Madras High Court
****** vs Board Of Control For Cricket In India on 21 August, 2015
Author: T.S.Sivagnanam
Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, T.S.Sivagnanam
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on: 14::12::2015
Delivered on: 20::01::2016
Coram:
The Honble Mr.SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
The Honourable Mr.Justice T.S.SIVAGNANAM
Writ Petition No. 26777 of 2015
and
M.P.Nos.2 and 3 of 2015
******
Chennai Super Kings Chennai Ltd.,
Represented by its Manager,
Mr.K.George John
No.827, Anna Salai, Chennai 600002. Petitioner
Versus
1. Board of Control for Cricket in India
Cricket Centre, Wankhade Stadium,
D. Road, Church Gate, Mumbai 400 020.
2. India Cements Ltd.,
Coromandel Towers,
No.93, Santhome High Road,
Karpagam Avenue, R.A.Puram,
Chennai 600 028.
3. Cricket Association of Bihar
Represented by its Secretary
Mr.Aditya Verma,
B-607, Lotus Apartments,
New Patliputra Colony,
Patna - 800 013.
(R.3 Impleaded suo-motu by order
dated 21.08.2015 by CJ & TSSJ
in W.P.SR.No.100163/2015) Respondents
Prayer - Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records of a Committee dated 14.07.2015 headed by Mr.Justice Lodha for and on behalf of the first respondent, from the first respondent, quash the same and consequently direct the first respondent to permit the petitioner to participate in the IPL matches.
For Petitioner ::: Mr.Dushyant Dave
Senior Counsel for
Mr.V.Srikanth
For Respondent 1 ::: Mr.AL.Somayaji
Senior Counsel
and
Mr.Ushanath Banerjee
Senior Counsel
for Mr.Adithya Reddy
For Respondent2 :::Mr.V.Prakash Senior Counsel
for Mr.K.Harishankar for R.2
For Respondent 3 :::Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram
Senior Counsel for Ms.C.Uma for R.3
O R D E R
THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE The Gentlemens game that is what cricket is all about or at least used to be. Thus, whatever gentlemen would not do was by implication excluded as that was not Cricket. As cricket evolved from the more traditional concept of Test matches to the One day / 50 over matches and then the 20 over matches, it went through a sea change in the sense it became more an issue of entertainment and higher financial remuneration to cricketers and administrators of the game. The vast amount of money which came to be involved in the game through sponsorships slowly resulted in scourge of betting and match-fixing. The stakes had become high. Cricketers and sports organizers at the highest level were compromised, tainting the very concept of the game and India with its passion for cricket, generated maximum funds.
2. The Board of Control for Cricket in India/first respondent is stated to have conceived the idea of a shorter version of the game of cricket i.e., T-20 being played among the franchisees in the manner of other sporting leagues abroad and one of the successful bidder for the franchisee was the second respondent, and the second respondent did have a successful run, having won various awards in the league including winning the Championship on two occasions.
3. The crowning success of the league and the hefty amount involved paved the way for allegations of betting and spot fixing in IPL-6 season, which led to arrest of some players and Team Officials (Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan) by the Mumbai Police. The third respondent/ Cricket Association of Bihar, which was suo-motu impleaded by this Court, filed Public Interest Litigation in the Bombay High Court seeking appointment of a fresh committee for the game, which aspect was not acceded to by the Bombay High Court, resulting in filing of SLP.No.25027 of 2013 (Civil Appeal No.4235 of 2014) and SLP.No.26633 of 2013 (Civil Appeal No.4236 of 2014) filed by the third respondent herein, before the Honble Supreme Court.
4. Judicial intervention which ultimately took place was to control and remedy the malpractices. The highest Court of our land thus sought to sweep the game clean and bring it back to its old glory. It is in this process that we have seen the appointment of Justice Mudgal Committee and thereafter Justice Lodha Committee.
5. The actions taken naturally had ramifications for persons involved and the present litigation is an off-shoot of the same, claiming that the right to approach this Court arose out of a window given by the Honble Supreme Court itself.
6. By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the report of the Committee dated 14.07.2015, headed by Mr.Justice Lodha acting for and on behalf of the first respondent-Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) and also seek a direction to the first respondent to permit the petitioner to participate in the Indian Premier League (IPL) matches.
