Allahabad High Court
Radhey Shyam Birla vs Union Of India Secy Textiles And Others on 25 November, 2019
Author: Sudhir Agarwal
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD (A.F.R.) Court No. - 34 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 30517 of 2005 Petitioner :- Radhey Shyam Birla Respondent :- Union Of India Secy Textiles And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Kshetresh Chandra Shukla, Vivek Kumar Singh Counsel for Respondent :- S.S.C., Devendra Pratap Singh, Jitendra Nath Sharma, Kirtika Singh, V.B. Singh Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
1. Heard Sri Vivek Kumar Singh, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Devendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for respondents.
2. Petitioner was an employee of National Textiles Corporation (U.P.) Limited (hereinafter referred to as "NTCL") which was having its unit New Victoria Mills at Kanpur. He was appointed on 27.04.1984 as Cotton Selector (non-gazetted post). Several units of NTCL suffered losses and declared sick, therefore, Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme (hereinafter referred to as "MVRS") was launched by Respondent-Employer and pursuant whereto, petitioner submitted letter dated 31.07.2002 resigning from service. Said letter reads as under:-
^^jk"V~h; iquokZl ;kstuk }kjk lapkfyr lalksf/kr LoSfPNd lsokfuo`fRr ;kstuk ds vUrxZr fey dh lwpuk fnukad 13&6&2002] ,oa 27&7&2002 ds ifjizs{; esa viuk R;kx i= nsuk pkgrk gwaA vr% fuosnu gS fd izkFkhZ ds lsokdky ls lEcfU/kr leLr ns;ksa dk Hkqxrku lqfuf'pr djrs gq, R;kx i= Lohdkj djus dh d`ik djsaA** "Under amended Voluntary Retirement Scheme run by National Rehabilitation Plan, in the light of information dated 13.6.2002 and 27.7.2002, I wish to tender my resignation.
It is, therefore, requested that resignation of applicant be kindly accepted ensuring all payments payable to him relating to his service period." (Emphasis added) (English Translation by Court)
3. However, before it could be accepted, petitioner submitted another letter dated 07.07.2003 withdrawing his resignation letter dated 31.07.2002. A reminder letter dated 21.07.2003 was also submitted by petitioner to Officer on Special Duty Unit at Kanpur intimating that he is withdrawing his resignation and in this regard he has already submitted letter dated 07.07.2003, therefore, his resignation should not be accepted. Averments in respect of withdrawal of resignation vide letters dated 07.07.2003 and 31.07.2003 have been made in paras- 14 and 15 of writ petition which read as under:-
"14. That the petitioner withdrawn his resignation as tendered on 31.07.2002 by means of letter dated 7.7.2003 given to respondent no. 4. The said applicatioin dated 7.7.2003 was duly received by Factory Manager/ Manager (Industial Relation) on same date which was duly endorsed on the Register of New Victoria Mills.
15. That the petitioner also sent withdrawal application dated 21.07.2003 through registered post to respondent-4 and the copy of the same also forwarded before the respondent no. 3 for revocation of his resignation dated 31.07.2002 tendered in pursuance to modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme."
4. However, respondents communicated to petitioner that his resignation has been accepted with effect from 01.08.2003.
5. It is contended that since petitioner has already withdrawn resignation, subsequent acceptance of resignation is patently illegal and of no legal consequence.
6. Sri D.P. Singh, learned counsel for respondent-Employer drew my attention to the averments contained in para-8 of counter affidavit wherein it is stated that letter dated 07.07.2003 was not received by Office/Management and has wrongly been annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. It is further stated that it was a conditional withdrawal of resignation to provide a job in the Mill which was not possible. Reply to para-15 of the writ petition has been given in para-9 of the counter affidavit wherein it is stated that letter dated 31.07.2002 mentioned in said letter, was not actually received in the Office. He also submitted that Mill has already been closed, therefore, it is not possible to take petitioner into service.
7. The first question up for consideration before Court is, "whether acceptance of resignation letter dated 31.07.2002 is valid and in accordance with law".
8. Parties have not disputed that resignation letter dated 31.07.2002 was given by petitioner. Its contents are already reproduced in para-2 of the judgement. Respondents claim to have accepted petitioner's resignation after an year i.e. vide order dated 31.07.2003. Petitioner was sought to be relieved on 01.08.2003. The letter/ notice dated 31.07.2003 issued by Sri N.K. Pandey, Officer on Special Duty (hereinafter referred to as "OSD") is Annexure-5 to the writ petition and it reads under:-
"Notice It is, hereby, informed to the following employees that their resignation under M.V.R.S., have been accpeted by the management. Accordingly, they are, hereby, retired/relieved from the services of the mills w.e.f. 01.08.2003 (before duty).
S.No. Name Deoig Deptt.
P.F. No. 1 Sri R.K. Verma By. Psocg Mastor Procg.8082 2
Sri S.K. Dixit Shift Incharge Wvg.5112 3
Sri R.S. Birla Cotton Selector Spg.
(N.K. Pandey) Officer on Spl. Duty"
9. There is another office order dated 10.09.2003 issued by OSD Sri N.K. Pandey which clearly states that due to some unavoidable circumstances, acceptance of resignations under MVRS is not possible and, hence, they (petitioner and another) are desired to continue in service and for the gap, if any, they may avail earned leave. Said office order is annexed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition and it reads as under:-
"Due to some unavoidable circumstances, till further orders to accept the resignation under MVRS of the following officials of the mills is not possible and as such they are desired to continued their services. For the gap, if say in between, they may avail their earned leave.
