Jharkhand High Court
Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs Md. Khalil on 16 April, 2024
Author: Rajesh Kumar
Bench: Rajesh Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
M.A. No.134 of 2016
----
Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Branch Manager, Branch Office at Hindustan Building, Bistupur, P.O. & P.S. Bistupur, represented through its Senior Divisional Manager, Divisional Office, Ranchi .... .... Appellant(s)
-Versus-
1. Md. Khalil
2. Noor Jahan Khatoon
3. Rubeda Khatoon
4. Md Khalif
5. Md Shaif
6. Md Shahid
7. Md Asiruddin .... .... Respondent(s)
----
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
----
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Pratyush Kumar, Adv.
For the Respondent Nos.1 to 5 : Mr. Peeyush Krishna Choudhary, Adv.
For the Respondent No.7 : Mr. Yogesh Modi, Adv.
----
th
12/Dated: 16 April, 2024
1. Heard the parties.
2. The present miscellaneous appeal has been filed by the appellant- Insurance Company impugning Award dated 26.08.2015 passed by the learned District Judge-III-cum-M.A.C.T., Jamshedpur, in Compensation Case No.37 of 2009.
3. The only issue raised in the present miscellaneous appeal is that 'Whether the death was an accidental or it was a murder simpliciter.'
4. The relevant portion of the material available on record before the Tribunal is quoted herein below:-
"22. The other information which:-
May be helpful in this case. That the deceased Mukhtar Ansari @ Shahid was the khalasi of a Truck bearing registration No-HR-38M- 8690 after loading the iron pipe from the Tube Company was to proceed for Guargaon and they parked the Truck loaded with the outside the gate of the said company., thereafter the said driver in concert and collusion with the other associates waited to misappropriate the goods. In the meantime the driver fled away, thereafter the associates of the deceased Mukhtar @ Shahid then changed their attitude and murdered the said Khalasi of the above said Truck and the body was thrown in a bush near Nala of Citi Inn Hotel in Pardih and the dead body was recovered from there."
5. The content of the First Information Report being Burmamines (Golmuri) P.S. Case No.244 of 2007 dated 20th August, 2007 is quoted herein below:-
lsok esa] Fkkuk izHkkjh cekZekbUl Fkkuk] te'ksniqj egk'k;] fuosnu ;g gS fd eSa f'kodqekj vxzoky firk Jh eksrhyky vxzoky] LFkk;h irk] ¶ysV u0 307] vkdk'k Vkoj] fMeuk jksM] ekuxks ¼myhMhg vks0ih0½ te'ksniqj orZeku eSa eSllZ lqij lksfud dSfj;j izk0 fy0] :e u0 12] VªkUliksVZuxj] fMeuk jksM] ekuxks] ¼myhMhg vks0ih0½ te'ksniqj dk 'kk[kk izca/kd gw¡A eSa vius vius dEiuh dk eky Vªd daiuh] cekZekbUl te'ksniqj ls Vªd u0%&HR-38M-8690 ds }kjk yksgk ikbi 15-160 MT ftldk :i;k 5]15]586-51 gS fnukad 18-08- 2007 dks V~;wc daiuh ls yksM gksdj la/;k 7-40 cts daiuh xsV ls ckgj fudydj xqM+xk¡o ds fy, tkuk Fkk ijUrq Vªd ua0 HR-38M-8690 ds pkyd eks0 edcqy vgen firk Jh xqyke jlqy] irk xzke&:fiu Fkkuk&pkSikj.k ftyk>kjhckx ,oa [kyklh lghn vgen firk&dYyq vUlkjh] xzke&dqjh;kMhg] egkjktxat Fkkuk&pkSikj.k nksuksa ftyk>kjhckx us dEiuh ls ckgj xkM+h [kM+h dj j[kkA tSlk fd pkyd us crk;k Vªd pkyd eks0 edcqy vgen us fnukad 19-08-2007 dks lqcg 7-00 cts czksdj Jh gjhizlkn nkaxh firk Jh [ksou egrks] xzke&nkniqj Fkkuk&pkSikj.k] ftyk>kjhckx ds ek/;e ls nwjHkk"k }kjk lqfpr fd;s fd fnukad 18-08-2007 dks djhc 12-00 cts jkf= ds yxHkx V~;cw dEiuh dh ikfdZax ls Vªd ua0%&HR-38M 8690 eky lfgr [kyklh ds lkFk xk;c gS geyksx jkrHkj b/kj&m/kj irk fd;s rks dqN Hkh irk ugha pyk blds ckn vkidks lqpuk ns jgk gw¡A esjk iq.kZ fo'okl gS fd Vªd ua0 HR-38M-8690 ds pkyd ,oa [kyklh rFkk dqN vU; yksxksa fd fefyHkxr ls mDr Vªd eky lfgr vekur esa [k;kur fd;k gSA vr% Jheku ls izkFkZuk gS fd blij mfpr dk;ZokbZ dj esjk eky dk irk djus esa lg;ksx fd;k tk,A Fkkuk ij lqpuk dqN foyac ls ns jgk gw¡ pwafd vius Lrj ls dkQh [kkstchu dj jgs FksA
6. The final-form has been submitted by the police, wherein, the deceased as well as the driver of the vehicle have been charge-sheeted for the offence under Sections 407, 120(B), 396, 412 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
7. From perusal of the same, it appears that dacoity has been committed in the factory premises, which was being carried out by the driver and Khalasi of the said vehicle. The Driver, Khalasi (deceased) and other associates have been charge-sheeted by the police.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rita Devi & Others vrs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd and Another reported in (2000) 5 SCC 113. Paragraph Nos. 10 & 14 of the said judgment as well as the facts of the case are as follows:-
