Delhi District Court
The Complainant Company vs Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd on 5 August, 2010
1
IN THE COURT OF SH. DIG VINAY SINGH, ADDITIONAL CHIEF
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE (SPL. ACTS): CENTRAL: TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CC NO.464/3
UNIQUE ID NO. 02401R1029302003
In re:
TEXMACO LIMITED
BELGHARIA, CALCUTTA, AND
REGIONAL OFFICE AT:
508, SURYA KIRAN BUILDIG,
KASTOORBA GANDHI MARG,
NEW DELHI110001. .....COMPLAINANT
VS.
BRAHMJEET
S/O SH. CHITTAR SINGH,
R/O Q.NO. 68B, SHIVAJI LINES,
SHAKTI NAGAR,
DELHI110007 ........ACCUSED
U/S. 630 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 19.08.2003
DATE OF RESERVATION OF JUDGMENT: 05.08.2010
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT: 05.08.2010
CC No. 464/3
page
1 of
27 klj
2
JUDGEMENT
(a) The serial no. of the case : 02401R1029302003
(b) The date of commission of offence: On and after 30.11.1996 continuously.
(c) The name of complainant : M/s Texmaco. Ltd.
Registered office at :
Balgheria Calcutta.
Regional Office at : 508, Surya Kiran Building, Kastoorba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi110001
(d)The name, parentage, residence: Brahm Jeet, S/o Sh.
of accused Chittar Singh,
R/o. Q. NO. 68B, Shivaji
Lines Shakti Nagar,
Delhi.
(e) The offence complained of/ proved : U/s.630 of Companies Act, 1956.
(f) The plea of accused : Pleaded not guilty.
(g) The final order : Convicted u/s 630 of Companies Act,
1956.
(h) The date of such order : 05.08.2010
Brief statement of the reasons for the decision:
1. The complainant company, M/s. Texmaco Ltd. filed the present complaint u/s. 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, CC No. 464/3 page 2 of 27 klj 3 against the accused Brahm Jeet, alleging that the accused was an employee of M/s Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., and he was allotted one quarter bearing no. 68B, Shivaji Lines, Shakti Nagar, Delhi110007, as a licensee, by virtue of his employment. It is further alleged, that by virtue of a scheme of arrangement, dated 03.01.1983, between the present complainant and M/s Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., passed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court, the present complainant became the owner of the concerned Birla Mill Unit where the accused was working along with all its employees and the properties, including the property in question and the accused. It is claimed that the accused did not vacate the quarter despite cessation of his services w.e.f.
30.11.1996 and was, thus, wrongfully withholding the quarter.
2. On being summoned for the said offence, a notice for the said offence of Section 630 of the Companies Act was served upon the accused, in terms of Section 251 Cr.P.C, to which he claimed trial.
3. In support of his claim the complainant examined only one witness PW1 R. S. Sharma who deposed that he is power of CC No. 464/3 page 3 of 27 klj 4 attorney holder of the complainant company and duly authorised to sign, verify the complaint and to depose in the present case vide resolution Ex. PW 1/1 and power of attorney Ex. PW1/2. He also proved the certificate of incorporation Ex. PW1/3 and also deposed that the accused was allotted the said quarter vide allotment letter Ex. PW1/5. He also proved order of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Company Petition No.59/1982 dated 03.1.1983, Ex PW1/4; vide which scheme of arrangement, all the rights, titles, interest, properties, assets and liabilities as well as the employees of the said mill unit of M/s. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., became that of the complainant company. He further deposed that the accused ceased to be the employee of complainant company w.e.f. 30.11.1996. He also deposed that the accused was liable to vacate the quarter but he failed to do so even after request made. Despite cross examination of this witness nothing material could be brought on record from the cross examination in order to impeach the creditworthiness or trust worthiness of the witness or the case of the complainant.