7. Initially, the Registry has raised an objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition as under:-
As per averment of the affidavit, the Honble Supreme Court appointed a Committee in Civil Appeal No.4235 of 2014 and constituting Retired Honble Supreme Court Judge as Chairman and Members and the same (Committee) has been challenged in this Writ Petition. Hence, it may be clarified as to how this Writ Petition is maintainable under Article 226 Constitution of India seeking relief against the Honble Committee constituted by the Honble Supreme Court of India.
8. The writ petition SR.No.100163 of 2015 was listed for hearing under the caption for maintainability on 21.8.2015. After hearing the counsel for parties, we directed the Registry to number the petition, subject to the maintainability being decided in view of the contents of the writ petition. In paragraph-3 of our order dated 21.8.2015, we specifically observed as under:-
We would like to hear the concerned parties on the issue of maintainability of the petition first in the context of the relief sought in the past proceedings and orders passed by the Honble Supreme Court before we proceed to examine the issue on merits.
9. Thereafter, on the question of maintainability, we have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for parties at length further on two occasions.
10. The sum and substance of the case canvassed before us by Mr.Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the petitioner was based on a comprehensive reading of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 4235 & 4236 of 2014 (Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Cricket Association of Bihar & others dt.22.01.2015) which resulted in accusation of mal practices and conflict of interest of persons holding high positions/influence in the Board of Control for Cricket in India, while owning franchise and teams competing in the IPL format. The Honble Supreme Court through this judgment has endeavoured a cleanup operation of this popular game of cricket. The questions which fall for determination have been sketched out in paragraph-19 of the judgment, and what is relevant for the present matter is the second and third question, which read as under:-
(2) Whether Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra were team officials of their respective IPL teams - Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals? If so, whether allegations of betting levelled against them stand proved?
(3) If question No.2 is answered in the affirmative, what consequential action in the nature of punishment is permissible under the relevant Rules and Regulations, and against whom?
11. The prelude to this was the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 30th July, 2013, which had declared that the probe commission set up by the BCCI was not validly constituted, being in violation of the provisions of the IPL Operational Rules, but yet simultaneously declined to grant any further relief of constituting a panel to conduct an enquiry under the supervision of the High Court, treating it as prerogative of the BCCI. It is in these circumstances that both the Cricket Association of Bihar, which was the original petitioner, as well as the BCCI had come on appeal before the Honble Supreme Court.
12. The Honble Supreme Court in terms of its order dated 27th September, 2013 permitted holding of the Annual General Meeting of the BCCI to be held on 29th September, 2013, including the election to the post of President, but with a caveat that if Mr.N.Srinivasan got elected, he would not take charge until further orders. Mr.N.Srinivasan, did get elected as President of the Board. But the Supreme Court noted on 8th October, 2013 that a probe into the allegations of betting and spot fixing was necessary and constituted a three member probe Committee of Mr. Justice Mukul Mudgal, Mr.L.Nageswara Rao and Mr.Nilay Dutta, Senior Advocates with consent of the parties, which came to be known as Justice Mudgal Committee. This Committee interacted inter alia with Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan, Mr.Raj Kundra and the players against whom the BCCI had taken action for match fixing and spot fixing. Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan incidentally is the son-in-law of Mr.N.Srinivasan. The Committee submitted its report on 09th February, 2014. The findings of this Committee, as culled out in paragraph-11 of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, read as under:-
i)That Gurunath Meiyappan formed an integral part of Chennai Super Kings and most persons viewed him as the face of the team, though de-jure ownership vested in India Cements Ltd.
ii)That Gurunath Meiyappan was a team official within the meaning of IPL Operational Rules if not de facto owner of CSK.
iii)That Gurunath Meiyappan had knowledge of or was in a position to easily access sensitive team information, team strategies knowledge about match conditions etc. which knowledge was outside the purview of an ordinary person following the game of cricket.
iv)That Gurunath Meiyappan was also a participant under IPL Anti-corruption Code hence IPL Rules and Regulations were squarely applicable to him.
v)That Gurunath Meiyappan was in regular touch with bookies and punters.
vi)That several calls were traced between Gurunath Meiyappan and Vindoo Dara Singh who was himself a punter in close proximity with several 12 other bookies, evident from the telephonic transcripts produced by the Bombay Police.
