Madras High Court
Hariram Sundaravel vs Seethalakshmiammal on 20 December, 2006
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 20/12/2006 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA S.A.No.423 of 1996 Hariram Sundaravel ... Appellant / Plaintiff Vs 1. Seethalakshmiammal 2. Sriram Ashok ... Respondents / Defendants Prayer Appeal filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Sattur in O.S.No.184 of 1991 dated 05.08.1993 and confirmed by the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputtur, Kamarajar District in A.S.No422 of 1993 dated 30.12.1994. !For Appellant ... Mr.A.Srinivasan ^For Respondents ... Mr.D.Dhana Chandra Prakash for R1. Mr.V.Seetharaman for R2. :JUDGMENT
This appeal is directed as against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Sattur in O.S.No.184 of 1991 dated 05.08.1993 and as confirmed by the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputtur, Kamarajar District in A.S.No.422 of 1993 dated 30.12.1994.
2. The parties are referred to hereunder as they were arrayed before the trial Court.
3. Shorn and bereft of details, the re'sume' of facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of the Second Appeal could be portrayed thus:
(i) The plaintiff filed the suit for declaring the exclusive right of pathway of the plaintiff and the second defendant over the suit pathway as his private pathway and for removal of encroachments made by the first defendant and for consequential injunction. Originally, a vast extent of land in Anaiyur, belonged to one family as one stretch of land. Subsequently, from one Rajamani Nadar and his brother Manickavasaga Nadar, the first defendant purchased the north western portion of it.
(ii) The plan was attached with the plaint and marked by the plaintiff as Ex.A.1 which shows the location of the various properties. The first defendant purchased the property almost at the north-western corner of the entire property and to the east of the first defendant's property, there is a pathway which is the suit pathway. For the entire larger extent of the property, there exist two roads so to say on the northern side Sivakasi - Srivilliputhur road runs and on the western side Iyyampatti road runs. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant being not satisfied by the two roads abutting her area lays claim over the suit pathway which the plaintiff claims to have exclusive right over it as private pathway.
(iii) On the contrary the first defendant would contend that she is also having right over the suit pathway as according to her it is a common pathway available for her usage also. The second defendant is the brother of the plaintiff who has no adverse interest as against him.
4. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court negatived the claim of the plaintiff by mainly relying on Exs.A.2, A.3, A.4 and B.1 marked during trial.
5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of both the courts below, the plaintiff has filed the Second Appeal chiefly on the following grounds among others:
(a) The trial Court failed to consider that the first defendant purchased her property covered under Ex.A.2 dated 10.9.1970 from Rajamani Nadar and Manickavasaga Nadar, wherein there was no reference to the suit pathway as a common pathway meant for the usage of the first defendant.
(b) The trial Court failed to frame a specific issue relating to the first defendant's alleged right over the suit property marked as A B C D in the plan.
(c) The Courts below wrongly understood that the suit was bad for non-
joinder of parties. Both the courts below failed to consider that no suit shall be dismissed merely based on misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
(d) The trial Court failed to consider Exs.A.3 and A.8 which would highlight that the suit pathway ABCD is a private pathway exclusively available for the usage of the appellant and the second respondent herein.
(e) Accordingly, the plaintiff prayed for reversing the decision of both the Courts below and decreeing the original suit.
6. The Second Appeal was admitted to decide the following substantial questions of law:
"(i) Whether the Courts below have properly framed the relevant and necessary issues arising in the case and whether the failure constitutes violation of Order 14 Rule 1 C.P.C and such violation resulted in mistrial and miscarriage of justice? and
(ii) Whether the suit has been properly valued?"
7. Point Nos.(i) and (ii) are taken together for discussion in view of the fact that they are interwoven and inter-linked with each other.
Point Nos:(i) and (ii)
8. Right at the outset, I may proceed to refer to Exs.A.2, A.3 and A.4. Ex.A.2 is the certified copy of the sale deed dated 10.9.1970 executed by the said Rajamani Nadar and Manickavasaga Nadar in favour of Seethalakshmi - the first defendant selling a portion at the north-western corner of the entire extent of their property.