Page | 2 M.A. No.134 of 2016"10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that "murder", as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a "murder" which is not an accident and a "murder" which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the Act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder.
14. Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the autorickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare-paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the autorickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the autorickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the autorickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the autorickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the autorickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the autorickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the autorickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing theft of the autorickshaw.
Facts:- Some unknown passengers hired the autorickshaw from the rickshaw stand and the dead body of the driver was recovered on next day. The act of killing was committed for furtherance of the object of robbery but the Hon'ble Supreme Court has outlined the law as to when "act of killing/ murder" would be "accidental murder" and "when it shall be not an accidental murder"
Held:- If the dominant intention of the 'act of felony' is 'to kill any particular person', then such killing is 'not accidental murder'.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Dhela Rani & Anr vrs. Deepak Prasad & Ors., reported in (2009) 1 JLJR 216. Paragraph Nos.6 to 17 of the said judgment as well as the facts of the case are as follows:-
"6. In the book "Law of Insurance" by Raoul Colinvaux, (Fifth Edition), the author defines the word as under:-
"Definition of "accident"Page | 3 M.A. No.134 of 2016
The definition of the risk insured against under accident policies occasions peculiar difficulty. Many of the questions on them arise concerning the true meaning of the word "accident," and it is difficult so to define the word as to include the innumerable mishaps which happen in the dally course of human life:
and it is often equally difficult to decide whether a mishap comes within the risk taken, or the exceptions made, by the terms of a particular policy. Accident excludes intentional act of assured.
Nor is an intentional act of the assured an "accident" however unforeseen an Injury may be which results from it. There was held to be nothing accidental in the assured pushing and pulling a drunken man from his premises, even though, unknown to him, his heart was in so weak a condition that he died from the exertion. Thus, there is no accident where a person with a weak heart injures it by running to catch a train. In a Scottish case the assured was putting on his stockings when he felt something give way in his inside," and soon died. He was held not to be covered by an accident policy. In South Africa a drunken man intentionally driving dangerously was held not to have been killed as a result of an "accident.
7. In the book " Law of Motor Insurance" by Robert Merkin and Jeremy Stuart-smith, First Edition, the term 'accident' has been defined as:-
"The word "accident" is ambiguous, and might refer to what has happened from the point of view of the victim (in that he has suffered unexpected injury) or from the point of view of the driver (in that the victim's injuries were caused unintentionally). The difference between these two possibilities is brought into sharp focus in a deliberate running down case: injuries inflicted may be regarded as an accident in the former sense but not in the latter sense. The point divided the Court of Appeal in Charlton v. Fisher, the majority view being that a deliberate running down could be classified as an accident for the purposes of policy coverage. It may be that the point is of no real significance, as a direct action under the 2002 Regulations is probably unavailable on the separate ground that the rights of the victim as against insurers are the same as those of the assured, but that public policy precludes any action by the assured."