1. Sri Mohd. Yunus, Jr. Asstt. W/H/ Incharge.
2. Sri R.S.Birla, Cotton Selector."
(Emphasis added)
10. The facts about office order dated 10.09.2003 have been mentioned by petitioner in para-22 of the writ petition. It has been replied in para-11 of the counter affidavit wherein, though, it has been denied but subsequent explanation shows admission of issue of said letter dated 10.09.2003 by Sri N.K. Pandey, OSD. It would be appropriate to reproduce para-11 of the counter affidavit as under:-
"11. That the contents of paragraph Nos. 22 and 23 of the writ petition as stated are denied. The letter of a OSD of N.V.M. Dated 10.09.2003 is not the denial of MVRS or non acceptance of his resignation submitted by him dated 31.07.2002. It was merely a letter for taking work from the petitioner as a temporary measure for which necessity arose as a wining up operation. Few skeleton hands were required for closing of operation. But it does not effect the status of the petitioner to claim continuance of service in the Mill which is not existence."
11. Then, there is another letter dated 23.10.2004 (Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit) filed on behalf of respondents-1 to 4 wherein it is stated that petitioner's resignation has been accepted and he has been relieved from service with effect from 01.02.2004. Here the date of relieving, after acceptance of resignation, has changed from 01.08.2003 to 01.02.2004. Respondents have also filed a copy of letter dated 16.02.2004 stating that original copy of letter dated 30.01.2004 regarding acceptance of petitioner's resignation under MVRS with effect from 31.01.2004 is enclosed and the same was also displayed on notice board. This letter dated 16.02.2004 (Annexure- CA-2) reads as under:-
"Shri R.S. Birla, Ex.Cotton Selector H.No. 11/249, Opp: G.C.T.I. Hostel, Souterganj, Kanpur Dear Sir, Enclosed please find herewith the original copy of this letter dated 30.01.2004 regarding accpetance of your resignation under Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme w.e.f. 31.01.2004 (After duty). A copy of the same has already been displayed at the Notice Board of the mills. Please also submit your Bank Account number immediately.
Thanking you, Yours faithfully, for New Victoria Mills, Unit of NTC (UP) Limited, (Govind Singh) Officer on Spl. Duty"
12. A copy of letter dated 31.01.2004 is Annexure-10 to the writ petition and this shows that alleged acceptance of resignation under MVRS was vide letter dated 31.01.2004 and petitioner was sought to be relieved in the afternoon on 31.01.2004. It also directed petitioner to collect his dues from office. The contents of letter dated 31.01.2004 reads as under:-
^^avkids la'kksf/kr LoSfPNd lsokfuo`fRr ;kstuk ds vUrxZr tks R;kx i= fn;k x;k gS] mls lohdkj dj fy;k x;k gSA vkidks fnukad 31-01-2004 ¼M~;wVh mijkur½ ls fey dh lsokvksa ls lsokfuo`Rr fd;k tkrk gSA vkidk tks Hkh /ku curk gS mls 25 fnu ds ckn fdlh dk;Z fnol esa fey dk;kZy; ls izkIr dj ysA** "The resignation tendered by you under the Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme has been accepted. You stand retired from the Mill services w.e.f. 31.01.2004 (after duty).
You may on expiry of 25 days receive your dues from the Mill office in any working day."
(English Translation by Court)
13. In between, I find that there is one more letter dated 07.10.2003 which informs petitioner that his resignation under MVRS has been accepted by Management and shortly he shall be relieved. This letter dated 07.10.2003 is Annexure-7 to the writ petition and contents thereof reads as under:-
^^alwpuh; gS fd la'kksf/kr LoSfPNd lsokfuo`fRr ds vUrxZr vkids }kjk fn;k R;kx i= fnukad 12-07-2002 izcU/k ra= }kjk Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA rFkk vkidks 'kh?kz lsok ls eqDr dj fn;k tk;sxkA^^ "Be informed that your resignation tendered under the Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme stands accepted by the Management on 12.07.2002 and you will be relieved of your duties at the earliest."
(English Translation by Court)
14. Therefore, as per the case set up by respondents, resignation submitted by petitioner on 31.07.2002 was accepted, firstly, vide letter dated 31.07.2003 and he was relieved on 01.08.2003; thereafter vide letter dated 10.09.2003, petitioner was informed that it is not possible to accept his resignation and he will continue to work. Again, vide letter dated 07.10.2003, respondents claim to have accepted petitioner's resignation but state that he shall be relieved shortly. Then comes third letter dated 31.01.2004 informing petitioner that his resignation has been accepted and he is being relieved in the afternoon on 31.01.2004. In the meantime, respondents admit that petitioner had continued to work and one of such letter dated 07.01.2004 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) shows that earlier he was attached with Vigilance Department of the Unit, vide order dated 09.01.2001 which was withdrawn and he was directed to report to his place of new posting. He was relieved by Vigilance Officer on 07.01.2004. Subsequent vide letter dated 16.02.2004 issued by respondents refers to resignation of petitioner vide letter dated 30.01.2004 and his relieving in the afternoon on 31.01.2004 which means that earlier acceptance was not acted upon by respondents or it was not accepted or there was no such valid acceptance at all. In the meantime, petitioner submitted letter dated 07.07.2003 withdrawing his resignation. Then letter dated 21.07.2003 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) was also given referring to withdrawal letter dated 07.07.2003. It was sent by registered post. Interestingly, facts regarding withdrawal letters dated 07.07.2003 and 21.07.2003 have been stated in paras- 14, 15 and 16 to the writ petition and it read as under:-
"14. That the petitioner withdrawn his resignation as tendered on 31.07.2002 by means of letter dated 7.7.2003 given to respondent no.4. The said application dated 7.7.2003 was duly received by Factory Manager/ Manager (Industrial Relation) on same date which was duly endorsed on the Register of New Victoria Mills.