9. While describing the property sold under the sale deed Ex.A.2, the southern boundary was shown as vendors' own property under their control for pathway purpose and it is significant and pertinent, important and indispensable to note that in Ex.A.2, the southern boundary is not shown as common pathway. But it is only stated as vendors' own land. In such a case, it is not known as to how the first defendant could lay claim over it as pathway meant for her use. However, on the first defendant's side, it is contended that Ex.A.3 and A.4 would refer to the area to the east of the defendants' property as a common pathway, for which learned counsel for the plaintiff would highlight that nowhere in Ex.A.3 or A.4 it is found stated that the pathway referred to therein is meant for the first defendant.
10. The plaintiff would candidly admit that other than the first defendant who is having property to the west of the suit pathway and one Velayutha Mudaliar who is owning property to the east of the pathway, others including Ranganayagi who owns property to the south of first defendant's property and all others who acquired land from the original owners and subsequently from the plaintiff are having right of ingress and egress through the suit pathway as the suit pathway is meant for those who are owning lands to the south of suit pathway and the suit pathway is linking the said Sivakasi - Srivilliputhur road and the area situated to the south of that road.
11. It is therefore, just and necessary to scrutinise as to whether both the Courts below properly considered the evidence on record. They considered the relevant documents as though such documents refer to common pathway available for all the land owners in that area including the first defendant. It is therefore, just and necessary to scrutinise the documents and see whether those documents were properly understood by the Courts below. Ex.A.3, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 10th March, 1972 executed by Rajamani Nadar and Manickavasaga Nadar in favour of Anthoni Nadar Swami, would describe the property thus:
"vq;fs; iftrKs;s epyj;jpd; kj;jpapy; bjd;tly; ghijf;fhf xJf;fg;gl;Ls;s 12 mo mfyKs;s epyj;jpw;Fk; bjw;F ,jw;Fs; fpHnkylo 127 bjd;tlyo 86 cs;sjw;F Rkhh; 25
- K.S.V.Rajamani Nadar, K.S.V.Manickavasaga Nadar - bfhz;Ls;s kidao epyKk; i\ epyj;jpw;F tlg[wKs;s 12 (5 mo) mfyj;jpy; _tpy;ypg[j;J}h; nuhL tiuf;Fk; ehq;fs; xJf;fpa[s;s bjd;tly; nuhl;L epyj;jpy; bghJthf ele;J bfhs;Sk; tHpeil tz;og;ghijg; ghj;jpaKk;...."
12. The aforesaid description would no way convey the idea that was meant for the first defendant also.
13. Ex.A.4 is the certified copy of the partition deed dated 10th January 1977 effected between Rajamani Nadar and Manickavasaga Nadar and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder for ready reference:
"Vw;fdnt tl gf;fj;jpYk; bjd; filrpapYk; ehk; bghJtha; fpiuak; bra;J bfhLj;Jtpl;l br 46 1/ 2 ePf;fp ghf;fpa[s;s V 1 br 65 1/ 2 y; tlghjp br 82 3/ 4 ,jw;F khy; _tpy;ypg[j;J}h; nuhl;Lf;Fk; i\ nuhl;oypUe;J ,e;j epyj;Jf;F tUk; bghJg;ghijahd fpHnkylo 10 bjd;tly; nky;jiyao 105 fPH;jiyao 60 cs;sjw;Fk; rPjhyf\;kp buq;fdhr;rpahh; ,th;fs; tPLfSf;Fk; - ntyha[jk; brl;oahh; filf;Fk; bjw;F ....."
14. The above description would show that the said suit pathway referred to therein is available for ingress and egress of those owning lands to the south of that pathway. It is not found stated that such pathway should be made available for the first defendant also. But, on the other hand, it is stated that the said pathway is available for those having lands to the south of the pathway. English translation of such description of pathway in Tamil in Ex.A.4 would be to the effect that the said suit pathway is proceeding from Sivakasi - Srivilliputtur Road towards south to the land situated to the south of the suit pathway. In Ex.A.4, the same original owners/vendors as found in Ex.A.2, i.e., Rajamani Nadar and Manickavasaga Nadar declared it so.
