intervened and informed that the land acquisition cost of Option-1 is high and that it is difficult to acquire the land abutting the existing 100 feet road in Section 2 of Option-1 and suggested Option-2. The Respondent-State has not provided material to show that the Minister for MAUD's suggestion was incorrect during the investigation.
28. Another contention raised by the Respondent-State is that a Cabinet Sub-Committee was formed to frame proposals for a Land Pooling Scheme. A.1 and A.2 decided to execute an MoU to engage foreign private sector entities as Master Planner to prepare Master Plans for the Capital City, Capital Region, and Seed Capital and to engage a Master Developer for Seed Capital development. The Ministry of External Affairs, in response to a letter seeking remarks, stated on 05.12.2014 that it had no objection from a political angle but requested views from the Ministry of Urban Development.
29. The learned Advocate General contends that although the Government of Andhra Pradesh claimed to have sent a letter on 06.12.2014 to the Ministry of Urban Development for concurrence, the latter, in a letter dated 17.08.2022, categorically stated that they never received such a letter. Additionally, in response to a clarification, the Ministry of External Affairs stated that the MoU is between two government agencies and may not be considered an MoU between two governments.
T.M.R., J 17 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
30. The Respondent-State has not asserted that any proceedings were initiated against the individuals responsible for the alleged lapse based on the correspondence with the Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of External Affairs. Moreover, there is no claim by the Respondent-State that the Petitioner/A.1 is culpable for the mentioned lapse, and the investigation has uncovered A.1's role in this matter.
31. Another contention is that the appointment of Sri Charukuri Sridhar, I.A.S., as Commissioner of APCRDA violates legal provisions, circumventing basic eligibility criteria. Section 21(1) of the CRDA Act stipulates that the Government shall appoint a Commissioner for CRDA as the Chief Executive, requiring the appointee to have experience working as a District Collector in the State. However, Sridhar had only served as Joint Collector, making him ineligible for the role of Commissioner at APCRDA. This argument was previously presented in Criminal Petition No.3811 of 2022, a bail application for A.2, and this Court addressed the contentions as follows:
The State seeks to prosecute the petitioners, mainly on the ground of alleged violation of procedure in appointing Commissioner/C.A.O., APCRDA; another important aspect which needs examination is whether a mere violation of circular of Central Vigilance Commission in appointing consultant M/s. Surbona Jurong International Private Limited would constitute any offence without any requisite mens rea or guilty intention on the part of the concerned, which is the basic principle of our criminal jurisprudence. At this stage, there is no reliable material on record to hold that the said acts violate the Rules, which would not constitute any offences.
32. The allegations mentioned above have been made against A.1 and A.2. However, the allegation against the A.1 is that the value of the land T.M.R., J 18 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 purchased by the Lingamaneni Group increased due to the Master Plan and the proposed IRR. Even according to the respondent/State, before June 2, 2014, i.e. the date the A.P. Organization Act came into force, the Lingamaneni owned about Ac.355.34 cents in Kanteru, Kaza and Namburu Village. Between June 2, 2014, and December 31 2014, the formation of the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh and the declaration of Capital City of Andhra Pradesh, Lingamaneni completed a registration on the lands on which they held the General Power of Attorney from the earlier period of another Acs.10.53 cents on 21.07.2014. As seen from the Orders passed by this Court in Crl.P.Nos.3834 of 2022 and 3835 of 2022, anticipatory bail was granted to Lingamaneni Ramesh and Lingamaneni Venkata Surya Rajasekhar. As seen from the Order, it is the contention of A.3 and A.4 they acquired the entire lands from the year 1986 up to 2014, which was much before the bifurcation of the State, and A.3 suffered the loss of Acs.14.00, as it is proposed for acquisition for the proposed alignment of Inner Ring Road. Moreover, all of his lands are situated four to ten kilometres away from the Inner Ring Road alignment, and thereby, the Complainant's contention that A.3 got wrongful gain is incorrect.