15. That the petitioner also sent withdrawal application dated 21.07.2003 through registered post to respondent-4 and the copy of the same also forwarded before the respondent no. 3 for revocation of his resignation dated 31.07.2002 tendered in pursuance to Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme.
16. That it is noteworthy here that the office of respondent no. 4 had received the said registered revocation letter dated 23.07.2003."
15. Respondents have replied aforesaid paragraphs in paras- 8 and 9 of counter affidavit and the same read as under:-
"8. That the contents of paragraph Nos. 12, 13 and 14 of the writ petition as stated are denied. The letter of resignation dated 31.07.2002 has been accepted and acted upon by the management. By letter dated 07.07.2003 which has not been received by the management and has wrongly been annexed as Annexure No. 3 in the writ petition, even its perusal tells different story. It is a conditional withdrawal of resignation and provide a job in the mill was impossibility for the management. It is reiterated that the letter is a manufactured document only to create a confusion.
9.That contents of paragraph Nos. 15, 16 and 17 of the writ petition as stated are denied. It is too late for the petitioner to take Summer Sault. His resignation dated 31.07.2002 was accepted and on the Notice Board pasted on 31.07.2003. Petitioner has been relieved from duty w.e.f. 01.08.2003, his name appears at Sl.No.3 vide Annexure-5 in the writ petition annexed by the petitioner. As stated above, even the withdrawal of resignation which has never received by the management was conditional as sated by the petitioner by a document Annexure No. 3 not received by the management. In the alternative, the petitioner will have no other remedy in the matter as due to the closure of mill, no relief can be granted. It is wrong to allege that the registered letter dated 23.07.2003 was ever received by the management rather the management is always informed even personally to the petitioner that he stood relieved. His resignation has been accepted and his MVRS is ready can be collected by him. The petitioner was fluctuating in the decision."
(Emphasis added)
16. The provisions of MVRS also shows that once resignation is accepted, incumbent could not have been allowed to continue since that will have resulted in abolition of post. Hence, if resignation of petitioner was accepted by respondents vide letter dated 31.07.2003, neither it could have been deferred nor petitioner could have been allowed to continue nor there would have arisen any other occasion to accept resignation at two different times i.e. 07.10.2003 and 30.01.2004. This shows that respondents have taken inconsistent stand in the matter though, in the meantime, petitioner already withdrew his resignation and communicated this fact to the respondents vide letter dated 07.07.2003 and again vide letter dated 21.07.2003 which was sent by registered post. The registered receipt is shown as Annexure-8 to the rejoinder affidavit and copy of said letter was also addressed to Chairman and Managing Director, N.T.C. (U.P.) Limited, Kanpur. It is not the case of respondents that registered letter is not properly addressed and, hence, presumption of service lie in favour of petitioner unless proved otherwise by respondents. In taking above view, I am fortified by Statute and may refer the same as under.
17. First, is Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1897" which reads as under:
"27. Meaning of service by post.-Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, where the expression "serve" or either of the expressions "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post."
18. Another relevant provision is Section 114, Illustrations (e) and (f), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") which reads as under:
"114. Court may presume existence of certain facts.- The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.
Illustrations The Court may presume-
...
(e) The judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;
(f) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases;"
19. The third is Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1898"). Section 3 and 14 thereof, relevant for the purpose of present case, are reproduced as under:
"3. Meanings of "in course of transmission by post" and "delivery".- For the purposes of this Act,-
a) a postal article shall be deemed to be in course of transmission by the post from the time of its being delivered to a post office to the time of its being delivered to the addressee or of its being returned to the sender or otherwise disposed of under Chapter VII;
b) the delivery of a postal article of any description to a postman or other person authorized to receive postal articles of that description for the post shall be deemed to be a delivery to a post office; and
c) the delivery of a postal article at the house or office of the addressee, or to the addressee or his servant or agent or other person considered to be authorized to receive the article according to the usual manner of delivering postal articles to the addressee, shall be deemed to be delivery to the addressee."
"14. Post Office marks prima facie evidence of certain facts denoted.-In every proceeding for the recovery of any postage or other sum alleged to be due under this Act in respect of a postal article,-
(a) the production of the postal article, having thereon the official mark of the Post Office denoting that the article has been refused, or that the addressee is dead or cannot be found, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact so denoted, and
(b) the person from whom the postal article purports to have come, shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to be the sender thereof."
20. Though in the three statutes referred to above, the oldest one is Act, 1872 but in fact the provisions relating to Post Office Act are older, going to 1866 when the first Post Office Act was enacted. In the then British Indian Territory governed by the British Government, postal services were established by appointing a Director, Post Office by the Governor General in Council in order to regulate this branch of public service and revenue, in the light of experiences gained by English postal legislation and development of Post Offices. Commenting upon the Post Office service in England, in Whitfield Vs. Lord Le Despencer (1778) 2 Cowp. 754, Lord Mansfield had said:
"The Post Master has no hire, enters into no contract, carries on no merchandise or commerce. But the post office is a branch of revenue, and a branch of police, created by Act of Parliament. As a branch of revenue, there are great receipts; but there is likewise a great surplus of benefit and advantage to the public, arising from the fund. As a branch of police it puts the whole correspondence of the kingdom (for the exceptions are very trifling) under government, and entrusts the management and direction of it to the crown, and officers appointed by the crown. There is no analogy therefore between the case of the Post Master and a common carrier."