4. When entire incriminating evidence was put to the accused, CC No. 464/3 page 4 of 27 klj 5 the accused did not deny his signatures on Ex PW1/5, nor he challenged the document Ex PW1/5 to be forged or fabricated in any manner. The accused admitted that he was appointed by M/s Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., but he claimed that the property was built by him out of his own fund and sources. He claimed that the complainant was neither the owner of the land, nor it is owner of the quarter in question. He also claimed that the streets etc. were maintained by MCD and other people, who had no concern with the complainant company were also residing in the locality.
5. Despite opting to lead defence evidence in his favour, the accused did not lead any defence in his favour.
6. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the complainant company and Ld. Counsel for the accused.
7. It is settled law that the scope of inquiry in a proceedings u/s 630 is extremely restricted in law and the case is to be confined within those narrow ambit's without permitting any delay. The provision contained in Section 630 has been purposely enacted by the legislature with the object of providing a summary procedure for retrieving the property of CC No. 464/3 page 5 of 27 klj 6 the company. It is the duty of the Court to place a broad and liberal construction on the provision in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. In Atul Mathur v. Atul Kalra and another, 1989 (4) SCC 514, it was held that the purpose of enacting Section 630 is to provide speedy relief to a company when its property is wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld by an employee or an exemployee. I n, 1993 CRI. L. J. 2791"K. G. K. Nair v. P. C. Juneja", also it is held that, the provisions of S. 630 are intended to provide speedy and efficacious redress in cases where company's property is wrongfully withheld and that the scope of the enquiry in a proceeding under Section 630 is extremely restricted in law and, consequently, the parties be confined within those narrow ambits without being permitted to dilate or protract the proceeding through extraneous avenues.
In the case of S. K. Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 3294 = 2002 AIR SCW 3827 Union of India v. B.N. Prasad and, in [(1978) 2 SCC 462] the cases pertained to Section 138 of the Railways Act, which is somewhat similar to section 630 of the Companies Act, and CC No. 464/3 page 6 of 27 klj 7 which provides a procedure for summary delivery of property, detained by a railway servant, to the railway administration. It was observed that the said provision is in public interest and must be construed liberally, broadly and meaningfully so as to advance the object sought to be achieved by the Railways Act..............".
8. Perusal of cross examination of the complainant's witness would reveal that the accused admitted that he was working with the complainant company. There is a suggestion made by the accused in the cross examination of PW1 that the accused was still working with the complainant company. The accused also took a stand that he was tenant in the premises, independent to his employment.
9. Although, the accused claimed that he was a tenant of the property, independent to his employment, but no rent agreement or rent receipt or any other documentary proof, to show that the accused was a tenant in the premises, independent to his employment, was putforth by the accused. There is no proof on record to show that the accused paid rent to the company. In the statement of accused, the signatures on allotment letter Ex. PW 1/5 are not CC No. 464/3 page 7 of 27 klj 8 denied by the accused. The accused admits his employment with the company. The accused also admitted that he joined as an employee of M/s. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. Accordingly, this Court has no reason to doubt the genuineness of Ex. PW1/5. It is not even the case of accused that he was paying any rent after termination of his services to the company or that the company refused to accept the same. It also nobody's case that the accused ever deposited the rent with Rent Controller upon refusal of the company to accept the same. Had the accused been a tenant, in the normal course, he would have adopted the procedure of depositing rent before the Rent Controller, in case of refusal by the company to accept the rent. Nondepositing of it, itself is a proof that the defence of tenancy is nothing but sham.
