Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mohammad Sharif S/O Abdul Sattar And ... vs Kesharsingh Hirasingh Thakur on 25 February, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(2)MPLJ184
JUDGMENT V.K. Agarwal, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 14-8-1998 in Civil Appeal No. 26-A/98 by Additional District Judge, Waraseoni, whereby the judgment and decree dated 18-1-1995 in Civil Suit No. 114-A/1991 by II Civil Judge, Class-II, Waraseoni, decreeing the suit of the respondent/plaintiff for eviction of the appellants/defendants, was affirmed.
2. The respondent/plaintiff filed a civil suit for eviction of appellants/defendants on various grounds under Section 12(1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short). It was alleged that the appellants/defendants are the tenants of the respondent/plaintiff in the suit-premises, situate at Ward No. 6, Katangi, Tahsil Waraseoni and were in arrears of rent. The suit accommodation was required for starting the cycle shop and residence of the respondent/plaintiff, and that he had no other suitable accommodation for the purpose. It was also averred that the suit-house had become dilapidated and was required by the plaintiff/respondent for repairs of the same, which cannot be carried out without the appellants/defendants vacating the same.
3. The learned trial Court decreed the suit for eviction holding that the same is required bonaflde by the respondent/plaintiff, and that he also intends carrying on repairs therein. In appeal filed by appellants/defendants, the judgment and decree as above, were affirmed and the suit of the respondent/plaintiff for eviction of the appellants/defendants was decreed.
4. This second appeal of appellants/defendants has been admitted on the following substantial question of law :-
"Whether the Courts below, while granting the decree for eviction under Section 12(l)(g) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, ought to have ascertained from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation, as provided under Section 18 of the said Act?"
5. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that the decree for eviction has also been granted under Section 12(l)(g) of the 'Act' on the grounds that the respondent/landlord required the suit accommodation for carrying out essential repairs in the suit-premises. Therefore, under Section 18 of the 'Act', the appellants/defendants are entitled to elect to be placed in occupation of the suit accommodation and the Courts below should have given suitable directions, in the above regard, as is specified in Section 18 of the 'Act'. However, the learned Courts below have neither recorded the election of the appellants/defendants to reoccupy the suit-accommodation and have failed to give suitable directions of re-entry of the defendants/appellants after repairs. Hence the decree for eviction without obtaining the option of the appellants/defendants of re-entry and directions in that regard, is illegal and bad in law. It has, therefore, been urged that the case be remanded for due compliance of Section 18 of the 'Act' and for passing appropriate orders after ascertaining election of the appellants/defendants regarding re-entry.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, however, has submitted that the decree for eviction granted in his favour is not on the ground of Section 12(l)(g) of the 'Act' alone. In fact, the decree for eviction by the Courts below has been granted upholding his requirement of the suit- accommodation for residence as well as for his business. Therefore, even if the ground under Section 12(l)(g) of the 'Act' raised by the respondent/plaintiff was accepted; still the decree for eviction would essentially be on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit-premises by the respondent-landlord. In view of above, there was no question of seeking or recording election of re-entry by the tenant/appellants and no directions regarding it, in the above circumstances, deserve to or required to be given. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff on Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1676; Radhey Shyam and Ors. v. Kalyan Mal and Anr., 1985 MPLJ 112 and Kishorekant (deceased) through : LRs Pradip Kumar and Ors. v. Ramabai (deceased) through : LRs Shrichand and Ors., 1985 MPRCJ N(61).
7. The case of the respondent/plaintiff was that he requires the suit accommodation for residence as well as for carrying on his business. He also pleaded that the suit-accommodation is in dilapidated condition and has become unsafe for human habitation and that he requires the same for carrying out repairs, which cannot be carried out without the appellants/defendants-tenants vacating the same. Both the above pleas were accepted by the learned trial Court and were affirmed in appeal preferred by the appellants/defendants.
8. Clearly, therefore, case of the respondent/plaintiff basically was that he requires bonafide the suit-accommodation for the purpose of his residence as well as for his business. It was also the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the suit-accommodation is in a dilapidated condition, therefore, he wants to repair the same. However, it is clear from the above pleadings that after repairs of the house, he would himself occupy the same, as noticed above. The requirement as above of the plaintiff/respondent has been upheld by both the Courts below.
9. In the circumstances, there was no question of permitting re-entry in the house to the appellants/tenants as that would imply and render the decree for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement meaningless. If the decree had been granted only under Section 12(l)(g) of the 'Act', it was mandatory that the election for reoccupation of the premises by the appellants/defendants should have been ascertained and recorded and suitable directions given, in accordance with Section 18 of the 'Act'. However, that is not the case here.
10. In Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta's case (supra) which was under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947), eviction was sought under Section 13(l)(g) and 13(l)(hh) of Bombay Act. Section 13(l)(g),and 13(l)(hh) of the Bombay Act substantially correspondent to Sections 12(l)(f) and 12(l)(g) of the 'Act' respectively. The Supreme Court, in that case, has observed as follows :-
"We are therefore of opinion that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in view of the provisions of sub- clause (g) of Section 13(1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to them or after making the necessary alterations.
The provisions of clause (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of Clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants."
11. Similarly, in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), the Supreme Court relying on the above decision of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta, has clarified and held that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from the tenants under Section 12(l)(f) of the 'Act'. The mere fact that Section 12(1)(h) of the 'Act', is also mentioned in the orders of Courts below, does not make the order of eviction purely one under that section, for the main ground of eviction is bona fide personal requirement of the landlord.
12. In Kishorekant's case (supra), this Court has ruled that when the tenanted accommodation is required by the landlord for residence and for starting the business, there was no question of making any direction under Section 18 of the 'Act',
13. The decree of eviction granted in favour of the landlord upholding his bona fide requirement for personal need would stand nullified and rendered meaningless if directions of re-entry in the suit-premises of the defendant/tenant are given under Section 18 of the 'Act'. Therefore, directions under Section 18 of the 'Act' for re-entry can reasonably be given only when the decree was under Section 12(l)(g) or under Section 12(l)(h) of the 'Act'. Therefore, in the instant case, since decree for eviction of the appellants/tenants was granted accepting the grant of bona fide requirement of the respondent/plaintiff; there was no question of giving directions of re entry of the appellants/tenants under Section 18 of the 'Act'.
14. Therefore, the Courts below, in the above circumstances, did not commit any error in not making any direction of re-entry under Section 18 of the'Act'.
15. The appeal, therefore, has no merit. It deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Costs of this appeal shall, however, be as incurred.