Power Grid Corporation Of India Ltd vs S.V.Nanjunda Chetty .. 1St on 9 August, 2010

[Cites 23, Cited by 0]

Madras High Court

Power Grid Corporation Of India Ltd vs S.V.Nanjunda Chetty .. 1St on 9 August, 2010

Bench: K.Chandru

       

  

  

 
 
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :  09.08.2010

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU

A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 849, 851 to 854, 
964 to 973, 975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008,
894 to 896 and 922 to 924 of 2009
and
M.P.Nos.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 and 1 of 2008,
1,1,1,1,1 and 1 of 2009


Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.,
represented by its Chief Manager,
Hosur.					..  Appellant in
					 A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 					 849, 851 to 854 of 2008 and
					 894 to 896 of 2009

Land Acquisition Officer (Power Grid)/
Revenue Divisional Officer,
Hosur.					..  Appellant in
					 964 to 973, 975 to 979 and
					 982 to 985 of 2008 and
					 922 to 924 of 2009
	
	Vs.


1.S.V.Nanjunda Chetty			..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.836 and 982
					    of 2008

Jayaramappa				..  1st respondent in
					    A.s.Nos.837 and 983
					    of 2008

Suseela					..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.838 and 984
					     of 2008

Venkatesalu				..  1st respondent in
					     A.S.Nos.839 and 985
					     of 2008

Makkamma				..  1st respondent in
					    A.s.Nos.840 and 964
					    of 2008

Harish					..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.841 and 965 
					    of 2008

Ramachandran				.. 1st respondent in
					   A.S.No.842 and 966
					   of 2008
1.S.V.Lakshminarayana Chetty
2.S.V.Srikanta Gupta			..  1st and 2nd  respondents in
					    A.s.Nod.843 and 967
					    of 2008

K.Ramachandaran				..  1st respondent in
					    A.s.Nos.844 and 968
					    of 2008

S.V.Pandarinath				..  1st respondent in
					     A.s.Nos.845 and 969
					     of 2008
1.Chinnappa
2.Puttappa				.. 1st and 2nd respondents in
					   A.S.Nos.846 and 970
					   of 2008
1.Chinna Gooliappa
2.Venkataraman				..  1st and 2nd respondents in
					    A.s.Nos.847 and 971
					     of 2008

Chinna Gooliappa				..  1st respondent in
					     A.S.Nos.848 and 972 
					     of 2008

Nagaraj					..  1st respondent in
					    A.s.Nos.849 and 973
					    of 2008

Vediappan				..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.851 and 975
					    of 2008

Nanjamma				..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.852 and 976
					    of 2008


Chinna Yuvappa				..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.853 and 977
					    of 2008

Savithri					..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.854 and 978
					    of 2008

Sampath					..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.No.979 of 2008

Venkataramanappa				..  1st respondent in
					    A.s.Nos.894 and 922
					    of 2009

Peria Yuvappa				..  1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.895 and 923
					    of 2009

Pappanna					.. 1st respondent in
					    A.S.Nos.896 and
					    924 of 2009

2.Land Acquisition Officer,
   (Power Grid) and
   Revenue Divisional Officer,
   Hosur.					.. 2nd  Respondent in
					 A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to
					 842, 844,845,848, 849, 851 					 to 853, 854 of 2008, 894 					to 896 of 2009 and
					 3rd respondent in
					 A.s.Nos.843,846,847 of 2008
The Chief Manager,
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited,
Hosur.					..  2nd respondent in
					    964,965,966,968,969,972,
					    973, 975 to 979 and
					    982 to 985 of 2008 and
					    922 to 924 of 2009
					    3rd respondent in
					    A.s.Nos.967,970, 971, 
					    of 2008
	
A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 849 and 851 to 854 of 2008, 964 to 973, 975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008 are preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against judgments and decrees made in various LAOPs in LAOP No.13 of 2001 and batch cases, dated 04.12.2007 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Hosur.
A.S. Nos.894 to 896 and 922 to 924 of 2009 are preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against judgments and decrees made in LAOP Nos.26,30 and 40 of 2001, dated 25.04.2008 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Hosur.