10. When this document was proved by PW as Ex PW1/5, no objection whatsoever was raised as to the mode of proof of this document and, therefore, once it was not objected to at time of its proof, objections as to the mode of proof this document cannot be raised at later stages. Once, no such objection was raised as to the mode of proof of a document at CC No. 464/3 page 8 of 27 klj 9 the time of examination in chief of PW, subsequent objection cannot be raised. This is because had the objections been raised at the time of its exhibition, the complainant would have been within its right to prove this document through other modes. By not raising objection, the complainant was within its right to presume that this document is admitted by the accused. Now, the accused cannot be permitted to go back and say that the document was not exhibited/proved in accordance with Law. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the case of reported as (2003) 8 SCC 752 B, where it was held, as to the stage at which the objection as to admissibility of a document can be raised, as follows, "such objections can be classified as, i. objection that the document sought to be proved is itself inadmissible, and
(ii) Objection directed not against the admissibility of the document but against the mode of proof thereof on the ground of irregularity or insufficiency. Objection under the category (i) can be raised even after the document has been marked as exhibit or even in appeal on revision. But the objection under category (ii) can be raised CC No. 464/3 page 9 of 27 klj 10 when the evidence is tendered but not after the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit. In the present case the ledger of books and photo state copies of the order in question and of the rent agreement were admitted in evidence by the trial court without any objection from the opposite side. Therefore, the objection raised before High Court in second appeal that in the absence of the deceased maker of the entries in the ledger of books and in the absence of production of the originals the said document ought not to have been admitted, fell under the category (ii) and High Court erred in upholding that objection in appeal."
11. Therefore, this court has no reason to doubt the genuineness of Ex PW1/5 and this document reveals that the quarter in question was allotted to the employee purely as a licensee. The terms and conditions mentioned in this document makes it clear that the quarter was allotted as a licensee. Even otherwise, whenever any such quarter is allotted by the company to its employees, it has to be as a licensee only .
12. U/s 630 of the Companies Act, not only a property, which is acquired by an employee lawfully can be recovered, but it would also cover those cases, where the properties of the CC No. 464/3 page 10 of 27 klj 11 companies are acquired by employee unlawfully and then it is retained. Section 630 of the Companies Act includes those situations, where the property of the company is taken possession of by unlawfully. Thus, the arguments of the accused that he constructed the quarter out of his own funds and sources on the land would still to be covered U/s 630 of the Companies Act, since the land belongs to the complainant company, as the said property is covered under the scheme of arrangement Ex PW1/4.
13. The scheme of arrangement passed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court has been proved as Ex .PW1/4, which reveals that the property in question was indeed a part of the property, which stood transferred to the present complainant by the predecessor in interest company. Whether the accused was a party to the said scheme of arrangement or not is immaterial, since it is binding on the accused. Let it be mentioned that till date, none of the employees of this company has challenged the said proceedings of Hon'ble High Court either in Hon'ble High Court itself or in any other Higher Court. As mentioned above, the proceedings u/s.630 of the Companies Act, 1956, are summary proceedings, in which strict rules of CC No. 464/3 page 11 of 27 klj 12 procedure and evidence does not apply and it is not necessary to go into those details. There is no denial of fact that the quarter was allotted by the company. When such quarter is allotted by the company to its employee, it is but natural that it is by virtue of the employment and the employee is bound to vacate the property on being asked to do so by the company. Neither the company is required to wait till the services of the employee are over before asking for vacation of property, nor the employee can claim that unless his services are terminated, he cannot be asked to vacate the property. Merely because accused was maintaining the quarter in question will not make it a lease, independent of his services. Admittedly the concerned mill where the accused was working is closed pursuant to the orders of Hon'ble Supreme Court.
14. The complainant company is registered under the Companies Act. It is so proved by the certificate of incorporation exhibit PW 1/3. Birla Textile Mills was nothing but a unit of M/s Birla Cottons Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd which was taken over by the complainant company pursuant to the scheme of arrangement of Hon'ble Delhi High Court which CC No. 464/3 page 12 of 27 klj 13 is proved as Ex. PW 1/4. There is no denial by the accused that he is still holding the said quarter till date. No evidence has been lead by the accused to show that he is still in services of the company, especially when the complainant claims that the accused was no more in services.
15. As mentioned above the present complainant company acquired all the property rights, interests etc. in the mill unit of the said M/S Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., vide a scheme of arrangement passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and proved as Exhibit PW1/4. Perusal of the said document reveals that on page 5 in the order of petition, it is specifically written as follows.
