Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Mumbai
Gujarat Aluminium Extrusions Pvt. Ltd. vs C.C.E. And C. on 13 December, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001(131)ELT314(TRI-MUMBAI)
ORDER Gowri Shankar, Member (T)
1. The appellant manufactured, on job work, parts of aluminium out of aluminium ingots supplied by luggage manufacturers, to whom it sent the parts that it manufactured. In the order impugned in the appeal, the Commissioner has held that the cost of the material which might have been supplied to the appellant to compensate for the burning loss that takes place during manufacture, and the expenses incurred on the transit insurance of the aluminium should form part of the assessable value.
2. It is the appellant's contention that it included in the cost of manufacture the entire cost of the aluminium that it received. It did not deduct any cost on account of burning loss. It is further contended that there is not the slightest material to show that the appellant for the burning loss received any material as replacement.
3. Neither the show cause notice, nor the Commissioner's order cite any evidence to show that the appellant received on the order of the luggage manufacturer, any burning loss of aluminium as a replacement for what was lost in the manufacturing process. The statement of D.B. Bhatt, a Manager of Safari Industries, one such manufacturer, only says that this loss is taken into account in calculating the profit. That is to be taken into account for financial purposes is clear. This is however very different from saying that any replacement was given to the appellant. In the normal course, the luggage manufacturer would know how many parts would be obtained from a specified quantity of ingots of aluminium and there would be no extra material given on account of loss. In the total absence of anything to show that this was not the case, we are unable to confirm this part of the order of the Commissioner.
4. The advocate for the appellant does not deny the expenses on account of transit insurance should form part of the cost of the material, and should form part of the assessable value. He contends however that the appellant was not aware that the material was in insurance transit. He points to the statement of Tase, its excise clerk to this effect, and emphasises that orders for supply of the material was placed on them by the manufacturer directly by the luggage manufacturer. There is therefore no suppression [of] facts by the appellant.
5. That there has been incorrect declaration is no doubt true. However, the departmental representative's assertion that the appellant ought to have verified whether there was transit insurance or not, does not appear to us to be relevant. He is not able to rebut the contention of the counsel for the appellant that it did not receive any document, relating to the insurance or otherwise come to know of it. In that situation, we cannot agree that merely because special efforts were not made by the appellant to get the information whether the transit insurance was paid or not, there has been either suppression of facts. The proviso under Sub-section (1) of Section 11A speaks of wilful suppression. A person can only suppress a fact of which he is aware. Therefore, there has been no suppression of the fact as alleged in the notice. The notice dated 14-8-1992 demanding duty in relation to the cost of insurance for the clearances between August, 1987 and December, 1991 is barred by limitation.
6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Consequential relief.