21. Following the above decision, in a recent case in Triefus & Co. Ltd. Vs. Post Office (1957) 2 Q.B. 352, it was held that Post Office is a branch of Revenue and Post Master General does not enter into any contract with a person who entrusted to the Post Office a postal packet for transmission overseas.
22. Presently also the Post Office service in India, with which this Court is concerned, is not in the hands of any private individual or corporate body but it is a Department of Government of India and on certain matters, it is regulated by various Statutes including Act, 1898.
23. I have referred to the above two decisions in Whitfield Vs. Lord Le Despencer (1778) 2 Cowp. 754 and Triefus & Co. Ltd. Vs. Post Office (1957) 2 Q.B. 352 for the reason that the system of Post Office in India has been observed to be similar as it was in England. Apex Court referring to the certain provisions of Act, 1898 has said, in Union of India Vs. Mohd. Niazim AIR 1980 SC 431, as under:
"These are only some of the provisions of the Act which seem to indicate that the post office is not a common carrier, it is not an agent of the sender of the postal article for reaching it to the addressee. It is really a branch of the public service providing postal services subject to the provisions of the Indian Post Office Act and the rules made thereunder. The law relating to the post office in England is not very much different from that in this country. "
24. The aforesaid decision was rendered considering the provisions in Act, 1898 which was enacted by repealing previous Act of 1866 so as to consolidate and amend the law relating to Post Office in India.
25. The Post Office in India, thus, is an institution established by a statute. "Postage" required to avail of the postal services has been defined in section 2 (f) of Act, 1898 as "the duty chargeable for the transmission by post of postal articles". Under section 4 the exclusive privilege of conveying letters is reserved to the Central Government with certain exceptions which are not significant. Section 17 of the Act says that "postage stamps" shall be deemed to be issued by Government for the purpose of revenue. The provisions of the Act indicate that the Post Office is not a common carrier. It is not an agent of sender of the postal article for reaching it to the addressee. It is really a branch of the public service providing postal services subject to the provisions of Act, 1898 and the Rules made thereunder. It is in this context, Section 14 of Act, 1898 would also be a matter of relevance which says that the production of the postal article, having thereon the official mark of Post Office denoting that the article has been refused, or that the addressee is dead or cannot be found, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact so denoted. The Statute provides a prima facie evidence of the mark given by Postal Department on the postal article sent by post regarding its correctness, though the word "prima facie" shows that it is liable to be disproved by adducing evidence otherwise. Meaning thereby the mere denial by the party in respect to whom the endorsement has been made by postal agent otherwise, would not be sufficient unless he adduce evidence to discredit prima facie evidence in the shape of endorsement made by postal department on the article concerned. This provision read with Section 114 of Act, 1872 and Section 27 of Act, 1897 makes the situation quite clear. It appears that in various decisions, while considering the question of service of notice, most of the times, provisions of Act, 1898 and its implication have been omitted even when the service was sought to be effected by registered post.
26. Initially the issue of service of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1882") was considered by Privy Council in Harihar Banerji and others Vs. Ramshashi Roy and others AIR 1918 PC 102. Court said, if a letter, properly directed, containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put into Post Office, it is presumed that letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of Post Office and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. The presumption would apply with still greater force to such letters for which the sender has taken precaution to register and is not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced, signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself. Here was a case where service of notice was not denied by all and one of the person has admitted its service, therefore, a presumption was drawn. So the facts of this case makes it clear that the presumption was rightly drawn.
27. In Sukumar Guha Vs. Naresh Chandra Ghosh AIR 1968 Cal. 49, a Single Judge (Hon'ble Amresh Roj, J.) referring to Section 114, Illustration (f) of Act, 1872, Section 106 of Act, 1882 and Section 27 of Act, 1897 said that presumption under Section 27 of Act, 1897 can arise only when a notice is sent by registered post while there may arise a presumption under Section 114 of Act, 1872 when notice is sent by ordinary post or under certificate of posting. Both the presumptions are rebuttable. When the cover containing notice has been returned to the sender by postal authorities, then that fact is direct proof of the fact that the notice sent by post was not delivered to the party to whom it was addressed. Whether it was tendered and, if so, to whom tendered, remains a matter to be ascertained on evidence. If acceptable evidence is available that it was tendered to the party personally, then such facts may bring the service of notice within the second mode, namely, tendered or delivered personally to such party. If however, tender or delivery is not to the party personally but to a member of his family or a servant, then it may be effective tender or delivery only when the notice was addressed to the residence of the party. Such personal tender or vicarious tender may be effective even if it was through the agency of post office, and proof of that tender comes from testimony of any person present at the event, and not only by examining the postman. Here what I find is that when Court talks of evidence, when we read it in the context of Section 114 of Act, 1872, a registered envelop received back from postal authority with the endorsement of postman of "refusal" will constitute a valid evidence to show that it was served upon the addressee but he refused to accept unless proved otherwise and for that purpose the examination of postman for constituting a prima facie evidence further would not be required in view of Section 14 of Act, 1898. This Section 14 of Act, 1898 has not been noticed by the Court.