8. The term 'accident' caused controversy. Did it imply as in criminal jurisprudence, absence of mens rea or was mens rea irrelevant as In insurance contract Lord Macnaghten in Fenton's v. Thorely case, (1903) AC 443) observed that the Act used accident' in its popular sense as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. (1972) ACJ 492, para 13.
9. In Halsbury's Law of England, Fourth Edition at para. 569, the term 'accident' has been defined as under:
"569. Meaning of 'accident', the event insured against may be indicated in the policy solely by reference to the phrase 'injury by accident' or the equivalent Page | 4 M.A. No.134 of 2016 phrase 'accidental injury', or it may be indicated as 'injury caused by or resulting from an accident'. The word 'accident', or its adjective 'accidental', is no doubt used with the intention of excluding the operation of natural causes such as old age, congenital or insidious disease or the natural progression of some constitutional physical or mental defect; but the of (sic) what is included by the word is not entirely clear. It has been said that what is postulated is the intervention of some cause which is brought into operation by chance so as to be fairly describable as fortuitous. The idea of something haphazard is not necessarily inherent in the word; it covers any unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed or any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence. The test of what is unexpected is whether the ordinary reasonable man would not have expected the occurrence, it being Irrelevant that a person with expert knowledge, for example of medicine, would have regarded, it as inevitable. The standpoint is that of the victim, so that even wilful murder may be accidental as far as the victim is concerned."
10. In para-575 of the Halsbury's Laws of England, it is mentioned that injury caused by a wilful act is not an accident. Paragraph 575 reads as under:-
"575. Injury caused by a wilful act. An injury caused by the wilful or even criminal act of a third person, provided the Insured is not a party or privy to it, is to be regarded as accidental for the purposes of the policy, since from the insured's point of view it is not expected or designed. Injuries sustained by a gamekeeper in a criminal attack upon him by poachers, by a cashier who was murdered by a robber, and by a master at an industrial school who was murdered by the boys, have been held to be accidental. However, if the immediate cause of the Injury is the deliberate and wilful act of the insured himself, there would seem to be no accident, and no claim will lie under the policy, at any rate if the insured is not mentally disordered at the time of his act."
11. The word Accident as expressed by Lord Halsbury, LC in Hamilton Frazor and Co. v. Pandrof & Co., (1887) 12 APP Cas 518, 524, is the idea of something fortuitous and unexpected. Therefore, an injury is said to be accidentally caused whensoever it is neither wilfully nor negligently caused.
12. According to Willes, J in Fenwick v. Schmalz, (1868) LR 3 CP 313, 316, an accident is not the same as an occurrence, but is something that happens out of the ordinary course of the things. According to Oxford dictionary, accident is an unfortunate event which is unintentional and unexpected'. An effect is said to be accidental when the act by which it is caused is not done with the intention to causing it.
13. The main dispute raised by the Insurance Company is that the death of the employee namely the driver of the vehicle cannot be said to be an accident arising Page | 5 M.A. No.134 of 2016 out of and during the course of employment. The term 'accident' has not been defined under the aforesaid Act, but the law in this regard has been well settled. The word 'accident would mean kind of event which is unlooked for and sudden and cause personal Injury. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is in pari materia with the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. A similar question came for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Abida Khatoon v. General Manager, Diesel Locomotive, Varanasi, (1972 ACJ
489): (1973 Lab IC 666) and their Lordships have considered the English decisions while determining the meaning and connotation of the term 'accident' arising out of and in course of employment. The Full Bench followed various decisions, including the view taken by the Court of appeal in Nishet v. Reyne, (1910 (2) KB 689) and Anderson v. Balfour, (1910 (2) IR 497) and held that the definition of of accident extended to case of death by murder. It was observed that injury by 'accident' is an integrated phrase and an event in the ordinary and popular sense can be described as an accident even though it was caused by deliberate violence.