vii)That Mr. Ramesh Vyas and Jupiter were acting for Vindoo Dara Singh who was also placing bets for certain IPL stakeholders and actors including Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan. Mr. Meiyappan was in close contact with Mr. Vikram Agarwal who is a hotelier and alleged punter operating from Chennai as revealed by call record details produced by the Chennai Police in Crime No.1 of 2013 registered by the CBCID Branch.
viii)That Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan would regularly place bets in IPL matches both in favour of his team (i.e. CSK) and against his team - a fact established from call records produced by the Mumbai Police.
ix)That Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan would place bets through Vindoo Dara Singh and such bets were even placed during the course of IPL match as revealed by transcripts produced by Mumbai Police.
x)That in one instance Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan made certain predictions to Mr. Vindoo Dara Singh regarding the runs that would be scored in a match between CSK and Rajasthan Royals held on 12th May, 2013 at Jaipur. According to Mr. Meiyappans prediction that CSK would score 130- 140 runs came true as CSK actually scored 141 runs only.
13. Justice Mudgal Committee, thus, in view of the aforesaid findings found Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan guilty of betting, an aspect accentuated by his position in the Chennai Super Kings. In paragraph-12 of the judgment, the Honble Supreme Court referred to the findings of Justice Mudgal Committee that Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan had in his acts of betting, the implicit approval of the franchisee owner India Cements, and thus violating the Operational Rules and Anti-Corruption Code and Articles of IPL Code of Conduct for players and team officials. The blame was also sought to be put on the franchisee owner Chennai Super Kings. In terms of the order dated 16th May, 2014, the Honble Supreme Court, after considering the report of the Probe Committee, permitted Justice Mudgal Committee to inquire into the allegations made against those names mentioned in the sealed cover filed before the Court by the said Committee, including Mr.N.Srinivasan. The process taken thereto resulted in Justice Mudgal Committees final report recording an unanimous conclusion that Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan had indulged in betting in IPL matches, though it found no material to show that he was involved in match fixing.
14. In answer to the second question framed in paragraph-19, the Supreme Court opined that Justice Mudgal Committee had correctly appreciated the facts, as emerging from the documents and depositions, to come to the conclusion that Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan was a Team Official of the Chennai Super Kings. The Supreme Court also noticed the fact of the affected parties having been given a right of opportunity before Justice Mudgal Committee, irrespective of the nicety whether a formal notice was issued or not.
15. On the aforesaid findings, the third question was examined by the Honble Supreme Court in paragraph-47 to the effect that what possible action is permissible against Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr.Raj Kundra and their teams and franchisees . The upshot of the discussion resulted in a finding in paragraph-50 that the sanction was not limited to Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr.Raj Kundra alone, but may extend to the suspension of the team or the franchisee from the league also.
16. Mr.Dave, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, however, sought to emphasize on certain other findings qua Mr.N.Srinivasan, while contending that the sins of son-in-law should not be visited on the father-in-law. In the aforesaid context, while dealing with Question No.4, Justice Mudgal Committee had recorded a finding that the allegations of match fixing, spot fixing or betting were not proved against Mr.N.Srinivasan and that finding was not seriously assailed before the Supreme Court, as noticed in paragraph-63 of the judgment. In fact, the opinion of the Supreme Court recorded in paragraph-65 is that it was difficult to hold that there was even a preponderance of probability to prove the charge of cover up leveled against Mr.N.Srinivasan, and thus, this charge has not been proved against Mr.N.Srinivasan.
17. The detailed discussion in the judgment of the Supreme Court reached its culmination in paragraph-107 qua the course of action to be followed i.e., in the light of the finding, whether the Court should impose a suitable punishment itself or leave it to the BCCI to do the needful. The aforesaid course of action, however, did not find favour with the Court, as the power to punish for mis-conduct vested in the BCCI. But, in the nature of the matter, the award of suitable punishment was required to be left to an independent committee to exercise that power for and on behalf of the BCCI. It is in that context that the final directions passed in paragraph-110, inter alia, stated as under:-
(II) The quantum of punishment to be imposed on Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr. Raj Kundra as also their respective franchisees/teams/owners of the teams shall be determined by a Committee comprising the following:
i)Honble Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha, former Chief Justice of India Chairman.
ii)Honble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan, former Judge, Supreme Court of India Member.
iii)iii) Honble Mr. Justice R.V. Raveendran, former Judge, Supreme Court of India Member.