" a) That all the property, rights, and powers of the said transferor company specified in the first , second and third parts of the Schedule II hereto and all the other property, rights and powers of the said transferor company be transferred without further act or deed to the said transferee company and accordingly the same shall, pursuant to section 394(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, be transferred to and vest in the said transferee company for all the estate and interest of the said transferor company therein but subject CC No. 464/3 page 13 of 27 klj 14 nevertheless to all charges now affecting the same, and
b) That all the liabilities and duties of the said transferor company by transferred without further act or deed to the said transferee company and accordingly the same shall , pursuant to section 394(2) of the Companies Act , 1956, be transferred to and become the liabilities and duties of the said transferee company: and c ) That all proceedings now pending by or against the said transferor company be continued by or against the said transferee company; and
d) All contracts, deeds, bonds, agreements and instruments of whatever kind or nature relating to the said units of Birla Cotton shall continue to be in full force and effect against or in favour of Texmaco as the case may be and enforced as fully and effectively as if Texmaco instead of Birla Cotton had been a party thereto.
Accordingly it is very clear that the complainant company became the owner of all the property, rights and powers in the mill unit of the transferee company without any further act or deed and the same stood transferred and vested with the complainant company for all the estate and interest. By CC No. 464/3 page 14 of 27 klj 15 virtue of the said scheme of arrangement, the complainant company became owner of the property in question and therefore the complainant company has every right to prosecute this complaint.
16. Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly provides that once there is a duly notarized power of attorney, than it shall be presumed to be true, unless the contrary is proved. The expression used is 'shall presume' which shows that the section is mandatory and the Court has to presume that all necessary requirements for the proper execution of the power of attorney were duly fulfilled before the notary public. It is noticed that the power of attorney on record is legally and properly notarized and it fulfills all the ingredients of section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act. The accused has not produced any evidence to disprove the power of attorney of the company. No objection was raised at the time when these documents were being exhibited in evidence as to its mode of proof.
In the case of Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1971 SUPREME COURT 761 before a three judge bench of Hon'ble Supreme court it was argued, that to invoke S. 85 CC No. 464/3 page 15 of 27 klj 16 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that a Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney and to have been executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public was duly executed and authenticated, that authentication of the power of attorney had to be in a particular form, and that it was not sufficient that a witness should have signed the document, be he a Notary Public or any other. It was argued that, it ought to have been signed by the persons named in S. 85 and should have been authenticated properly. It was argued that the authentication should have shown on its face that the Notary Public had satisfied himself that executor was the real person who had signed the power of attorney before him and, the power of attorney was invalid because it did not show on its face that the Notary Public had satisfied himself that it was Mr. X who executed the document. Negating the contention that the Notary Public did not say in his endorsement that Mr. X had been identified to his satisfaction, it was held as follows;
"But that flows from the fact that he endorsed on the document that it had been subscribed and sworn before him. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts and we CC No. 464/3 page 16 of 27 klj 17 are satisfied that he must have satisfied himself in the discharge of his duties that the person who was executing it was the proper person."
In the case of M/s. Northland Traders and others v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1994 Allahabad 381 it is observed as follows:
" 11. ...... it would also be presumed that the person executing the power of attorney on behalf of a corporate body was competent to do so. In the present case Sri M.K. Bose had executed the power of attorney in favour of K.N. Pandey which was duly authenticated by a notary public as mentioned in Section 85. The Court is, therefore, bound to presume that the power of attorney was duly executed and authenticated. This presumption, however, is a rebuttable presumption and it was open to the defendants to challenge the authority of the attorney or to prove that the power of attorney was invalid or that the person acting on the basis of such power of attorney was not duly authorised. No such evidence has come from the side of the defendants. On the contrary PW. 1 K.N. Pandey had deposed that (sic) the Senior Branch Manager and was authorised to sign and verify the plaint and to file the suit. There being no evidence CC No. 464/3 page 17 of 27 klj 18 in rebuttal the court below was, therefore, justified in holding that K.N. Pandey was authorised to sign and verify the plaint."