15. If those original owners wanted to dedicate the suit pathway as common pathway, certainly they would have worded it otherwise. The extent of the common private pathway is also found described as measuring 10 feet east to west and 105 feet north to south on the western side and 60 feet south to north on the eastern side. Ex.A.1 Map would highlight that the said description in Ex.A.4 tallies on ground. Ex.A.6 is the certified copy of the sale deed dated 8th May 1978 which was executed by the said Manickavasaga Nadar in favour of Sundaravelu, the plaintiff and in which, the suit pathway is described as under:
"epyj;jpy; fPH;gf;fk; 10 mo mfy bghJg;ghijf;fhf _tpy;ypg[j;Jhh; nuhoypUe;J jq;fs; epyk; Koa[k; tiu tpl;oUf;Fk; ghijia jw;nghJ ,e;jg;gj;jpuk; K:yk; fpiuak; thq;Fk; mj;Jtiu ghijf;ffhf 10 mo mfy epyj;ij ePf;fp ghf;fp epyj;jpy; fl;olk; fl;of;bfhs;s ntz;oaJ...."
16. The same Manickavasaga Nadar who is the vendor under Ex.A.6 is one of the vendors under Ex.A.3, clearly stated that the said suit pathway was not one dedicated to the first defendant as claimed by the first defendant.
17. Ex.A.7, the exchange deed between the plaintiff and the second defendant would evince that in that exchange deed, the suit pathway is referred to as follows:
"....fPnHhuk; bjd;tlyhft[k; 'A' jgrpy; Kot[ tiu 10 mo mfyj;jpy; 'B' jgrpy; brhj;Jf;F tz;o thfdq;fs; te;J nghf xJf;fpapUf;Fk; ghijf;F <thf 2 tJ egh; ,e;jg; ghpth;j;jidg; gj;jpuk; K:yk; mile;jpUf;Fk; 'B' jgrpy; brhj;jpypUe;J 3 3/4 brz;L epyj;ij 1 tJ egUf;Fg; ghj;jpak; bra;J bfhLg;gjhf xg;g[f; bfhz;lgo ...... "
18. The true purport of Ex.A.5 is required to be considered in depth. The second defendant, who is the brother of the plaintiff, purchased in addition to the extent of 2 acres 12 cents in S.No.30/1, the suit pathway which is found described at page No.16 of the original sale deed as follows:
"... i\ rh;nt ek;ghpy; rptfhrp _tpy;ypg[j;Jhh; nuhoypUe;J ,e;j epyj;jpf;F tUk; bjd;tly; bghJg;ghij fpHnkylo 10 (gj;J) thp 1y; ghjmo rhy; ...."
19. The incontrovertible fact is that Ex.A.5 sale deed was executed by Rajamani Nadar, one of the vendors, who executed the sale deed Ex.A.2, in favour of the first defendant. If really, the original vendor thought that the suit property which was subsequently came to be described as a private common pathway should be made available for the first defendant also, who earlier purchased the north western corner of their property, then in Ex.A.3, A.4 and A.5, any of those two vendors would have mentioned so. But, the fact remains that the suit pathway itself was sold under Ex.A.5. The above delineation of facts and discussion would highlight without any shadow of a doubt that the original owners of the entire extent of property never intended that the suit pathway should be made available for the use of the first defendant whose property is situated to the west of the suit pathway.
20. The learned Counsel for the first defendant would advance the argument indicating that the suit pathway was already taken over by the civic body concerned and laid canal and that in such a case, nothing more survives in the case of the plaintiff, which should be dismissed. However, despite time granted for production of some evidence or communication relating to the factum of the suit property having been taken over by the civic body concerned, nothing has been produced and in such a case, it cannot be countenanced and held that the suit property was taken over by the civic body. Simply based on one small canal found existing on the northern side of the suit property, there is no presumption that suit property was taken over by the civic body. The civic bodies such as municipality, panchayat union or panchayat, are all governed by rules and regulations. There are detailed procedures prescribed under the Act and Rules for taking over streets / roads and maintaining them. If at all, any piece of property is treated as road by civic body, there should be proceedings relating to it and there should be records also and no one can be heard to say simply that automatically a private property became a civic body's property.
21. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff would counter the argument of the learned counsel for the first defendant that the suit property was not taken over by the civic body and that he has got evidence to show that civic body did not take over the suit property. As such, merely based on oral arguments, and photographs, the Court cannot decide and that too at the second appeal stage, quite as against the procedures prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure relating to second appeals.
