State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Emerging India Infra And Developers ... vs Mohan Lal on 22 April, 2024
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PUNJAB, CHANDIGARH.
First Appeal No.153 of 2024
Date of institution : 19.01.2024
Date of decision : 22.04.2024
Emerging India Infra and Developers Ltd., Guruharsahai, through its
Authorized Signatory Chandan Bajaj, resident of House No.212, Street
Karan Singh Sodhi, Adarsh Nagar, Mandi Guruharsahai, District
Ferozepur.
....Appellant/OP No.1
Versus
1. Mohan Lal S/o Hans Raj, R/o House No.C-155, Street No.12,
Old Post Office, Mandi Guruharsahai, District Ferozepur-152022.
....Respondent/Complainant
2. The National CO-O Nat Credit Society Limited, Shop No.3,
Sante Majra, opposite Divine World, Kharar, C/o Emerging India
Infra and Development Limited, SCO 46-47, First Floor, Sector
9-D, Madhya Marg, New Matka Chowk, Chandigarh-160017.
3. The National Co-op Nat Credit Society, 1st Floor, opposite Sunny
Enclave, above HDFC Bank, Kharar-Chandigarh Road, Mohali.
4. Emerging India Infra and Developers Ltd., Guruharsahai, through
its Authorized Signatory, SCO 46-47, First Floor, Sector 9-D,
Madhya Marg, New Matka Chowk, Chandigarh-160017.
....Respondents/OPs No.2, 4 & 5
First Appeal under Section 41 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against the
order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the
District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Ferozepur in EA No.55 of
2020.
First Appeal No.153 of 2024 2
Quorum:-
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Daya Chaudhary, President
Ms. Simarjot Kaur, Member
1) Whether Reporters of the Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes/No
3) Whether judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes/No Present:-
For the Appellant : Ms. Arshpreet Kaur, Advocate JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY, PRESIDENT The present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant/OP No.1 under Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter to be called as 'the Act') for setting aside the order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Ferozepur (in short, "the District Commission"), whereby the objections filed by the Appellant/OP No.1 had been dismissed and the case was adjourned for filing the list of the property.
2. It would be apposite to mention here that hereinafter the parties will be referred, as had been arrayed before the District Commission.
3. Briefly, the facts of the case, which are necessary for disposal of the present Appeal are that Respondent No.1/Complainant had filed the Consumer Complaint No.636 of 2018 against the OPs before the District Commission, which was allowed vide order dated First Appeal No.153 of 2024 3 01.11.2019. The relevant portion of said order as mentioned in Para- 12 is reproduced as under:
"12. For the reasons recorded above, the Complaint is allowed against opposite parties with ₹5,000/- as consolidated compensation for mental agony, pain and harassment and litigation expenses. Opposite parties are directed to refund an amount of ₹1,66,500/- as maturity amount to the Complainant along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of its maturity i.e. 18.04.2018 till its realization."
4. The OPs had failed to comply with the said order and thereafter, the Complainant filed the Execution Application before the District Commission. The Complaint was dismissed qua to the Appellant/OP No.1 & OP No.5 and it was allowed only against OPs No.2 to 4.
5. The Appellant filed the objections in the Execution Application that the Complaint was dismissed qua to him as per the observations made by the District Commission in Para-10 of the order dated 01.11.2019. However, the objections filed by the Appellant were dismissed by the District Commission vide impugned order dated 06.03.2023, which is reproduced as under:
"The learned Respondent for the Respondent No.1 has filed the objections by taking plea that as per para No.10 of the order dated 1.11.2019 the Complaint against opposite party Nos. 1 & 5 has been dismissed and accordingly the execution Application against Respondent Nos.1 & 5 is liable to be dismissed.
On the other hand, the learned Respondent for the applicant/Complainant has argued that in para No.10 of the order dated 1.11.2019 the learned Predecessor of this Commission has made reference for the plea taken by the parties and as such cannot be taken into consideration to the effect that Complaint has been dismissed against opposite party Nos.1 & 5. He has further argued that operative para in which the main relief has been given i.e. para No.12 is very much clear as per which the opposite parties are First Appeal No.153 of 2024 4 directed to refund Rs.1,66,500/- as maturity amount to the Complainant.