28. This Court in Wasu Ram Vs. R.L. Sethi 1963 AWR 472 said:
"The question whether a communication sent through the post was received by the address is one of fact, but in many cases it may be difficult and inconvenient if not impossible, to produce the postal official who delivered the letter or the money order. To obviate this difficulty the Evidence Act permits certain presumptions to be made under certain circumstances. S. 16 provides that "when there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact". The illustration (a) to this section explains that in a question "whether a particular letter was despaired, the facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letter put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant". S. 114 provides that the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and proper business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustration (e) to this section says that "the court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed"; and Illustration (f) says that the court may presume that "the common course of business has been followed in particular cases". The combined effect of these two sections is to raise a presumption that a communication sent by post was received in the ordinary course by the addressee, and if it was returned to the sender with the endorsement "refused", the postman must have tendered it but delivery could not be made because of the refusal of the addressee. These presumptions are based on human experience and common sense. Our experience tells us that millions of letters which are posted are delivered in due course to the address, though in exceptional cases letters do get lost. The onus of proof is on the person who asserts that the abnormal happened in his case and the communication sent by post did not follow its normal course to destination."
29. This Court further held:
"Whenever a communication is sent by post there is a presumption that it was duly delivered or tendered. If the communication is returned by the post office with the endorsement "refused" the presumption will be that it was tendered by the postal authorities in their ordinary course of business to the addressee who refused. The strength of the presumption will vary according to the fact of each case, being strong in the case of registered letters, and strongest in the case of money orders and insured articles the delivery of which cannot be made without observing certain precautions which are prescribed. Rules u/Chap. VII of the Post and Telegraph Guide provide that in case of refusal the money order shall be returned to the remitter with the endorsement "refused". If the addressee states on oath that he never received the communication, the Court must decide after considering all the surrounding circumstances, whether he should be believed. The question is always one of fact, though I would add as a matter of plain common sense that a denial which is not only bare but bare-faced and made by a person who stood to profit by his denial and, therefore, had all the motive in the word to deny, will not ordinarily weaken the presumption."
30. The above view was followed in Asa Ram Vs. Ravi Prakash AIR 1966 All. 519 and relevant observation in para 3 reads as under:
"3. Mr. Sinha then argued that a presumption of refusal could arise only if the endorsement 'refused' was proved by evidence, and this could only be done by producing the postman who made the endorsement. I do not agree. If the landlord deposes that he sent an envelop containing the notice and that the same envelop was received by him with the endorsement 'refused' which was not there before and he produces the envelop with the endorsement, this is a sufficient evidence to prove the endorsement. In this case the respondent appeared as a witness and proved the sending and the return of the envelope. On this evidence the Court could rely on the presumption authorized under S. 114 of the Evidence Act."
31. Thereafter, the issue came to be considered by a Full Bench in Ganga Ram Vs. Phulwati AIR 1970 All. 446. One of the three questions referred for consideration before Full Bench was "whether it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him? Full Bench considered this question referring to provisions of all three Statutes, namely, Act, 1872; Act, 1897 and Act, 1898. Besides others, it also referred to Rule 64 (1) of Indian Post Office Rules which reads as under:
"64 (1). If the sender of a registered article pays at the time of posting the article a fee of one anna in addition to the postage and registration fee, there shall be sent to him on the delivery of the article a form of acknowledgement which shall be signed by the addressee or if the addressee refuses to sign shall be accompanied by a statement to the effect that the addressee has refused to sign."
32. Having referred to various provisions of Act, 1898 and Rules framed thereunder, Court said, when the postmen or the clerks at the station of destination are required to do and what endorsements they are required to make, all such acts are clearly provided in the Statute. All such acts are done by them and all such endorsements are made by them in discharge of their official duties. Court, thus, proceeded further and held that a notice sent by registered post will be entitled to draw a presumption regarding due service of that notice vide Illustration (e) and (f) of Section 114 of Act, 1872. In this regard, Court also referred to Section 16 of Act, 1872 and said that as a proposition, it cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to an accepting or receiving post office it is reasonably expected that in the normal course it would be delivered to the addressee. That is the official and the normal function of the post office.
33. Having said so, Court further proceeded to hold that taking into consideration the manner in which Post Office deals with registered letters, the endorsement on the notice "Refused" strengthens the presumption that an attempt was made to deliver the notice to the addressee. Court in para 22 of the judgment clearly said:
"... with the endorsement "Refused" the presumption of service could be raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, and it would be a presumption of law, and not of fact."
34. It also held that a presumption of law is rebuttable unless it is made unrebuttable by some provision of law. Full Bench disagreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Vaman Vithal Vs. Khanderao Ram Rao. AIR 1935 Bom 247, Nagpur High Court in Jankiram Narhari Vs. Damodhar Ramchandra, AIR 1956 Nag. 266 and Madhya Bharat High Court in Tekchand Devidas Vs. Gulab Chand Chandan Mal, AIR 1957 Madh B. 151 where the said three Courts have taken a view that there can be no presumption that the endorsement of refusal was made by the postman unless the postman is examined and such endorsement was inadmissible in evidence. Full Bench thus answered the question accordingly holding that postman is not necessarily to be examined by plaintiff.
35. The above Full Bench judgment in Ganga Ram (supra) has been referred to and approved in Samittri Devi and another Vs. Sampuran Singh and another (2011) 3 SCC 556 (para 26).