22. The learned Counsel for the first defendant filed a fresh set of typed set containing field map relating to S.No.30/1 and various photographs showing the suit property and all those things cannot be treated as part of evidence for the reasons already adverted supra.
23. All the exhibits marked in this case by themselves would clearly highlight, from a cumulative reading of the excerpts from those registered documents, the fact that the original owners of the land at no point of time ever intended that the suit property should be thrown open for use of the public or it should be thrown open for use of all the purchasers of various plots from the original owners. Nowhere under the law, it is contemplated that a private person while selling his land should dedicate even private pathway as common to all the persons who might purchase various plots from his larger extent.
24. What a purchaser of a plot could insist from his vendor is that the former should provide a passage for ingress and egress and nothing more. Simply because, the person purchased a plot from an owner possessing the land, he cannot dictate terms or command as to why the vendor pick and choose only certain purchasers of the properties from him for preferential treatment and the same should not be extended to others. A land owner while selling his vast track of land, can decide as to how private passages and private roads in his land should be used by the persons concerned. Approved lay-outs under the town and country planning Act are on a different footing and the authorities concerned would prescribe terms and conditions as per the Rules and Zoning Regulations. Here, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as already highlighted supra, simply because the first defendant purchased the south - western corner of the entire extent of the property and having on the northern and western sides roads for ingress and egress relating to her property, she cannot additionally claim right over the private passage which the common owner kept for selective usage, as the one which should be thrown open for the first defendant also.
25. The maxim "Ubi jus ibi remedium" [Where there is a right there is a remedy.] has to be considered in the wake of the facts and circumstances of this case. There should be a legal right in favour of a party whereupon he could enforce it in a Court of law. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the appellant would cite a few decisions in this regard and it is just and necessary to consider those decisions in seriatim.
26. The decision of this Court in Jayalakshmi Ammal, K. v. S.M.Balasundaram, and another reported in 1997 - 3 - L.W.644 would evince the following:
"12. The argument that the right of way has not been mentioned in Ex.A.4 also may not be of much importance. If the right could be recognised as an easement by transfer of immovable property, all the rights of the transferor are also transferred. That is clear from Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act.
13. Both the Courts below have taken into consideration the evidence on record, particularly, the evidence of D.W.2, to come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs and their predecessors were also making use of the said passage for scavenging purpose. It is further seen that the residential building of plaintiffs is facing Pillayar Koil Street, on the west, and the entire portion is covered by residential buildings. Therefore, permitting scavengers also to make use of that way as access to the residential buildings for scavenging purposes will destroy the use of the same as dwelling houses."
I am of the opinion that this decision has been cited out of context as the facts and circumstances of the case on hand is entirely different.
27. The dictum of this Court in Lalithamaheswari v. Poomalai Ammal and two others reported in 1999-2-L.W.596, would highlight the fact that common passage cannot be presumed unless there is document to indicate the same. An excerpt from the said judgment would run thus:
"20. It is also not in dispute that the entire area was originally owned by same owner, who had alienated portion after portion on either side of the passage. When the first defendant's vendor had alienated the property in favour of the first defendant under Ex.B.1 with measurements as early as in 1981 as well as under the earlier documents, it cannot be assumed that the entire A B C D is a common passage nor any document had been proved to show that A B C D was earlier dedicated as a common passage, nor any municipal notification treating A B C D A as public street or a common passage had been placed before the Court.
21. When the first defendant has acquired the title to the portion A1 F1 E1 J as seen from Ex.B.1, it cannot be assumed that part of A1 F1 E1 J is a passage. The first defendant had established his exclusive title and the disputed portion being A A1 F1 E2, which falls within the exclusive property of the first defendant. Merely because, the first defendant had not put up construction on the said portion and had kept it for himself as vacant site, it cannot be assumed that it forms part of the common passage. ....
25. The approach of the first appellate Court, that while executing Ex.B.1 the vendor ought to have mentioned the east west measurement of the passage as 10 feet 9 inches on the northern side and 8 feet 6 inches on the southern side and in the absence of measurements, the entire portion has to be taken as common passage, is illegal and a total misdirection and misconception and contrary to law. ....