33. So far as the allegation against the Petitioner (A.1) is concerned, the Respondent contends that he resided in A.3's house without paying rent, and the benefits accorded to the Lingamaneni Group through the Master Plan were a quid pro quo. The Petitioner's affidavit asserts that he never concealed his residence in A.3's house, and the fact was publicly known. The T.M.R., J 19 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 counter-affidavit also discloses that the Petitioner's wife made a payment of Rs.27,00,000/- to A.3 through RTGS. The learned Advocate General argues that despite receiving a House Rent Allowance (H.R.A.) from the Government for the guest house, the Petitioner did not pay any corresponding amount to A.3. The I.T. returns of both A.3 and the Petitioner's wife reportedly did not declare the receipt or payment of this money. The Respondent contends that A.1 stayed in the guest house of A.3 without officially notifying it as the Chief Minister's official residence. It is not the case of A.3 that the petitioner/A.1 has not paid the rent. The Respondent placed material before the Court to show that an amount of Rs.27,00,000/- was transferred to A.3 from the account of the Petitioner's wife. Learned Advocate General contends that the I.T. returns of A.3 as well as the wife of the petitioner/A.1 shows that neither of them ever declared the receipt of the amount nor the payment of the same. Also, the Auditor of A.3-Sri C.T.Chowdary, in reply to a letter addressed by the Investigating Officer, has produced a copy of a page from a Ledger Account Book to indicate that the said amount was transferred from the wife of A.1 to A.3 towards the 'Rent Deposit for River Site'.
34. The Respondent argues that the inconsistency between the accused's statements and contemporaneous documentary evidence reveals a clear quid pro quo. While the ledger account copybook and the statement from the chartered accountant indicate the transfer of the amount from A.1's wife to A.3 for the river site's rent deposit, no material suggests it was not T.M.R., J 20 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 intended for the guest house where A.1 resides. Mere non-showing of rent amounts in the Income Tax returns of A.3, it cannot be said that the rent amount was not paid by A.1's wife, particularly when it is not the case of A.3 that rent was not paid. It is the lookout of the Income Tax department if A.3 fails to show the rent amount in the Income Tax returns.
35. It is the Respondent/State's contention that the Lingamanenis initially sold land Ac.4.553 cents in Kantheru village to M/s. Heritage Foods Ltd. The details are as follows:
(1) 1.35 Acres in Survey No.63/2B vide Doc.No.8026/2014, dt:08.9.2014 at SRO, Pedakakani, at a cost of Rs.10,80,000/-. (2) 2.22 Acres in Survey No.56 vide Doc. No.8027/2014, dt:08.09.2014 at SRO, Pedakakani, at a cost of rs.17,76,000/-. (3) 0.983 Acre in Survey No.63/1 vide Doc.No.8028/2014, dt:08.09.2014 at SRO, Pedakakani, at a cost of Rs.7,84,000/-.
Perhaps, realizing that the conspiracy would be revealed too evidently, M/s. Heritage Foods Ltd., cancelled the above registration on 07.10.2014 via registered document numbers 8321/2014, 8622/2014 and 8623/2014 of S.R.O., Pedakakani. However, M/s. Heritage Foods retained another acre of 8.06 cents purchased in the adjacent Survey numbers in the same village of Kantheru, Tadikonda Mandal, Guntur District. The landmark of the Lingamanenis and that of M/s.Heritage Foods was contiguous, and both derived similar benefits from the Master Plan and the alignment of the Inner Ring Road.
T.M.R., J 21 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
36. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision reported in Chekka Guru Murali Mohan and another vs State of Andhra Pradesh and another6, wherein this Court observed that:
"64. In this context, it is very much relevant to note that the facts of the case show that, as per the recitals in the sale deeds, the sellers have voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the petitioners to meet their family and legal necessities and the petitioners have accepted the said offer and purchased the lands by paying valid sale consideration under registered sale deeds. Therefore, it is a lawful sale transaction, and it cannot be said that the petitioners had wrongful gain by unlawful means of property to which they are not legally entitled. Similarly, as the sellers have sold the lands under registered sale deeds after receiving valid sale consideration to a tune of lakhs of rupees, no wrongful loss is also caused to them by unlawful means by the petitioners. The landed property was acquired lawfully, i.e. by lawful means by the petitioners. So, it cannot be said under any stretch of reasoning that the petitioners have wrongfully acquired the property. Therefore, absolutely no act of dishonesty is involved in the transaction.
xxx
92. Thus, in the light of the above legal position, viewed from any angle, even if the petitioners really got any information regarding the location of the capital in the said area where the lands are purchased, the mere non-disclosure of the said information to the sellers at the time of purchasing the said lands cannot be construed as a dishonest concealment of fact for the purpose of fastening criminal liability to the petitioners for the offence under Section 420IPC.