	For Appellants	 : Ms.Rita Chandrasekar for 
			    M/s.Aiyer and Dolia in
			   A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 849, 851 to 854/2008
			   and 894 to 896 of 2009

			   Mr.V.Ravi, Spl. G.P.(AS) in
			   964 to 973, 975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008
			   and 922 to 924 of 2009

	For Respondents	: Mr.P.Mani for R-1 in A.S.Nos.836 to 839 of 2008
			  and for R-1 in A.S.Nos.840 to 842, 844,848 
			  to 854 of 2008 and for 
			  RR1 and 2 in A.S.Nos.843, 846 and 847 of 2008
		
			  Mr.V.Ravi, Spl.G.P.(AS) for R2 in
			  A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to
			  842, 844,845,848, 849, 851 					  to 853, 854 of 2008 and 894 to 896/2009
			  for R-3 in A.S.Nos.843,846,847 of 2008

			  Mr.P.Mani, for R-1 in A.S.Nos.964, 966, 969,
			  971 to 973, 975, 978 and 979 of 2008 and
			  922 and 924 of 2009
	
			  Ms.Rita Chandrasekar for
			  M/s.Aiyer and Dolia for R-2
			  in A.S.Nos.964 to 966, 968, 969, 972 to 979/2008
		 	  and for R-3 in A.S.Nos.967, 970 and 971/2008


- - - - 

COMMON JUDGMENT

Heard both sides. There are two sets of appeals in these batch of cases. One set of appeals were filed by the Land Acquisition Officer (Power Grid)-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Hosur (for short LAO), who is the acquiring authority. The second set of appeals were filed by the Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., (for short PGCI) represented by its Chief Manager, Hosur, which is the requisitioning body. The table given below will show the number of LAOPs and the corresponding appeal suit numbers indicating in parenthesis either LAO or PGCI showing the respective appeals filed by them and the name of the claimants connected with such appeals.

Sl.No Claimant Name A.S.No. LAOP No. Date of order in LAOP 1 S.V.Nanjunda Chetty A.s.No.836 of 2008 (PGCI) A.S.No.982 of 2008 (LAO) LAOP.13 of 2001 41207 2 Jayaramappa A.S.No.837 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.983 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.15 of 2001

-do-

Suseela A.S.No.838 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.984 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.16 of 2001

-do-

Venkatesalu A.S.No.839 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.985 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.17 of 2001

-do 5 Makkamma AS No.840 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.964 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.21 of 2001

-do-

Harish AS No.841 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.965 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.22 of 2001

-do-

Ramachandran AS No.842 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.966 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.24 of 2001

-do-

S.V.Lakshminarayana Chetty S.V.Srikanta Gupta A.S.No.843 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.967 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.25 of 2001

-do-

K.Ramachandaran A.S.No.844 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.968 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.27 of 2001

-do-

S.V.Pandarinath A.S.No.845 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.969 of 2007(LAO) LAOP.28 of 2001

-do-

Chinnappa Puttappa A.S.No.846 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.970 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.29 of 2001

-do-

Chinna Gooliappa Venkataraman A.S.No.847 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.971 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.31 of 2001

-do-

Chinna Gooliappa A.S.No.848 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.972 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.32 of 2001

-do-

Nagaraj A.s.No.849 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.973 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.33 of 2001

-do-

Vediappan A.S.No.851 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.975 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.35 of 2001

-do-

Nanjamma A.S.No.852 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.976 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.36 of 2001

-do-

Chinna Yuvappa A.S.No.853 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.977 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.37 of 2001

-do-

Savithri A.S.No.854 of 2008(PGCI) A.S.No.978 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.38 of 2001

-do-

Sampath A.S.No.979 of 2008(LAO) LAOP.39 of 2001

-do-

Venkataramanappa A.S.No.894 of 2009(PGCI) A.S.No.922 of 2009(LAO) LAOP.26 of 2001 25.04.2008 21 Peria Yuvappa A.S.No.895 of 2009(PGCI) A.S.No.923 of 2009(LAO) LAOP.30 of 2001

-do 22 Pappanna A.S.No.896 of 2009(PGCI) A.S.No.924 of 2009(LAO) LAOP.40 of 2001

-do-

2.The lands of claimants situated in Nallaganakothapalli and Marudandapalli villages were acquired for the purpose of transmitting power from NTPC, Thalcher to Kolar, Karnataka and also to distribute the Tamil Nadu's share of its power from the Central pool by establishing 400/220 KV Sub Station in that place. On request made by the PGCI, the acquiring authority published a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in the Tamil Nadu Gazette, dated 10.12.1997. An extent of 61.41 acres of lands were sought to be acquired in Marudandapalli as well as Nallaganakothapalli villages coming under Soolagiri Block of Hosur Taluk. Enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with by invoking the emergency clause vide G.O.Ms.No.166, Energy Department, dated 1.9.1999. Thereafter, following due procedure, the Award No.1 of 2000(F) came to be passed on 31.10.2000. The acquiring authority fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.31500/- per acre together with other statutory payments.

