Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Tamil Nadu
Collector Of Central Excise vs A.V.R.A. And Co. on 28 April, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1987(13)ECC264, 1987(13)ECR302(TRI.-CHENNAI), 1987(31)ELT238(TRI-CHENNAI)
ORDER S. Kalyanam, Member (J)
1. The appeal is filed by the Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore and is directed against the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Madras dated 4-7-1986. The short question that arises for our consideration in the appeal is whether M/s. A.V.R.A. & Co., the respondents herein and M/s. Remi Perfumes (P) Ltd., Madras in law constitute one manufacturing unit, as it were, for the clearances from them to be clubbed in considering the question with reference to the entitlement of the respondent for the benefits of exemption Notification No. 140/83 dated 5-3-1983. Shri Chandramouli, the learned S.D.R. at the outset submitted that an identical question as to whether the respondent and M/s. Remi Perfumes (P) Ltd., Madras are one and the same or are two different units, has already been considered by the Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Madras by order dated 21-10-1980 in Appeal No. 511/80 and adverting to this aspect under the impugned order the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Madras has held that the said two units are two different units. The learned S.D.R. urged that though there is a finding in favour of the respondent, in the earlier order of the Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Madras referred to supra with reference to the issue arising for consideration in this appeal, there is no estoppel in revenue matters so as to estop the Department from reconsidering the issue once again. The learned SDR also submitted that in the order-in-appeal No. 511/80 of the Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise referred to supra, the question that came up for consideration was the applicability of Notification No. 71/78 dated 1-3-1978 whereas the relevant notification arising for consideration in the present appeal is Central Excise Notification No. 140/83 dated 5-3-1983.
2. Shri D.J.G.C. Pandian, the learned Consultant for the respondents submitted that once an identical issue had been decided in favour of the respondent by a competent statutory authority and when the same has not been appealed against or revised, a finality would attach itself to the same in law and the same issue cannot be reopened by the Department unless there are other circumstances or evidence available.
3. We have carefully considered the submissions before us. It is not seriously disputed before us that the short question with reference to clubbing of the said two units has already been decided by the Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Madras by his order dated 21-10-1980 referred to supra. This has also been adverted in the impugned order now appealed against. It is well-settled in law that once a competent authority in exercise of a Quasi-Judicial statutory jurisdiction decides an issue on consideration of relevant materials, such finding or conclusion can be assailed or challenged only in a manner known to law and when such finding or conclusion has reached a state of finality, it cannot be assailed or questioned unless there are fresh circumstances or fresh pieces of evidence or any rulings or authoritative pronouncements of the High Court or the Supreme Court contra so as to enable the Department to reopen the issue to the detriment of the respondent. The plea of the S.D.R. that there is a difference in the notification applicable in the earlier case and the present case is neither here nor there and is not a relevant circumstance at all. The fundamental and essential question is with reference to the validity of the clubbing of the said two units in law for the purposes of Assessment and that issue has already been decided in favour of the respondents in the earlier order of the Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Madras referred to supra and that finding was not appealed against or revised by any authority in a manner known to law. In such a circumstance unless there are other fresh circumstances or a judicial pronouncement, the Department cannot in law reopen the issue at a later point of time to the disadvantage or detriment of the respondent. In short the Department cannot approbate and reprobate. This position is no longer res integra and is covered by the ruling of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in the case of 'S.P.S. Jayaram and Co. Vs. Asst. Collector of Central Excise (Prev.), Madurai, reported in 1987 (28) ELT 20 (Mad.) wherein the Madras High Court has highlighted the fact that a quasi-judicial authority is bound by the principles of 'Constructive res judicata' and has derived support from the ratio decidendi of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Orient Paper Mills Vs. Union of India - AIR 1970 SC 1498. It has also been observed that the same principle was adopted by the Delhi High Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Ors. 1981 (8) E.L.T. 328. Therefore, an authority can depart from his earlier stand only for cogent reasons i.e. fresh facts being brought on record or the process of manufacture getting changed or the relevant Tariff entry undergoing modification or subsequent to the earlier decision, there is a pronouncement of a High Court or the Supreme Court necessitating the reconsideration of the issue. In the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the fact that issue arising for determination herein has already been conclusively decided by a competent authority under the order referred to supra and on application of principles of res judicata, we are inclined to hold that the Department would not have right or jurisdiction in law to reopen the issue except in circumstances set out above. In this view of the matter we hold that the impugned order appealed against is sustainable in law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. We find that the impugned order is in favour of the respondent in toto and therefore, we are unable to understand as to how a cross-objection in law would arise. The cross-objection is, therefore, dismissed.