Information relating to the location of capital is very much in the public domain.
99. X It is noticed supra that the appointed day for the formation of the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh under the A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014, is 2-6-2014. The new Government for the said State was formed after the General Assembly Elections on 9-6-2014. The Chief Minister was sworn in on 9-6-2014."
37. Aggrieved by the said orders passed, the State of Andhra Pradesh preferred the Special Leave Petition, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court in The 6 (2021) S.C.C. OnLine A.P. 41 T.M.R., J 22 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Chekka Guru Murali Mohan & others 7, held that:
"16. Xxx The present one has not been a case of the High Court embarking upon an inquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. What the High Court has examined is as to whether the stated facts of the complaint make out any case of deception or not and thereafter has concluded that no case of constituting offences under Sections 420, 406, 409 and 120B of I.P.C. is made out. The cases relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner-State and also the learned senior counsel for the Complainant, otherwise proceeding on their own facts, do not make out a case for interference in the Order passed by the High Court."
38. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that, according to the Prosecution's material in the counter-affidavit, Heritage had an annual total income of Rs. 2292.33 Crores in 2014-15. It purchased Acs.75.23 lands in 14 locations across five states during the same period; the Petitioner was not a board member of Heritage and did not participate in the meetings. Public companies typically make such business decisions with full disclosures and prior public knowledge; the decisions related to the Inner Ring Road (IRR) led to issuing a Gazette Notification on 31.10.2018, confirming the Draft IRR plan, as stated in the counter-affidavit. The Petitioner further argues that it is absurd to allege that he benefited from a scheme finalized in 2018 by purchasing around Ac. 10.00 of land in the name of a public company in 2014. Approximately 41 villages and a total of Acs.3521.00 of land fell within the IRR plan. At this stage, it is difficult to conclude that the Petitioner favoured the public company merely based on 7 2021 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1316 T.M.R., J 23 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 its land purchase in 2014, especially when the IRR master plan covers a substantial land area of Acs.3521.00, in the absence of supporting evidence.
39. The learned Advocate General for the Respondent/State contends that the petitioner/A.1 contravened Rule 4 of the First Schedule of the APCRDA Act, which reads as follows:
"4. Member's interest to be made known: -
(1) A member who is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a transaction or project of the Authority shall disclose the nature of his interest at the first meeting of the Authority at which he is present after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge.
(2) A disclosure under sub-section (1) shall be recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Authority and, after the disclosure, that member -
(a) shall not take part in any deliberation or decision of the Authority with respect to that transaction or project; and
(b) shall be disregarded to constitute a quorum of the Authority for such deliberation or decision."
40. It is crucial to note that Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 4 of the Act explicitly states that no act or proceedings of the Authority shall be questioned on the ground that a member has contravened this section. The Respondent/State, by overlooking Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 4 of the Act, is required to clarify how it intends to challenge such contravention, if any. The complaint does not provide information on whether there is any penal provision for the alleged contravention, and such details are crucial for this case.
41. At this stage, for better appreciation, it is pertinent to refer to Section 146 of the APCRDA Act, 2014, which reads as follows:
T.M.R., J 24 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 "S.146. Bar of Legal Proceeding: No suit, Prosecution or proceeding shall lie against the Government authority, officer or person for any act done or purporting to be done under or in pursuance of the Act or the rules or standing orders made thereunder."
42. While dealing with the bail applications of A.2 to A.5, this Court observed that the facts of the case clearly show that alleged acts complained against the petitioners (A.2 to A.5) pertain to the acts done in pursuance of the APCRDA Act, 2014. Therefore, the bar under Section 146 of the APCRDA Act clearly applies to the present facts of the case. Aggrieved by the orders passed by this Court in granting anticipatory bail in Crl.P.Nos.3811, 3833, 3834 and 3835 of 2022, the State preferred the Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.9926-9929 of 2022 before the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court vide Order, dated 07.11.2022, observed thus:
"We have perused the Order passed by the High Court in allowing the application(s). We are of the view that the discretion exercised cannot be said to have been exercised in a perverse manner.