36. This issue also came up for consideration in Puwada Venkateswara Rao Vs. Chidamana Venkata Ramana AIR 1976 SC 869 and in para 10 of the judgment, it has held:
"It is not always necessary, in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct."
37. In Har Charan Singh Vs. Shiv Rani AIR 1981 SC 1284, a three-Judge Bench (by majority held) with respect to notice when registered letter is returned with endorsement of "refusal", said:
"Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic 'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorities or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise."
38. Again this issue came to be considered by a two-Judge Bench in Anil Kumar Vs. Nanak Chandra Verma AIR 1990 SC 1215. Overruling this Court's decision in Shiv Dutt Singh Vs. Ram Das AIR 1980 All. 280 Court held in para 2, as under:
"2. The question considered in both the decisions was to the statement on oath by the, tenant denying the tender and refusal to accept delivery. It was held that the bare statement of the tenant was sufficient to rebut the presumption of service. In our opinion there could be no hard and fast rule on that aspect. Unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself is inherently unreliable, the position may be different. It is always a question of fact in each case whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge the initial burden."
39. In Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh AIR 1992 SC 1604, Court confirmed a decision of this Court in respect of presumption about service of notice received with the endorsement of "refusal" and held that presumption contemplated by Section 27 of Act, 1897 must be drawn to deem service upon the addressee. In para 8 of the judgement, the Court said:
"In our opinion, the High Court was right in its view. The notices must be presumed to have been served as contemplated by S. 27 of the General Clauses Act."
40. I find a straight answer as to who should disprove the factum of offer of registered letter when returned by postal authority with the endorsement of "refusal" in Gujarat Electricity Board Vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani AIR 1989 SC 1433 where it has been observed:
"There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. In the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge this burden as he failed to place material before the court to show that the endorsement made by the postal authorities was wrong and incorrect. Mere denial made by the respondent in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of the registered cover."
(emphasis added)
41. Following Apex Court decision in Gujarat Electricity Board (supra), this Court in Jhabul Ram Vs. District Judge, Ballia 1994 (23) ALR 464 has also said in para 9 as under:
"9. Bald denial of the petitioner could not absolve him from the burden of rebutting the presumption of service of notice arising from the endorsement by the postal authorities on the registered cover containing the notice. The court below did not commit any error, muchless an error apparent on the face of record, in holding that the notice in question was duly served on the petitioner."
42. I find another Apex Court's decision straight on this issue i.e. Basant Singh Vs. Roman Catholic Mission 2003 (1) AIC 1 (SC). In paras 8 and 10 of the judgment, Court has observed:
"The presumptions are rebuttable. It is always open to the defendants to rebut the presumption by leading convincing and cogent evidence."
"As already noticed, Hari Singh appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was not tendered to him, no evidence whatsoever was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. He has failed to discharge the onus cast upon him by the Statute."
43. This Court has followed above decision in Noor Mohammad and another Vs. XIV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur Nagar 2006 (63) ALR 244. Therein Revisional Court reversed Trial Court's order on the ground that tenant has tendered rent to landlord through money order which was received with the endorsement "refusal" by the postman but when landlord denied the tender of money order, tenant did not examine the postman and hence failed to discharge burden lying upon him. In other words, Revisional Court said that it is the sender who should examine the postman and not the sendee/addressee for whom the postal authorities have endorsed that it has refused to accept the article. This view of Revisional Court was reversed by this Court by observing:
"In respect of endorsement of refusal by the postman, there is no necessity to examine the postman to prove that. If there is any such duty then it is for the person denying tender by the postman."
(Emphasis added)
44. This Court also in Brij Nandan Gupta Vs. III Addl. District Judge, Rampur and another (Writ-A No. 24853 of 1989) decided on 30.7.2012 in para 21 of judgment said:
"Similarly, if a notice has been sent by landlord by registered post and it is received back with an endorsement made by an official of Post Office namely Postman that it was refused by the addresee, presumption of service upon addressee shall be drawn unless the tenant prove that the letter was never offered to him by the Postman and endorsement made thereon is not correct. The tenant's bare denial would not be sufficient in such a case and he will have to prove his case by adducing relevant evidence. Such denial can be by making statement on oath and in such case onus would shift on the landlord to prove that refusal was by the tenant which he can show by summoning the postman and adducing his oral evidence. However, this is one aspect of the matter. Sometimes from the conduct of tenant or other circumstances, his denial even if on oath, can justifiably be disproved by the Court without having Postman examined."
45. The above authorities leave no manner of doubt that it is for the sendee, who deny service of registered letter upon him and attempted to challenge endorsement of "refusal" made by Postman, to lead evidence which includes examination of 'Postman' also and in case he fails to do so, legal presumption will go against him and will remain to be unrebutted unless there is other material to show otherwise. Nothing of this sort has been shown in the case in hand.
46. Hence, I answer the question in favour of petitioner that he withdrew his resignation in July, 2003 itself while respondents as per the own case set up finally accepted resignation of petitioner vide letter dated 30.01.2004 i.e. after withdrawal of resignation which could not have been done.
47. The exposition of law that once resignation is withdrawn, it could not have been accepted, has not been disputed by learned counsel for respondents before this Court in view of law laid down in Union of India etc. Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra and Others (1978) 2 SC 301; Union of India and Another Vs. Wing Commander T. Parthasarathy (2001) 1 SCC 158 and Srikantha S.M. Vs. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 314.