The Committee shall, before taking a final view on the quantum of punishment to be awarded, issue notice to all those likely to be affected and provide to them a hearing in the matter. The order passed by the Committee shall be final and binding upon BCCI and the parties concerned subject to the right of the aggrieved party seeking redress in appropriate judicial proceedings in accordance with law.
18. The result of the aforesaid direction was that Justice Lodha Committee was constituted to take a final view on the quantum of punishment, after issuing notice to all those likely to be affected and provide to them hearing in the matter. The order was to remain final and binding upon the BCCI and the parties concerned, subject to the right of the aggrieved party to seek redress in the appropriate judicial proceedings in accordance with law. If one may say so, this is the bed rock of the submission of the learned senior counsel, as he claims that a gate way has been provided to an aggrieved party, as per the directions of the Honble Supreme Court, and thus, there is no need to approach the Honble Supreme Court on this matter.
19. The submission of the learned senior counsel was that Justice Lodha Committee was only exercising the power of the BCCI and was not exercising any independent jurisdiction nor had the Supreme Court conferred any such jurisdiction. That is the reason the Supreme Court had given liberty to the aggrieved party as aforesaid, and did not direct that the parties must approach the Honble Supreme Court. Learned senior counsel further submitted that when the franchisee of Chennai Super Kings was not even mentioned for being looked into for its conduct by Justice Mudgal Committee, there could be no vicarious civil liability and that is the reason no notice was issued to the franchisee and owner. The charges, it was pleaded, were against the individuals, and the role of the owner and franchisee vis-`-vis Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan were not required to be looked into.
20. Learned senior counsel conceded that in view of the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, the subject matter of Justice Mudgal Committee could not be gone into, but since the principles of natural justice were emphasized to be followed by Justice Mudgal Committee and the finding was that they had been followed, such principles became important for the purposes of imposition of punishment. The fact that Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan was found to be a Team Official, it was submitted, could not imply that the consequences which flow to Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan could also flow to the owner and the franchisee.
21. The proceedings before Justice Lodha Committee had resulted in punishment of suspension of Chennai Super Kings from the IPL league for a period of two years, vide proceedings dated 14th July, 2015, and that is the reason the petitioner had approached this Court to quash the same and permit participation of the Chennai Super Kings team in the IPL matches.
22. The reason for the petitioner to approach the Court was stated to be the subsequent assignment and control vested in the petitioner obtained from the second respondent in respect of Chennai Super Kings team. A Tripartite Novation Agreement dated 20th February, 2015 between the petitioner and the first two respondents is stated to have vested such rights in the petitioner.
23. The petitioner also seeks to make out a case that the factum of the petitioner taking over Chennai Super Kings franchise had been brought to the notice of Justice Lodha Committee, but no separate notice of hearing was issued to the petitioner. But a copy of the order passed by Justice Lodha Committee had been handed over by the second respondent to the petitioner under a cover of letter dated 21st July, 2015.
24. We may add that the averments made in the petition suggest that the petitioner was originally wholly owned subsidiary of the second respondent, but with effect from 28.02.2015, the entire shares of the petitioner have been transferred to ICL Shareholders Trust which was in the process of effecting a further transfer of the entire shareholding interest in the petitioner to all non-promoter shareholders of the second respondent and to another ex-cricketers Trust. The management of the second respondent is stated to have no role in the petitioner nor Mr.N.Srinivasan or any of his family members have any connection with the petitioners management which is entirely in the hands of the ICL Shareholders Trust.
25. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is alleged that a strong element of bias had crept into in the proceedings on account of the false media campaign against Chennai Super Kings while commenting on the doubts abounding in the public consciousness about whether the games are clean or not.
26. It is also pointed out by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the petitioner that an application filed by the BCCI seeking clarification of the order dated 22nd January, 2015 about Mr.N.Srinivasan being disqualified from participating in the affairs of the BCCI did not find favour in the order passed by the Honble Supreme Court on 5th October, 2015. The BCCI had taken a view on the subject and excluded Mr.N.Srinivasan from participating in the affairs of the BCCI. But the Honble Supreme Court observed that whether or not subsequent developments removed the conflict of interest, which Mr.N.Srinivasan was found guilty by the Court, it was not a matter which would fall for consideration in those proceedings, though it was left to the BCCI to determine whether any conflict of interest subsisted.