In the case of Citibank N.A., New Delhi, Plaintiff v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur, Defendant. AIR 1982 DELHI 487 it was held that execution of power of attorney by a Bank's Executive Officer and Cashier delegating certain powers to one employee of that Bank and Document bearing Bank's seal and attested by Notary Public raises a presumption that power of attorney is executed by the Bank. Presumption that the officers executing the document had authority to execute it on behalf of the Bank also arises. Word "person" in Section 85 includes legal person. (Paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 28).
Similarly in the case of Smt. Kulsumunnisa, Appellant v. Smt. Ahmadi Begum and others, Respondents. AIR 1972 ALLAHABAD 219 (V. 59 C 58) (Division Bench): and in the case of Yogesh Singh Sahota, Petitioner v. Niranjan Lal Gupta, Respondent. AIR 1981 DELHI 222. It is held, that a Power of attorney along with verifications are to be presumed to be true u/S.85.
CC No. 464/3
page 18 of 27 klj 19 In the case of Kamla Rani and Ors. v. M/s. Texmaco Ltd.
AIR 2007 DELHI 147, which was a case of this very complainant on the same facts, it was one of the contentions, of the employee, before High Court that the eviction petitions were not filed under a proper authorisation. It was held as follows;
" 33. Authentication by a notary public is a solemn act performed by the notary public whose duty is to ensure that the executant is the person before him and is identified to his satisfaction. Once a document is authenticated by a notary public, it will be presumed that the document was duly executed and was in order. The use of the expression 'shall presume' shows that the section is mandatory and the Court has to presume that all necessary requirements for the proper execution of the power of attorney were duly fulfilled before the notary public. As observed in AIR 1984 (363) (sic) M/s. E. C. and E.Co. Ltd. v. M/s. J. E. Works, if two conditions are satisfied, firstly the power of attorney being executed before a notary public and secondly it being authenticated by a notary public, a presumption would arise under Section 85 about the executant of the power of CC No. 464/3 page 19 of 27 klj 20 attorney.
34. Onus would thus lie on the opposite party to prove to the contrary.
35. It is well settled that authentication would mean more than mere execution. Where proof of authentication surfaces, benefit of Section 85 has to be granted.
36. No negative evidence has been brought on record, none has been shown to me by the petitioners.
37. The purpose of Section 85 of the Evidence Act appears to be that a duly executed and authenticated power of attorney can be proved under Section 85 without undue expenses to be incurred by producing the executant thereof or the original board resolution.
38. The reason is obvious. Banks, insurance companies and multinational companies empower officers to institute and file suits on their behalf. Large number of suits are filed by these organisations. If the original board resolution or the executant of the power of attorney has to submit itself/himself before the Court as a sine qua non to prove the power of attorney, practical difficulties would arise and unnecessary expenses would be incurred by the CC No. 464/3 page 20 of 27 klj 21 organizations to prove the document in the aforenoted manner.
39. I am in full agreement with the view taken by the learned Rent Control Tribunal that the authority of the person who had signed and verified the petition as also instituted the eviction petition stood duly proved by means of production of the authenticated and notarised power of attorney bearing the seal of the notary public.
40. Decision of the Supreme Court reported as AIR 1997 SC 3 Union Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar is additionally relied upon by me. The said decision states that where a suit has been filed on behalf of a corporate body and is duly prosecuted by the person who had filed the suit, a presumption would arise that the person concerned was authorised to do so."
17. Ownership of the property of the company has been challenged by the accused during crossexamination of prosecution witnesses. Section 116 of the Evidence Act provides, No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such CC No. 464/3 page 21 of 27 klj 22 tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given."
In the case of Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, (AIR 1915 Privy Council at p. 98), the Privy Council observed as follows:
"A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord." (Emphasis supplied).
