Karnataka High Court
Smt. Iravva And Ors. vs The Assistant Commissioner, Dharward ... on 9 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1996KAR3492, 1996(7)KARLJ394, 1996 A I H C 5546
ORDER M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. Heard learned Advocates. These two Civil Revision Petitions involve a common point of law and they are therefore being heard and disposed of together. The facts are hardly in dispute in so far as the petitioners' lands were acquired by the State under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, for the benefit of the second respondents K.S.R.T.C. arid these proceedings culminated in an award in the year 1963. These two petitioners received their compensation and it is contended that they had migrated elsewhere in search of work and were therefore unaware of the subsequent developments. Several other similarly situated persons whose lands had also been acquired applied for a reference to the Court for enhancement of compensation which proceedings went up from the District Court and ultimately culminated before the High Court on 30.12.1986. there is one other significant date which assumes importance which is 30.3.1977, namely the date on which the District Court disposed of the matter prior to its reaching the High Court. After the High Court had finally disposed of the matter whereunder compensation was enhanced from Rs. 200/- per gunta to Rs. 300/-per gunta, the present petitioners who are effectively the legal heirs of the original land holders had applied to the Land Acquisition Officer for award of enhanced compensation to them at the rate which the High Court had awarded to the other similarly situated persons and these applications came to be filed on 2.12.86 and 30.12.86. The contention was that under the provisions of Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act the present petitioners would be entitled to the higher compensation as has been awarded to the other land owners irrespective of the fact that these petitioners had not challenged the earlier award. The Land Acquisition Officer computed the two awards with interest etc. and even drafted out the award dated 30.10.1987. However, the copy of the award was not handed over to the petitioners despite repeated requests and it is alleged that subsequently the Land Acquisition Officer reconsidered the matter, reviewed his decision and communicated to the petitioners that they were not entitled to the benefit of the amended Section 28(A). They thereupon filed the present proceedings being Miscellaneous Case Nos. 28 & 29/1 in the Court of the Learned Civil Judge, Hubli. The Trial Court after considering the position in law dismissed the applications principally on the ground that the contention raised by the respondents namely that the provisions of the amended Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act would not apply to the petitioners was valid and that therefore, the contention of the Land Acquisition Officer did not require to be interfered with. The Trial Court relied heavily on the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in the case of LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, BIDAR v. BALAPPA AND ORS., 1992(1)K.L.J. P 471 wherein this Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act and to hold that this Section which came into force on 24.9.1984 could only be applied prospectively and not retrospectively. The Division Bench took the view that parties in whose cases the orders have been passed to that date would not be eligible for the benefit of that Section. The Trial Court has effectively applied the law as laid down by the Division Bench and dismissed the application and it is against this common order that the present C.R.Ps. have been filed.
2. The petitioners learned Advocate has advanced two submissions. First of them is that he has emphasized the factual position namely that the petitioners are persons who were rendered landless as a result of the acquisition, that they migrated from that place and having regard to their illiteracy and economic conditions that the delay that has occurred should not be held against them. He submits that Section 28(A) does make provision for extension of time in so far as the time period for obtaining the copy of the judgment etc. are required to be excluded. Certain reasons have been set out by the petitioners in their applications which are marginally outside the three months time limit because the High Court has disposed of the matter on 11.7.86. Applying the proviso to Section 28(A)(1), I am not inclined to uphold the plea canvassed by the respondents that the applications are not maintainable because they are time barred. To my mind, the applications will have to be treated as having been made within the time prescribed by Section 28(A).
3. On the more important aspect, petitioners, learned Advocate submitted that the reasoning of the learned Trial Judge is erroneous. He submits that the Division Bench ruling referred to by me earlier of this Court, has wrongly been applied by the learned Trial Judge to the facts of the present case. Learned Advocate submits that the ruling would apply in all such cases where the award has become final prior to 24.9.84 when Section 28(A) came into force. He contends that in the present instance, the High Court finally disposed of the proceedings only on 11.7.86 which is quite long after Section 28(A) came into force and that therefore there can be no dispute about the fact that the provisions of that Section would apply to the petitioners cases.
4. This contention has been vehemently opposed by the learned Government Advocate as. also by the learned Advocate who represents R-2 namely K.S.R.T.C. They have both advanced submissions more or less along common lines whereby they have contended that the Division Bench judgment applies very clearly to the facts of the present case. They demonstrate that the award was made in the year 1963 and that the District Court disposed of the matter in 1977 which was 7 years prior to Section 28(A) coming into operation. It is their contention that merely because some of the parties went in appeal to the High Court and the High Court had occasion to modify the original award as far as the quantum of compensation was concerned, that this would not make any difference to the case because the date on which the Reference Court disposed of the matter is what is material. They have contended that consequently the order passed by the Trial Court does not deserve to be interfered with. The learned Advocates advanced one more submission namely that unless the Court upholds this view, that in effect it would conflict with the ratio of the Division Bench decision because it would virtually apply to a large number of cases in which the awards were made prior to Section 28(A) coming into operation and merely because those proceedings were pending before some appellate forum on that date, that it would create an incongruous situation in respect of cases long before the provision came on the statute book. They submitted that it was for this reason that the Division Bench very clearly laid down the law and that the date on which the award was made or the date on which the Reference Court disposed of the matter is the material date.