27. The petition was strongly resisted by Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the first respondent, as, according to him, no petition could be entertained at the behest of the petitioner and that too before this Court. Relying on sub-para (II) of paragraph-110 of the Honble Supreme Court judgment referred to aforesaid, it was contended that only an aggrieved party could approach the Court, and the petitioner could not be categorized as an aggrieved party.
28. In order to buttress the aforesaid contention, a reference was made to the Novation Agreement dated 20th February, 2015. The recitals of the agreement show that it is claimed that the second respondent sought BCCIs permission to transfer the franchisee to the petitioner and that the BCCI vide its letter dated 11th February, 2015 informed the second respondent of the approval of the proposed transaction. Clause-2 of the Novation Agreement provided that on and from the effective date (20th February, 2015), and subject to terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement, the petitioner would automatically and without any further action be deemed to have become a party to the franchise agreement in the place of the second respondent. It is also provided that the decision of the Committee (Justice Lodha Committee) was to equally bind the petitioner and the second respondent. Clause 2.3 of the Agreement reads as under:-
For avoidance of doubt, the Parties agree that any direction(s)/decision(s)/order(s) that may be passed by the Committee shall be equally binding on CSKCL ad ICL and the execution of this Agreement or the substitution of CSKCL in place of ICL shall not in any way restrict/diminishing/curtail the implementation, enforcement and execution of any direction(s)/decision(s)/order(s) that may be passed by the Committee.
29. A reading of the proceedings of Justice Lodha Committee clearly shows that the second respondent was called for and submissions of each of such notices have been dealt with separately.
30. The petitioner company was incorporated on 19th December, 2014 which was prior to the order of the Supreme Court dated 22nd January, 2015 appointing Justice Lodha Committee. Yet the petitioner did not consider it appropriate to either approach the Supreme Court or Justice Lodha committee. It is pleaded that there are questions about the validity of the transaction entered into between the petitioner and the second respondent, and the petitioner has not been recongnised as a franchisee. CSK was only a brand name till 2014 and the Franchisee Agreement was between the first respondent and the second respondent. The fact that the Novation Agreement is dated 20th February, 2015 itself shows that the petitioner had no status as on the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court i.e., on 22nd January, 2015. If it was not in existence, how it could claim that it could be an aggrieved party? In fact, when the second respondent appeared before Justice Lodha Committee on 6th March, 2015, it did not even inform that it was no more a franchisee. The petitioner was incorporated in 2014, as a fully owned subsidiary of the second respondent and thus, has to take the consequences of misconduct by the second respondent as the franchisee.
31. If the petitioner is not an aggrieved party having not come into the picture till the date of judgment on 22nd January, 2015, it could not exercise the right given to an aggrieved party alone, and thus, the question of punishment cant be gone into at the behest of the petitioner. The Supreme Court itself had found a conclusive guilt of the franchisee and thus, if at all only the Supreme Court can only look into the matter.
32. The aspect of public interest raised by the petitioner has been specifically denied as the punishment imposed is against a member on behalf of the BCCI. The manner of shareholding of the petitioner is stated to be apparent from the communication dated 22nd March, 2015 to the first respondent, and in that context, it was submitted that the petitioner, as assignee, could not claim a personal right of hearing as a franchisee, as the assignment was not recognized and in any case, in the absence of disclosures on the relevant date, the second respondent was represented before Justice Lodha Committee.
33. Learned senior counsel strenuously contended that the findings of Justice Mudgal Committee have been alleged to be not approved by the Honble Supreme Court in its order dated 22nd January, 2015 requiring them to be gone into by Justice Lodha Committee. It was, thus, submitted that the liberty granted to an aggrieved person for any action initiated by Justice Lodha Committee cannot mean that the scope and content of the whole findings of the Honble Supreme Court can be agitated before any other fora like this High Court.
34. Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel for the third respondent question the maintainability of the petition even on account of the fact that the nature of relief claimed was of Certiorari and that such a relief could not be maintained in the absence of impleadment of the Committee, since the Writ of Certiorari would require records to be called, which are only in the custody of the Committee.
35. In this connection, learned senior counsel referred to the Madras High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1965 and referred to Form-6, which prescribes the form for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari and specifically refers to the records to be called. The order nisi to be issued for Writ of Certiorari is prescribed in Form-7 of the said Rules, which also refers to the aspect of records.
36. In the aforesaid context, learned senior counsel referred to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Udit Narayan Singh vs. Board of Revenue reported in AIR 1963 SC 786. Paragraph-8 of the aforesaid judgment deals with the Writ in the nature of Certiorari. The said paragraph reads as under:- (Pages 788-789) The next question is, what is the nature of a writ of certiorari ? What relief can a petitioner in such a writ obtain from the Court ? Certiorari lies to remove for the purpose of quashing the proceedings of inferior courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ in the nature of certiorari : in either case the High Court directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to itself the record of proceedings pending therein for scrutiny and, if necessary, for quashing the same. It is well settled law that a certiorari lies only in respect of a judicial or quasi-judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act. The following classic test laid down by Lord Justice Atkin, as he then was, in The King v. The Electricity Commissioner [1924] 1 K.B. 171, and followed by this Court in more than one decision clearly brings out the meaning of the concept of judicial act :
"Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs."
Lord Justice Slesser in The King v. London County Council [1931] 2 K.B. 215, dissected the concept of judicial act laid down by Atkin, L J., into the following heads in his judgment : "wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority - a writ of certiorari may issue". It will be seen from the ingredients of judicial act that there must be a duty to act judicially. A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of a party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void. As a writ of certiorari will be granted to remove the record of proceedings of an inferior tribunal or authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial acts, ex hypothesi it follows that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction shall also act judicially in disposing of the proceedings before it. It is implicit in such a proceeding that a tribunal or authority which is directed to transmit the records must be a party in the writ proceedings, for without giving notice to it, the record of proceedings cannot be brought to the High Court. It is said that in an appeal against the decree of a subordinate court, the court that passed the decree need not be made a party and on the same parity of reasoning it is contended that a tribunal need not also be made a party in a writ proceeding. But there is an essential distinction between an appeal against a decree of a subordinate court and a writ of certiorari to quash the order of a tribunal or authority : in the former, the proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and the court making the order is directly subordinate to the appellate court and ordinarily acts within its bounds, though sometimes wrongly or even illegally, but in the case of the latter, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the order of a tribunal which is ordinarily outside the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the court and the order is set aside on the ground that the tribunal or authority acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. If such a tribunal or authority is not made party to the writ, it can easily ignore the order of the High Court quashing its order, for, not being a party, it will not be liable to contempt. In these circumstances whoever else is a necessary party or not the authority or tribunal is certainly a necessary party to such a proceeding. In this case, the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner of Excise were rightly made parties in the writ petition. (emphasis supplied)
37. The Constitution Bench clearly holds that since record of proceedings cannot be brought before the High Court, otherwise, a Tribunal or Authority, which is directed to transmit the records must be a party to the writ proceedings, as otherwise it may ignore the order passed by the High Court.
38. In respect of the other aspects of the maintainability, learned senior counsel more or less took the same line of arguments as of the learned senior counsel for the first respondent.
39. While submitting his rejoinder arguments, Mr.Dave, learned senior counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the franchise agreement dated 10th April, 2008 stipulated in Clause-16 the mode of transfer of the agreement. Thus, while stating that all rights are personal to the franchisee and that the franchisee will have no right to assign this agreement or sub-contract or otherwise delegate the franchise obligations, the said condition was only if it was without BCCI/IPL prior written consent. In this context, it is submitted that the petitioner has paid to the first respondent Rs.20 crores on 06.04.2015, Rs.20 crores on 16.05.2015, and Rs.15 crores on 14.12.2015, totaling to Rs.55 crores towards their obligations. The petitioner is also stated to have paid towards their obligation Rs.26 crores on 08.04.2015. It is, thus, submitted that the proposal was approved even by the IPL on 11th February, 2015 as per the letter issued of the even date.
40. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to paragraph 14.2 of Justice Lodha Committees Report, which records that the franchise Chennai Super Kings was no longer owned by the second respondent and that pursuant to the approval of the BCCI, the franchise rights had been transferred in favour of the company, being the petitioner, originally owned subsidiary of the second respondent, pursuant to the Novation Agreement.
41. We may, however, note a change in line of the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, as he clearly admitted that what the petitioner was claiming his rights was only that it stepped into the shoes of the second respondent. This is relevant in the context that the second respondent was represented before Justice Lodha Committee and in our view, the grievance made for non-issuance of notice to the petitioner and violation of principles of natural justice would really not survive.
42. We have to consider the aforesaid submissions in the context of what gave rise to the judicial intervention in the matter of this nature. Such judicial intervention was necessitated or what was initially suspicion that so much more was happening than just Cricket in the different formats which had been introduced in respect of the game.
43. The Honble Supreme Court found it a fit case to intervene on the first issue of probity into the conduct of various people connected with the administration of cricket, after the charge sheet had been submitted against Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan. This probe committee, which was known as Justice Mudgal Committee, consisting of three members, was appointed to look into the allegations of betting and spot fixing in the IPL matches against Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan, the allegedly Team Principal of Chennai Super Kings, the players and the team owner, and the involvement of all these in the spot fixing and betting. The report of the Commission is an indictment qua corruption and mal-practices that apparently surrounded the game of cricket, more particularly IPL noticing it had a ring of truth to it. The judgment delivered by the Honble Supreme Court on 22nd January, 2015 ultimately gave its imprimatur to Justice Mudgal Committees report and thus it could never be seriously contended before us that we have to go back into the issues examined by Justice Mudgal Committee or merits thereof. We noted above, the questions which were framed to be examined by Justice Mudgal Committee enumerated in paragraph-19, more specifically the second and third question. These two questions hinge on whether Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan was a Team Official and if so found, the consequential action in the nature of punishment is permissible under the relevant Rules and Regulations and against whom. We have noted here that the fourth question was of alleged cover up leveled against Mr.N.Srinivasan and whether it stood proved. The Supreme Court categorically found that the probe committee had correctly appreciated the facts and the documents in coming to the conclusion that Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan was a Team Official of the Chennai Super Kings. It is also noticed that the principles of natural justice were required to be followed by such a Committee constituted like Justice Mudgal Committee, and in the context of the allegations against Mr.Raj Kundra for the purposes of franchise of Rajasthan Royals found that adequate opportunity had been granted to him and absence of notice to anyone else was of little consequence so long as the person concerned was notified and afforded an fair opportunity of hearing. Similarly, in answer to the third question, the finding is that imposition of one or more of the sanctions stipulated under Rule 6.4 could be imposed, and such sanctions were not limited to Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan alone, but may extend to suspension of the team or the franchisee from the league also. The termination of the agreement was held to be one of the consequences dependent upon the material adverse effect found in the case in respect of the reputation or standing in the league or BCCI-IPL, BCCI, the franchisee, the team or game of cricket. However, match fixing, spot fixing or betting was not proved against Mr.N.Srinivasan.
44. The only function to be performed after the judgment was qua imposition of suitable punishment and looking into this issue, as to whether the Supreme Court should itself embark on this task or leave it to the BCCI, that the Court found it appropriate that the said task should be left to an independent committee to exercise that power for and on behalf of the BCCI. As to on whom the punishment was to be imposed is very clear from Paragraph 110(ii) of the order, which provides that the quantum of punishment to be imposed on Mr.Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr.Raj Kundra as also their respective franchisees/teams/owners of the team was to be determined by the Committee. This Committee is Justice Lodha Committee. The Committee was required to issue notices to all those likely to be affected and provide them a hearing in the matter, and the order of the Committee was to be final and binding upon the BCCI and the parties.
45. However, while stating so, it was also observed that this was subject to the right of the aggrieved party seeking redress in appropriate judicial proceedings in accordance with law.
46. The complete case of the petitioner seeking to exercise the right as an affected party is based on this crucial paragraph and thus, naturally the question which arises is whether the petitioner can be categorized as such an aggrieved party.