However, we clarify that the observations made in the impugned Order would not affect the investigation, and the Investigating Agency would be free to investigate, uninfluenced by the observations made in the Order of the High Court."
43. The learned Advocate General contends that as immunity is granted only in respect to offences purported to have been committed under the APCRDA Act, by no stretch of the imagination, the same would be granted in respect to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate General relied on the decision reported in T.M.R., J 25 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 M. Natarajan vs State by Inspector of Police, S.P.E., C.B.I., A.C.B., Chennai.8, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"33. ... an immunity is granted only in respect of offences purported to have been committed under direct tax enactment or indirect tax enactment, but by no stretch of imagination, the same would be granted in respect of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. A person may commit several offences under different Acts; immunity granted in relation to one Act would not mean that immunity granted would automatically extend to others. By way of example, we may notice that a person may be prosecuted for commission of an offence in relation to property under the Penal Code as also under another Act, say for example, the Prevention of Corruption Act. Whereas charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act may fail, no sanction having been accorded therefore, the charges under the Penal Code would not."
44. Learned Advocate General relied on the decision reported in Ravi Khandelwal vs Taluka Stores9, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"17. Whether the expression used is "shall lie" or "be entertained"
would really make no difference. The objective is to create an impediment in the institution and trial of the suit for a period specified under the said Act. We are in agreement with the view adopted in B. Banerjee case [B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, (1975) 1 SCC 166] that the spirit of protection is fulfilled with the passage of the prescribed time period, and the filing of a fresh suit would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of litigation. No doubt B. Banerjee case [B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, (1975) 1 SCC 166] dealt with the constitutional validity of a retrospective amendment and whether the bar could be applied to pending litigation, but that itself would not dilute its ratio.
18. We are thus of the view that the objective of Section 14(3) of the said Act, being the safeguarding of the tenant for five years, was subserved by the proceedings going on for the requisite period of time and beyond within which the tenant could not have been evicted. As noticed, in fact, the proceedings have gone on for 38 years, which itself is extraordinary."
8 (2008) 8 SCC 413 9 (2023) 7 SCC 720 T.M.R., J 26 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
45. Learned Advocate General relied on the decision reported in Durga Hotel Complex vs Reserve Bank of India and others10, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"13. Clause 16(3) of the Scheme says, "No complaint to the Banking Ombudsman shall lie." According to Black's Law Dictionary ", lie" means "to have a foundation in the law; to be legally supportable, sustainable, or proper". In the context of the power conferred on the Ombudsman by the Scheme read in the light of Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, it would be appropriate to understand the expression as having a foundation in law in the sense that the claim must have a foundation in law. A Banking Ombudsman, though, might initially have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint on the basis that it has a legal foundation; here, in terms of the Scheme, he may be divested of that jurisdiction, or the foundation in law might be lost on either of the parties approaching the Court, the arbitrator or the Debts Recovery Tribunal in respect of the same subject- matter. Dealing with the expression "entertain", this Court held in Lakshmiratan Engg. Works Ltd. v. C.S.T. [A.I.R. 1968 SC 488 : (1968) 1 SCR 505] that it means to deal with or admit to consideration. The Court approved the views expressed by some of the High Courts that the word "entertain" meant not "receive" or "accept" but "proceed to consider on merits" or adjudicate upon. The Court also accepted the dictionary meaning of the word as "admit to consider".
46. In General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles vs Central Bureau of Investigation and another11, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"24. Section 7 of the 1990 Act provides for umbrella protection to the army personnel in respect of anything done or purported to be done in the exercise of powers conferred by the Act. The whole issue is regarding the interpretation of Section 7 [Ed. : Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 2006 relates to Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. Section 6 of the 1958 Act is identical to Section 7 of the 1990 Act except for the words "good faith" in the margin heading to Section 7:
"Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 19586. Protection to persons acting under the Act.--No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Act. Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 10 (2007) 5 SCC 120 11 (2012) 6 SCC 228 T.M.R., J 27 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 19907.Protection of persons acting in good faith under this Act.--No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Act."] of the 1990 Act, as to whether the term "institution" used therein means filing/presenting/submitting the chargesheet in the Court or taking cognisance and whether the Court can proceed with the trial without previous sanction of the Central Government.
