Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Mahendrasinh Hakumatsinh Vaghela & on 9 February, 2015
Author: K.J.Thaker
Bench: K.J.Thaker
R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 812 of 2003
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.J.THAKER
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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STATE OF GUJARAT....Appellant(s)
Versus
MAHENDRASINH HAKUMATSINH VAGHELA &
3....Opponent(s)/Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MS MONALI BHATT, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR MB PARIKH, ADVOCATE for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1 - 4
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.J.THAKER
Date : 09/02/2015
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The State has preferred this criminal appeal Page 1 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C.") against the judgment and order dated 07.04.2003 rendered by the learned 2nd Fast Track Judge, Amreli in Sessions Case No.116 of 2002. The said case was registered against the present respondents-original accused for the offence under Sections 498-A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC").
2. The original complainant filed Criminal Revision Application No.283/2003, wherein on 19.01.2015, this Court passed the following order:
"Learned Advocate Mr. R.C. Kakkad states that he may be permitted to appear with the prosecution.
He seeks permission to withdraw the Criminal Revision Application No.283/2003. However, the papers should not be de-linked. The papers should be kept with Criminal Appeal No.812/2003 and the grounds urged in the Criminal Revision Application also are to be treated as part of the memo of the Appeal.
All the matters be listed for final hearing on 9th FEBRUARY, 2015."
3. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that Complainant-Ranubha Chenubha Jadeja is residing at Village Mungni, Tal: Sikka Dist: Page 2 of 25
R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT Jamnagar with his family and he is maintaining his family by doing agricultural work. It is further case of the prosecution that his deceased-daughter Hinaben was married to accused no.1 six months prior to the incident and the deceased was residing with her in-laws in a joint family. After her marriage, she had come to her parental house seven or eight times and complained to her parents that accused no.1- Mahndrasinh-her husband and accused no.3-her mother-in-law, Taraba were taunting her on account of inadequate dowry brought at the time of her marriage. It is further case of the prosecution that the accused were demanding clothes, money, gold and furniture from her parents. The complainant on the demand of the accused once paid Rs.5000/-. However, the accused continued their demand and as the demand was not complied with, they tortured the deceased mentally and physically. That ultimately as the harassment became unbearable, the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene herself on Page 3 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT her body and setting herself on fire. Thereafter, she was taken to the Government Hospital, Amreli where she expired. On these facts, the complaint was registered being I-C.R.No.97/2002 with Amreli City Police Station.
4. After completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed before the learned Magistrate Court. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, learned Magistrate Court, Ahmedabad under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. committed the said case to the Court of 2nd Fast Track Court, Amreli, which was, thereafter, numbered as Sessions Case No.116/2002. Since the opponents-accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried, they were tried for the alleged offences.
5. To prove the prosecution case, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses:
P.W. Nos. Witnesses Exhibit
Nos.
1 Dr.Hareshbhai Dalsukhbai Yadav 13
2 Anilbhai Natvarlal Ghamecha 17
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3 Complainant-Ranubha Chenubha 20
4 Narharibhai Ravjibhai Patel 22
5 Diluba Ranubha Jadeja 25
6 Kalubha Dipsinh Jadeja 27
7 I.O. Gandabhai Kalabhai Desai 30
6. The prosecution has led the following
documentary evidence in support of its case:
Sr.Nos. Documentary evidence Exhibit Nos.1 Letter for P.M. Note 14 2 P.M. Note of deceased-Hinaben 15
3 Letter for giving cloths of the 16 deceased to Amreli Police Station 4 Scene of offence panchnama 18 5 Inquest panchnama 19 6 Complaint 21 7 Report of PSO Amreli 23 8 Report of scene of offence 33 prepared by FSL Officer 9 Receipt of dead body of deceased 34 was given to Ranubha Manubha 10 Letter of muddamal was send to 31 Chemical Analyzer 11 Receipt of muddamal 32 12 Forwarding letter of Chemical 29 Analyzer
7. At the end of the Trial and after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Page 5 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT Cr.P.C. and hearing the arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the defence, the learned 2 nd Fast Track Judge, Amreli acquitted the accused of all the charges leveled against them.
8. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, the appellant-State has preferred the present Criminal Appeal.
9. Ms.Monali Bhatt, learned APP has taken this Court through entire evidence and has threadbare read the evidence, which was led before the learned Sessions Judge. She has also relied on the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act as it is one of the grounds urged. It is an admitted position, according to her, that the marriage span of the deceased was two months. She further submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have believed the evidence of complainant-Ranubha Chenubha Jadeja and his wife Dilubha Ranubhai, who were examined at Exhs:20 and 25 respectively and they have narrated as to Page 6 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT how the deceased was being harassed mentally and physically at the hands of the accused and they have also stated that as and when their daughter-
deceased used to visit their house, she was telling them about the physical and mental harassment on account of inadequate amount of dowry demanded by the accused. She further submitted that as the accused were demanding clothes, gold, money and furniture, the complainant had given to his daughter Rs.5,000/- in order to see that deceased lives peacefully in her in-laws house. She also submitted the lower Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record and wrongly acquitted the accused persons. She therefore requested that the criminal appeal is required to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court is required to be quashed and set aside.
10. As against that, learned advocate for the opponents-accused persons supported the judgment and order of the Trial Court submitting that the Page 7 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT same was passed after appreciating the evidence adduced on record by the prosecution and hence, no interference is called for with the same at the hands of this Court. She has relied upon the findings of the Court below and submitted that the Trial Court has given cogent reasons for acquitting the accused. He also submitted that cross-examination of the complainant also does not prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or that ingredients of Section 306 or Section 498-A of the IPC are satisfied. It is stated that there was no nexus between the incident and the allegations of cruelty. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the decision of Ramaiah Vs. State of Karantaka (2014(9) SCC 365) and he submitted that in view of the ratio laid down in the said judgment, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. He has taken this Court through the cross examination of father of deceased, wherein it is mentioned that when deceased used to visit the resident of the parents, the parents used to give her fare for Page 8 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT the ticket of the S.T. and for that fare, that was paid by father of the deceased cannot be said to be dowry demand by accused no.1. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court is just and proper and the present criminal appeal is required to be dismissed.
11. I have heard learned APP for the appellant- State and the learned advocate for the opponents- accused and perused the material on record with their assistance
12. This takes this Court to the evidence against accused. Before deciding the case against the accused, it would be profitable to refer to some of the provisions of the statutes. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is reproduced hereunder:-
"113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.-When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the Page 9 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860).]"
13. Sections 306 and 114 of IPC provide as under:
"306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
114. Abettor present when offence is committed:-
Whenever any person, who is absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence."
14. In the case of S.S.CHHEENA V. VIJAY KUMAR MAHAJAN AND ANOTHER, (2010) 12 SCC 190), the Apex Court observed as under in Paragraph Nos.-19 to 27:
19. "Abetment" has been defined under Section 107 of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 107, which reads as under:
"107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of a thing, who-
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing."Page 10 of 25
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20. Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with Section 107 reads as under:
"Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
15. It is trite law that in a case where there is no direct eye-witness version available and the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the principle which is to be applied by the Court is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. In this regard, the Supreme Court has observed as follows in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra ((2006) 10 SCC 681):-
"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an Page 11 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of T.N. v. Rajendran (SCC para 6) : (1999 AIR SCW 3536) (Para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal (SCC para 39 : AIR para
40) : (1992 AIR SCW 2417); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (SCC para 27) : (2001 AIR SCW 5251) (Para
15); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (SCC para
15) : (2001 AIR SCW 5251) (Para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (SCC para 4) : (1995 AIR SCW 2504).]