3.The land owners/claimants herein were aggrieved by the lower rate of compensation. Therefore, they filed their objections. In view of their objections, the mattes were referred for determination of the market value of the lands under Section 18 to the jurisdictional reference court, which in the present case is the Sub Court, Hosur. The Reference Court registered the references as various LAOPs (indicated in the tabular column given in para 1) and recorded evidence. The judgments were pronounced on two different dates, i.e. 04.12.2007 and 25.4.2008. The reference court by its judgment enhanced the compensation at the rate of Rs.3,50,000/- per acre. Wherever there were standing trees found, they were also given separate compensation. Aggrieved by the same, these appeal suits were filed.

4.In the first batch of cases, i.e. in LAOP Nos.13,15,16 and 17 of 2001, common evidence was recorded in LAOP No.13 of 2001. Before the court below, on behalf of claimants, four witnesses were examined as C.W.1 to C.W.4. On their side, two documents were filed as Exs.C.1 and C.2. They are two registered sale deeds, dated 10.9.1999 and 15.10.1999. On the side of the acquiring authority, one V.Chennakesava Babu, the then Sub Collector of Hosur was examined as R.W.1. On their side, four documents were filed and they were marked as Exs.R.1 to R.4. On the basis of these evidences (both oral and documentary) the court below pronounced a common judgment, dated 04.12.2007.

5.In the second batch of cases, i.e. in LAOP Nos.21,22,24,25,27,28, 29,31 to 39 of 2001 (16 LAOPs), a joint trial was conducted and evidence was recorded in LAOP No.25 of 2001. Before the reference court, on behalf of claimants, five witnesses were examined as C.W.1 to C.W.5. On their side, four documents were filed and marked as Exs.C.1 to C.4. Exs.C.1 and C.2 are the very same documents relating to sale deeds, dated 10.9.1999 and 15.10.1999 recorded in the previous batch of cases. On the side of the acquiring authority, the very same Chennakesava Babu was examined as R.W.1. On their side, the very same documents which were filed in the earlier cases, were marked as Exs.R.1 to R.4. On the basis of these materials, a common judgment was pronounced on 04.12.2007.

6.Subsequently, the reference court tried LAOP Nos.26,30 and 40 of 2001 jointly. In that case, common evidence was let in in LAOP No.40 of 2001. On the side of claimants, one witness was examined as C.W.1 and three documents were filed and marked as Exs.C.1 to C.3. Exs.C.1 and C.2 are the sale deeds relied upon in the earlier batch of cases and Exs.C.3 is the judgment pronounced in the earlier batch of cases in LAOP No.13 of 2001, dated 04.12.2007. On the side of the acquiring authority, the very same Chennakesava Babu was examined as R.W.1 and the very same documents were filed and marked as Exs.R.1 to R.4.

7.As found from the Award proceedings, acquiring authority collected statistical datas from the Sub Registrar Office at Soolagiri for the period from 1.4.1997 to 4.4.2000 which were three years before the date of Section 4(1) notification. He had considered as many as 160 sale transactions. Those transactions related to the lands which were classified as dry lands in the revenue records. Out of 160 sale transactions, the authority discarded 74 cases on the plea that those lands were located 1.6 Kms. away from the land which are acquired. He also further rejected 41 cases as soil, 'Tharam' and classification of those lands were differing. He had also discarded 31 other cases on the ground that they were lease deeds or loan transactions or partition deeds and hence they are not reliable indicators in arriving at the market value. Further, he rejected 7 other cases on the ground that either they were considered as thope or covered by gift deeds or wet lands or were sold as house sites. He took Serial No.116 as the data land and it was in Survey No.346/2A2 covered by sale deed No.1396, dated 8.9.1999. It was claimed that the said land was 200 meters away from the lands under acquisition and the soil, tharam and classifications were similar to the lands under acquisition. The said land which was to an extent of one acre and classified as unirrigated dry land was sold at Rs.35,500/-. Since there was a Well, deducting the value for the Well, it was calculated that the value of the said land would be Rs.31500/- per acre or Rs.77805/- per hectare. This was taken as the basis for arriving at the compensation for the lands acquired from the Marudandapali village.

8.In respect of lands at Nallaganakothapalli village, the authority considered 114 sale transactions and discarded all of them. He found that in 73 cases, the lands were situated beyond 2 Kms and in 17 cases, lands were situated 1.6 Kms away and they were sold for exorbitant rate for commercial purpose. In 7 cases, he rejected them on the ground that they were wet lands. In 1 case, it was found that there were trees and Well in the land. In 13 cases it was found they were sold for forming a factory and considered highly exorbitant. In 3 cases, it was found to be sold as house sites. Therefore, all the 114 sale transactions the authority rejected and only adopted the valuation given as data land (marked as Ex.R.4) taken from the other village Marudandapalli.

