Meghalaya High Court
Smt Belina Marak vs State Of Meghalaya on 30 October, 2015
Bench: Uma Nath Singh, T Nandakumar Singh
1
THE HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
WP(CRL) No. 1 of 2015
1. Smti. Belina Marak,
Wife of Shri. Akram Khan,
Presently Resident of Pynthorumkhrah,
Block-I, Shillong, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
... Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The District Magistrate,
West Garo Hills, Williamnagar.
2. The State of Meghalaya,
Represented by Commissioner & Secretary,
Political Department, Shillong.
3. The Union of India,
Represented by the Secretary, Home,
New Delhi.
.....Respondent
BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UMA NATH SINGH, CHIEF JUSTICE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T NANDAKUMAR SINGH For the petitioner : Ms. S.G.Momin, Adv.
For the respondents : Mr. N.D.Chullaim Sr. GA Mr. P.Yobin, GA.
Date of hearing : 13-10-2015
Date of Judgment : 30-10-2015
2
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(Justice T. Nandakumar Singh)
Heard Ms. S.G.Momin, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also Mr. N.D.Chullai, learned Sr. GA, assisted by Mr. P.Yobin, learned GA appearing for the State respondents.
2. The petitioner is the aunt of the detenu, Shri. Salgra D. Sangma alias Silgra/Kalu. By this writ petition, the petitioner is assailing (i) the detention order dated 18-09-2013 issued by the detaining authority, District Magistrate, West Garo Hills, Tura in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 for detaining the detenu with immediate effect until further orders, (ii) the order of the State Government dated 27-09-2013 for approving the detention order dated 18-09-2013 in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 and (iii) the order of the State Government dated 12-11-2013 in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 on the recommendation of the Advisory Board for confirming the detention order dated 18-09-2013 and also for continuing the detention of the detenu for a period of three years with effect from 18-09-2013 to 17-09-2016.
33. The fact of the case sufficient for deciding the present writ petition is briefly noted. The detenu, Shri. Salgra D. Sangma was arrested by the Garo Hills Police on 16-07-2013 in connection with the FIR i.e. Dalu P.S. case No. 21(6)2013 U/S 364/34 IPC.
For that case the detenu was remanded to custody by the concerned Judicial Magistrate. While the detenu was in custody, the District Magistrate, Tura issued the impugned detention order dated 18-09-2013 under the Meghalaya Prevention Detention Act, 1995. For easy reference, the impugned detention order dated 18- 09-2013 is quoted here under:
"GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE::
WEST GARO HILLS DISTRICT::TURA No.CB.32/13/14 Dated Tura, the 18th September, 2013 ORDER UNDER SECTION 3(1) OF THE MEGHALAYA PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT, 1995 Whereas, it has been brought to my notice that a person known as Shri Salgra D. Sangma, alias Silgra/Kalu, S/o Shri Pobison M Marak of village Magupara Nokmagittim, PO Khoinabhui, PS Dalu, West Garo Hills District is now in judicial custody;
And whereas, he is an active member of newly formed militant organization named Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), a dreadful militant outfit of Meghalaya, which has unleashed a reign of terror by causing abductions, targeting innocent civilians, engaging in rampant extortion and wanton killing of police personnel and civilians by pre-meditated attacks and ambushes;
And whereas, the militant organization has generated a sense of insecurity and fear amongst the innocent citizens of Garo Hills in Meghalaya by declaring bandhs, attacking police convoys, ambushing police and paramilitary forces and targeting innocent 4 civilians merely on suspicion of their being police informers;
And whereas, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith;
And whereas, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), a militant outfit of Garo Hills, which came into existence in early 2010 has been consolidating its position in the three Garo Hills Districts both organizationally and in terms of weapons and cadres and to achieve the objective of a separate Garo State, the outfit is resorting to terrorism in the form of killing of innocent civilians and security forces in addition to engaging in other violent activities like physical assault on Government employees, lobbing grenades in Government buildings and other violent activities and extortions.
And whereas, the Central Government believes that the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) is involved in terrorism; and as such under clause (a) of sub section (1) of Section 35 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Central Government decided to add the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) and all its formations and front organizations as terrorist organization, in the Schedule to the said Act by S.O. 62(F), dated 12th January, 2012 (Notification No. F.No.11011/124/2011-NE-V) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.