26. According to the appellants, the institution of Prosecution is a stage prior to taking cognisance and, therefore, the word "institution" is different from the words "taking cognisance".
28. "Prosecution" means a criminal action before a court of law for the purpose of determining "guilt" or "innocence" of a person charged with a crime. "Civil suit" refers to a civil action instituted before a court of law for the realisation of a right vested in a party by law.
32. "Legal proceedings" means proceedings regulated or prescribed by law in which a judicial decision may be given; it means proceedings in a court of justice by which a party pursues a remedy which a law provides but does not include administrative and departmental proceedings. (See also S.V. Kandeakar v. V.M. Deshpande [(1972) 1 SCC 438: A.I.R. 1972 SC 878], Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal [(1982) 1 SCC 525: A.I.R. 1982 SC 818] and Binod Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Chandra [(1987) 3 S.C.C. 99: 1987 S.C.C. (L&S) 161: A.I.R. 1987 SC 1739] .)
41. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that the expression "institution" has to be understood in the context of the Scheme of the Act applicable in a particular case. So far as the criminal proceedings are concerned, "institution" does not mean filing, presenting or initiating the proceedings; rather, it means taking cognisance as per the provisions contained in CrPC.
43. The question to examine as to whether the sanction is required or not under a statute has to be considered at the time of taking cognisance of the offence and not during enquiry or investigation.
44. There is a marked distinction between the stages of investigation and Prosecution. The Prosecution starts when the cognisance of the offence is taken. It is also to be kept in mind that the cognisance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. The sanction of the appropriate Authority is necessary to protect a public servant from unnecessary harassment or Prosecution. Such protection is necessary as an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his public duty honestly and to the best of his ability. The threat of Prosecution demoralises the honest officer.
45. However, the performance of public duty under the colour of duty cannot be a camouflage to commit a crime. The public duty may provide such a public servant an opportunity to commit a crime, and such an issue is required to be examined by the sanctioning Authority or T.M.R., J 28 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 by the Court. It is quite possible that the official capacity may enable the public servant to fabricate the record or misappropriate public funds, etc. Such activities definitely cannot be integrally connected or inseparably interlinked with the crime committed in the course of the same transaction. Thus, all acts done by a public servant in the purported discharge of his official duties cannot, as a matter of course, be brought under the protective umbrella of the requirement of sanction."
47. In a decision reported in Syed Jaferullah Jaferi vs Abdul Aziz and others12, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
27. In light of the foregoing discussion, we will now proceed to examine whether the acts of the respondents are protected by S. 65 of the Wakfs Act and whether sanction under S. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is necessary in the case of the 1st Respondent. The Wakfs Act is an Act intended to provide for the better administration and supervision of Wakfs S. 4 casts a duty on the Commissioner of Wakfs to make a survey of Wskfs properties in the State and to submit a report to the Government and to the Wakf Board.
30. The learned Judge was not right in his conclusion. The learned Judge appears to have thought the fact that the accused were acting in their official capacity when they were alleged to have committed the offences was sufficient to attract S. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
We have explained that it is not so. The acts complained of should themselves be authorised by statute, or there should be a reasonable nexus between the acts and the duties enjoined by statute. This aspect was not considered by the learned Judge. We think that Criminal Revision Case No. 441/1964 was wrongly decided. We, therefore, hold that in the present case, S. 65 of the Wakfs Act is not a bar to the Prosecution of any of the respondents, nor is sanction under S. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code necessary for the Prosecution of any of the respondents.
48. In a decision reported in Khandu Sonu Dhobi and another vs. State of Maharashtra13, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"12. Lastly, Mr Kotwal has argued that the Prosecution of the accused was barred by time under Section 23 of the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act, 1942. The section reads as follows:
"(1) No suit, Prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against any public servant or person duly authorised under this Act in 12 1969 S.C.C. OnLine A.P. 57 13 T.M.R., J 29 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 respect of anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or the rules made thereunder.