9.Though the acquiring authority considered that they were dry lands but number of lands under acquisition, i.e. Survey Nos.315/1C2, 315/1F2, 315/2B, 315/1E2, 315/2A, 333/1C, 335/1B, 333/2A, 335/1F, 334/1, 334/2A, 334/2B, 335/1C, 335/2, 336/2, 337/2A2, 341/3A1, 341/3A2A, 337/2A3, 337/2B3, 338/2A2, 341/3A3, 341/3A4, 341/4A and 338/2B, there were standing trees including Mango, Tamarind and Coconut. It was factually wrong on the part of the acquiring authority to state that some of the data lands were rejected as they were thope or they were sold as house sites. In any event, the court below considered the evidence let in by both sides and Exs.C.1 and C.2 on one side and Ex.R.4 sale deed filed by the acquiring authority on the other side and gave its factual findings.

10.The then Sub Collector who was examined as R.W.1 in his cross examination made the following admissions. He agreed that some of lands are adjacent to National Highways and the other lands are adjacent to Tar road leading to the village. He also admitted that in some of lands, there were coconut trees and irrigation facilities were available. In most of lands, they were having irrigation facilities and were growing vegetables. In one land, pipe line was found laid to bring water and it had irrigation facilities. He also feigned ignorance about the existence of a Steel factory adjacent to the land but admitted on the Eastern side, there was a Tiles factory. He also admitted that in the statistical data provided in Ex.R.3, Serial Nos.7,17,29 and 37 were purchased for commercial purposes and likewise, Serial Nos.45 and 82 were also purchased for establishing a factory. He also admitted that lands were situated in the road leading from Hosur to Soolagiri at a distance of 20 Kms.

11.The reference court held that Ex.C.1, dated 10.9.1989 the sale deed between Ramadoss Naidu and Girishbabu found in Sl.No.96 in the statistical data was considered by the acquiring authority, but as to why the said land was not considered as the data land for the purpose of fixing the compensation, there was no satisfactory explanation on the side of R.W.1. Though it was contended that Exs.C.1 and C.2 were exemplars of sale of small plots, there was no denial about its genuineness or the bonafide nature of those transactions. The court below considered that Ex.C.1 was situated closer to the land which is acquired and it can be seen from Ex.R.2, topo plan of the village and the sale deed came into existence six months prior to Section 4(1) notification. In that, the sale consideration was Rs.5 lakhs per acre. Though claimants demanded Rs.20 lakhs per acre, there was no supporting document for making such a claim. Therefore, the court below safely relied on Ex.C.1 and the fact that the land was acquired for the purpose of locating a Sub Station by PGCI. The market value of the land was considered as Rs.5 lakhs. Further, the court below held that sufficient deduction towards development charges should be made. Therefore, for the lands which are adjacent to the road, deduction of 25% and those far away from the road, deduction of 30% was to be made towards development charges. In essence, in the first set of cases, the rate of compensation was fixed at Rs.3,75,000/- per acre and for the second set, it was fixed at Rs.3,50,000/- per acre. Since there were fruit bearing trees in the land and also other trees which are useful for other purposes, the court below fixed Rs.4000/- towards fruit bearing trees and for younger trees, Rs.2000/- was fixed. Thus the compensation which was determined was directed to be paid along with 30% solatium and additional compensation at the rate of 12% and also statutory interest payable. The judgments rendered in three batch of cases as set out above is now under challenge in these appeals.

12.Mr.V.Ravi, learned Special Government Pleader (AS) contended that Exs.C.1 and C.2 are not comparable lands and the acquired lands were undeveloped lands. The rate fixed by the reference court was excessive. The compensation fixed by the LAO as per Exs.R.1 to R.4 alone should have been relied upon. The deduction made towards development charges are more insignificant and deduction of 53% or 65% should have been granted. The genuineness of Ex.C.1 and C.2 were also not established.

13.Mrs.Rita Chandrasekaran, learned counsel appearing for PGCI, elaborately contended that people of that area were aware that there was going to be a Sub Station and thus, the land value were boosted. Exs.C.1 and C.2 had come into existence only on the basis of their awareness about the location of the proposed Sub Station. She also submitted that Ex.C.1 and Ex.C.2 are exemplars of sale of small plots of lands and should not form the basis. She further submitted that Exs.C.1 and C.2 were transactions between the family members themselves and should not be made as the basis for determination of market value. But Ex.R.4 data land alone is comparable. The finding that it was not agricultural land and were fit to be used as construction of building and factory was not based upon evidence.