And whereas, Shri Salgra D. Sangma, who is a member of this banned terrorist organization is involved in various anti-national activities, unlawful activities and crimes like extortion and robbery and with use of deadly weapons for ransom, disruption of public order etc. for which police have implicated him as borne out in the case registered with Police Station viz:
1. On receipt of information that some GNLA cadres are coming to Rongdopara under Dalu Police Station to collect the demanded money, on 17/6/2013, a Police team of Dalu PS proceeded to the village and while the police team approaching the village at about 2:30 5 PM, one cadre who was waiting for the demanded ransom suddenly emerged from hiding and lobbed one country made pressure bomb upon the police team and immediately fled away towards the thick jungle. On seeing the seriousness police also retaliated in self defense, also the bomb exploded within a short span of time, however no one was injured. During the course of investigation, it was ascertained that the he along with his associates were involved in the crime. In this connection a case has been registered at Dalu PS vide Dalu PS C/No. 19(6)2013 U/S 353/307/34 IPC, R/W sec. 5 E.S.Act.
2. Complainant Smt. Pollina R. Sangma D/o Shri Jenggan M. Sangma of village Doldenggagre, PO. Josipara, PS. Dalu lodged an FIR at Dalu PS that on 18th June, 2013 at about 11:30 PM 6(six) unknown miscreants entered into her house at Doldenggagre and identified them as members of GNLA and at gun point abducted her father Shri Jenggan M. Sangma to unknown place. On 20th June, 2013 at about 11:00 AM, the abductors released her father Shri Jenggan M. Sangma after having paid them Rs. 5 lakhs. During investigation, it was ascertained that he along with his associates were involved in the crime. In this connection a case has been registered at Dalu PS vide Dalu PS C/No.21(6)2013 U/S 364/34 IPC.
And whereas, seizure of indiscriminating documents have established corroboration and connivance of the person in the aforementioned crimes.
And whereas, I am satisfied that if Shri Salgra D. Sangma is allowed to remain at large, in the event of his obtaining bail form the judicial court, he would act in the manner prejudicial to security of the State, maintenance of public order and threat to the life and property of the citizens and it is necessary that he be detained and being so satisfied;
6Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred upon me under section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995, I Shri Pravin Bakshi, IAS, District Magistrate, West Garo Hills District, Tura do hereby direct that Shri Salgra D. Sangma be detained with immediate effect and until further orders at the District Jail, West Garo Hills, Tura under provisions of the aforementioned Act;
Further, Shri Salgra D. Sangma shall, in accordance with article 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with section 8(1) of MPDA, 1995 have every right to make a representation against the order of detention to the detaining authority i.e. the District Magistrate, West Garo Hills, Tura, which right is in addition to and independent of his right to make representation before the State Govt i.e. to the Principal Secretary/Commissioner & Secretary, Political Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, Meghalaya Secretariat, Shillong, Advisory Board, Guwahati and also to the Central Government (Government of India) i.e. to the Secretary (Home), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, North Block, New Delhi
- 1.
Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court this 18th day of September, 2013 Sd/-
(Pravin Bakshi) District Magistrate West Garo Hills, Tura"
4. In pursuance of the provision of Section 8(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 and the order No. CB.32/13/14, dated 18-09-2013, the detaining authority had also furnished the grounds of detention to the detenu under the 7 letter dated 18-09-2013 of the District Magistrate, West Garo Hills, Tura. The impugned detention order dated 18-09-2013 had been approved vide the impugned order of the State Government dated 27-09-2013 and ultimately confirmed vide the impugned order of the State Government dated 12-11-2013.
5. The petitioner filed the present writ petition assailing the impugned detention order on the main ground that there was non-application of mind in passing the impugned detention order inasmuch as there was absolutely no material for coming to the satisfaction that "in the event of his obtaining bail from the judicial court, he would act in the manner prejudicial to the security of the State, maintenance of public order and threat to the life and property of the citizens and it is necessary that he be detained detained and being so satisfied." Para No. 11 and 12 of the writ petition read as follows:
"11.That the petitioner states that the Detaining Authority i.e. the District Magistrate, West Garo Hills District, Tura passed the detention order dated 18-09-2013 in most mechanical manner against the detenue as he had no potent ground or reason to come to a subjective satisfaction to conclude that "And whereas, I am satisfied that if Shri. Salgra D. Sangma is allowed to remain at large, in the event of his obtaining bail from the Judicial Court, he would act in the manner prejudicial to security of the State, maintenance of public order and threat to the life and property of the citizens and it is necessary that he be detained and being so satisfied;............" The said proposition by the detaining authority could not have been drawn as, there was no cogent material or whatsoever before the detaining authority to come to such conclusion as the Detenue was already under the custody of the Police as he is arrested on the 16-07-2013 and was being kept 8 under continuous custody. And in fact one of the persons who was arrested on the strength of one of the FIR alleged against the detenue i.e. Dalu PS case No. 21(6)2013 U/S 364/34 IPC has not been granted bail and detained under the same Act. And as there existed no bail application on record pending or disposed off by or on behalf of the detenue before any competent court to come to such conclusion or to arrive at such apprehension.