(2) No suit or Prosecution shall be instituted against any public servant or person duly authorised under this Act in respect of anything done or intended to be done under this Act unless the suit or Prosecution has been instituted within six months from the date of the Act complained of."
Sub-section (1) of the section has plainly no application as it relates to anything done in good faith. According to the Bombay General Clauses Act, a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is, in fact, done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. The appellants admittedly were not acting honestly when they prepared the false documents in question and showed a disbursement of Rs 369.07 on March 11, 1966. Mr Kotwal, however, relies on sub-section (2) of Section 23 and submits that the Prosecution could be instituted against the appellants only within six months from March 11, 1966. As the chargesheet was submitted long after the expiry of six months, the case against the accused-appellants, according to the counsel, was barred by time. This contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force. Sub-section (2) refers to a suit or Prosecution against a public servant or person duly authorised under the Act with respect to anything done or intended to be done under the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act. It cannot be said that the acts of the accused-appellants in preparing false documents and in committing criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount of Rs 369.07, as also their Act of criminal misconduct, were done under the Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 deals with anything done or intended to be done under the above-mentioned Act by a public servant or a person duly authorised under the Act. It has no application where something is done not under the Act even though it has been done by a public servant who has been entrusted with the duties of carrying out improvement Schemes under the above-mentioned Act. ..........."
49. As seen from Section 146 of the APCRDA Act, nothing in the said section indicates that the said protection from Prosecution applies only to acts done in good faith. Considering these submissions, while disposing of the bail applications vide Crl.P.Nos.3811 of 2022 and batch, dated 06.09.2022, this Court observed that in view of the express bar engrafted under Section 146 of the APCRDA Act, 2014, ultimately, if it is found that the bar applies to the present facts of the case, it goes to the very root of the T.M.R., J 30 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 matter and strikes at its bottom regarding the very maintainability of the Prosecution against the petitioners.
50. Upon a careful perusal of the aforementioned citations relied on by the learned Advocate General and the observations made in Special Leave Appeal (Crl.) No(s).9926-9929 of 2022, this Court views that the bar contained in Section 146 of the CRDA Act does not impede the respondent/State from investigating the alleged offences against the Petitioner.
51. The learned Advocate General contends that though this Court was pleased to grant anticipatory bail to A.2 to A.5, but on parity, A.1 is not entitled to grant anticipatory bail. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision reported in Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another14, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second Respondent was a history sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second Respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned Order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 31078 of 2014, decided on 22-9-2014 (All)] clearly exposes the non- application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact, it has been brought on record that the second Respondent has been chargesheeted in respect of a number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the Order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would be tantamount to the travesty of justice, and accordingly, we set it aside."14
(2014) 16 SCC 508 T.M.R., J 31 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
52. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana (Koli) and another15, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"26.xxxx The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law."
53. In Tarun Kumar vs Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement16, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"19. It is axiomatic that the principle of parity is based on the guarantee of positive equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing similar wrong Order. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate the illegality or irregularity. If there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people by any authority or by the Court, without legal basis or justification, other persons could not claim as a matter of right the benefit on the basis of such wrong decision."
54. This Court views that as against the orders passed by this Court vide Crl.P.Nos.3811 of 2022 and batch, the State preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.9926-9929 of 2022. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the discretion exercised by this Court cannot be said to have been exercised perversely. As such, it is not open to contend that Order has been passed by this Court, cannot be taken into consideration on the principle of parity. By relying on the judgments relied on by the learned Advocate 15 (2021) 6 SCC 230 16 S.L.P. (Crl.) No.9431 of 2023, dt:20.11.2023 T.M.R., J 32 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 General, this Court has examined the role of the petitioner/A.1. As the parity is claimed, this Court has considered whether a case for the grant of bail on reason of parity is made out. As seen from the record, similar accusations have been made against A.1 and A.2. This Court was pleased to grant anticipatory bail to A.3 to A.5 in favour of whom the benefits were provided allegedly contravened to the APCRDA Rules.
55. The learned Advocate General contends that the contention raised by the Petitioner that the case was politically motivated as "regime revenge" by the present Government is not sustainable.