14.In support of her contention, the learned counsel for PGCI relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Raofuddin Vs Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2009 (14) SCC 367. She relied upon the following passages found in paragraphs 14 and 11 from the said judgment which are as follows:

"14. Thus, comparable sale instances of similar lands in the neighbourhood at or about the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act are the best guide for determination of the market value of the land to arrive at a fair estimate of the amount of compensation payable to a landowner. Nevertheless, while ascertaining compensation, it is the duty of the Court to see that the compensation so determined is just and fair not merely to the individual whose property has been acquired but also to the public which is to pay for it.

11. One of the preferred and well-accepted methods adopted for working out the market value of the land in acquisition cases is the comparable sales method. The comparable sales i.e. the lands sought to be compared must be similar in nature and potentiality. Again, in the absence of sale deeds, the judgments and awards passed in respect of acquisition of lands, made in the same village and/or neighbouring villages can be accepted as valid piece of evidence and provide a sound basis to determine the market value of the land after suitable adjustments with regard to positive and negative factors enumerated in Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Undoubtedly, an element of some guesswork is involved in the entire exercise."

15.But in the very same judgment, it must be noted that the Supreme court in paragraph 16 has held that in case of a well considered decision of the reference court, the interference by the higher court in an appeal is very limited. Hence the following passage found in paragraph 16 may be usefully extracted below:

"16. The following observations of this Court in Food Corpn. of India v. Makhan Singh (1992 (3) SCC 67) are quite apposite: (SCC pp.75-76, para 15) 15. This Court as the last court of appeal, will ordinarily not interfere in an award granting compensation unless there is something to show not merely that on the balance of evidence it is possible to reach a different conclusion, but that the judgment cannot be supported by reason of a wrong application of principle or because some important point affecting valuation has been overlooked or misapplied. Besides, generally speaking, the appellate court interferes not when the judgment under appeal is not right but only when it is shown to be wrong. See in this connection Dollar Co. v. Collector of Madras (1975 (2) SCC 730)6. Added thereto are other rules of prudence that the courts do not treat on a par land situated on the frontage having special advantage and the land situated in the interior undeveloped area, or to compare smaller plots fetching better price with large tracts of land. See in this connection Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1991 (4) SCC 195). Therefore, the scope of interference in such matters is very limited and it is only in cases where it is found that the authorities below have either applied wrong principles or have omitted to take into consideration some important point affecting valuation, that this Court can interfere."

16.The learned counsel for PGCI further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Land Acquisition Officer v. Karigowda reported in (2010) 5 SCC 708 to justify that the burden of higher compensation is primarily on the claimants and they had failed to discharge their obligation. In this context, she placed reliance upon the following passages found in paragraphs 29 and 32 which are as follows:

"29. It is a settled principle of law that the onus to prove entitlement to receive higher compensation is upon the claimants. In Basant Kumar v. Union of India (1996 (11) SCC 542) this Court held that the claimants are expected to lead cogent and proper evidence in support of their claim. Onus primarily is on the claimants, which they can discharge while placing and proving on record sale instances and/or such other evidences as they deem proper, keeping in mind the method of computation for awarding of compensation which they rely upon. In this very case, this Court stated the principles of awarding compensation and placed the matter beyond ambiguity, while also capsulating the factors regulating the discretion of the Court while awarding the compensation. This principle was reiterated by this Court even in Gafar v. Moradabad Development Authority(2007 (7) SCC 614) and the Court held as under: (SCC p.620, para 12) 12. As held by this Court in various decisions, the burden is on the claimants to establish that the amounts awarded to them by the Land Acquisition Officer are inadequate and that they are entitled to more. That burden had to be discharged by the claimants and only if the initial burden in that behalf was discharged, the burden shifted to the State to justify the award. Thus, the onus being primarily upon the claimants, they are expected to lead evidence to revert the same, if they so desire. In other words, it cannot be said that there is no onus whatsoever upon the State in such reference proceedings. The court cannot lose sight of the facts and clear position of documents, that obligation to pay fair compensation is on the State in its absolute terms. Every case has to be examined on its own facts and the courts are expected to scrutinise the evidence led by the parties in such proceedings.