5. The real question is as to whether on the facts of the present case the applications were maintainable or not. I have already held that the three months period within which the applications should have been filed cannot be rigorously enforced against the present petitioners because there is ample reason in the grounds set out by them and hence, they would have to be treated as having been made within the prescribed period of time. Whether however Section 28(A) applies to the present case is the real issue. We have on the one hand the Division Bench decision which clearly states that retrospective application cannot be given to Section 28(A), and if the date of the award which is the year 1963 or the date on which Reference Court disposed of the matter in 1977 are to be taken into consideration, the petitioners are virtually out of Court. If however the contentions advanced by the learned Advocate that the year 1986 namely the date on which the High Court disposed of the matter is the material date, then the applications would be clearly maintainable.
6. I need to point out here that Section 28(A) takes cognizance of the date on which the award has become final. The opening part of the Section refers to a situation in which "the Court allows the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section........." This presupposes a stage subsequent to the date on which the Collector has disposed of the matter. It clearly refers to a judicial forum namely the Court and therefore it is clear that the legislature had in mind a situation whereby the award in question is enhanced. That can either be done by the Reference Court or in a given situation this could take place at some later stage of the litigation either before the High Court of the Supreme Court. In a situation such as this, the award cannot be said to have become final at the stage when the Reference Court disposes of the matter unless neither of the parties carries it further. If the matter is carried further in appeal, it stands to reason that the date on which the Appeal Court disposed of the matter is the material date. This must be so because even if the appeal Court were to ultimately confirm 'the earlier award, the position that emerges is that this Court has to take into account a situation whereby the award may have been enhanced by the Appeal Court and the law has got to be uniformly applied to both situations. If on the one hand the Section is interpreted to mean that the expression 'Court' is taken to be the Court which finally disposed of the proceedings which is the only way in which the Section can be correctly interpreted, then it will have to be the last Court because otherwise, the Section cannot be logically interpreted. It is in these circumstances that it is very dear that if the litigation has continued, that the last Court which disposed of the matter and at whose hands the awards became final is to be taken as the Court which the legislature referred to in Section 28(A). That Court in the present instance happens to be the High Court which disposed of the matter on. 11.7.86. That date being after the date on which Section 28(A) came on to the statute book the provisions of Section 28(A) would clearly apply to the facts of the present-petitioners. The orders passed by the Trial Court dismissing the applications on the ground of maintainability would clearly be incorrect. In taking, this view, I am not in the least in conflict with the reasoning of the Division Bench in the decision referred to by me earlier.
7. There is however one other last aspect of the matter which must be considered very carefully. The learned Government Advocate and learned Advocate who represents the second respondents have drawn my attention to one of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court reported in J.A.C.D.R. RODRIGUESES v. LAO, wherein, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court has occasion to refer this very question to a larger Bench. The learned Judges have pointed out that two of the earlier decisions reported in BABU RAM v. STATE OF UP., AIR 1995 SCW 65 and UNION OF INDIA v. KARNAIL SINGH, were cases in which a view has been expressed that the limitation would run from the date on which the award was originally made and that it may not be correct to contend that a successive cause of action arises when each of the subsequent Courts disposes of the matter. In the latest decision, the learned Judges have clearly expressed the difficulty in accepting the earlier view and have therefore referred the matter to a larger Bench. Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary for this Court to pass a conditional order because the position in law is still undecided.
8. The order passed by the Trial Court is set aside and the two cases are remanded to the Trial Court. The original proceedings which were dismissed are restored to file. The Trial court shall however await the decision of the Supreme Court and as soon as the decision is available, depending on the view taken by the Supreme Court the Trial Court shall proceed further in the matter. If the Supreme Court upholds the view that a successive cause of action arises and that it is the date on which the last Court has decided the matter is the material date, then the Land Acquisition Officer shall be directed to award to the petitioners the higher compensation at the rate of Rs. 300/- per gunta which was awarded by the High Court. The petitioners would be entitled to the difference between what was originally awarded to them and the enhanced rate, undoubtedly, the petitioners would be entitled to interest on this amount but as far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, I consider that having regard to the special facts and circumstances of this case, that it would not be fair to burden the State with the heavy burden of interest even if, the petitioners are entitled to the enhanced interest for the period after the date on which the applications were made by them to the Land Acquisition Officer. Accordingly, the petitioners would only be entitled to interest even if they are entitled to enhanced compensation upto 30.12.1986 and 2.12.1986 respectively. I need to need to record here that I am upholding the objection canvassed by the learned Government Advocate and the learned Advocate who represents Respondent No. 2 when they have pointed out that irrespective of the fact that the petitioners may be entitled to the enhanced compensation, that the respondents should not be burdened with the payment of heavy interest for several years because the applicants came forward at a very late stage. This objection to my mind, is reasonable and it is on that basis that I have prescribed the cut-off date.
9. The Civil Revision Petitions accordingly succeed and stand disposed of. No order as to costs.