14. It is well settled that the word 'accident' excludes the idea of wilful and intentional act, but it includes 'murder' as it was an accidental happening so far as the workman is concerned. The term 'accident' for the purpose of law relating to compensation for personal injury sustained by workman and the employer's liability in that behalf includes any injury which is not designed by the workman himself and it is of no consequence that the injury was designed and intended by the person inflicting the same. In Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. Kelly, (1914 AC 667) where an Assistant Master at an industrial school was assaulted and killed by two of the pupils while the Assistant Master was performing his duties, the House of Lords held that his death was caused by an accident for the purpose of the same statute. Viscount Haldane L.C. pointed out that the meaning of the term 'accident' would vary according as the context varies, and as instances mentioned criminal jurisprudence where crime and accident are sharply divided by the presence or absence of mens rea and the law of marine insurance where the maxim In Jure non remote causa set proxima spectator (in law the proximate, and not the remote, cause is to be regarded) applies. The learned Lord Chancellor said-
"My Lords, if we had to consider the principle of the Workmen's Compensation Act as res Integra, I should be of opinion that the principle was one more akin to insurance at the expense of the employer of the workman against accidents arising out of and in the course of his employment than to the imposition on the employer of liability for anything for which he might reasonably be made answerable on the ground that he ought to have foreseen and Page | 6 M.A. No.134 of 2016 prevented it. I think that the fundamental conception is that of insurance in the true sense.
And if so it appears to me to follow that in giving a meaning to 'accident' in its context in such a scheme one would look naturally to the proximo causa of which Lord Herschell & Lord Barmwell spoke in connection with marine Insurance, the kind of event which is unlooked for and sudden, and causes personal Injury, and is limited only by this, that it must arise out of and in the course of the employment. Behind this event it appears to us that the purpose of the statute renders it irrelevant to search for explanations or remote causes, provided the circumstances brings it within the definition. No doubt, the analogy of the Insurance cases must not, as Lord Lindlev points out in his judgment in Fenton v. Thorley be applied so as to exclude from the cause of injury the accident that really caused it, merely because an intermediate condition of the Injury in that case a rupture arising from an effort voluntarily made to move defective machine has Intervened. If, so far as the workman is concerned, unexpected misfortune happens and injury is caused which the statute seems to me to Impose in the interest of the employer, who cannot escape from being a statutory insurer, is that the risk should have arisen out of and in the course of the employment."
15. In the case of Fenton v. J. Thorely & Company Ltd., (1903 AC 443) it was held that in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, the word 'accident' was used in popular and ordinary sense and meant mishap or untoward event not expected or designed. Lord Lindley has observed that the word 'accident' is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause; and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called an accident. The word 'accident' is also often used to denote both the cause and the effect no attempt being made to discriminate between them. The great majority of what are called accidents are occasioned by carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often important to distinguish careless from other unintended and unexpected events.
16. Besides the various English decisions, some of which have been referred to hereinabove, I must also take notice of one important decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhagubal v. General Manager, Central Railway, (AIR 1955 Bombay 105) in which the provision of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was considered and the principle of law has been laid down. His Lordship Chagla, C.J. held:
"Now, it is clear that there must be a causal connection between the accident and the employment in order that the Court can say that the accident Page | 7 M.A. No.134 of 2016 arose out of the employment of the deceased. It is equally clear that the cause contemplated is the proximate cause and not any remote cause. The authorities have clearly laid down that if the employee in the course of his employment has to be in a particular place and by reason of his being in that particular place he has to face a peril and the accident is caused by reason of that peril which he has to face, then a causa connection is established between the accident and the employment. It is now well settled that the fact that the employee shares that peril with other members of the public is an irrelevant consideration. It is true that the peril which he faces must not be something personal to him; the peril must be incidental to his employment It is also clear that he must not by his own act add to the peril or extend the peril. But if the peril which he faces has nothing to do with his own action or his own conduct, but it is a peril which would have been faced by any other employee or any other member of the public, then if the accident arises out of such peril, a cause connection is established between the employment and the accident.
In this particular case what is established is that the employee while in the course of his employment found himself in a spot where he was assaulted and stabbed to death. He was in the place where he was murdered by reason of his employment. He would have been safely in his bed but for the fact that he had to join duty, and he had to pass this spot in order to join his duty. Therefore, the connection between the employment and the accident is established..."