In the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 3569 = 2006 AIR SCW 1073 it is observed that a person, who comes upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall not be permitted to deny that such person had title to such possession at the time when such license was given. An equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section. It is CC No. 464/3 page 22 of 27 klj 23 based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant's entry into possession on the admission of the landlord's title that the principle of estoppel is attracted. To the same effect is judgment in Sheikh Noor and another v. Sheikh G. S. Ibrahim (dead) by LRs AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 4163= 2003 AIR SCW 3784. In Krishna Prasad Lal v. Barabani Coal Concern Ltd.
(AIR 1937 P.C. 251), "It (Sec. 116) deals with one cardinal and simple estoppel and states it first as applicable between landlord and tenant and then as between licensor and licensee, a distinction which corresponds to that between the parties to an action for rent and the parties to an action for use and occupation".
In the case of S. K. Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma (supra) the case pertained to Section 138 of the CC No. 464/3 page 23 of 27 klj 24 Railways Act which is somewhat similar to section 630 of the Companies Act and which provides a procedure for summary delivery of property, detained by a railway servant, to the railway administration,. It was observed as follows:
"13. Further, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the railway administration has to prove that the property in question was belonging to it before invoking Section 138 is totally misconceived because once it is admitted that respondent was given possession of the premises in question by order dated 1711967 as he was entitled for the same while working as CPRO of the Department, he could not be permitted to deny the title of the railway administration. Admittedly, respondent was inducted because he was in railway service. Now, he is estopped from challenging the title of the appellant over the premises in question. For this purpose, we would refer to Section 116 of the Evidence Act....."
"14. Second part of the aforesaid section clearly provides that no person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny the title to such person to such possession CC No. 464/3 page 24 of 27 klj 25 of the property. He cannot deny the same during the pendency of such license or sublease. Such estoppel continues to operate so long as licensee or subtenant has not openly restored possession by surrender to such person. This rule of estoppel would cease to operate only after such licensee or subtenant has been evicted......"
It was also held that "16. In this view of the matter, respondent cannot be permitted to contend that property was not belonging to the railway administration. Whether the railway administration is owner, mortgagee, lessee or licensee is not required to be decided in such proceedings at the instances of sublessee or licensee of railway administration."
18. In the case of Kamla Rani and Ors. v. M/s. Texmaco Ltd. (Supra), which was a case of this very complainant on the same facts, the contention raised that the complainant is not the owner, and all other contentions raised before this court, were also answered in favour of the complainant, and for the sake of brevity it would be relevant to quote the observations which are as follows:
25. Ownership is not relevant for the reason a person may be a landlord without being an owner.
CC No. 464/3
page 25 of 27 klj 26
26. A company may take premises on a 30 year lease from the owner with a permission to induct its employee as a tenant/sub tenant. Such an employee to whom the said permission is allotted would be a tenant under his company and the allotment would be pursuant to his employment. Such an allottee cannot resist the eviction, if otherwise grounds are made out.
27. Even otherwise, under the directions of the Supreme Court, 68% land had to be handed over to DDA for being maintained as open area. DDA has not become the owner of the said land. Ownership would vest in DDA when possession is handed over.
28. It would be the obligation of the company to evict its tenants including heirs of the tenants and hand over possession to DDA.
29. But, I rest my decision on firmer grounds. A tenant who accepts a person as his landlord is estopped from questioning the title of his landlord.
30. The petitioners are therefore estopped from questioning the title of M/s. Texmaco Ltd. for the reason either they or their predecessorininterest were inducted as a tenant by the predecessorininterest of M/s. Texmaco Ltd."
19. Accordingly the complainant has succeeded in proving its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the accused is CC No. 464/3 page 26 of 27 klj 27 found guilty and thus convicted for the offence u/s 630 of The Companies Act 1956.
ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 05th August, 2010 (DIGVINAY SINGH) ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE SPECIAL ACTS, CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS DELHI CC No. 464/3 page 27 of 27 klj