12. That the petitioner most humbly submits that the detention order dated 18-09-2013 passed by the District Magistrate Tura suffers from non application of mind as the detention order shows that the detenue was in judicial custody at the time the detention order was passed but the same does not disclose as to the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority as to how there was a likelihood of the detenue to be released on bail or remaining at large."
6. The State respondents had filed the affidavit-in-opposition and nowhere in the affidavit-in-opposition mentioned that the detenu had filed bail application for releasing him on bail in connection with the case i.e. Dalu P.S. case No. 21(6)2013 U/S 364/34 IPC and any co-accused in the said case had been released on bail.
7. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Paul Manickam & Anr: AIR 2003 SC 6422 laid down three conditions which are to be satisfied for detaining a detenu already in custody under the detention order. Para 12 of AIR in Paul Manickam's case (Supra) reads as follows:-
"12. So far as this question relating to procedure to be adopted in case the detenue is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in Jail under some other laws, the detaining authority should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such 9 persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody the detenue by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenue was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu: (AIR 1989 SC 2027); Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India: AIR 1990 SC 1196). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (AIR 1991 SC 1640). The principles were set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed, (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities, and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand, the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail.
8. The Apex Court in Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi Vs. State of Manipur & Ors.: (2010) 9 SCC 618 held that there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order. There must be material to support the same and Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion 10 only to see if there is any objective basis for the subjective satisfaction.
9. In Lourembam Sana Singh vs. State of Manipur & Ors.:
2008 (2) GLT 813, (one of us is the party) held that:
"13. It is well settled law that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at for detaining the detenu as a preventive measure under the preventive law is invalid if such satisfaction is based on non- existent or irrelevant ground only. Reference in Dwarika Prasad Sahu vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 134. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention and the involvement of the detenu in different activities. Reference may be made in A.P. Saravanan vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2001) 10 SCC
212. There is no set standards laid down by the NSA for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before it by the police. In the present case as stated above, the detaining authority had arrived at, on subjective satisfaction, for detaining the detenu under the NSA on the basis of the materials and the information placed by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non application of mind. Reference in Gurudayal Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2002) 1 SCC 545. The Apex Court in Union of India vs. Paul Manikham reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 held that:
"Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authorities. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of 11 conduct, the failure to confirm to which alone should lead to detention."
10. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardas Patel Vs. Union of India & Ors : (1995) 4 SCC 51 observed that while discharging constitutional obligation to protect fundamental right of the people, more specifically right to personal liberty, the court would not be influenced by the nature of the activity of the detenu. The history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. The safeguards enshrined in clauses (4) and (5) of the Article 22 are required to be jealousy watched and enforced by the Court.
11. The Apex Court through Hon'ble Justice H.L. Dattu in Pebam Ningol Mikol Mikoi Devi vs. State of Manipur and Others: (2010) 9 SCC 618 observed that :-
"3. Individual liberty is a cherished right, one of the most valuable fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens of this country. On "liberty", William Shakespeare, the great play writer, has observed that "a man is master of his liberty."
Benjamin Franklin goes even further and says that "any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both". The importance of protecting liberty and freedom is explained by the famous lawyer Clarence Darrow as "you can protect your liberties in this world only by protecting the other man's freedom; you can be free only if I am free." In India, the utmost importance is given to life and personal liberty of an individual, since we believe personal liberty is the paramount essential to human dignity and human happiness.
4. The Constitution of India protects the liberty of an individual. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. In matters of preventive detention such as this, as there is 12 deprivation of liberty without trial, and subsequent safeguards are provided in Article 22 of the Constitution. They are, when any person is detained pursuant to an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order is required to communicate the grounds on the basis of which, the order has been made and give him an opportunity to make a representation against the order as soon as possible. It thus, cannot be doubted that the constitutional framework envisages protection of liberty as essential, and makes the circumstances under which it can be deprived."
12. In the present case, it is clear that the petitioner was in custody while the detaining authority issued the impugned detention order dated 18-09-2013 and also that the detenu did not file any bail application for releasing him on bail in the said Dalu PS case No. 21(6)2013 U/S 364/34 IPC.