30. As already pointed out, the first appellate Court had erroneously cast the onus on the first defendant, while it is for the plaintiff to prove that the entire A B C D is a common passage and even the disputed portion A A1 F1 E2 is part of the passage and the plaintiff and other neighbours have used the same as a matter of right and prescribed such a common passage by immemorial user."
28. The aforesaid verdict supports the case of the plaintiff, as it highlights the fact that simply because, a person purchased a property from the common owner, he cannot assume common passage unless, it is indicated so in any document. Here, while selling the property to the first defendant, the original owner as revealed by Ex.A.2, specifically stated that the pathway to the east of the property sold to the first defendant is under possession of the original vendor and thereby, unambiguously and unequivocally, without giving room for any double-entendre stated that it was not a common passage at all which was dedicated for the use of the first defendant. The subsequent contact as delineated above would also show that in various other subsequent documents also, they never intended the suit property as the one dedicated for the common usage of all the purchasers.
29. The learned Counsel for the appellant also cited the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Keshav Kumar Swarup v. Flow More Private Limited reported in (1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 10 which posits the proposition that the entire document has to be read as a whole along with the circumstances. An excerpt from the said judgment would run thus:
"3. In interpreting a document the intention of the parties has to be ascertained, if possible from the expressions used therein. More often than not, this causes no difficulty, but if difficulty is felt owing to inarticulate drafting or inadvertence or other causes, the intention may be gathered reading the entire document and, if so necessary, from other attending circumstances also. If through such a process the intention of the parties can be culled out consistently with the rule of law, the courts are required to take that course. Keeping these principles in mind, we may proceed to consider the facts of the instant case." [emphasis supplied]
30. In this factual matrix, it is just and necessary to understand the intention of the original owners of the properties. Had really, the original owners thought it fit to dedicate the suit property as a common pathway, they would have very well stated so. But, they in express terms retained their control and possession over the pathway and that shows, the animus possidendi over the suit property. It is not for the first defendant to dictate terms as to how the suit property should be dealt with. There is no element of afterthought involved in the original owners' intention in dealing with the suit property as their separate property for being used selectively as passage by them and not by others.
31. The learned Counsel for the appellant also would advance the argument to the effect that the first defendant shied away from the witness box for the reasons best known to herself; for which, the learned Counsel for the first defendant would try to torpedo such argument unsuccessfully by putting forth the point that there were overwhelming documentary evidence to prove that the suit pathway was a common pathway and that thereupon only, the first defendant was not examined as a witness. As has been already highlighted above by me, it is clear that none of those documents recognised the right of the first defendant to use the suit pathway as the one dedicated for her use also.
32. The learned Counsel for the first defendant would draw the attention of this Court, as though there is candid admission in the deposition of P.W.1 about the pathway having been dedicated to the use of the first defendant also. The perusal of the deposition of P.W.1 does not reveal any such admission much less any candid admission recognising the first defendant's right of pathway. During cross-examination, P.W.1 would state that in Ex.A.4 at page 3, there is reference to 10 feet east to west pathway as common pathway; in Ex.A.5 at pages 12 and 13, common pathway is contemplated and that is the suit pathway. He also admitted that in Ex.A.6, there is stipulation that 10 feet pathway which runs throughout from north to south direction should not be obstructed by any construction by the parties. Those facts have already been adverted to in my discussion supra and P.W.1 reiterated what is contained only in those documents, but nowhere P.W.1 has stated that the suit property is the common pathway open to the first defendant also or a private common pathway open to all the purchasers of the properties from the common owners.
33. To the risk of repetition, I could state that the common owners were specific in retaining the suit property for themselves and subsequently, they sold it for a price as per Ex.A.5 in favour of the second defendant. It is therefore, crystal clear that the first defendant is having no right over the suit property.
34. The judgment of the trial Court elucidates that it misdirected itself in pondering over unimportant points such as non-joinder of the parties, etc. Here, the first defendant caused obstruction which necessitated the plaintiff to file the suit as against the first defendant as obstructor and the second defendant as the interested party who is also having the right to use the suit pathway along with the plaintiff.