48. In Shambhu Murari Sinha Vs. Project & Development India Ltd. & Another(2002) 2 SCC 437, it was held, if voluntary retirement is withdrawn by an employee, he continue to remain in service and the relationship of Employer and employee would not come to an end.
49. The next submission is, "whether withdrawal being conditional, it will not be treated to be a withdrawal".
50. Here, I find that the very resignation letter itself, if read properly, it is clearly a conditional resignation. The second para of resignation letter dated 31.07.2003 states that resignation may be accepted on payment of all outstanding dues. Therefore, condition imposed by petitioner for acceptance of resignation was simultaneous payment of all outstanding dues. If resignation is conditional, it could not have been accepted.
51. Resignation in relation to an office connotes the act of giving up or relinquishment of the office. To relinquish office means to cease to hold office or to lose hold of the office. Therefore, it means that the employee wants to sever his relation from the employer without any riders and then only it would amount to resignation.
52. Corpus Juris Secundum Vol.77 page 311 defines the words ''resign' and ''resignation' as under: -
"RESIGN. To give up; to surrender by a formal act; to yield; to relinquish; to give up one's office or position; to withdraw from. The word "resign," in its ordinary and usual sense, imports a voluntary act, and has been held not to include the act of one whose continuance in a position has been terminated by death or by induction into the armed forces under the Selective Service Act.
"Resign" has been held equivalent to, or synonymous with, "abandon" see 1 C.J.S. p 41 note 38, "renounce" see 76 C.J.S. p 206 notes 90.2, 90.3."
"RESIGNATION. It has been said that "resignation" is a term of legal art, having legal connotations which describe certain legal results. It is characteristically the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning, made freely and not under duress, and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession, or position."
53. The Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol.37 Page 473 defines the word ''Resign' denoting voluntarily act, to give up, surrender by formal act, yield, relinquish, give up one's office or position, or withdraw from. It is synonymous with words "abandon" and "renounce". At Page 474 the word ''Resignation' has been defined and at Page 476 it provides that the resignation must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such.
54. Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition Page 1310 defines the resignation as formal renouncement or relinquishment of an office. It must be made with intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by act of relinquishment. It is said that resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio i.e. resignation is spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right.
55. In the case of R.J. Maurya Versus State, 1967 SLR 823 it was held that the term resignation implies voluntary surrender of the position by a person resigning and acting freely and not under duress and it becomes effective when the authority competent to make appointment accepts it.
56. In Ramchand Nihalchand Advani Versus Anandlal Bapalal Kothari and another, AIR 1962 Gujrat 21, it was held that the letter of resignation must be unambiguous and where an ambiguous letter of resignation is submitted, the authority should right to the employee to explain or clear the ambiguity instead of proceeding to accept the same.
57. Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hirdeyashawer Singh Chauhan Versus State of Madhya Pradesh, 1987 Jabalpur Law Journal 566 observed that "the resignation denotes voluntary surrender of a position by one resigning, made freely and not under duress. The resignation denotes, therefore, a spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right. It is conveyed by maxim resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio."
58. Recently, the question, when a resignation would be conditional and what are the requirement of a valid letter of resignation has been considered in Prabha Atri (Dr.) Versus State of U.P. and others, 2003 (1) UPLBEC 772, AIR 2003 SC 534 wherein it has been held:
"The only question that mainly requires to be considered is as to whether the letter dated 9.1.1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a letter of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign, if her claims in respect of the alleged lapse are not viewed favourably. Rule 9 of the Hospital Service Rules provided for resignation or abandonment of service by an employee. It is stated therein that a permanent employee is required to give three months notice of resignation in writing to the appointing authority or three months salary in lieu of notice and that he/she may be required to serve the period for such notice. In case of non-compliance with the above, the employee concerned is not only liable to pay an amount equal to three months salary but such amount shall be realizable from the dues, if any, of the employee lying with the Hospital. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Vol. 37 at page 476, it is found stated that, "To constitute a "resignation", it must be unconditional and with intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office." At page 474 of the very same book, it is found stated: "Statements by club's President and corresponding Secretary that they would resign, if constant bickering among members did not cease, constituted merely threatened offers, not tenders, of their resignations." It is also stated therein that "A `resignation' of a public office to be effective must be made with intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by act of relinquishment". In the ordinary dictionary sense, the word `Resignation' was considered to mean the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right, as conveyed by the maxim: Resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio [Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition]. In Corpus Juris Secundum. Vol.77, page 311, it is found stated "It has been said that `Resignation' is a term of legal art, having legal connotations which describe certain legal results. It is characteristically, the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning, made freely and not under duress and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession or position. " (Para-7) "We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side, in the light of the materials and principles, noticed supra. This is not a case where it is required to consider as to whether the relinquishment envisaged under the rules and conditions of service is unilateral or bilateral in character but whether the letter dated 9.1.1999 could be treated or held to be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the office, so as to severe her services once and for all. The letter cannot be construed, in our view, to convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a `resignation', it must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. At best, as observed by this Court in the decision in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) it may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out of an idea that she was being harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the Hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated 9.1.99 does not seek for any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings being scrapped as a sequel to her so-called resignation. The words 'with immediate effect' in the said letter could not be given undue importance dehors the context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was written. That the management of the Hospital took up such action forthwith, as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of much significance in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on 9.1.1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the case reported in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) the respondents have seized an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the moment they got the letter dated 9.1.1999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the Writ Petition." (Para-10)
59. It would also be appropriate to quote the letter of resignation which was considered in Prabha Atri (Dr.) Versus State of U.P. and others (Supra) which is as under: -
"Your letter is uncalled for and should be withdrawn. I have been working in this Hospital since May, 10, 1978 and have always worked in the best interest of the patients. It is tragic instead of taking a lenient view of my sickness you have opted to punish me.