22.Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling house where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of H.P. : (AIR 1972 SC 2077), it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with "khukhri" and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1992 AIR SCW 1175) the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that the wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at house at that time. The letters written by the wife to her Page 12 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302, IPC. In State of T.N. v. Rajendran, the wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries.
It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime."
16. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and later decisions of this Court, not only that the circumstances go to show that accused in their statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., except stating that it is a false case against them does not say anything else. In the case of Buta Singh vs. The State of Punjab (1991 Cri.L.J. 1464), the Apex Court has observed in Paras-8 & 9, as under:
"8. We may now consider the evidence regarding the injuries to the appellant and his wife. Indisputably the appellant and his wife sustained injuries. This is clear from the Page 13 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT evidence of PW 2-Dr. Manjit Singh. His evidence shows that the appellant had two sharp edged punctured wounds on the back and the chest and two abrasions on the left fore-arm and on the front of the chest. His wife, Gurbachan Kaur, had a scalp deep incised wound on the left parietal region, two sharp punctured wounds on the right thigh and the right gluteal region, a swelling around the ankle joint and an abrasion on the left shoulder joint. The prosecution witnesses have tried to explain these injuries by stating that they had received the same when they tried to block PWs 7 and 8 from going to the rescue of the deceased. It is their case that when they found the appellant and his wife attacking them, they hit back with their weapons and caused the injuries in question. The defence version is that when the assault was launched they received these injuries, they fought back and caused injuries to the deceased as well as PWs 7 and 8 but unfortunately the deceased succumbed to his injuries. In other words, according to them, they caused the injuries in exercise of their right of private defence. The High Court however, has taken the view that the injuries were caused to the appellant and his wife by the prosecution witnesses in exercise of their right of private defence. But here again if it is found that the incident occurred near the appellants dera and the tubewell and not in the field as deposed by the prosecution witnesses, the substratum of the prosecution case would stand knocked out. As pointed out earlier the find of the blood and the deposition of DW-1 support the defence case. The reason for shifting the place of occurrence is obvious. If the incident occurred there and not in the disputed field, it would show that the prosecution party was the aggressor and not the appellant and his wife. It also does not stand to reason that the appellant would go to the disputed field with his wife and a 13 year boy to quarrel with men who were armed with deadly weapons. It is difficult to believe that he would expose his wife and son to the risk of being attacked. The defence version, therefore, seems to be probable. If that be so, the prosecution party had no right of self defence. Then the appellant and his wife would claim that benefit.Page 14 of 25
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9. From the above state of evidence, it appears that the defence version regarding the incident is a probable one and is supported by the find of blood from near the tubewell which is adjacent to the dera of the appellant. When two versions are before the Court, the version which is supported by objective evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly unless it has been properly explained. As stated earlier, the prosecution has not explained how blood was found from near the tubewell and no blood was found from the spot where according to them the incident occurred. In addition to this, the factum regarding the delay in lodging of the First Information Report and the suspicion that it was delayed with a view to concocting he prosecution case and further the delay in forwarding the special report to the Magistrate as well as the case papers to the hospital shows that the investigation was not above board. In these circumstances, we think that the approach adopted by the Court below cannot be justified."
17. In the said decision, in Para-9 on which the reliance is placed, the Honble Supreme Court has held that the objective evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly unless it has been properly explained. In this case, objective evidence is against the accused no.1-husband, and therefore, the same requires to be viewed in light of this observation. Therefore, the learned trial Judge has materially erred in relying on the fact that the marriage span is of two months. The principles enunciated by the Apex Court for Page 15 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT reversing the judgment of acquittal will permit this Court to reverse the decision of acquittal of accused no.1.
18. From the observations of the Apex Court in S.S.CHHEENA (supra), it is clear that without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid an act of suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Apex Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 of IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide, seeing no other option and that act must have been intended to put the deceased into such a position that she is compelled to committed suicide. Therefore, even on the touchstone of the latest decision of the Apex Court, as referred to hereinabove, the prosecution has not even brought home the charge that the conduct of the accused was such, which Page 16 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT perpetrated and fastened the death of the deceased.
19. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. NARAYANA MENON @ MANI VS. STATE OF KERALA & ANR (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39, the Apex Court has narrated the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In Para-54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under;
"54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below."
20. Further, in the case of CHANDRAPPA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415, the Apex Court laid down the following principles; Page 17 of 25
R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
[1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
[2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
[3] Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
[4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
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[5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court."
21. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
22. Even in the case of STATE OF GOA Vs. SANJAY THAKRAN & ANR. reported in (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In Para-16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under;
"16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court Page 19 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with."
23. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in cases of STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS. RAM VEER SINGH & ORS. (2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553) and in GIRJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY L.R.s VS. STATE OF MP (2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589). Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled.
24. In the case of LUNA RAM VS. BHUPAT SINGH AND ORS. ((2009) SCC 749), the Apex Court in Paras-10 and 11 has held as under;
"10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition.
11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the Page 20 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence."
25. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of MOOKKIAH AND ANR. VS. STATE, REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, TAMIL NADU (AIR 2013 SC 321), the Apex Court in Para-4 has held as under:
"4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as Page 21 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573]"
26. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. HEMAREDDY (AIR 1981 SC 1417), wherein it is held as under;
"...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93:(AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice."
27. In the recent decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shivasharanappa & ors. v/s. State of Karnataka (JT 2013 (7) SC 66) has held as under:
"That appellate Court is empowered to re-appreciate the entire evidence, though, certain other principles are also to be adhered to and it has to be kept in mind that acquittal results into double presumption of innocence."Page 22 of 25
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28. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court and the factual scenario which emerges from record, it cannot be said that the accused, more particularly, accused Nos.2 to 4 meted out cruel treatment to the deceased so as to see that the deceased commits suicide. In light of aforesaid observations of the Apex Court and considering the evidence on record, it can be said that the prosecution successfully proved the offence under Section 498(A) and Section 306 of IPC against accused nos.2 to 4. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment and order passed by the trial Court does not require interference at the hands of this Court qua accused nos.2 to 4.
29. As far as the findings of facts are concerned, learned APP has not been able to prove that there was any demand of dowry by accused nos.2, 3 and 4. The evidence led qua them is insufficient. In light of the latest decision of Page 23 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT the Apex Court, as the evidence is scant evidence, they could not have been held guilty of the alleged offences. Therefore, acquittal qua accused nos.2, 3 and 4 is confirmed. This takes this Court to the role attributed by accused no.1. It is categorically admitted by the father of the deceased that after the marriage, he had paid Rs.5,000/-. Further, the said amount was repeatedly demanded by accused no.1. There is a corroborative evidence to the effect that during marriage span of the deceased, his daughter was complaining about demand of dowry. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr.Parikh, learned advocate qua accused no.1 only. The decision of Ramaiah Vs. State of Karantaka (supra) will not apply to the facts of the present case and ingredients are established against accused no.1 that parents of the deceased had given money to her, which in turn was to be given to accused no.1, just because accused no.1 demanded dowry.
30. In view of the above, this Court is of the Page 24 of 25 R/CR.A/812/2003 JUDGMENT opinion that the Trial Court rightly acquitted accused nos.2 to 4 for the alleged offences.
Hence, the appeal qua accused nos.2 to 4 deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the appeal qua accused nos.2 to 4 fails and is dismissed. The judgment and order of the Trial Court stands confirmed qua accused nos.2 to 4. Bail and bail bonds of the accused nos.2 to 4, if any, stands discharged. R & P be sent back to the concerned Trial Court, forthwith.
31. However, at this stage, Mr.Parikh learned advocate for the accused-opponents requests for time. Accused no.1 i.e. his client will remain present before this Court on 13.02.2015 for hearing of sentence as he is convicted under Sections 498(A) read with 306 of IPC.
(K.J.THAKER, J) rakesh/ Page 25 of 25