35. In this view of the matter, absolutely there is no scope for the plea of non-joinder of parties being raised. But, the trial Court made a mountain of such a plea and gave a finding as against the plaintiff. The trial Court also proceeded to hold as though there were discrepancies in the measurement of the pathway as per the Commissioner's report and that all those facts are against the case of the plaintiff. The very case of the plaintiff itself is that only a portion of the property was sold in favour of one Velayutham to the east of the suit pathway and thereafter, another portion was sold in favour of the first defendant to the west of the pathway and the extent sold to Velayutham and the extent sold to the first defendant were not of uniform length and width and obviously, the pathway which the common owner retained, cannot have a clear rectangular shaped area and this basic fact was not noted by the trial Court and the appellate Court also overlooked such fact and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court.
36. The trial Court dealt with the facts and held that the first defendant even though constructed steps in the suit pathway, yet it was not an obstruction. The evidence available on record evince that the suit property is meant for lorries also to pass through it so as to reach the land on the southern side of the suit pathway, where the match factory is situated. When the first defendant is having no right over the suit pathway, I am at a loss to understand as to how the trial Court could hold that such construction by the first defendant is not an obstruction for the plaintiff. The first defendant is not at all concerned with the fact whether the suit pathway is of even or uneven length, because the first defendant has got no right over the suit property.
37. It is not the case of the first defendant that the plaintiff encroached into the first defendant's property. If there is any such proof or pleading, she should have filed a separate suit for recovery of her land covered by Ex.A.2 or she should have made counter claim for regaining her portion of the property covered by Ex.A.2. But, such is not the case. The trial Court went on discussing over the unevenness about the measurement of the suit pathway. The first defendant is having no right to have openings abutting the suit pathway and in such a case, she has no right to have steps into the suit pathway.
38. Without considering all these facts, the trial Court misdirected itself and dilated its discussion on measurements in vain. Both the Courts below have not read the documents in a proper perspective and that resulted in miscarriage of justice which warranted the High Court to interfere.
39. The learned Counsel for the appellant would state that the civic body removed the steps constructed by the first defendant in the suit property and as such, the suit itself became infructuous. Such an argument for the reasons set out above is neither here nor there. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaring that the suit property is the private pathway of the plaintiff and the second defendant and for permanent injunction as against the first defendant and also for mandatory injunction as against the first defendant for removal of steps. As such, this is a comprehensive suit and the first defendant shall not be heard to say that the steps were already removed and that the suit became infructuous. The very resistance and objections raised by the first defendant as against the plaintiff's enjoyment of the exclusive pathway of the plaintiff and the second defendant, would show that there exists cause of action for the suit and it cannot be dismissed that there is no cause of action at all.
40. The trial Court framed the following issues:
"1. jhthr;brhj;J thjpf;Fk; 2k; vjph;thjpf;Fk; ghj;jpag;gl;l eilghij vd tpsk;g[if bra;ag;glf;Toajh?
2. thjpf;F tHf;Fiuapy; nfhUk; epue;ju cWj;Jf;fl;lis fpilf;ff;Toajh?
3. thjpf;F tHf;Fiuapy; nfhUk; epue;ju cWj;Jf;fl;lis tHq;fg;glf;Toajh?
4. thjpapd; tHf;F rl;lg;go epiyf;fj;jf;fjh?
5. ,e;j tHf;F mtrpaf; fl;rpf;fhuh;fisr; nrh;f;fhj gpiHahy; ghjpf;fg;gl;Ls;sjh?
6. thjpf;F tHf;F jhf;fy; bra;a tHf;F K:yk; ,y;iyah?
7. thjpf;F fpilf;ff;Toa ghpfhuk; vd;d?
41. But, no doubt, those issues should have been framed in a better manner touching upon the interpretation of those documents discussed supra. Even then, while dealing with the issues, both the Courts below misread the documents and such an interpretation is found to be perverse and they arrived at a wrong conclusion which warranted the interference of the High Court in the second appeal. Relating to valuation of the suit property, nothing was argued at the time of hearing the second appeal. Point Nos.(i) and (ii) are answered accordingly.
42. In the result, the judgment and decree of both the Courts below are set aside and the original suit is decreed as prayed for. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.
rsb To
1. The Principal District Munsif, Sattur.
2. The Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputtur, Kamarajar District.