32. Where a statutory provision confers rights and also states mandatory or implied conditions which would have to be satisfied before the claim can culminate into a relief, such considerations or conditions are relevant for the purposes of interpretation as well. A power conferred by the statute often contains an express condition for its exercise and, in absence of, or in addition to the express condition, there are also implied conditions for exercise of power. Exercise of statutory power in breach of express or implied conditions will be illegal, if the conditions breached are mandatory. This principle, to a large extent, is applicable to exercise of rights arising from beneficial legislations, when an owner claims benefits under statutory provisions, it is for him to show that what is contemplated under the conditions attached thereto has been satisfied, particularly when such legislative intent is clear from the bare reading of the provisions. Like the cases in hand, it is for the claimants to show that, to award the compensation payable under the statutory provisions, they have brought on record evidence to satisfy the criterion and conditions required to be fulfilled for such a claim."

Therefore, she stated that in the present case, the claimants have failed to justify the enhanced compensation.

17.Further, she relied upon the passage found in paragraph 46 for the purpose of contending that the purpose of locating the sub station in that land cannot be a ground for enhanced compensation and that the lands are only fetching the value either as agricultural lands or dry lands as indicated in the said paragraph, which may be usefully extracted below:

"46. The second circumstance specified in Section 23(1) to be considered by the court in determining compensation is the damage sustained by the person on account of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collectors taking possession thereof. Even from a reasonable practicable view it has to be understood that the compensation which is payable to the claimants is in relation to the acquired land, the standing crops or trees and what they earn from the agricultural crops or fruits or trees on the agricultural land. To extend the benefit for the purposes of compensation, considering that the fruits grown on the agricultural land would be converted into jam or any other eatable products will not be a relevant consideration within the scheme of the Act. The purpose is not to connect the acquisition to remote factors which may have some bearing or some connection with the agricultural activity being carried on, on the land in question. Such an approach by the court is neither permissible nor prudent, as it would be opposed to the legislative intent contained under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act."

18.But, however, the Supreme Court in the very same judgment in paragraphs 81, 82 and 83 had observed as follows:

"81. The above compensation was computed by the SLAO on the basis of the sale instances of the villages falling within the same circle as well as on the basis of the guidance value maintained in the Register of the Sub-Registrar of the villages concerned. From the report, it is evident that both these Villages Sanaba and Pandavapura are located in the same circle and are practically part of the larger revenue estate. It was not in dispute before us that primarily all these lands were being used for cultivating mulberry crop which is the sole agricultural activity. The court has to keep in mind a very pertinent equitable principle while awarding compensation i.e. the court should grant just and fair market value of the land at the time of the acquisition while ensuring that there is no undue enrichment. These are compulsive acquisitions but the guiding factor for the court is sale instances of a willing seller and a willing purchaser while determining the compensation payable. To award fair compensation is the obligation of the State and depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts may enhance the compensation within the framework of law. The sale instances referred to by the Collector in his report are from the same villages or nearby villages or adjacent villages which are a part of the same circle and where the land can easily said to be comparable as the entire chunk of the land was being used for raising mulberry crop and was acquired for common purpose, that is, the lands were submerged in the water coming from Hemavathi Dam.

82. This Court in Shaji Kuriakose3 (2001 (7) SCC 650)13 held that out of the three aforestated methods, the courts adopt comparable sales method of valuation of land while fixing the market value of the acquired land. Comparable sales method of valuation of land is preferred than the other methods such as capitalisation of net income method or expert opinion method. Comparable sales methods of valuation is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of the market value of the acquired land which a willing purchaser would pay for the acquired land if it has been sold in open market at the time of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. In Kantaben Manibhai Amin v. Land Acquisition Officer (1989 (4) SCC 662) this Court also stated that latest sale instance closer to the date of notification for acquisition of the land should be taken into consideration.

83. It is also an accepted judicial norm that the claimants can be given the benefit of awarding compensation on the basis of the genuine sale instance containing the highest rate, provided it has been proved in accordance with law and is a comparable instance. Such sale instance must satisfy all the requirements and prerequisites stated in the Act. It should be a bona fide transaction and should also be in reasonable proximity to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Since the SLAO had referred to the four sale instances which were produced before him and being part of the reference file, they were duly noticed by the Reference Court as well as by the High Court. But the courts held that it was not appropriate to apply sales statistics method in the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, the claimants produced no sale instances. In our view, these sale instances can be taken into consideration by the Court and benefit of the highest instance can be granted to the claimants in accordance with law in fixing the market value of the acquired land. Whatever benefit accrues to the claimants from the record produced and proved by the respondents, cannot be denied to them just because they have not produced evidence by way of sale instances."