56. In a decision reported in Ramveer Upadhyay and another vs State of U.P. and another17, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar4. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or Complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh5, "If the use of power is of the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not logical."
57. In a decision reported in the State of Chattisgarh and another vs Aman Kumar Singh and others18, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station, and an offence is registered in respect of a 17 2022 S.C.C. OnLine SC 484 18 (2023) 6 SCC 559 T.M.R., J 33 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance.
In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint.
58. Relying on the decisions cited above, this Court opines that even if assumed the case against the Petitioner was registered due to political vendetta, such ground alone cannot warrant the grant of anticipatory bail.
59. The learned Advocate General has relied on a decision reported in Manish Sisodia vs Central Bureau of Investigation19. This is in support of the contention that policy decisions taken in a blatant disregard for law with a common intention to secure undue pecuniary gains are not immune to criminal law implications. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that:
"23. The charge sheet under the PoC Act includes offences for unlawful gains to a private person at the expense of the public exchequer. In this regard, reference is made to the provisions of Sections 7, 7A, 8, and 12 of the PoC Act.
25. On this aspect of the offences under the PoC Act, the C.B.I. has submitted that conspiracy and involvement of the appellant - Manish Sisodia is well established. For the sake of clarity, without making any additions, subtractions, or a detailed analysis, we would like to recapitulate what is stated in the chargesheet filed by the C.B.I. against the appellant - Manish Sisodia."
60. The Learned Advocate General contends that merely because custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated by itself, it cannot be a 19 2023 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1393 T.M.R., J 34 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 ground to grant anticipatory bail. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision reported in Sumitha Pradeep vs Arun Kumar C.K. and another20, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that:
"16. xxx The first and foremost thing that the Court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment. Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail."
61. After careful perusal of the material placed, this Court views that the respondent/State has to gather prima facie material supporting the contents of the report to establish the Petitioner's alleged role in commission of the offence.
62. The mere fact that the previous Government belonged to a different political dispensation than the current one does not warrant suspicion unless there is prima facie evidence supporting such scepticism. This Court acknowledges that an unexplained delay of three-and-a-half years, as evident in the present case, can be a valid consideration for granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner, in line with observations in the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar.21.
63. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre's case, as referred to supra, the Hon‟ble Apex further held as follows:
"113. Arrest should be the last option, and it should be restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused is imperative 20 2022 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1529 21 (2011) 14 SCC 770 T.M.R., J 35 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 based on the facts and circumstances of that case. The Court must carefully examine the entire available record, particularly the allegations directly attributed to the accused, which are corroborated by other material and circumstances on record."
64. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing; the justification for exercising it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons. No arrest can be made routinely on a mere allegation of the commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no arrest is made without reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness of the allegation. (In this regard, a reference can be made to Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar.22)
65. This Court views the power to authorise detention as a very solemn function. It affects the liberty and freedom of citizens and needs to be exercised with great care and caution. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool for police officers who lack sensitivity or Act with oblique motives.
66. Notably, the Petitioner presently holds the position of the opposition leader and lacks direct or indirect control over the concerned department. There is no reasonable apprehension that the Petitioner may influence witnesses or tamper with the evidence. The Petitioner highlights that even in the remand report filed by the same investigation agency in Cr. No.29 of 2021, it is explicitly acknowledged that the Petitioner is not a flight risk, and 22 (2014) 8 SCC 273 T.M.R., J 36 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 the Petitioner is afforded Z+ security by the National Security Guards (N.S.G.) under the Central Government's auspices. Despite the alleged offences occurring from 2015 to 2019, during the Petitioner's tenure as Chief Minister, there is no indication that any documents pertaining to the Inner Ring Road have been tampered with. Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner would not impede the ongoing investigation, given that the relevant documents are already in the custody of the current Government. Considering the nature of the accusation made against the Petitioner, this Court finds that the custodial interrogation of the Petitioner is not required to conduct further investigation.