17. Similar question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., ((2000) 5 SCC 113): (AIR 2000 SC 1930), where the Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between murder and death arising out of accident. In that case, the fact was that some unknown persons hired an auto- rickshaw, but subsequently stole away the same and killed the driver. The legal representatives of the driver filed a claim case for the grant of compensation on the ground that the driver died in course of employment. The Tribunal allowed the claim against the owner of the auto-rickshaw and also fastened legal and statutory liability. However, the High Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the case was one of murder and not that of an accident. The matter ultimately went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court clearly laid down distinction between murder and death arising out of an accident. For better appreciation, paragraphs 10, 14 and 18 of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
"10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that "murder", as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a "murder" which is not an accident and a "murder" which is Page | 8 M.A. No.134 of 2016 an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder.
14. Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case In hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the autorickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare-paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the autorickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the autorickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the autorickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the autorickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the autorickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the autorickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the autorickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing theft of the autorickshaw.
18. In the instant case, as we have noticed the facts, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the murder of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the claimants were entitled for compensation as claimed by them and the High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the death of Dasarath Singh was not caused by an accident involving the use of motor vehicle."
Facts:- The Offender-Raju Thathera used the vehicle as a weapon to kill the deceased. Thus the dominant intention was to kill.
Held as under:
Word 'Accident' not defined under the M.V Act, 1988 or Emp. Compensation Act, 1923. "Accident'' would mean and include unlooked for mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed. The standpoint is that of the victim."
10. On the strength of above factual matrix and the judgments quoted herein above, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that if the dominant factor is the crime then the claim under the Motor Vehicle Act is not available.
11. It has been argued that since the Driver as well as the Khalasi (deceased) were involved in the commission of crime and furthermore, the deceased was himself involved in the commission of crime and as such, it Page | 9 M.A. No.134 of 2016 was a crime of dominant factor, not an accident. Since the death was occurred during the commission of crime, it is nothing to do with the performance of duty.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the claimants has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd vrs. Gangadhar Pathak & Ors in M.A. No.239 of 2008. Paragraph No.7 of the said judgment is quoted herein below:-
"7. The principle of law laid down by the Apex Court settles the law on the point and the question in such cases that need to be asked is whether murder was the dominant motive for the offence or it was the accidental consequence of it. Here in the present case the deceased was the driver of the trailer and a consignment of iron rods were booked for Delhi. On the fateful night the vehicle was hijacked, looted and the young driver was murdered in cold blood. After the dead body was found, the case was registered under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC but police after investigation submitted charge sheet (Ext. 2) under Section 396 of the IPC. This substantiates the claimants case that the murder was in furtherance and accidental consequence of commission of the dacoity.
13. From the arguments and pleadings of the learned counsel for the parties and the materials available on record, the factual matrix which emerges are as follows:-
(i) The Khalasi, in question, has been murdered by alleged associates during course of committing dacoity.
(ii) The driver, in question, has fled away.
(iii) The deceased himself was involved in the commission of crime.
14. The judgments cited herein above is clear on the point that if dominant intention was dacoity then it was not accidental rather murder simpliciter. If 'act of murder' was originally not intended rather it has been caused in furtherance of any felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder.
15. In the aforesaid mentioned cases, the deceased was not involved in the commission of crime, rather, crime was being committed by person other than the deceased.
16. In the present case, the deceased himself was involved in the commission of crime, it appears that due to the internal dispute between the dacoits, the death was occurred and caused by co-accused and further, vehicle was not the cause.Page | 10 M.A. No.134 of 2016
17. Since it was an internal dispute between the dacoits, which is the cause of death, the death cannot be termed as an accidental, rather, it is a simpliciter crime. There is other reason also that the deceased himself was a criminal and there was dispute amongst the criminals. Thus, in course of commission of crime, the death was occurred. The person, who was involved in the commission of crime cannot claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
18. In view of the above discussion and the materials available on record, this Court finds that Khalasi (deceased) was involved in the commission of dacoity and in course of commission of dacoity, he has been killed by other co-accused. Thus, it will not fall in the arena of the accident, rather, it is an arena of crime and as such, the claimants are not entitled for any compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
19. Accordingly, the Award dated 26.08.2015 passed by the learned District Judge-III-cum-M.A.C.T., Jamshedpur, in Compensation Case No.37 of 2009 is hereby, quashed and set-aside.
20. Accordingly, the present miscellaneous appeal is hereby allowed and disposed of.
21. The statutory amount deposited by the appellant-Insurance Company shall be returned to the appellant-Insurance Company.
(Rajesh Kumar, J.) Raja/-
Uploaded Page | 11 M.A. No.134 of 2016