(Emphasis added)

19.Further, in the very same judgment, the Supreme court also highlighted the loss of agricultural land and also the consequent loss of livelihood due to acquisition. In paragraphs 89 to 91, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:

89. We have two important facts which cannot be ignored by the Court. Firstly, that the claimants, by leading definite evidence have shown on record that the lands in question are not only lands having regular source of irrigation through the backwaters but otherwise are also lands superior to the other garden lands used for ordinary agricultural activities. The fields in question are being used exclusively for growing mulberry crops. Mulberry leaves are the only and the specified food for cocoons. In other words, the agricultural purpose for which the fields in question are being used is a special purpose and the crop so grown is again used for a specific commercial purpose to which there is no other alternative. In fact, none was stated before us by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. In all these peculiar facts, it cannot be disputed that some additional benefits have to be provided in favour of the claimants.

90. In the present cases, the claimants have not only lost their agricultural land but they have also been deprived of seasonal income that was available to them as a result of sale of mulberry leaves. Deprivation of livelihood is a serious consideration. The Court is entitled to apply some kind of reasonable guesswork to balance the equities and fix just and fair market value in terms of the parameters specified under Section 23 of the Act. The SLAO has ignored both these aspects firstly providing of annual increase, and secondly, giving some weightage to the special agricultural purpose and the purpose for which the mulberry crop had to be utilised. The claimants have not proved and produced on record sale instances. They have also not produced on record any specific evidence to justify the compensation awarded to them by the Reference Court and/or the High Court. In fact, there is hardly any evidence, much less a cogent and impeccable evidence to support the increase on the basis of net income capitalisation method.

91. It is a settled rudiment of law that the court, in given facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the potentiality and utility of the land acquired, can award higher compensation to ensure that injustice is not done to the claimants and they are not deprived of their property without grant of fair compensation. Reference, in this regard, can be made to the judgment of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer v. Kamadana Ramakrishna Rao (2007 (3) SCC 526). While adopting the average sale method as the formula for awarding compensation to the claimants, we are also of the considered view that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the land is being compulsorily acquired, the claimants should be awarded a higher compensation. The compensation at the rate of Rs2,30,000 per acre for the wetland and at the rate of Rs1,53,400 per acre for the dry land would be just and fair compensation and would do complete justice between the parties. This element of increase had not been added by the SLAO which ought to have been done."

(Emphasis added)

20.It is necessary to deal with the contentions raised by appellants. The first contention that deduction towards development charges was on the lower side cannot be accepted. It was held by the Supreme Court in Kanta Devi v. State of Haryana reported in (2008) 15 SCC 201 that 1/3rd of the market value can be the normal rate though higher deduction is permissible towards development charges.

21.Further, the Supreme court in Nelson Fernandes and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and others reported in (2007) 9 SCC 447 held that development charge is based upon the purpose for which land is acquired. In that case, the Supreme Court dealt with the laying of railway lines. In the present case, it is only to establish the sub station where towers are put up and transmission lines are made to pass through the sub station. The following passage found in paragraph 30 from the said judgment may be usefully extracted herebelow:

30. We are not, however, oblivious of the fact that normally 1/3rd deduction of further amount of compensation has been directed in some cases. However, the purpose for which the land is acquired must also be taken into consideration. In the instant case, the land was acquired for the construction of new BG line for the Konkan Railways. This Court in Hasanali Khanbhai & Sons v. State of Gujarat5 and Land Acquisition Officer v. Nookala Rajamallu6 had noticed that where lands are acquired for specific purposes, deduction by way of development charges is permissible. In the instant case, acquisition is for laying a railway line. Therefore, the question of development thereof would not arise......"

It will not be out of place to note that most of transmission lines carrying on high tension wires are situated right in the midst of agricultural lands. Therefore, in the present case, the reference court fixing 25% to 30% towards development charges is more enough. Hence the contention raised in this regard has to be rejected.

22.The second contention that Exs.C.1 and C.2 are exemplars of sale of small plots also cannot be accepted because for untenable reasons, the acquiring authority rejected many of comparable sales. The court below found on evidence that Exs.C.1 and C.2 are the true reflectors of the market rate.