13. The Apex Court in Union of India vs. Paul Manickam and Another (2003) 8 SCC 342 held that even in the case of a person in custody, detention order can validly be passed subject to 3 (three) principles. Para 14 of the SCC in Paul Manickam's case (supra) read as follows:
"14. .... The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N. : (1989) 4 SCC 418 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 732 : AIR 1989 SC 2027 and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India : (1990) 1 SCC 746 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 249 : AIR 1990 SC 1196 . The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India : (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88 : AIR 1991 SC 1640). The principles were set out as follows: even in 13 the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed : (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail."
14. The Apex Court in A.Geetha vs. State of T. N. and Others (2006) 7 SCC 603 held that:
" 10. It has to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction is not to be interfered with. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. It has been clearly stated that in similar cases orders granting bail are passed by various courts. The appellant has not disputed the correctness of this statement. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi : (2002) 7 SCC 129 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1627. The factual scenario in that case was entirely different. In fact, five bail applications filed had been already rejected. In that background this Court observed that it was not a "normal" case. The High Court was justified in rejecting the stand of the appellant. (See Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. : (2006) 6 SCC 64 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 17 : JT (2006) 6 SC 228 and Senthamilselvi vs. State of T.N. and Another (2006) 5 SCC 676 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 50."14
15. The Apex Court in Senthamilselvi vs. State of T.N. and Others (2006) 5 SCC 676 held that:
"10. ...The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction is not to be interfered with. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail. It has been clearly stated that in similar cases orders granting bail are passed by various courts. The appellant has not disputed correctness of this statement. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi : (2002) 7 SCC 120 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1627. The factual scenario in that case was entirely different. In fact, five bail applications filed had been already rejected. In the background this Court observed that it was not a "normal" case. The High Court was justified in rejecting the stand of the appellant."
16. The Apex Court in Rekha Devi vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244 clearly held that in the absence of bail application, detaining authority without any materials cannot come to the conclusion that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. However, in similar cases if the accused had been granted bail, the detaining authority for the sufficient reasons still could come to the conclusion that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. In the present case neither the detenu had filed application for bail nor the co-accused had been released on bail.
17. Paras 7, 10, 11, 12, 25 of the SCC in Rekha's case (supra) read as follows:-
15"7. A perusal of the above statement in Para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the court concerned. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein, nor the bail application number, the co-accused on the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co- accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused. All that has been stated in the grounds of detention is that "in similar cases bails were granted by the courts". In our opinion, in the absence of details this statement is mere ipse dixit, and cannot be relied upon. In our opinion, this itself is sufficient to vitiate the detention order.
10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number whether the bail order was passed in respects of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored.
11. In our opinion, the detention order in question only contains ipse dixit regarding the alleged imminent possibility of the accused coming out on bail and there was no reliable material to this effect. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained.
12. Moreover, even if a bail application of the petitioner relating to the same case was pending in a criminal case the detention order can still be challenged on various grounds e.g. that the act in question related to law and order and not public order, that there was no relevant material on which the detention order was passed, that there were mala fides, that the order was not passed by a competent authority, that the condition precedent for exercise of the power did not exist, that the subjective satisfaction 16 was irrational, that there was non-application of mind, that the grounds are vague, indefinite, irrelevant, extraneous, non-existent or stale, that there was delay in passing the detention order or delay in executing it or delay in deciding the representation of the detenu, that the order was not approved by the Government, that there was failure to refer the case to the Advisory Board or that the reference was belated, etc.
25. In this connection, it may be noted that there is nothing on the record to indicate whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the bail application of the accused was pending on the date when the detention order was passed on 8-4-2010. On the other hand, in para 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that "Thiru. Ramakrishnan is in remand in Crime No. 132 of 2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far". Thus, the detaining authority was not even aware whether a bail application of the accused was pending when he passed the detention order, rather the detaining authority passed the detention order under the impression that no bail application of the accused was pending but in similar cases bail had been granted by the courts. We have already stated above that no details of the alleged similar cases have been given. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained."
18. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that there was non application of mind on the part of the detaining authority in coming to the satisfaction that "in the event of his obtaining bail from the Judicial Court, he would act in the manner prejudicial to security of the State, maintenance of public order and threat to the life and property of the citizens and it is necessary that he be detained" in passing the impugned detention order and also that satisfaction in passing the impugned detention order is nothing but ipse dixit of the authority.
Accordingly, the impugned detention order dated 18-09-2013, impugned approval order dated 27-09-2013 and impugned confirmation order dated 12-11-2013 are hereby set aside.
17Detenu, Shri. Salgra D.Sangma is set at liberty forthwith if he is, otherwise, not required in connection with any other case(s).
19. Writ petition is allowed.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE S.Rynjah