If the foregoing is not acceptable to you then, I have no option left but, to tender my resignation which immediate effect."
60. Considering the kind of letter of the resignation, Court in Prabha Atri (Dr.) Versus State of U.P. and others (Supra) found it a conditional letter and, therefore, not a valid resignation in the eyes of law.
61. It can be safely said that letter of resignation tendered by petitioner in the present case is also a conditional letter of resignation. A reading of the entire letter dated 31.07.2002 shows that it is not unconditional.
62. A Division Bench of this Court in Phool Chandra Singh Vs. The Chairman, Vindhyavasini Gramin Bank and Others 2006 (6) AWC 5513 (All.) has also taken a similar view that a conditional resignation is not a valid resignation, hence, it could not have been accepted.
63. The last submission is that Unit in which petitioner was working is closed in 2004 itself and, therefore, petitioner neither can be given re-employment or reinstatement nor any other service benefit.
64. This fact could not be disputed by learned counsel for petitioner. The question is, "whether for the fault of respondents, petitioner can be allowed to suffer and despite the fact that injustice has been caused to petitioner, can he be denied ultimate relief to which he otherwise is entitled".
65. The respondents being "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, its officers are public functionaries. As observed above, under our Constitution, sovereignty vest in the people. Every limb of constitutional machinery therefore is obliged to be people oriented. Public authorities acting in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions oppressively are accountable for their behaviour. It is high time that this Court should remind respondents that they are expected to perform in a more responsible and reasonable manner so as not to cause undue and avoidable harassment to the public at large and in particular their ex-employees and their legal heirs like the petitioner. The respondents have the support of entire machinery and various powers of statute. An ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match such might of State or its instrumentalities. Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impressible. This may harm the common man personally but the injury to society is far more grievous. Crime and corruption, thrive and prosper in society due to lack of public resistance. An ordinary citizen instead of complaining and fighting mostly succumbs to the pressure of undesirable functioning in offices instead of standing against it. It is on account of, sometimes, lack of resources or unmatched status which give the feeling of helplessness. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. This is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention are being allowed to linger on and remain unattended. No authority can allow itself to act in a manner which is arbitrary. Public administration no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields action of administrative authority but where it is found that the exercise of power is capricious or other than bona fide, it is the duty of the Court to take effective steps and rise to occasion otherwise the confidence of the common man would shake. It is the responsibility of Court in such matters to immediately rescue such common man so that he may have the confidence that he is not helpless but a bigger authority is there to take care of him and to restrain arbitrary and arrogant, unlawful inaction or illegal exercise of power on the part of the public functionaries.
66. In our system, the Constitution is supreme, but the real power vest in the people of India. The Constitution has been enacted "for the people, by the people and of the people". A public functionary cannot be permitted to act like a dictator causing harassment to a common man and in particular when the person subject to harassment is his own employee.
67. Regarding harassment of a common man, referring to observations of Lord Hailsham in Cassell & Co. Ltd. Vs. Broome, 1972 AC 1027 and Lord Devlin in Rooks Vs. Barnard and others 1964 AC 1129, the Apex Court in Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta JT 1993 (6) SC 307 held as under:
"An Ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. That is provided by the rule of law....... A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it...........Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous." (para 10)
68. The above observations as such have been reiterated in Ghaziabad Development Authorities Vs. Balbir Singh JT 2004 (5) SC 17.
69. In a democratic system governed by rule of law, the Government does not mean a lax Government. The public servants hold their offices in trust and are expected to perform with due diligence particularly so that their action or inaction may not cause any undue hardship and harassment to a common man. Whenever it comes to the notice of this Court that the Government or its officials have acted with gross negligence and unmindful action causing harassment of a common and helpless man, this Court has never been a silent spectator but always reacted to bring the authorities to law.
70. In Registered Society Vs. Union of India and Others (1996) 6 SCC 530 the Apex court said:
"No public servant can say "you may set aside an order on the ground of mala fide but you can not hold me personally liable" No public servant can arrogate in himself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary".
71. In Shivsagar Tiwari Vs. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 558 the Apex Court has held:
"An arbitrary system indeed must always be a corrupt one. There never was a man who thought he had no law but his own will who did not soon find that he had no end but his own profit."
72. In Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction and Another AIR 1996 SC 715 has held as follows:
"A democratic Government does not mean a lax Government. The rules of procedure and/or principles of natural justice are not mean to enable the guilty to delay and defeat the just retribution. The wheel of justice may appear to grind slowly but it is duty of all of us to ensure that they do grind steadily and grind well and truly. The justice system cannot be allowed to become soft, supine and spineless."
73. Petitioner has placed on record certain documents to show that some employees have been retained by respondents which is sought to be explained by respondents that a skeleton staff was maintained to take out formal closure activities. This means that entire staff has not been terminated.
74. In these facts and circumstances of the case, I find no reason to deny relief of petitioner to which he is entitled, particularly when I find respondent-Employer to have committed fault. They cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong.
75. In view thereof, writ petition is allowed. Impugned orders dated 31.07.2003 and 31.01.2004 passed by respondents are hereby set aside. Petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with law.
Order Date :- 25.11.2019 Siddhant Sahu