We have heard the learned Respondent for the parties and have gone through the order dated 1.11.2019. Although the reading of para No.10 is little bit unclear. However, perusal of order shows that arguments of the opposite parties has been discussed in para No.10 of the order. Since the operative para No.12 of the order, was clear shows that the opposite parties are directed to refund the amount and accordingly the para No.12, which is operative para is to be seen while executing the order. Accordingly objections filed by opposite party No.1 are dismissed. Now to come up for 20.3.2023 for filing list of property."
6. Said order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the District Commission has been challenged by the Appellant/OP No.1 by way of filing the present Appeal by raising a number of arguments.
7. There was a delay of 341 days in filing of the Appeal. Misc. Application No.452 of 2024 has been filed for condonation of delay, which is supported by an affidavit.
8. Ms. Arshpreet Kaur, learned Counsel for the Appellant/OP No.1 has submitted that the Appellant was not aware about the technicalities of law and procedure, due to which the Appeal could not be filed within the prescribed period. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the delay of 341 days in filing the Appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate but was due to the said reason. In case the delay is not condoned, the Appellant would suffer an irreparable loss and the purpose of filing the Appeal would be frustrated, as the case is good on merits.
9. We have heard the arguments raised by learned Counsel for the Appellant on the Application for condonation of delay. We have First Appeal No.153 of 2024 5 also carefully perused the impugned order passed by the District Commission and all other relevant documents available on the file.
10. In the Application for condonation of delay, simply it has been mentioned that the Appellant was not aware about the technicalities of law and as such the Appeal could not be filed within the period of limitation. The delay in filing the Appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate but was for the reasons beyond the control of the Appellant.
11. Section 41 of the Act is relating to filing of the Appeal against the order passed by the District Commission, before the State Commission, which is reproduced as under:
"41. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an Appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an Appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no Appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the Appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:
Provided also that no Appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80."
12. On perusal of Section 41 of the Act, it is apparent that the Appeal against the order passed by the District Commission is required to be filed before the State Commission within a period of 45 First Appeal No.153 of 2024 6 days from the date of the order. However, the State Commission may entertain the Appeal even after the expiry of the said period, only in case the State Commission is satisfied that there is 'sufficient cause' for not filing the Appeal within the statutory period.
13. The impugned order was passed on 06.03.2023, whereas present Appeal was filed on 09.01.2024 after a huge delay of 341 days. No 'sufficient cause' or explanation has been mentioned in the Application for not filing the Appeal within the period of limitation as provided under Section 41 of the Act. Simply it has been mentioned that the Appellant was not aware about the technicalities of the law and procedure and as such the delay of 341 had occurred in filing of the Appeal. It has further been mentioned that the delay is liable to be condoned as the Appellant is having a good case on merits and the balance of convenience also lies in his favour. However, it is settled proposition of law that ignorance of law or procedure is no ground to condone the delay. The Hon'ble Kerala High Court in the case of Fatima Educational & Charitable Trust v. Commissioner of Income Tax WP (C) 31709 of 2016 decided on 12.01.2017 has held that ignorance of law is no excuse to condone the delay. The relevant portion of said judgment is reproduced as under:
"2. While so, the petitioner approached the Tribunal with a delay of 1964 days. The Tribunal by a detailed order refused to condone the delay. The only ground raised in the affidavit accompanying delay condonation Application was the lack of understanding of the assessee with respect to the relevant procedure and the provisions of the Act. It is trite that ignorance of law is not an excuse and lack of understanding would also be akin to ignorance; which First Appeal No.153 of 2024 7 cannot validly be taken up. The delay is also huge coming to 1964 days. This Court does not find any reason for condoning the delay and is unable to persuade itself to interfere with the order of the Tribunal."
14. In another case of N. Tamilarasi & Ors. v. The Managing Director M.P. No.1 of 2015 in CMA SR No.10042 of 2015 decided on 08.04.2015, the Hon'ble Madras High Court has held as under:
"5. It is seen that the Award was passed as early on 20th September, 2007. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Moreover, the petitioners have not taken any appropriate legal advice. It cannot be a ground to condone the huge delay. If this kind of petitions are allowed, a lot of similar cases would be filed by the parties and the Courts will be burdened with many such cases. There is also no proper explanation for condoning the delay. This petition is dismissed."
15. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled as Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. Civil Appeal No.2075 of 2010 decided on 26.02.2010 had rejected/dismissed the Application for condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an Application in setting aside an ex parte decree on the ground that the explanation given for condonation of delay was not satisfactory. The relevant portion of said judgment as mentioned in Para-13 & 14 is reproduced as under:
"13. From what we have noted above, it is clear that the Law Department of Respondent No.1 was very much aware of the proceedings of the first as well as the second suit. In the first case, Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel was appointed as an advocate and in the second case Shri B.R. Sharma was instructed to appear on behalf of the Respondents, but none of the officers is shown to have personally contacted either of the advocates for the purpose of filing written statement and preparation of the case and none bothered to appear before the trial Court on any of the dates of hearing. It is a First Appeal No.153 of 2024 8 matter of surprise that even though an officer of the rank of General Manager (Law) had issued instructions to Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel to appear and file vakalat as early as in May 2001 and Manager (Law) had given vakalat to Shri B.R. Sharma, Advocate in the month of May 2005, in the Application filed for condonation of delay, the Respondents boldly stated that the Law Department came to know about the ex parte decree only in the month of January/February 2008. The Respondents went to the extent of suggesting that the parties may have arranged or joined hands with some employee of the corporation and that may be the reason why after engaging advocates, nobody contacted them for the purpose of giving instructions for filing written statement and giving appropriate instructions which resulted in passing of the ex parte decrees. In our view, the above statement contained in para 1 of the Application is not only incorrect but is ex facie false and the High Court committed grave error by condoning more than four years' delay in filing of Appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
14. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Application for condonation of delay filed by the Respondents is dismissed. As a corollary, the Appeal filed by the Respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred by time.
16. In another case titled as Basawaraj & Anr. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer Civil Appeal No.6974 of 2013 decided on 22.08.2013, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had declined to condone the delay, as the sufficient explanation for condonation of delay was not furnished. The relevant portion of said judgment is reproduced as under:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be First Appeal No.153 of 2024 9 exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the Application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:
"330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence".
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by First Appeal No.153 of 2024 10 long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches.
(See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The Application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.
16. In view of above, no interference is required with impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The Appeals lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed. ..."
17. In one more case titled as Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. Civil Appeal No.7696 of 2021 decided on 16.12.2021, the Hon'ble Supreme Court by relying upon the aforesaid judgment had refused to condone the huge delay of 1011 days in filing the Second Appeal for want of bonafide and sufficient cause/reasons.
18. Further, the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case "Union of India & Ors. Vs Hari Singh", 2009(4) RCR (Civil)-654, had declined to condone the delay for taking the matter in a casual manner. In Para-7, it was observed as follows:- First Appeal No.153 of 2024 11
"Even otherwise, no explanation is forthcoming from 15.09.2004 to 18.01.2005 for not filing the Appeal. The pleadings in Application itself show that the matter was being taken in most casual manner, without bothering for the law of limitation".
19. In view of the facts and circumstances as well as the law as laid down in the above noted judgments, it is settled proposition of law that the statutory provisions may cause hardship or inconvenience to the party but the Court has no option but to enforce it. The legal maxim 'dura lex sed lex', which means 'the law is hard but it is the law', is applicable in such like cases. Further, 'sufficient cause' is a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute with regard to limitation. In the present case, no 'sufficient cause' or explanation has been mentioned in the Application for condonation of huge delay of 341 days in filing of the Appeal. The ignorance of law/procedure is also no ground to condone the delay as per the settled law as laid down in a number of judgments. Even the matter of filing the Appeal was taken in a casual manner without bothering about the limitation period.
20. Accordingly, finding no force in the contentions raised by learned Respondent for the Appellant, the Misc. Application No.452 of 2024 for condonation of delay in filing of the Appeal is dismissed. Since the Application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, so the Appeal is also dismissed being barred by limitation.
First Appeal No.153 of 2024 12
21. Since the main case has been disposed off, so all the pending Miscellaneous Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed off.
(JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY) PRESIDENT (SIMARJOT KAUR) MEMBER April 22, 2024.
(Gurmeet S)