23.The Supreme Court vide its judgment in U.P. State Industrial Development Corpn. v. Rishabh Ispat Ltd., reported in (2007) 2 SCC 248 after referring to Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act permitted the method of comparative sale details and the judgment of the reference court in enhancing the compensation relying upon the sole sale deed as a reliable exemplar was upheld. All that it requires was only proper application of principles relating to determination of compensation as well as the correct appreciation of evidence on record. The following passage found in paragraph 7 of the said judgment may be extracted below:

"7......The Reference Court relied upon a sale deed executed on 25-7-1981 which related to the sale of 2 bighas of land of Village Habibpur @ Rs21,600 per bigha. This sale deed was executed on 25-7-1981 whereas the notification under Section 4 was issued on 25-8-1981. The Reference Court found this exemplar to be a reliable piece of evidence and accordingly determined compensation @ Rs11 per sq. yard for the lands abutting the road and Rs6 for the lands away from the road. The High Court has affirmed the finding of the Reference Court. We find no reason to interfere with the finding which is based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and the proper application of the principles relating to determination of compensation under the Act."

24.Further, it has also been held by the Supreme court in Rishi Pal Singh v. Meerut Development Authority reported in (2006) 3 SCC 205 that exemplar of sale of small plot can be considered for determination of the market value when there are no other evidence available. All that it requires in such case was there must be adequate discount. In paragraph 5, the Supreme Court held as follows:

"5. ..... With respect to the first reason, that is, exemplars of small plots have been taken into consideration by the Reference Court, in the first instance our attention was invited to some judgments of this Court to urge that there is no absolute bar to exemplars of small plots being considered provided adequate discount is given in this behalf. Thus there is no bar in law to exemplars of small plots being considered....."

Therefore, the contention that Exs.C.1 and C.2 do not reflect correct market value has to be rejected.

25.The contention that it is only an agricultural land and therefore, it cannot fetch higher value also cannot be accepted. In the present case, R.W.1 himself in his evidence admitted that there are factories around the lands which are sought to be acquired. Further, the purpose of acquisition itself was to install an electric sub station. It has been held by the Supreme Court vide its decision in Sangunthala v. Tahsildar (LA) reported in (2010) 3 SCC 661 that potentiality of immediate use including relative advantages and facilities available on the acquired land can be considered. The following passages found in paragraphs 26 and 34 may be usefully extracted below:

"26. It should also be taken into consideration that the disputed lands were situated near the factory premises and further were adjoining the main road which connects Tanmag Road. As such the aforesaid lands are potential house sites.

34. In view of the admitted case that the lands acquired were potential house sites we do not agree with the views taken by the High Court while calculating the compensation. R-13 and R-15 are the two sale deeds containing particulars of the sale transactions held three years prior to the Section 4(1) notification. The Reference Court after close perusal of the aforesaid documents held that the same disclose that out of more than 100 sales, a number of sales in respect of the lands were sold as house sites in Thathaiyangarpatti Village and the adjacent survey numbers in Thekkampatty Village were also sold as house sites."

26.In the present case, the acquiring authority himself in his cross examination had admitted the locational advantages of the lands. In fact, it was surrounded by factories and also abutting the land, there is a National Highway going to Bangalore. It is also seen from the records that many of the comparable lands found in the statistical data were ignored deliberately to pay the compensation at the lower rate which was not accepted by the reference court. Excepting the assertion made by R.W.1 that Exs.C.1 and C.2 were relied on for the purpose of the case, there is no other evidence produced to show the nature of the transaction. In the absence of any proof forthcoming, the statements made in the ground of appeals cannot be the basis for rejecting the claim of respondents/claimants.

27.It must also be noted that in the very same area, few years before acquisitions were made for locating an industrial complex by SIPCOT near Hosur and also an housing scheme by TNHB. The acquisitions were done even as early as in the late 1980 and early 1990. The compensation fixed by a division bench of this court were more than Rs.2000/- and Rs.2500/- per cent. In the present case, the compensation fixed was only Rs.3000/- and Rs.3500/- per cent depending upon the location and the acquisition was after 10 to 15 years.

28.Though the learned Special Government Pleader (AS) attempted to state that these villages are near Hosur which is far away from the capital of Tamil Nadu i.e. Chennai, but it must be noted that they were very closer to the Metropolitan city of Bangalore (Karnataka State) and the land cost had considerably appreciated in that area as it was an hour drive to Bangalore City.

29.In the light of the above, this court is not inclined to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the reference court which are under appeal in a batch of cases. Even in respect of A.S.Nos.895 and 923 of 2009, the LRs have not been brought on record. Thus, those appeals are liable to be rejected not only on the ground of merits but also as having abated.

30.Hence all Appeal Suits will stand dismissed. However, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

31.Even though a common judgment is pronounced in these appeal suits, it is needless to state that the learned Special Government Pleader (AS) as well as the counsel for PGCI are entitled to get separate fees in respect of each appeal suit.

vvk To The Subordinate Court, Hosur

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