47. It is relevant to note that judgment of the Honble Supreme Court was delivered on 22nd January, 2015. It is post this judgment that the Novation Agreement came to be executed on 20th February, 2015 between the petitioner and the first two respondents for transfer of franchise in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner was nowhere in the picture as on 22nd January, 2015. If it was not in the picture, where could the question be of it being an aggrieved party which can seek redressal in appropriate judicial proceedings. Thus, this very premise that the petitioner can claim any independent right as an aggrieved party is clearly unsustainable.
48. We may note that it is really only in the rejoinder that the learned senior counsel for the petitioner sought to accept and confine the aspect to the petitioner really claiming rights only as an assignee, who had stepped into the shoes of the second respondent. Thus, whatever be the fate of the second respondent, the consequences of that would flow on to the petitioner. If the role of the petitioner as assignee is taken into consideration, then it subsequent existence shows that it is only the second respondent which could have defended itself before Justice Lodha Committee and once that entity was so represented, the principles of fair hearing and audi alteram cannot be extended to a position where the assignee can insist that it must also be heard. It must sink or swim with the findings against the second respondent.
49. It is nobodys case that the second respondent was not before Justice Lodha Committee, and the plea initially advanced of absence of notice to franchise and the owner thus has only stated to be rejected. In view of the order passed by the Honble Supreme Court on 22nd January, 2015, it is quite apparent that ultimately the issue of imposition of punishment was not confined only to the individuals, and it cannot be permitted to be argued that all this was outside the scope of Justice Lodha Committee, and thus could not have been so directed, as Justice Mudgal Committee received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court vide the said order, and appropriate directions had been passed as to what should be the role of Justice Lodha Committee. Thus, we are really not able to appreciate how and in which ever manner the issue be looked into could be said that there is violation of principles of natural justice qua the petitioner.
50. It can hardly be accepted that the petitioner was unaware of what was transpiring and could not approach Justice Lodha Committee, if its so wanted on its own. It was, in fact, originally 100% subsidiary of the second respondent and in order to continue the participation of CSK that the financial arrangement of these companies was sought to be altered. As already stated, CSK, in fact, was only a brand name, and if it is contended that public interest would suffer arising from the loss of opportunity to CSK in operation, all we can say is that whatever be the extent of the performance of the team, the public interest in cleaning up operation of the game would far outweigh any public interest of watching the team perform.
51. We may also note that when the second respondent appeared on 06th March, 2015 before Justice Lodha Committee, it was not put forth on that day that the second respondent was no more a franchisee. The petitioner being a fully owned subsidiary of the second respondent, it seems obvious to us that the grievance of lack of opportunity to present the case has been set up through the petitioner as an exercise to frustrate the consequences of the recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee. The petitioner must sink with the findings against the second respondent, and the punishment arising there from as franchisee.
52. We, thus, have no doubt that certain aspects which were sought to be obliquely raised before us really could only have been raised before the Supreme Court in so far as they pertain to the aspects arising from Justice Mudgal Committees report, since after the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, it was the punishment aspect, in terms of the directions of the order of the Supreme Court, which was gone into by Justice Lodha Committee, and that too exercising powers for and on behalf of the BCCI, which were to remain final and binding on the parties. We are thus unable to appreciate or agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that the window made available by the last two lines of sub-para (II) of paragraph 110 of the Judgment can be said to be available to the petitioner.
53. The objections raised by the third respondent, in addition, really are on the technical aspects of where and as to how the Writ of Certiorari would lie. Since the records are available with the Committee, and it is true that the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court has put an embargo against the issue of such a Writ of Certiorari in the absence of impediment. We are however of the view that the aforesaid findings do not require this aspect to be analysed any further.
54. At the cost of repetition, we make it clear that thus the petitioner has no independent status as a franchisee, who is only an assignee, and in the given situation was certainly not required to be heard separately nor did it seek any such hearing. The aspect of public interest cannot also be brought in to canvass the case to re-open the issue of recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee.
55. We, thus, dismiss the petition as not maintainable, in view of our aforesaid findings, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Index:Yes/No (S.K.K., CJ) (T.S.S., J)
Internet : Yes/No 20::01::2016
ksr/pv
The Honble Chief Justice
and
T.S.Sivagnanam, J
-----------------------------------------------
Pv/-
Pre-delivery Order
in
W.P.No.26777 of 2015
Delivered on: 20::01::2016