67. F.I.R., is based on a complaint dated 27.04.2022 filed by Sri A.Ramakrishna Reddy, the M.L.A. of the Ruling party from Mangalagiri Assembly Constituency. The F.I.R. was originally registered on 09.05.2022 for offences punishable under sections 120B, 420, 34, 35, 36, 37, 166, 167, and 217 of I.P.C. and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(a) of the P.C. Act. On 16.05.2022, during the course of the investigation from 09.05.2022 to 16.05.2022, the offence under section 409 of I.P.C. and the offences under the P.C. Act were modified from 13(2) r/w s.13(1)(a) to 13(2) r/w 31(c) and
(d). However, it is the Petitioner's grievances that without providing any reasons or basis, the sections were amended. As rightly pointed out by the Petitioner, it is not the Prosecution's case also that it is able to show any misappropriation of funds for the personal benefit of the Petitioner.
T.M.R., J 37 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
68. The Petitioner contends that the Defacto Complainant invoked the criminal law after the lapse of three and half years to harass the Petitioner by falsely implicating him on account of political vendetta without any complaint or legal proceeding said to have been initiated by any aggrieved person who represented the Complainant. It is not the case of the Respondent-State that, except for the Defacto Complainant, anyone who said to be aggrieved/sufferer out of the alleged change of alignment of the Inner Ring Road lodged the complaint against the Petitioner or any other person.
69. It is also not the Defacto Complainant's case that at the time of the finalization of the master plan, he or the alleged affected persons represented their objections to the public notification, which was issued, calling for objections from the public. The Petitioner's grievance is that no objections were raised at the relevant time; the Defacto Complainant is now agitating after a long lapse of six years. It is not in dispute that a final notification of the Master Plan was notified by way of publication in the Official Gazette. It is not the Defacto Complainant's case that either he or his alleged representatives challenged the final notification/Official Gazette.
70. It is the submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner that no investigative action was undertaken in pursuance of the F.I.R. dated 09.05.2022, and the Petitioner was never asked to join the investigation or provide any information/document until September 2023. When the Petitioner was arrested in relation to Crime No.29 of 2021, the C.I.D. Police, T.M.R., J 38 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 Mangalagiri, the Respondent, for the first time, filed a P.T. Warrant application seeking the custody of the Petitioner. Admittedly, the C.I.D. did not require the custodial interrogation of the appellants during the period of investigation from 09.05.2022 (date of filing of F.I.R.) till recently. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention that, at this stage, the custody of the Petitioner may be required;
71. All transactions out of which the complaint had arisen have taken place during the period 2014-19, and all are borne out by records. When the primary focus is on documentary evidence, this Court fails to understand why the Petitioner should now be arrested.
72. On behalf of the Respondent-State, Special Public Prosecutor, CID- EOW-II, High Court of A.P, filed a memo dated 22.12.2023 reporting that the Petitioner‟s son (A.14) gave an interview to ABN and E-TV News channels on 19.12.2023, wherein, he threatened the official witnesses who provided statements under section 164 Cr.P.C., in the present crime. The Petitioner filed objections to this memo, contending that the interview did not directly or indirectly discuss the present crime. This Court is of view that the fate of granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner should not be decided on the statement made by the Petitioner‟s son in the interview.
73. After careful consideration of the material, this Court is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to grant anticipatory bail.
T.M.R., J 39 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023
74. As a result, the petition is allowed by granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner/A.1 subject to his surrender before the Investigating Officer concerned within one (1) week from today. On such surrender, the petitioner/accused shall be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond for Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer. Upon his release, the Petitioner is mandated to adhere to the following conditions:
(a) The Petitioner/A.1 is required to appear before the Investigating Officer whenever his presence is necessary, with a minimum of 48 hours' notice provided for his appearance.
(b) The Petitioner/A.1 shall cooperate with the investigation, and he shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required, and he shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case to dissuade his from disclosing such facts to the Court or any police officer.
(c) The Petitioner/A.1 should abstain from making any public comments related to this case.
It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is T.M.R., J 40 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 affirmed to have the freedom to conduct the investigation without being influenced by the observations in this Order.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, in this petition shall stand closed.
______________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 10.01.2024 SAK / MS T.M.R., J 41 Crl.P.No.7894 of 2023 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.7894 OF 2023 Date: 10.01.2024 SAK